Türkiye: Treatment of family members of suspected current and former Hizmet supporters [Gülen supporters; Gülenists] in Türkiye; treatment of returnees, including whether particular profiles of current or former supporters face greater risks upon return; ability of the Turkish authorities to monitor suspected Hizmet supporters abroad (2021 - June 2024) [TUR201739.E]

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Overview

According to a Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs' country report on Türkiye, Gülenists are followers of Fethullah Gülen, an Islamic preacher who [lived] in Pennsylvania, and call themselves followers of the Hizmet Hareketi (Servitude Movement) (Netherlands 2023-08, 41). The same source indicates that the Turkish government began referring to the movement as the "Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü (Fethullah Terrorist Organisation, FETÖ)" (Netherlands 2023-08, 41). Sources report that the government blamed Gülenists (Aydıntaşbaş 2016-09) or Fethullah Gülen (The New York Times 2021-05-31) for an attempted 2016 coup (Aydıntaşbaş 2016-09; The New York Times 2021-05-31). A 2021 New York Times article indicates that following the 2016 failed coup, the Turkish government had detained "100,000 people and purg[ed] 150,000 public employees from their jobs" (2021-05-31). Media sources report that on 20 October 2024, Fethullah Gülen died in the US (Turkish Minute 2024-10-21; AP 2024-10-21).

Citing two "confidential sources" interviewed in June 2023, the Dutch report, covering the period from March 2022 to February 2023, states that "[v]erifying the status of Gülenists (or alleged Gülenists) in Türkiye was problematic because the movement had been outlawed" in the country, and people "refrained from openly disclosing their affiliation with the Gülen movement"; as a result, information "continued to be scarce, piecemeal, and anecdotal in nature" (2023-08, 7, 41). For instance, one confidential source interviewed in June 2023 indicated in the same Dutch report that due to its "covert existence," the size of the movement in Türkiye could not be confirmed (2023-08, 41). Anonymous sources interviewed in December 2021 in a 2022 Dutch report on Türkiye, covering the period from March 2021 to February 2022, indicated that people do not "formally" become members of the Gülen movement since there are no membership cards issued to new members (Netherlands 2022-03, 7, 38). In an interview with the Research Directorate, a non-resident senior fellow at the Silk Road Studies Program [1] who writes about political, religious, and security issues in Türkiye, speaking on their own behalf, similarly stated that the Hizmet movement does not keep membership lists and has a "loose structure" (Senior Fellow 2024-04-30). Finally, the 2021 Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements, which includes a chapter on the Gülen movement authored by Caroline Tee [2], indicates that although it is "impossible to say precisely how many individuals are, or have been, involved" in the Hizmet movement, "an extremely approximate estimation might put the number of close affiliates of Gülen" in Türkiye "somewhere between 500,000 and 2 million people in the pre-2016 era" (Tee 2021, 97). The same source adds that such "ambiguity is partly" due to the absence of official requirements for joining, including "no initiation rites and no clear membership status," and "individuals may be involved in different capacities and with greatly differing degrees of commitment" (Tee 2021, 97).

Sources state that when compared to the aftermath of the attempted 2016 coup (Netherlands 2023-08, 42; Senior Fellow 2024-04-30), the mistreatment of Gülenists had "decreased in intensity" (Netherlands 2023-08, 42) or there is "less of a crackdown" (Senior Fellow 2024-04-30). However, sources indicate that government operations against the Gülen movement continue (Finland 2024-06, 6; Netherlands 2023-08, 41) "regular[ly]" on a small or large scale (Netherlands 2023-08, 41) or "every week" with one or two new operations (Finland 2024-06, 6). According to a "Turkish legal expert" interviewed in October 2023 by the Finnish Immigration Service for their fact-finding mission (FFM) to Türkiye, authorities report on those "operations" publicly through their official channels (Finland 2024-06, 6).

For further information on the Hizmet movement, including the situation and treatment of followers or perceived followers, and how members are identified, including how persons or organizations might be perceived as belonging to the movement, see Response to Information Request TUR106389 of January 2020.

2. Treatment of Family Members of Suspected Current and Former Hizmet Supporters in Türkiye

According to the Senior Fellow, the relatives of supporters who stayed in Türkiye "were targeted" during the "intense crackdown" that followed the 2016 failed coup (2024-04-30). A representative of Human Rights Watch, interviewed by the Finnish Immigration Service in October and November 2023, described the situation of family members of individuals connected to the movement as "a form of 'collective punishment'" (Finland 2024-06, 18).

In an interview with the Research Directorate, an associate professor at a university in the UK, whose research focuses on religion, politics, and the history of Türkiye, stated that the associates of a suspected Gülenist are placed in the "same basket" as a suspected Gülenist, including "family members, friends, sympathizers, and social groups" (Associate Professor 2024-04-26). According the Finnish Immigration Service FFM report, "many" children of "'well-known figures'" linked to the Gülen movement were investigated due to their "family background" when they became of age; however, authorities provided other reasons for looking into these individuals such as possessing a Bank Asya account or using the ByLock application, both of which are viewed as evidence of association with the Gülen movement by the authorities (Finland 2024-06, 18, 26). A report by the Turkish human rights NGO İnsan Hakları Derneği (IHD) indicates that the "prominent features and consequences of emergency decree laws" that were issued by the Turkish government following the 2016 failed coup included the cancellation of the passports of the spouses and children of public servants who were dismissed from their positions for being suspected Gülenists (IHD 2021-12, 4). Similarly, a September 2020 country information report by Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) notes that, following the 2016 attempted coup, authorities cancelled the passports of the family members of "people alleged to be associated with the Gulen movement" (Australia 2020-09-10, para 5.26). The same source indicates that "[i]n some cases the government has cancelled or refused to issue passports to family members of individuals outside the country who are accused of ties to the Gulen movement" (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 5.38).

In correspondence with the Research Directorate in 2024, a lawyer and director of the Arrested Lawyers Initiative (TALI) [3] who was speaking on their own behalf, shared a document they prepared in September 2023, which indicated that Turkish authorities continue to pursue the spouses of people associated with the movement "in a similar manner" as in the aftermath of the failed coup, "but perhaps not as actively" (Lawyer 2024-05-15). The same source stated that on 18 October 2022, 704 individuals, including "more than" 250 women, most of whom were "family members" of individuals imprisoned in Türkiye due to their connection with the Hizmet movement, were arrested for exchanging food or money amongst each other (Lawyer 2024-05-15). The lawyer indicated that this case "is not isolated" and that such operations are "regularly" conducted by Turkish police "under the pretext of fighting terrorist financing" (2024-05-15).

Sources report that the relatives of Gülenists, including alleged Gülenists, may face challenges gaining employment (Netherlands 2023-08, 46; Finland 2024-06, 54), "especially families where one of the spouses is imprisoned" (Finland 2024-06, 54). According to a PhD researcher at the University of Helsinki interviewed in May 2023 by the Finnish Immigration Service, these families are "excluded from society" and "labelled as 'terrorists'"; as a result, "individuals may choose to apply for a divorce due to concerns about potential job loss when their partners are under an investigation" (Finland 2024-06, 54). Similarly, the Senior Fellow noted that the "more common" mistreatment of relatives of alleged Gülenists face is being dismissed from their place of work, but others "were socially ostracized," or "have had their houses raided by the police" (2024-04-30). Examples provided by the Senior Fellow include a woman, whose husband had fled Türkiye, who had "trouble accessing medicine for her son," as doctors did not want their names on a prescription for her son; in another example, the brother of an individual who fled to the US following the coup attempt was detained in Türkiye, and authorities raided their mother's house and questioned her (2024-04-30).

The Senior Fellow indicated that the "social ostracism" faced by individuals associated with the Gülen movement or Gülenists "was punitive," including in the case of lawyers required by the state to represent suspected Gülenists and spouses of Gülenists, and who were subsequently unable to access employment (2024-04-30). Similarly, Amnesty International reports that hundreds of lawyers have been "targeted through abusive criminal investigations and unfair prosecutions, accused of the alleged crimes of their clients" (2021-01-23).

3. Monitoring of Suspected Hizmet Supporters Abroad

An October 2021 report by the Stockholm Center for Freedom (SCF), a non-profit organization that documents and monitors human rights in Türkiye [4], states that authorities have "reached tens of thousands of Turkish citizens abroad" by using "diplomatic missions and pro-government diaspora organizations" for monitoring, denying consular services, as well as performing acts of "intimidation and illegal renditions" (2021-10, 5). According to the Associate Professor, Turkish authorities engage in "transnational repression," including the "monitoring, surveillance, confiscation of passports" of individuals since 2016 in countries such as Belgium, France, Germany, Kosovo, Serbia and Sweden (2024-04-26). Similarly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) notes that Türkiye has "used some of the tools of 'transnational repression', particularly following the coup attempt of July 2016" and has a "consistent policy of pursuing amongst others anyone allegedly related to the 'Gülen movement'" (Council of Europe 2023-06-05, 3).

The 2021 article by the New York Times reports that teachers and administrators of "some" of the Hizmet schools were "extradited or deported with the cooperation of some countries, including Kosovo, Bulgaria and Malaysia" (2021-05-31). Human Rights Watch indicates in a 2024 report on transnational repression that there are "several cases" of abduction in which Turkish authorities ignored laws and court decisions made abroad (2024-02, 19). For example, the same source reports that Turkish authorities participated in the May 2021 "abduct[tion]" of an individual in Kyrgyzstan "accused of links to the Gulen movement in 2019"; one week after the abduction, the person "resurfaced in police custody in Ankara" (Human Rights Watch 2024-02, 19). Human Rights Watch adds that this practice by Turkish authorities, "in collaboration with authorities in countries with weak rule of law frameworks," continued following the May 2023 elections in Türkiye, with the abduction of two accused Gülen associates in July and September 2023 by Tajik authorities, who flew the individuals to Türkiye where they were held in pretrial detention (2024-02, 19). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a representative of the Alliance for Shared Values (AfSV), "a non-profit umbrella organization that serves as a voice for civic and service organizations associated with the Hizmet social initiative in the U.S." (AfSV n.d.), stated that Turkish authorities have "abduct[ed] and illegally transfer[ed]" individuals to Türkiye through a "variety of illegal means," including "extraditions on bogus charges, deportations, expulsions, and otherwise illegal transfers" (AfSV 2024-04-29). A 2024 submission on enforced disappearances in Türkiye to the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) by the Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF), a New York-based civil society organization whose honorary president was Fethullah Gulen (JWF n.d.), states that 144 individuals from "at least" 33 countries were "abduct[ed] and illegally transfer[ed]" back to Türkiye (JFW 2024-02-26, 3). The New York Times reports that Türkiye's former deputy prime minister, Bekir Bozdağ, "boasted that Turkish secret agents in 18 countries had seized 80 Turks suspected of having links to the Gülen movement" in 2018 (2021-05-31).

The Senior Fellow stated that while Türkiye's "intelligence agency has snatched members from other countries," there is a "reluctance to kidnap from 'first-class' countries" such as those in North America and Europe; as a result, "most of the kidnapped are from Central Asia, non-EU countries, the Arab world, and Africa" (2024-04-30). The 2021 SCF report documents cases of "forcible returns" of Turkish nationals since 2016 from Albania, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Gabon, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Moldova, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan, Thailand, and Ukraine (2021-10, 2). Additionally, the Senior Fellow noted that kidnappings have "gone down in the last few years" (2024-04-30). An article by Anadolu Agency (AA), a Turkish state-run news agency (Reuters n.d.), reports that in October 2023, Turkish intelligence "brought a wanted fugitive member" of Hizmet to Türkiye "after they captured him" in Tajikistan (2023-10-05).

According to sources, INTERPOL has rejected 839 (Nordic Research and Monitoring Network 2024-04-04) or "almost 800" (The Guardian 2021-11-25) red notices submitted by Türkiye to extradite individuals abroad (Nordic Research and Monitoring Network 2024-04-04; The Guardian 2021-11-25) between 2016 and 2021 (Nordic Research and Monitoring Network 2024-04-04).

The BBC reports that in July 2022 Türkiye demanded Sweden and Finland to hand over "more than 70 people" with ties to the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK) and to Fethullah Gülen as a condition for Türkiye agreeing to two countries' entry into NATO (2022-07-05). Freedom House notes that the "wanted individuals" in Sweden and Finland include "several journalists" (2023-04, 3).

4. Treatment of Returnees, Including Profiles of Individuals Targeted

The Associate Professor stated that the Gülen movement is no longer the "hot topic" that it was in 2016 (2024-04-26). The Senior Fellow stated that Turkish authorities would target returning individuals, perceived to be Gülenist, who were a part of the military or the security forces, who worked in media, or who led an NGO (2024-04-30). The same source added that low ranking members and sympathizers of the Gülen movement, and individuals who returned to Türkiye due to a failed asylum claim or expired visas were "often persecuted" (Senior Fellow 2024-04-30). The Associate Professor indicated that individuals perceived to be part of the Gülen movement, including sympathizers, professors, nurses, and engineers, could experience lack of social support and isolation, lack of access to employment, and imprisonment for "themselves or their relatives" (2024-04-26). The same source further stated that there are certain companies, universities, and secondary schools that are perceived to have ties to the Hizmet movement; individuals tied to those entities, regardless of their actual association with Hizmet, are denied new employment (Associate Professor 2024-04-26). However, according to the 2023 Dutch report, information on the treatment of returnees in their report is "anecdotal and fragmented," since there are no individuals, agencies or systems that track the situation of returnees; however, a "confidential source" interviewed in June 2023, who "had knowledge of various irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers who returned to Türkiye in 2022," was not aware of any of those returnees facing "post-return detention" (Netherlands 2023-08, 88). The same confidential source noted that "ris[k]" of detention occurred if criminal cases were pending against the returnee (Netherlands 2023-08, 88).

The AfSV representative stated that some individuals who did not have any links to the Hizmet movement were still viewed as "guilty-by-association" (2024-04-29). Citing a "confidential source" interviewed in June 2023, the Dutch report notes that it was "not always clear how the Turkish authorities decided which Gulenists to target," as in the past, the movement "was deeply rooted in every corner of Turkish society," including affiliated schools, hospitals, and charitable organisations (Netherlands 2023-08, 42). The same source notes, as it did in its previous two reports on Türkiye published in March 2021 and 2022, that persons not affiliated with the movement, including political opponants, human rights activists, and "left-wing trades union members," also "faced accusations" of being tied to the Gülen movement (Netherlands 2023-08, 43).

According to the Senior Fellow, "high profile" individuals who are "active in the movement" left Türkiye before the 2016 attempted coup; the Senior Fellow was unaware of any "high-profile person" returning to Türkiye (2024-04-30). The Turkish legal expert interviewed in October 2023 by the Finnish Immigration Service stated that since an "unprecedented number of people having already been arrested," there was a decrease in Gülen supporters in Türkiye (Finland 2024-06, 8).

The lawyer indicated that an individual can be convicted based on a number of factors, including possessing US dollar banknotes, "downloading the ByLock application, having a bank account in Bank Asya, being a member of unions or associations linked with the Gülen Movement, participating in religious gatherings (sohbet) and working in institutions associated with the movement" (2024-05-15). Sources indicate that holding a bank acccount with Bank Asya or downloading the ByLock application (Netherlands 2023-08, 43; Finland 2024-06, 26) are "'two elements' present in most of the convictions" (Finland 2024-06, 26) or are among "a range of criteria" that Turkish authorities use to "singl[e] out" individuals (Netherlands 2023-08, 43).

The AfSV representative observed that Hizmet followers

who have worked in Hizmet-affiliated schools, institutions, or organizations appear to be more at risk. Perceived Hizmet supporters who previously worked in law enforcement, the military, or the government are also at higher risk, in particular "high-profile" detainees, such as former high-level judges, prosecutors, military, law enforcement personnel and other high-level civil servants purged in the aftermath of the attempted coup of July 15, 2016. (AfSV 2024-04-29)

Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] The Silk Road Studies Program and the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute together "constitute a joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center" which is "independent and privately funded" and is based in the US and Sweden (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center n.d.).

[2] Caroline Tee is a professor of the Anthropology of Islam at the University of Chester, UK, who produces research that focuses on the relation between religion and democratic politics, who has undertaken fieldwork in Türkiye, and who has published "primarily" on the Alevi minority and Gülen movement in Türkiye (University of Chester n.d.).

[3] The Arrested Lawyers Initiative (TALI) is a human rights organization based in Brussels and composed of lawyers who, since 2016, advocate for protecting lawyers and human rights defenders from "fear of intimidation, reprisal and judicial harassment," particularly in Türkiye (TALI n.d.).

[4] The Associated Press (AP) reports that Abdullah Bozkurt, the current director of the Stockholm Center for Freedom (SCF) (SCF n.d), was the former editor of the "Gülen-linked Today's Zaman newspaper" (AP 2024-10-21).

References

Alliance for Shared Values (AfSV). 2024-04-29. Correspondence from a representative to the Research Directorate.

Alliance for Shared Values (AfSV). N.d. "Who We Are." [Accessed 2024-04-23]

Amnesty International. 2021-01-23. "Human Rights Lawyers Become 'Endangered Species' in Turkey." [Accessed 2024-04-04]

Anadolu Agency (AA). 2023-10-05. Mehmet Tosun. "Turkish Intelligence Nabs Wanted FETO Fugitive Abroad, Brings Back Home." [Accessed 2024-10-23]

The Arrested Lawyers Initiative (TALI). N.d. "About Us / Alliances & Activity Partners." [Accessed 2024-10-21]

Associate Professor, United Kingdom. 2024-04-26. Interview with the Research Directorate.

Associated Press (AP). Michael Rubinkam. 2024-10-21. "Self-Exiled Turkish Spiritual Leader Fethullah Gülen Dies in the US." [Accessed 2024-10-21]

Australia. 2020-09-10. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). DFAT Country Information Report: Turkey. [Accessed 2024-12-10]

Aydıntaşbaş, Aslı. 2016-09. The Good, the Bad, and the Gülenists: The Role of the Gülen Movement in Turkey's Coup Attempt. European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). [Accessed 2024-11-06]

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2022-07-05. Phelan Chatterjee. "Who Are 'Terrorists' Turkey Wants from Sweden and Finland?" [Accessed 2024-05-08]

Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. N.d. "About." [Accessed 2024-10-03]

Council of Europe. 2023-06-05. Parliamentary Assembly (PACE). Transnational Repression as a Growing Threat to the Rule of Law and Human Rights. (Doc. 15787) [Accessed 2024-05-06]

Finland. 2024-06. Finnish Immigration Service. Turkey: Individuals Associated with the Gülen Movement. The Finnish Immigration Service's Fact-Finding Mission to Ankara and Istanbul 2 – 6 October 2023. [Accessed 2024-10-03]

Freedom House. 2023-04. Yana Gorokhovskaia, Nate Schenkkan, & Grady Vaughan. Still not Safe: Transnational Repression in 2022. [Accessed 2024-05-06]

The Guardian. 2021-11-25. Kim Willsher. "Turkey Accused of Using Interpol Summit to Crack Down on Critics." [Accessed 2024-05-22]

Human Rights Watch. 2024-02. "We Will Find You." A Global Look at How Governments Repress Nationals Abroad. [Accessed 2024-10-23]

İnsan Hakları Derneği (IHD). 2021-12. Emergency Decree Laws and Their Impact and Human Rights in Turkey. [Accessed 2024-10-31]

Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF). 2024-02-26. Elections and Enforced Disappearances in Turkiye. JWF's Input to Thematic Study by WGEID to HRC 57th Session. [Accessed 2024-10-24]

Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF). N.d. "Honorary President." [Accessed 2024-10-24]

Lawyer, Brussels. 2024-05-15. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Netherlands. 2023-08. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. General Country of Origin Information Report on Türkiye. [Accessed 2024-05-06]

Netherlands. 2022-03. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. General Country of Origin Information Report: Turkey. [Accessed 2024-10-21]

The New York Times. 2021-05-31. Carlotta Gall & Abdi Latif Dahir. "Turkey Claims to Have 'Captured' Cleric's Relative in Kenya." [Accessed 2024-04-03]

Nordic Research and Monitoring Network. 2024-04-04. "Turkey's Abuse of Interpol Halts Partnership with CAR, an Organization that Traced ISIS Explosives to Turkish Firms." [Accessed 2024-10-04]

Reuters. N.d. "News Partner: Anadolu." [Accessed 2024-11-19]

Senior Fellow, Silk Road Studies Program. 2024-04-30. Interview with the Research Directorate.

Stockholm Center for Freedom (SCF). 2021-10. Turkey's Transnational Repression: Abduction, Rendition and Forcible Return of Erdoğan Critics. [Accessed 2024-05-30]

Stockholm Center for Freedom (SCF). N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 2024-10-24]

Tee, Caroline. 2021. "The Gülen Movement: Between Turkey and International Exile." Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements. Vol. 21. Edited by Muhammad Afzal Upal & Carole M. Cusack. Leyden: Brill. [Accessed 2024-10-21]

Turkish Minute. 2024-10-21. "Turkish-Islamic Scholar Gulen Dies at 83." [Accessed 2024-10-21]

University of Chester. N.d. "Professor Caroline Tee." [Accessed 2024-10-21]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Amnesty International – Türkiye branch; Centre for Türkiye Studies; Helsinki Citizens' Assembly; Lecturer in the United Kingdom who focuses on democratic erosion, militarism, and militarization; Professor in Sweden who studies Turkish culture, society, religion, and politics; Professor in the United Kingdom who specializes in Turkish politics and international relations; Turkey Human Rights Litigation Support Project.

Internet sites, including: Al Jazeera; Austrian Red Cross – ecoi.net; Balkan Insight; Bertelsmann Stiftung: Cambridge Scholars Publishing; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Carnegie Europe; The Citizen Lab; Deutsche Welle; Encyclopedia Britannica; Euronews; EU – European Commission, European Union Agency for Asylum; Financial Times; France24; Freedom of Expression Association; International Crisis Group; International Peace Institute; Minority Rights Group; PoliTurco; PR Newswire; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; Reuters; UK – Home Office; UN – Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; US – Department of State; Wilson Center.

Associated documents