a. Extrajudicial Killings

There were numerous reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings during the year.

There were multiple reports that in some prison colonies and other places of detention, authorities systematically tortured inmates, including cases resulting in death or suicide.

Chechen native Askhab Uspanov died in police custody after being arrested on March 22, following a terrorist attack that killed 145 persons at Crocus City Hall, an entertainment venue located in Krasnogorsk, near Moscow. While Russian authorities alleged Uspanov died by suicide, Chechen opposition groups maintained he was beaten to death and posted an autopsy video purportedly showing he had a fractured skull, broken ribcage, and broken spine.

There were reports the government or its proxies committed or attempted to commit unlawful killings of its opponents in other countries, including numerous such cases in Ukraine.

b. Coercion in Population Control

There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities during the year.

c. War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, and Evidence of Acts that May Constitute Genocide, or Conflict-Related Abuses

The Russia-Ukraine war continued. There were credible reports some Russian forces committed war crimes and some of its forces and officials committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine. Reporting indicated that Russian personnel committed execution-style killings of Ukrainian men, women, and children; torture of civilians in detention through beatings, electrocution, and mock executions; conflict-related sexual violence, including rape; and, alongside other Russian officials, deportation of thousands of Ukrainian civilians to Russia, including children forcibly separated from their families. There were numerous credible reports the war also caused thousands of civilian deaths, widespread displacement, and disruption to education, health, and energy services.

Significant human rights issues in the occupied areas included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings; disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by Russia’s forces or Russia-led proxies; serious abuses in a conflict; serious restrictions on freedom of speech and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjust arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; restrictions of religious freedom; trafficking in persons, including forced labor; and prohibiting independent trade unions or significant or systematic restrictions on workers’ freedom of association. (For further information regarding Russia’s human rights abuses and violations in the context of its war against and occupation of portions of Ukraine, see Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Ukraine).

The continuing Russia-Ukraine war resulted in thousands of civilian deaths in Ukraine, mostly from artillery and aerial bombardment.

In 2022, the Secretary of State determined that Russia had committed war crimes including through the deliberate targeting of civilians, including children. In 2024, the United States sanctioned numerous Russian officials for gross violations of human rights or serious human rights abuses related to its war in Ukraine. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine and human rights organizations reported dozens of cases of torture and extrajudicial executions of Ukrainian civilians by the Russian military, allegedly for suspected collaboration with the Ukrainian military. Media reported Russian soldiers executed seven Ukrainian prisoners of war in February near Bakhmut, Ukraine. In May, human rights organizations reported Russian forces also executed surrendering Ukrainian soldiers.

Russian forces engaged in forced deportation of civilians from Ukraine to Russia, often following a harsh and abusive filtration process, and there were credible reports of forced deportations and adoptions of children from Ukraine. Ukrainian authorities stated more than 19,000 children had been taken to date. During the year, the United States government sanctioned Russian officials for their involvement in the forced transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children.

President Vladimir Putin and Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova had active arrest warrants for their alleged responsibility for unlawfully deporting and transferring children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. According to a UN report, Russian forces and occupation authorities forcibly relocated these children using four methods: separating children from their parents during filtration operations; taking custody of children whose parents were killed or who lost contact with their parents during hostilities; pressuring or coercing parents to send their children to so-called summer camps in Russia, Belarus, or Crimea under the guise of “humanitarian relief” and then refusing to return them; and seizing custody of and relocating institutionalized children.

On January 4, President Putin signed a decree making it easier for Russian citizens to adopt and give citizenship to children from Ukraine who allegedly did not have parental care. Media reported the rules made it harder for Ukrainian relatives and the government of Ukraine to regain custody of these children. A February study by the Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab assessed the Russian federal government systematically relocated at least 6,000 children to a network of re-education and adoption facilities in Russia-occupied Crimea and Russia. In a December report, Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab identified 314 children who had been forcibly or illegally adopted since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, including 148 children listed in Russia’s child placement databases and 166 children placed directly with citizens of Russia.

Russian forces in Ukraine carried out acts of physical abuse, punishment, and torture. For example, according to a March report by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, Russian forces tortured Ukrainian prisoners of war, including through repeated beatings, electric shocks, threats of execution, prolonged stress positions, and mock execution. More than half of the recently released prisoners interviewed for the report said they had been subjected to sexual violence.

Russian forces in Ukraine reportedly attacked critical civilian infrastructure, including energy infrastructure, in repeated strikes across the country. Humanitarian access to vulnerable populations in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine was severely restricted or impossible.

Russia’s armed forces continued to conduct military operations, including airstrikes, in the conflict in Syria. According to human rights organizations, Russian personnel took actions, such as bombing urban areas, that intentionally targeted civilian infrastructure, civilians, and humanitarian workers (see Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Syria).

Russia continued to provide the Central African Republic Army unarmed military advisors under the auspices of parameters established by the UN Security Council sanctions regime. There were reports that Russian paramilitary forces and Russian advisors in the country committed human rights abuses against civilians. For instance, media reported Russian paramilitary groups beat and raped women and children. Media also reported forces linked to Russian mercenaries kidnapped children as young as 11 and forced them to work in gold and diamond mines. Following his reporting on these abuses, Daily Beast correspondent Philip Obaji Jr. stated he was abducted and beaten by soldiers working with Russian paramilitary groups (see Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for the Central African Republic).

a. Freedom of the Press

While the constitution provided for freedom of speech, including for the press and other media, the government increasingly restricted this right. Federal, regional, and local authorities used procedural violations and restrictive or vague legislation to detain, harass, or prosecute persons who criticized the government or institutions it favored. The government exercised editorial control over media, creating a media landscape in which most citizens were exposed to predominantly government-approved narratives. Significant government pressure on independent media severely constrained coverage of numerous topics, especially Russia’s war against Ukraine; political prisoners; problems involving the environment, elections, and corruption; and criticism of local or federal leadership, as well as secessionism or federalism. The government used direct ownership or ownership by large private companies with government links to control or influence major national media and regional media outlets, especially television. Censorship and self-censorship in television and print media and on the internet were widespread, particularly regarding points of view critical of the government or its policies.

The government enacted further restrictions on freedom of expression to stifle criticism of the Russia-Ukraine war, human rights organizations reported. Authorities misused the country’s expansive definition of extremism, under which citizens could be punished for certain types of peaceful protests, affiliation with certain religious denominations, and certain social media posts, as a tool to stifle dissent. The law prohibited the dissemination of false “socially significant information” online, in mass media, or during protests or public events, as well as the dissemination of “incorrect socially meaningful information, distributed under the guise of correct information, which creates the threat of damage to the lives and health of citizens or property, the threat of mass disruption of public order and public security, or the threat of the creation of an impediment to the functioning of life support facilities, transport infrastructure, banking, energy, industry, or communications.”

Human rights groups reported the Moscow police force in February deployed officers at two monuments to the Victims of Political Repression (the Solovetsky Stone on Lubyanka Square and the Wall of Grief) following Navalny’s death to “identify” anyone bringing flowers to the monuments and prevent them from commemorating Navalny’s death. The Russian internet digital map service 2GIS similarly did not allow users to leave reviews at these memorials.

On March 11, the president signed a law banning advertisers from working with “foreign agents,” which civil society groups stated jeopardized funding sources for independent media, including antiwar bloggers.

The law criminalized “offending the religious feelings of believers.” Conviction of actions in public “demonstrating clear disrespect for society and committed with the intent to insult the religious feelings of believers” resulted in fines, compulsory labor for up to one year, or imprisonment for up to one year. If these acts were committed in places of worship, the punishment was a fine, compulsory labor for up to three years, or a prison sentence of up to three years.

The law prohibited showing “disrespect” online for the state, authorities, the public, flag, or constitution.

The government continued to enact restrictions on the content that could be shared on the internet. The law authorized Roskomnadzor, the country’s media oversight agency, to block websites that “violate the rights of [Russian citizens],” including by restricting the “dissemination of socially significant information.” Experts characterized the law as restricting “Russophobic” content and targeted specifically at YouTube. The Federal Security Service (FSB) utilized a list of topics that could be “used against the security” of Russia, including information and assessments of the country’s military, security sector, and space agency, Roscosmos. Individuals who collected information in the specified categories could be subject to designation as “foreign agents.”

During the year, authorities invoked laws prohibiting “inciting minors to participate in dangerous activities” or “violations to the established procedure for organizing or holding a public event” to charge persons who published material online related to demonstrations.

During the year, authorities invoked a law prohibiting the distribution of “propaganda on nontraditional sexual relations” to children. The law banned the display of Nazi symbols and the symbols of groups placed on the government’s list of “extremist” organizations. There was no official register or list of banned symbols, although the law prohibited displaying images of persons found guilty of committing crimes in accordance with the verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal. During the year, authorities also enforced a law prohibiting the “propaganda of narcotics.”

There were reports the government sanctioned academic personnel for their teachings, writing, research, or political views.

Physical Attacks, Imprisonment, and Pressure

Journalists were subjected to arrest, imprisonment, physical attack, harassment, and intimidation for their reporting. Journalists and bloggers who uncovered government malfeasance or criticized the government often faced harassment, either in the form of direct threats to their physical safety or threats to their livelihood, frequently through legal prosecution. There were reports of government officials and police attacking journalists, police detaining journalists to interfere with or punish them for their reporting, police framing journalists for serious crimes to interfere with or punish them for their reporting, and police raids on the offices of independent media outlets that observers believed were designed to punish or pressure the outlets.

For example, on March 17, authorities arrested journalist and photographer for the internet news site SotaVision Antonina Favorskaya following her coverage of Aleksey Navalny’s trial, incarceration, and funeral. Authorities charged her and fellow journalists Konstantin Gabov, Sergey Karelin, and Artyom Kriger with “participation in an extremist association,” accusing them of participation in Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation. Foreign journalists working in the country also faced intimidation and harassment tactics from authorities, including verbal threats, revocation of visas, withdrawal of accreditation, and arrest on spurious charges.

There was no progress during the year in establishing accountability in several high-profile killings of journalists, including the 2004 killing of Paul Klebnikov, the 2006 killing of Anna Politkovskaya, and the 2009 killing of Natalia Estemirova.

Censorship by Governments, Military, Intelligence, or Police Forces, Criminal Groups, or Armed Extremist or Rebel Groups

The government directly and indirectly censored media, much of which occurred online.

There were reports the government retaliated against those who produced or published information deemed unfavorable to the government, especially regarding its war against Ukraine. In March, a court sentenced journalist Roman Ivanov to seven years in prison for distributing false information regarding the military for his coverage of the Russia-Ukraine war.

Virtually all independent or opposition-leaning media outlets were blocked within the country or shut down, along with many independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The Kremlin intensified efforts to block access to information that contradicted official narratives.

In February, Moscow authorities confiscated copies of the newspaper Sobesednik that featured an image of Aleksey Navalny on the front page, although journalists from the publication asserted publishing the photograph did not break any laws.

The vast majority of the country’s mass media was funded by the government or by progovernment actors. Government-friendly oligarchs owned most other outlets, which were permitted to determine what they published within formal or informal boundaries set by the government. In the regions, each governor controlled regional media through direct or indirect funding or through affiliated structures. The federal government or progovernment actors completely or partially owned all so-called federal television channels, the only stations with nationwide reach. Government-owned media outlets often received preferential benefits, such as rent-free occupancy of government-owned buildings, and a preferential tax rate.

On a regional level, state-owned and progovernment television channels received subsidies from the Ministry of Finance for broadcasting in cities with a population of less than 100,000 and for the creation and production of content. At many government-owned or -controlled outlets, the state increasingly dictated editorial policy. While the law restricted foreign ownership of media outlets to no more than 20 percent, another provision of the ambiguously worded law apparently banned foreign ownership entirely. The government used these provisions to consolidate ownership of independent outlets under progovernment oligarchs and to exert pressure on outlets that retained foreign backers.

The law required the Ministry of Justice to maintain a list of media outlets designated as “foreign agents.” The decision to designate media outlets or individual journalists as foreign agents could be made outside of court by other government bodies, including security agencies. The law allowed authorities to label individuals (both Russian and foreign citizens) as “foreign agents” if they disseminated foreign media to an unspecified number of persons, received funding from abroad, or “carry out the interests of a foreign state.” The law specified that a foreign journalist “performing the functions of a foreign agent, incompatible with his professional activities as a journalist,” could be declared an individual foreign agent.

Human rights defenders expressed concern the “foreign agent” law was being used to restrict further the activities of or selectively punish journalists, bloggers, and social media users. Those labeled a “foreign agent” were required to register with the Ministry of Justice, and those living abroad also had to create and register a domestic legal entity to publish materials inside the country. All information published by the “foreign agent” individual was required to be marked as having been produced by a “foreign agent.” Failure to comply with the law could result in heavy fines. As of August, 292 of the 810 organizations listed as “foreign agents” or “undesirable organizations” were members of media, according to Reporters Without Borders.

The law allowed authorities to close any organization a court determined to be extremist, including media outlets and websites. Roskomnadzor routinely issued warnings to newspapers and internet outlets it suspected of publishing extremist materials. Three warnings in one year sufficed to initiate a closure lawsuit. The law required Roskomnadzor to block, without a court decision, websites deemed to justify extremism or terrorism, if the prosecutor general or his deputy submitted a request.

Nonstate entities sought to inhibit members of the press who published material unfavorable to their organizations. For example, journalist Aleksander Skvortsov from the local Telegram channel Izhevsk Boom stated that on January 28, he was kidnapped by three unknown men associated with drone manufacturer Lancet, who bound his hands, taped his mouth, and beat him in a basement following Skvortsov’s critical piece on the company.

The government restricted and disrupted access to the internet and censored online content and monitored all internet communications. As of October, media reported at least 4,458 websites, including 3,617 news websites, had been blocked in the country since February 2022 for reasons relating to Ukraine. On June 25, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the websites of 81 media outlets from 25 European countries would be blocked in retaliation for a decision by the European Council on May 17 blocking access within the EU to four websites accused of spreading Russian prowar propaganda. In August, the Kremlin blocked access to the Signal messaging app for alleged ties to terrorist and so-called extremist groups.

Telecommunications companies were required to temporarily retain user data and make it available to security agencies. Observers believed the country’s security services were able to intercept and decode encrypted messages on at least some messaging platforms. The law also required telecommunications companies to provide authorities with “backdoors” around encryption technologies; companies faced fines for noncompliance.

The law required foreign tech companies with a daily audience larger than 500,000 users in the country to open official representative offices in the country. Local representation afforded authorities leverage to enforce fines and regulations, including content restrictions, through pressure on domestically located employees. If tech companies did not comply, Roskomnadzor was authorized to block their access to Russian users’ personal data.

The government blocked access to content and otherwise censored the internet. Roskomnadzor maintained a federal blacklist of internet sites and required internet service providers (ISPs) to block access to web pages the agency deemed offensive or illegal, including information that was already prohibited, such as items on the Federal List of Extremist Materials. The law gave the prosecutor general and Roskomnadzor authority to demand ISPs block websites that promoted so-called extremist information and “mass public events that are conducted in violation of appropriate procedures.” The law required social media companies to independently block and remove “obscene language” and other prohibited content.

There was a growing trend of authorities seeking to pressure social media platforms to censor posts and remove content deemed objectionable. This was especially the case with posts and content related to the Russia-Ukraine war. According to the internet freedom NGO Roskomsvoboda, more than 15,000 websites had been blocked for allegedly distributing materials “discrediting the Russian armed forces.” Roskomsvoboda reported government agencies permanently blocked more than 1.82 million websites, based on statistics from the Prosecutor General’s Office.

The law required owners of internet search engines (news aggregators) with more than one million daily users to be accountable for the accuracy of “publicly important” information before its dissemination. Authorities could demand content deemed in violation be removed and imposed increasingly heavy fines for noncompliance.

A law on the “right to be forgotten” allowed individuals in the country to request search engine companies block search results that contained information regarding them. The law failed to limit the “right to be forgotten” when the information requested for removal was in the public interest or concerned public figures, thereby impeding freedom of expression.

There was a growing trend of social media users being prosecuted for the political, religious, or other ideological content of posts, shares, and “likes,” especially content related to Ukraine, which resulted in fines or prison sentences if convicted.

b. Worker Rights

Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining

The law provided for workers to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination, but it did not require employers to reinstate workers fired due to their union activity. The law prohibited reprisals against striking workers. Unions were required to register with the Federal Registration Service, often a cumbersome process that included lengthy delays and convoluted bureaucracy. The grounds on which trade union registration could be denied were not defined and could be arbitrary or unjustified. The law required labor unions to be independent of government bodies, employers, political parties, and NGOs. Authorities used “foreign agent” designations to impede the activity of independent trade unions.

The law placed several restrictions on the right to bargain collectively. For example, only one collective bargaining agreement was permitted per enterprise, and only a union or group of unions representing at least one-half the workforce could bargain collectively. The law allowed workers to elect representatives if there was no union, but the law did not specify who had authority to bargain collectively when there was no trade union in an enterprise. The government had absolute discretion in determining whether a union had standing to bargain.

Public-sector workers were provided fewer freedom of association rights. Active-duty members of the military, civil servants, customs workers, judges, prosecutors, and persons working under civil contracts were excluded from the right to organize.

The right to strike was enshrined in the constitution, but the law restricted this right. Advanced notification requirements, excessive formalities, and legal requirements made it difficult to initiate a strike but easy for authorities to rule a strike illegal and punish workers. It was also very difficult for those without a labor contract to go on a legal strike. The law prohibited nonessential public servants and workers from a broad range of industries defined as essential from striking. The definition of essential services was beyond what the International Labor Organization generally considered essential. The law imposed compulsory arbitration for railroad, postal, and municipal workers, as well as public servants in roles other than law enforcement.

Union members had to follow extensive legal requirements and engage in consultations with employers before striking. Solidarity strikes and strikes on matters related to state policies were illegal, as were strikes that did not respect onerous time limits, procedures, and requirements mandated by law. Employers could hire workers to replace strikers. Workers had to give prior notice of the following aspects of a proposed strike: a list of the differences of opinion between employer and workers that triggered the strike; the date and time at which the strike was intended to start, its duration, and the number of anticipated participants; the name of the body that was leading the strike and the representatives authorized to participate in conciliation procedures; and proposals for the minimum service to be provided during the strike. In the event a declared strike was ruled illegal but still took place, courts could confiscate union property to cover employers’ losses.

The Federal Labor and Employment Service (RosTrud) regulated employer compliance with labor law and was responsible for “controlling and supervising compliance with labor laws and other legal acts which deal with labor norms” by employers. Several state agencies, including the Ministry of Justice, Prosecutor’s Office, RosTrud, and Ministry of Internal Affairs, were responsible for enforcing the law. These agencies, however, frequently failed to enforce laws protecting freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike for workers. Violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining provisions were common. Penalties for violations were less than those under other similar laws related to civil rights. Penalties were rarely applied against violators.

Employers frequently engaged in reprisals against workers for independent union activity, including threatening to assign them to night shifts, denying benefits, and blacklisting or firing them. Although unions were occasionally successful in court, in most cases managers who engaged in antiunion activities did not face penalties.

The government used laws on “foreign agents,” “discrediting the army,” and other provisions to pressure trade unionists. In March, the prosecutor general declared IndustriALL Global Union, a trade union representing mining, energy, and manufacturing workers that advocated for better working conditions and union rights, as “undesirable.”

Forced or Compulsory Labor

See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.

Acceptable Work Conditions

Wage and Hour Laws

The law provided for a minimum wage for all sectors, which was above the poverty income level. Some local governments had minimum wage rates higher than the national rate. The law provided for standard work hours, overtime, and annual leave.

The standard work week could not exceed 40 hours. Employers could not request overtime work of pregnant women, workers younger than 18, and other categories of employees specified by federal law. The law stipulated payment for overtime had to be at least 150 percent of the base wage for the first two hours and not less than 200 percent of the base wage thereafter; employees could request additional holiday leave in lieu of overtime. Overtime work could not exceed four hours in a two-day period or 120 hours in a year for each employee.

Nonpayment of wages was a criminal offense punishable by fines, compulsory labor, or imprisonment, but nonpayment or late payment of wages remained widespread across all sectors. Migrant workers often fell victim to nonpayment.

Occupational Safety and Health

Occupational safety and health (OSH) standards were appropriate within the main industries. The law defined safe working conditions ambiguously, establishing minimum conditions for workplace safety and worker health, but it did not explicitly allow workers to remove themselves from hazardous workplaces without threat to their employment. The law entitled foreigners working in the country to the same rights and protections as citizens.

Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement

RosTrud was responsible for enforcing minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws and made efforts to effectively enforce those laws, although the number of labor inspectors was insufficient to enforce the law in all sectors. Serious breaches of OSH provisions and nonpayment of wages were criminal offenses. Penalties for wage, hour, and OSH violations were commensurate with those for similar crimes. Penalties were rarely applied against violators.

Inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions, although there were significant restrictions on inspectors’ authority to inspect workplaces. Experts pointed to prevention of these offenses, rather than adequacy of available punishment, as the main challenge to protection of worker rights. RosTrud noted state labor inspectors needed additional professional training and that the agency needed additional inspectors to enforce consistent compliance. Although the labor inspectorate frequently referred cases for potential criminal prosecution, few of these cases were instituted by the Prosecutor’s Office. In addition, courts routinely canceled decisions and penalties imposed by labor inspectors.

Rosstat estimated 20.3 percent of the workforce, or approximately 15 million persons, were informally employed in 2021. Labor law and protections applied to workers in the informal sector but were rarely enforced.

c. Disappearance and Abduction

Disappearance

There were reports of enforced disappearances perpetrated by or on behalf of government authorities. Enforced disappearances for both political and financial reasons continued in the North Caucasus. According to a July report of the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, there were 2,149 outstanding cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances in the country.

There were reports police committed enforced disappearances and abductions. For example, NGOs documented cases in which authorities forcibly disappeared activists and journalists.

There were reports of abductions and torture in the North Caucasus, including of political activists and those critical of the head of the Republic of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov.

In May, Chechen Liya Zaurbekova, age 19, livestreamed her attempted abduction, with conditions similar to those of Seda Suleimanova in 2022 and Selima Ismailova in 2023. There were widespread reports the country’s armed forces, Russia-led forces, and Russian occupation authorities in Ukraine engaged in numerous enforced disappearances (see Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Ukraine).

Prolonged Detention without Charges

While the law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention, authorities engaged in these practices with impunity. Observers noted lengthy pretrial detention was a problem, but data on its extent were not available. By law, pretrial detention could not normally exceed two months, but the court had the power to extend it to six months, as well as to 12 or 18 months if the crime of which the defendant was accused was especially serious. Detained opposition figures, journalists, and civil society activists often faced long periods of pretrial detention. By law, a detainee could challenge the lawfulness of detention before a court. Due to problems with judicial independence, however, judges typically agreed with the investigator and dismissed defendants’ complaints.

By law authorities could arrest and hold a suspect for up to 48 hours without court approval, provided there was evidence of a crime or a witness; otherwise, an arrest warrant was required. The law required judicial approval of arrest warrants, searches, seizures, and detentions. Officials generally honored this requirement, although bribery or political pressure sometimes subverted the process of obtaining judicial warrants.

After an arrest, police typically took detainees to the nearest police station, where they informed them of their rights. Police were required to prepare a protocol stating the grounds for the arrest, and both the detainee and police officer had to sign it within three hours of detention. Police had to interrogate detainees within the first 24 hours of detention. Prior to interrogation, a detainee had the right to meet with an attorney for two hours. No later than 12 hours after detention, police were required to notify the prosecutor. They were also required to give the detainee an opportunity to notify their relatives by telephone unless a prosecutor issued a warrant to keep the detention secret. Police were required to release a detainee after 48 hours, subject to bail conditions, unless a court decided, at a hearing, to prolong custody in response to a motion filed by police not less than eight hours before the 48-hour detention period expired. The defendant and their attorney were required to be present at the court hearing, either in person or through a video link. The law prohibited lawyers from bringing “communications technologies on the grounds of a correctional institution,” effectively barring lawyers from taking cell phones or other recording devices into detention facilities when meeting with their clients.

Except in the North Caucasus, authorities generally respected the legal limitations on detention. There were reports of occasional noncompliance with the 48-hour limit for holding a detainee. At times authorities failed to issue an official detention protocol within the required three hours after detention and held suspects longer than the legal detention limits. By law, police were required to complete their investigation and transfer a case to a prosecutor for arraignment within two months of a suspect’s arrest, although an investigative authority could extend a criminal investigation for up to 12 months. Extensions beyond 12 months needed the approval of the head federal investigative authority in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, or the Investigative Committee and the approval of the court. According to defense lawyers, the two-month time limit often was exceeded, especially in cases with a high degree of public interest. Detainees had trouble obtaining adequate defense counsel. While the law provided defendants the right to choose their own lawyers, investigators sometimes did not respect this provision, instead designating lawyers friendly to the prosecution. These “pocket” defense attorneys agreed to the interrogation of their clients in their presence while making no effort to defend their clients’ legal rights.

In many cases, especially in more remote regions, defense counsel was not available for indigent defendants. Judges usually did not suppress confessions taken without a lawyer present. Judges at times freed suspects held in excess of detention limits, although they usually granted prosecutors’ motions to extend detention periods. There were reports security services sometimes held detainees in incommunicado detention before officially registering the detention. This practice usually coincided with allegations of the use of torture to coerce confessions before detainees were permitted access to a lawyer. The problem was especially acute in the Republic of Chechnya, where incommunicado detention could reportedly last for weeks in some cases.

There were reports authorities’ use of facial recognition technology to identify and detain demonstrators resulted in cases of wrongful arrest. There were also reports authorities targeted lawyers representing political prisoners. For example, members of Aleksey Navalny’s legal team, including Vadim Kobzev, Igor Sergunin, and Aleksey Lipster, were tried for “extremism.”

There were numerous reports of arbitrary arrest or detention, often in connection with demonstrations or single-person pickets, such as those organized against the Russia-Ukraine war. Numerous other examples of arbitrary arrests were reported, including for wearing blue and yellow colors or holding blank posters or signs that simply read “Peace.”

There were reports Russian forces, Russia-led forces, and Russian occupation authorities in Ukraine engaged in widespread arbitrary detention (see Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Ukraine).

d. Violations in Religious Freedom

See the Department of State’s annual International Religious Freedom Report at https://www.state.gov/international-religious-freedom-reports/.

e. Trafficking in Persons

See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.

a. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Although the constitution prohibited such practices, numerous credible reports indicated security personnel engaged in torture, abuse, and violence to coerce confessions from suspects, and authorities only occasionally held officials accountable for such actions.

Reporting indicated members of security forces committed torture of civilians in detention through beatings, electrocution, and mock executions, as well as conflict-related sexual violence, including rape.

On February 16, prominent opposition politician and anti-corruption campaigner Aleksey Navalny died in remote penal colony IK-3 while serving a 28-year sentence, itself the result of dubious charges and legal processes widely documented as being unfair, during which prison officials repeatedly denied him medical treatment. According to NGOs and media reporting, IK-3 had a history of inhuman treatment, denial of medical care, and torture. Six months after his death, Russia’s Investigative Committee issued a three-page determination that Navalny died of a “combination of diseases” and that, as a result, there were no grounds for a criminal investigation. The investigation was subsequently reopened and remained pending at year’s end. His wife, Yuliya Navalnaya, and several civil society organizations considered the committee’s conclusions and explanations as “preposterous” and “unconvincing.” Civil society organizations reported evidence prison authorities were culpable in his death.

In March, Human Rights Watch and media reported security services tortured four of the Tajik suspects charged with perpetrating a terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall that killed 145 persons. The reports documented torture using electricity on genitalia, asphyxiation, dislodging an eye, and cutting off a prisoner’s ear and feeding it to him. High-level government officials had publicly called for violence against the suspects, and Dmitry Peskov, President Putin’s spokesperson, refused to address the torture allegations.

Physical abuse of suspects by police officers reportedly was systemic and usually occurred within the first few days of arrest in pretrial detention facilities. Reports from human rights groups and former police officers indicated police most often used electric shocks, suffocation, and stretching or applying pressure to joints and ligaments because those methods were considered less likely to leave visible marks. The problem was especially acute in the North Caucasus, where there were widespread reports police and security forces tortured or abused alleged militants and civilians in detention facilities. There were reports police beat or otherwise abused persons, in some cases resulting in their death.

According to human rights groups, police and security forces used excessive force and harsh tactics when detaining antiwar and antimobilization protesters.

There were reports security officers used torture, including sleep deprivation, as a form of punishment against detained opposition and human rights activists, journalists, and critics of government policies.

NGOs reported an increase in the abuse of psychiatry by authorities in the country as of March, including a minimum of 35 persons undergoing involuntary “treatment.” Authorities detained defendants for psychiatric evaluations to exert pressure on them or sent defendants to psychiatric treatment as punishment. Prosecutors and certified medical professionals requested that suspects be placed in psychiatric clinics on an involuntary basis.

Reports of nonlethal physical abuse and hazing continued in the armed forces. Activists reported such hazing was often tied to extortion schemes. There were reports Russian forces, Russia-led forces, Russian proxies, and Russian occupation authorities in Ukraine engaged in torture, rape, and sexual abuse (see Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Ukraine).

Impunity was a significant problem in the security forces. In most cases in which security officers or other government officials were publicly implicated in human rights abuses, authorities denied internal and external requests for independent investigation and engaged in disinformation campaigns or other efforts to obfuscate such allegations. The few cases that were brought to trial resulted in sentencing inconsistent with the severity of the charged crime. In April, a court of appeals canceled the 2023 conviction of five police officers in Tatarstan for torturing a prisoner who later committed suicide. The government’s propensity to ignore serious human rights allegations along with the uneven application of the rule of law and a lack of judicial transparency resulted in impunity for most perpetrators.

In January, the European Court of Human Rights awarded compensation to several alleged victims of torture by security forces, including Ukrainian citizen Mykola Karpyuk and Russian citizens Evgeny Bunin and Yuri Vakulenko. A human rights organization asserted authorities did not conduct an effective investigation into these cases, nor did they punish the perpetrators.

b. Protection of Children

Child Labor

The law prohibited all the worst forms of child labor, explicitly prohibiting work in unhealthy or dangerous conditions, underground work, or jobs that could endanger a child’s health and moral development. The law prohibited the employment of children younger than 16 in most cases and regulated the working conditions of children younger than 18. The law permitted children at age 14 to work under certain conditions and with the approval of a parent or guardian. Such work could not threaten the child’s health or welfare. RosTrud was responsible for inspecting enterprises and organizations to identify violations of labor and occupational health standards for children. The government selectively enforced the law and sometimes applied penalties against violators. Penalties for violations were not commensurate with those for other serious crimes.

There were no available nationally representative data on the prevalence of child labor in the country. The Russia-Ukraine war led to increased demand for workers. As a result, the government lifted restrictions and introduced incentives for employment, targeting citizens ages 14 to 24.

Children traditionally worked in the informal and retail sectors, although recent regional governmental programs such as one in Tatarstan aimed to facilitate child employment in business that supported the defense industry. Some children, both Russian and foreign, were subjected to commercial sexual exploitation, forced participation in the production of pornography, and forced begging.

Researchers alleged JSC Alabuga in the Tatarstan special economic zone recruited and employed children to meet production targets for the Shahed 136 drones. Based on interviews with parents and students, children as young as 15 were forced to work exceedingly long hours, often without proper breaks or meals, under hostile conditions.

Child Soldiers

The Secretary of State determined Russia had governmental armed forces, police, or other security forces and government-supported armed groups that recruited or used child soldiers during the period of April 2023 to March 2024. See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.

Child Marriage

The minimum legal age for marriage was 18. Local authorities could authorize marriage from age 16 under certain circumstances. More than a dozen regions allowed marriage from age 14 under special circumstances, such as pregnancy or the birth of a child. Authorities did not enforce the law consistently across different regions.

c. Protection to Refugees

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported it had a working relationship with the government on asylum, refugee, and stateless-persons problems; however, despite its frequent requests, access was “rare, sporadic, and not unfettered.” Human rights defenders reported the government failed to provide protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, or other persons of concern.

Provision of First Asylum

The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government had a system for providing protection to refugees. NGOs reported applicants commonly paid informal “facilitation fees” of an estimated 33,000 rubles ($300) to General Administration for Migration Issues adjudicators to have their application reviewed. Applicants who did not speak Russian often had to pay for a private interpreter. Human rights organizations noted nearly all newly arrived asylum seekers in large cities, particularly Moscow and St. Petersburg, were forced to apply in other regions, allegedly due to full quotas. NGOs also noted difficulty in applying for asylum due to long queues and lack of clear application procedures. The General Administration for Migration Issues approved only a small percentage of applications for refugee status and temporary asylum, with the exception of applications from Ukrainians, which had a much higher chance of approval.

Human rights organizations noted the government’s issuance of refugee and temporary asylum status decreased during the previous few years, pointing to the government’s systematic and arbitrary refusal to grant asylum. NGOs reported authorities encouraged applicants to return to their countries of origin.

Authorities reportedly also had blanket authority to grant temporary asylum to Syrians, but local migration experts noted a decrease in the number of Syrians afforded temporary asylum.

In July, the government of Finland accused the country of exploiting migrants by encouraging, aiding, or coercing migrants and asylum seekers to cross the border to Finland.

d. Acts of Antisemitism and Antisemitic Incitement

The Institute for Jewish Policy Research estimated approximately 123,000 Jewish persons lived in the country, noting that additional persons may have Jewish heritage but did not identify as such. Official estimates were notably lower; in the 2021 census, the government reported 82,644 persons identified as Jewish.

Government officials engaged in Holocaust distortion. The Kremlin regularly falsely portrayed Ukraine and its supporters as Nazis and antisemites, often denigrated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Jewish roots, accused Jews of being the most egregious Nazis, and manipulated the history of the Holocaust for political purposes. The Kremlin also used antisemitism to silence Jews who opposed the war.

The Russian Jewish Congress reported there were five acts of vandalism against Jewish religious and cultural sites during the year. According to the organization, courts handed down convictions in 19 cases involving antisemitism. There were 249 sentences for inciting ethnic hatred.

For further information on incidents of antisemitism in the country, whether or not those incidents were motivated by religion, and for reporting on the ability of Jews to exercise freedom of religion or belief, see the Department of State’s annual International Religious Freedom Report at https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.

e. Instances of Transnational Repression

The government engaged in acts of transnational repression to intimidate or exact reprisal against individuals outside of its sovereign borders, including political opponents, civil society activists, and human rights defenders. According to Freedom House, the government conducted highly aggressive transnational repression activities, particularly related to Chechnya. Its efforts, which heavily relied on killing as a tool, targeted former insiders and others perceived as threats to the regime’s security.

Extraterritorial Killing, Kidnapping, or Violence or Threats of Violence

Authorities were credibly alleged to have killed or kidnapped persons or used violence or threats of violence against individuals in other countries, including to force their return to the country, for the purpose of politically motivated reprisal. For example, on February 13, army defector Maksim Kuzminov was shot and killed in Villajoyosa, Spain, where he had been hiding under another identity. Spanish media outlets reported the killers left behind nine-millimeter Makarov cartridges, standard ammunition from the former communist bloc, while Spanish intelligence services accused the Kremlin of orchestrating the killing. Security forces were allegedly complicit in the kidnapping and disappearance of individuals from Central Asia, whose forcible return was apparently sought by their governments.

Threats, Harassment, Surveillance, or Coercion

There were reports the government attempted to exert pressure and exact reprisal against persons located outside the country through threats, including against family, friends, or associates. For example, Indigenous activist Pavel Sulyandziga, who was in the United States seeking political asylum following a charge of “discrediting the military” for his criticism of the Russia-Ukraine war, told media the FSB had repeatedly harassed, questioned, and threatened his son in Vladivostok.

Misuse of International Law Enforcement Tools

There were credible reports authorities attempted to misuse international law enforcement tools for politically motivated reprisal against specific persons located outside the country. In December 2023, INTERPOL placed the government under “corrective measures,” including a more robust system for processing its inquiries. Media reported nearly half of INTERPOL’s public “red notices,” which observers stated could be used to locate, detain, and extradite political dissidents and other persons of interest, came from Moscow.

Efforts to Control Mobility

There were reports the government attempted to control mobility to exact reprisal against citizens abroad by revoking their identity documents, denying them consular services, or otherwise engaging in actions aimed at jeopardizing their legal status or restricting their movement. For example, the government canceled passports for activists living overseas, including Alesya Krivtsova, who lived in Norway. Obtaining a replacement travel document would require them to return to the country, where many faced arrest.

Bilateral Pressure

There were credible reports the government for politically motivated purposes attempted to exert bilateral pressure on another country to take adverse action against specific persons. According to media reports, exiled antiwar dissidents feared the government was pressuring other countries to force them to return. Some Russians living in Serbia faced legal challenges from Serbian authorities with respect to their legal status there.

In February, the government also reportedly unsuccessfully attempted to pressure Thailand to deport members of the Russian-language rock group Bi-2 to Russia after their arrest for an immigration violation. Media reported additional cases of shows by performers speaking out against the Russia-Ukraine war being canceled in Thailand, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates as a result of Russian government pressure. Media reported numerous Russian activists and journalists were prevented from entering Georgia during the year. Human rights activists expressed concern a June 2023 agreement on the exchange of personal data among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russian government authorities would facilitate the targeting for repression and possible politically motivated extradition of Russian dissidents living in exile. Human rights defenders reported more than a dozen Russian activists were forcibly deported to Russia from Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, in some cases without due process.

Knowing Cooperation with Other Governments to Facilitate Their Acts of Transnational Repression

A report by The Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto documented several Russia-backed transnational repression incidents during the prior decade, particularly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The Russian and Tajik governments cooperated in the past on targeting dissidents living in the two countries.