Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Overview

Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, written in 1948 and amended in 1987, defines the territory of the Republic of Korea as consisting of "the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands" (Republic of Korea 1948a). Article 2 of the Nationality Act, written in 1948 and amended in 2018, provides the following:

1. A person falling under any of the following subparagraphs shall be a national of the Republic of Korea at birth:
   
   1. A person whose father or mother is a national of the Republic of Korea at the time of the person's birth;
   2. A person whose father was a national of the Republic of Korea at the time of the father's death, if the person's father died before the person's birth;
   3. A person who was born in the Republic of Korea, if both of the person's parents are unknown or have no nationality.
2. An abandoned child found in the Republic of Korea shall be deemed born in the Republic of Korea. (Republic of Korea 1948b, amendment date omitted)

Sources reported that North Koreans have a legal claim to South Korean citizenship (Greitens 2021-03, p. 120; NKDB 2023-01-09; GongGam 2023-01-05). According to sources, since South Korea's Constitution already considers defectors from North Korea to be South Korean citizens, there is no formal granting of citizenship upon their resettlement (NKDB 2023-01-09; Republic of Korea 2023-01-16).

Sources indicted that defectors are issued (Greitens 2021-03, 132; HRNK 2023-01-06) or "apply" for (NKDB 2023-01-09) their South Korean Resident Registration Card [1] upon completing the Hanawon [Settlement Support Center for North Korean Refugees (Republic of Korea 2023-01-16)] process (NKDB 2023-01-09; HRNK 2023-01-06; Greitens 2021-03, 132). An article in the Journal of Korean Studies by Sheena Chestnut Greitens – an associate professor at the University of Texas at Austin's Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, a non-resident fellow with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a specialist of Chinese and Korean security issues – notes that a Resident Registration Card provides access to government services and welfare benefits (2021-03, 117, 132).

According to a 2022 white paper on Korean unification published by the Ministry of Unification (MOU), in 2021 63 North Korean defectors entered South Korea, which constituted a "huge decline" from the 229 defectors who entered in 2020; the MOU attributes this decline "largely" to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (Republic of Korea 2022, 154). The same source notes that by the end of 2021, the total cumulative number of defectors was 33,815, of whom 72 percent were women (Republic of Korea 2022, 158).

In an interview with the Research Directorate, the Director of International Cooperation for the Database for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) – a non-profit organization that records "North Korean human rights violations" and offers victim relief (NKDB n.d.) – indicated that both "protected" and "unprotected" defectors are considered to be citizens of South Korea and thus eligible to resettle there; the distinction is instead about whether individuals will receive the entire package of available resettlement support – reserved for "protected" defectors, only – or be eligible for limited defector support benefits (NKDB 2023-01-09). A 2019 article by the New York Times, citing South Korean government data, reports that at least 270 defectors living in South Korea "have been disqualified from government subsidies for various reasons," including 9 people "who had committed murder or other serious crimes" before resettling there (2019-12-19). Greitens notes that as of 2019, a total of 280 defectors who had resettled in South Korea were considered to be "nonprotected," and adds that approximately 75 percent of these people were "denied protection and support because they applied after having been in South Korea for over a year, rather than declaring their status and applying for resettlement before/upon entry" (2021-03, 117). Sources indicate that in 2019, the window of time for a North Korean already living in South Korea to declare their status and seek protection and support was expanded from one year to three years (Greitens 2021-03, 117; NKDB 2023-01-09).

In an interview with the Research Directorate, the Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) – a US-based organization composed of foreign policy and human rights experts [2] focused on human rights conditions in North Korea (HRNK n.d.b) – stated that they have visited Hanawon facilities many times, where they have encountered mothers with children who decided to permanently resettle in South Korea after "many years" of living in China (HRNK 2023-01-06). The NKDB Director of International Cooperation noted that sometimes North Koreans will enter South Korea with a "fake" Chinese identification document to find employment there; these people are unaware that they are eligible to legally resettle in South Korea as citizens, so this is not the intent of their travel there (NKDB 2023-01-09). The same source added that upon learning they are eligible to permanently resettle in South Korea as citizens, these individuals may pursue this option by presenting themselves to authorities and entering the National Intelligence Service (NIS) screening process; if these people declare their intentions to permanently resettle outside of the three-year window, they can still enter the screening process but will be ineligible for the resettlement support package (NKDB 2023-01-09).

1.1 Legislation

The North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act, first enacted in 1997 and partially amended most recently on 21 December 2021, and which applies to "North Korean defectors who have expressed their intention to be protected" in South Korea (Republic of Korea 1997a, Art. 3), provides the following:

Article 4 (Basic Principles)

…

(2) The Republic of Korea shall make all of its diplomatic efforts to protect and support North Korean defectors who are staying in foreign countries.

…

(4) The Minister of Unification shall ascertain the actual conditions of North Korean defectors for protection, support, etc. of North Korean defectors and incorporate the result thereof in the policies.

Article 5 (Criteria for Protection)

1. The criteria for protection of and support for persons eligible for protection shall be reasonably determined, based on the age, gender, members of a family, academic background, personal career, self-supporting ability, health conditions, personal possessions, etc.
2. In principle, the protection and settlement support prescribed in this Act shall be provided on the basis of respective individuals, but may, if deemed necessary, be given on the basis of the family, as prescribed by Presidential Decree.
3. Persons eligible for protection shall be provided with protection at settlement support facilities for a period of up to one year and at the place of residence for five years: Provided, That the respective periods of protection may be reduced or extended following deliberations by the North Korean Defector Protection and Settlement Support Council as prescribed in Article 6, where there exists any compelling reason to do so. (Republic of Korea 1997a, amendment notes omitted)

Article 7 of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act, concerning an application for protection, provides the following:

Article 7 (Application for Protection)

1. Any North Korean defector who intends to be protected under this Act shall apply for protection in person with the head of an overseas diplomatic or consular mission, or the head of any administrative agency (including the commander of a military unit of various levels; hereinafter referred to as "head of an overseas diplomatic or consular mission, etc."): Provided, That the same shall not apply where there exist the grounds prescribed by Presidential Decree, which make it impractical for the person to apply for protection in person.
2. The head of an overseas diplomatic or consular mission, etc. in receipt of such application for protection prescribed in the main clause of paragraph (1) shall, without delay, inform the Minister of Unification and the Director General of the National Intelligence Service via the head of the central administrative agency to which he or she belongs of such fact.
3. The Director of the National Intelligence Service informed pursuant to paragraph (2) shall take provisional protective measures, such as investigations necessary for the decision on protection for a person applying for protection, etc. and temporary personal protection measures, and shall without delay inform the Minister of Unification of the results thereof.

… (Republic of Korea 1997a, amendment notes omitted)

Article 10 of the Enforcement Decree of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act, which was first decreed in 1997 and partially amended most recently on 17 February 2022, and which concerns applications for protections, provides the following:

Cases where a resident who has escaped from North Korea may not apply for protection in person under the proviso of Article 7 (1) of the Act shall be as follows:

1. Where he or she has a mental disorder;
2. Where a member of his or her family applies for protection by proxy of the rest of the family members;
3. Where there exist other urgent grounds. (Republic of Korea 1997b, Art. 10, amendment notes omitted)

Article 8 of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act, concerning protection decisions, provides the following:

1. When the Minister of Unification is notified as prescribed in Article 7 (3), he or she shall decide on eligibility for protection following deliberation by the Consultative Council: Provided, That in the case of a person who is likely to affect national security to the considerable extent, the Director of the National Intelligence Service shall decide on eligibility for their protection, and inform or notify the Minister of Unification and the applicant for protection of the results thereof without delay.
2. Where the Minister of Unification has decided on eligibility for protection pursuant to the main clause of paragraph (1), he or she shall, without delay, inform the head of an overseas diplomatic or consular mission, etc. via the head of the relevant central administrative agency of such decision, and the head of an overseas diplomatic or consular mission, etc. informed as such shall promptly notify the applicant thereof. (Republic of Korea 1997a, Art. 8, amendment notes omitted)

Article 14 of the Enforcement Decree of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act, concerning the scope of people "likely to affect national security to [a] considerable extent," provides the following:

A person who is likely to affect national security to the considerable extent under the proviso of Article 8 (1) of the Act shall be the following:

1. A person who committed or intended to commit a crime concerning insurrection or a crime concerning foreign aggression defined in the Criminal Act, a crime of insurrection, a crime of benefiting the enemy, or a crime of unlawful use of secret codes defined in the Military Criminal Act, or any crime defined in the National Security Act (excluding Article 10) or the Military Secret Protection Act, but has expressed his or her will to renounce such intention;
2. A person who has been actively involved in the protection of the North Korean regime in the North Korean Workers' Party, the Cabinet, the military, and other organizations whose main function is to protect and defend the North Korean regime, which the Director of the National Intelligence Service deems important for national security;
3. A spouse or relative of the person of supreme power in North Korea;
4. A person with important intelligence in advanced science or other special and professional fields closely related to national security. (Republic of Korea 1997b, Art. 14, amendment notes omitted)

Article 9 of North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act, regarding the criteria for a protection decision, provides the following:

1. In making a decision on whether to provide protection pursuant to the main clause of Article 8 (1), any of the following persons may not be designated as persons eligible for protection:
   
   1. International criminal offenders involved in aircraft hijacking, drug trafficking, terrorism or genocide, etc.;
   2. Offenders of nonpolitical and serious crimes, such as murder;
   3. Suspects of disguised escape;
   4. Deleted;
   5. Persons who have applied for protection when three years elapsed since their entry into the Republic of Korea;
   6. Other persons prescribed by Presidential Decree as unfit to be protected as persons eligible for protection or hardly requiring protection, in consideration of potential serious harm to national security, maintenance of order, and public welfare, the economic capacity and conditions of overseas stay of applicants for protection, etc.
2. The provisions of paragraph (1) 5 shall not apply where North Korean defectors have unavoidable grounds prescribed by Presidential Decree.
3. The Minister of Unification may provide support and protection prescribed in any of the following subparagraphs, if necessary, to the North Korean defectors who have not been designated as persons eligible for protection because they fall under any of the subparagraphs of paragraph (1):
   
   1. Protection and special cases prescribed in Articles 11, 13, 14, 16, 17-3, 19, 19-2, 20 (only limited to where a person has not been designated as a person eligible for protection because he or she falls under paragraph (1) 5 of this Article), 22, and 26-2;
   2. Protection and support prescribed by Presidential Decree as necessary for settlement in a community.
4. Other matters necessary for protection and support prescribed in paragraph (3) shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree. (Republic of Korea 1997a, amendment notes omitted)

Article 16 of the Enforcement Decree of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act, concerning the criteria for protection decisions, provides the following:

1. (1)“Other persons prescribed by Presidential Decree as unfit to be protected as persons eligible for protection or hardly requiring protection” in Article 9 (1) 6 of the Act means the following persons:
   
   1. Persons anticipated to cause serious political or diplomatic difficulties to the Republic of Korea if designated as eligible for protection;
   2. Persons who commit violence or damage facilities that may seriously harm the safety of others during a period of examination and provisional protective measures under Article 12-3;
   3. Persons who have obtained a legitimate residency status in a third country after escaping from North Korea;
   4. A person who is recognized as having been able to lead a normal or stable life in a third country after leaving North Korea without circumstances such as detention, confinement, seclusion, flight, or forced marriage in a third country.
2. “Unavoidable grounds prescribed by Presidential Decree” in Article 9 (2) of the Act means the following cases:
   
   1. In case it is recognized that free activities are not possible due to reasons such as living in a facility that is blocked from outside or disease;
   2. In case the Minister of Unification recognizes that there are circumstances equivalent to subparagraph 1.
3. Deleted.
4. “Protection and support prescribed by Presidential Decree as necessary for settlement in a community” in Article 9 (3) 2 of the Act means education for social adaptation, etc., under Article 15 of the Act. (Republic of Korea 1997b, Art. 16, amendment notes omitted)

The Enforcement Decree of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act provides the following:

Article 12 (Details and Methods of Examination)

1. The contents of examination under Article 7 (3) of the Act shall be as follows:
   
   1. Matter necessary for confirming whether an applicant for protection falls under the category of residents escaping from North Korea, such as the place of birth, occupation, family relations, and whether to hold a foreign nationality;
   2. Matters necessary for confirming whether an applicant for protection falls under any of the subparagraphs of Article 9 (1) of the Act, such as his or her motive and process of escape from North Korea, circumstances after escape, details related to entry into the Republic of Korea, and criminal records;
   3. Other matters necessary for decision on protection of the applicant for protection.
2. Examination under Article 7 (3) of the Act may be conducted in forms of face-to-face examination, on-the-site examination, inspection of documents, sampling, etc.
3. If necessary for investigating the matters under the subparagraphs of paragraph (1), the Director of the National Intelligence Service may ask any questions to the applicant for protection, and, with the consent of the applicant, be provided with documents, fingerprint or facial information, etc. by which the status, family relations, etc. of the applicant can be verified.
4. The Director of the National Intelligence Service may request the head of the relevant administrative agency to provide necessary information to investigate the matters referred to the subparagraphs of paragraph (1).
5. Where the purpose of the relevant examination cannot be accomplished by examination alone or excessive expenses are necessary for verifying whether any act subject to examination is true, the Director of the National Intelligence Service may ask questions to the relatives or related persons of the applicant for protection by face-to-face or via telephone, fax and mail (including the email using an information and communications network).
6. Necessary matters concerning detailed procedures for investigating the matters under the subparagraphs of paragraph (1) shall be determined by the Director of the National Intelligence Service.

Article 12-2 (Details and Methods of Provisional Protective Measures)

1. The contents of provisional protective measures under Article 7 (3) of the Act shall be as follows:
   
   1. Protection of applicants for protection at a provisional protection facilities under Article 7 (4) of the Act (hereinafter referred to as "provisional protection facility") for a certain period to secure their safety from personal danger, such as terrorism;
   2. Measures deemed necessary for mental and physical stability of applicants for protection, such as psychology consultation, treatment of disease, health management, and basic education for social adaptation;
   3. Other measures necessary for securing the personal safety of applicants for protection.
2. If deemed necessary for provisional protective measures under Article 7 (3) of the Act, the Director of the National Intelligence Service may, with the consent of the applicant for protection, confirm whether such applicant for protection (including his or her children where he or she is under protection together with them under Article 12-4 (2)) possesses or conceals narcotics, arms, lethal weapons, other dangerous things, etc.
3. Necessary matters concerning details and procedures of provisional protective measures under each subparagraph of paragraph (1) shall be determined by the Director of the National Intelligence Service.

Article 12-3 (Period of Examination and Provisional Protective Measures)

The period of examination and provisional protective measures under Article 7 (3) of the Act shall not exceed 90 days from the date when the relevant applicant for protection enters into the Republic of Korea (referring to the date of applying for protection, if such applicant applies for protection after the date of his or her entry into the Republic of Korea): Provided, That in extenuating circumstances, such as the increase in the number of the residents escaping from North Korea who enter into the Republic of Korea, such period may be extended within the extent of 30 days only once, after deliberation by the Council.

…

Article 18 (Re-Application for Protection)

1. (1)An applicant for protection who is denied protection may apply for protection again if there exists new factual data or evidence within five years from the date he or she receives the first notification on the determination regarding whether protection will be provided under Article 8 of the Act.

… (Republic of Korea 1997b, amendment notes omitted)

2. Requirements and Procedures for North Koreans to Settle as Citizens in South Korea, Including Eligibility for Protection and Eligibility Limitations

The information in the following three paragraphs, which describes the settlement process for North Korean defectors, was provided by the MOU white paper:

Upon receiving a request for protection abroad by a person claiming to be North Korean, the government "issues a report and notifies the relevant ministries including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." Within the "host countries" where prospective defectors make their request, South Korean authorities provide them with accommodation inside "foreign diplomatic offices or temporary shelters." The South Korean government "negotiates with the host country and facilitates the immigration of defectors to South Korea after verifying their identities."

After prospective defectors enter South Korea, the NIS "questions defectors" in an effort to determine "whether to grant them protection and temporary protection including medical treatment." Then, authorities transfer defectors "to the custody of Hanawon, the education center for social adaptation." At this point, "[t]he government decides whether to grant the defectors protection through a deliberation process by the Consultative Council on Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors[,] who make a decision for each household."

While at Hanawon, defectors engage in a 12-week, 400-hour training program "for social adaptation," which includes "regular programs centered on emotional stability, health care, better understanding of South Korean society, career guidance, job search, and guidance for early settlement support." At Hanawon, the government assists defectors "in registering with the family relations registry and as residents of South Korea so that they can enjoy full rights as South Korean citizens" (Republic of Korea 2022, 157, 159, 174).

Sources report that the NIS's screening investigation [debriefing process] is intended to determine that individuals are indeed North Korean, that they are not "spies" of the North Korean government, and that they are not ethnic Korean citizens of China (NKDB 2023-01-09; HRNK 2023-01-06), nor ethnic Korean citizens of another country (NKDB 2023-01-09). The NKDB Director of International Cooperation added that the NIS investigation also confirms that the defector's arrival in South Korea was not the result of an accidental crossing of the border (especially the maritime border), and that their intention is to permanently resettle in South Korea (NKDB 2023-01-09). The same source stated that "elite North Koreans" who "occupied high-level government positions" do not go through the same screening and resettlement process as ordinary defectors and would experience a "significant" NIS screening investigation (NKDB 2023-01-09).

The NKDB Director of International Cooperation indicated that a person deemed to be a spy would not be returned to North Korea and [would still be accepted as a South Korean citizen], but would be investigated for criminal charges (NKDB 2023-01-09). Greitens states that a defector suspected of being a North Korean spy during their NIS screening could face trial and imprisonment (Greitens 2021-03, 129). The HRNK Executive Director noted that individuals determined to be "agents of North Korea," have received "generally lenient" treatment from South Korean authorities since the 1980s (HRNK 2023-01-06). The NKDB Director of International Cooperation stated that someone determined to be a "national security concern" would remain in South Korea as a citizen (NKDB 2023-01-09). The same source added that it is during the NIS screening investigation that authorities determine if a defector is to be "protected" or "unprotected," a distinction which does not impact their citizenship rights, but which describes the state support they are eligible to receive upon resettling in South Korea (NKDB 2023-01-09).

2.1 2019 Return of North Korean Fishermen

Sources report that in November 2019, South Korean authorities "detained" (BBC 2019-11-07) or "captured" (VOA 2022-07-15) two North Korean fishermen (VOA 2022-07-15; BBC 2019-11-07). Voice of America (VOA) [3] adds that the men "expressed a desire to defect" (2022-07-15). Sources indicate that after the two men "confessed" that they had "kill[ed]" the boat's captain and 15 of its crew members, South Korean authorities rejected their request for resettlement and returned them to North Korea against their will (VOA 2022-07-15; BBC 2019-11-07). The VOA article notes that authorities "rejected" the men's request following a three-day investigation in which they concluded the men's request was "insincere and incoherent" (2022-07-15). In contrast, an article by the Diplomat – an online magazine focused on events in the Asia-Pacific region (The Diplomat n.d.) – states that authorities returned the men to North Korea "without undergoing a formal trial or investigation" (2022-12-23). According to the BBC article, the MOU told the BBC that they decided to return the men to North Korea "when [they] couldn't trust their intention of defection" and determined the men to be "serious criminals" (BBC 2019-11-07). The NKDB Director of International Cooperation noted that the men "did not go through the proper NIS procedure," which would have taken weeks or months, and were instead returned within days (NKDB 2023-01-09).

The Al Jazeera article, citing local media, states that the case "reportedly" constitutes the first time South Korea has ever "forcibly repatriated" North Korean defectors (2022-07-07). Sources report that the NIS has opened an investigation into its former director over "shut[ting] down" (Al Jazeera 2022-07-07) or "forcibly closing" (The Diplomat 2022-12-23) the investigation into the fishermen before they were repatriated to North Korea (Al Jazeera 2022-07-07; The Diplomat 2022-12-23).

2.2 Duration of Screening

Article 15 of the Enforcement Decree of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act, which concerns authorities' determination on protection applications, provides the following:

1. The Minister of Unification shall determine eligibility for protection within 30 days from receipt of notice under Article 13 (1): Provided, That this shall not apply in any extenuating circumstances.
2. Where the Director of the National Intelligence Service intends to decide on whether to provide protection under the proviso of Article 8 (1) of the Act, he or she shall determine eligibility for protection within 30 days from the date he or she completes examination and provisional protective measures under Article 7 (3) of the Act: Provided, That this shall not apply in extenuating circumstances.

… (Republic of Korea 1997b, Art. 15, amendment notes omitted)

According to sources, the duration of the NIS screening investigation can vary (NKDB 2023-01-09; HRNK 2023-01-06; Associate Professor 2023-01-09), and the NKDB Director of International Cooperation stated that it currently takes an average of 1-3 months (NKDB 2023-01-09). The HRNK Executive Director indicated that the NIS's screening process can take between three weeks and one month, depending on the amount of information the defector has concerning "human rights violations" in North Korea (HRNK 2023-01-06). An associate professor of global and international studies at Carleton University – who is also the Program Director of Carleton's Bachelor of Global and International Studies and an expert on issues of North Korean human rights – in an interview with the Research Directorate, stated that the majority of defectors spend 10 days in the NIS's screening process (2023-01-09).

2.3 Treatment During Screening

Freedom House's 2022 annual report states that defectors can experience "months of detention and questioning upon arrival" in South Korea and adds that some defectors have "reported abuse in custody" (2022-02-24, F4). According to the NKDB Director of International Cooperation, the "interrogation process" "has changed a lot in recent years," and indicated that whereas it "used to be quite violent" – including defectors "being threatened physically or psychologically and being quite scared" – such experiences "rarely" occur now (NKDB 2023-01-09).

2.4 Procedure to Obtain Identification Documents, Including Processing Times

Article 23(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act provides the following information concerning the issuance of temporary identification cards:

1. The Minister of Unification and the Director of the National Intelligence Service shall issue temporary identification cards to persons eligible for protection who receive protection at their respective settlement support facilities.

(Republic of Korea 1997b, Art. 23)

Article 10 of MOU's [translation] "Established Rule Concerning Residence Protection and Identity Confirmation of Residents [of the Republic of Korea] Who Have Escaped from North Korea," enacted in 2021, provides the following concerning the issuance of resident registration numbers to North Korean defectors:

[translation]

1. Pursuant to the "Guide for the Management of New Resident Registration of Residents [of the Republic of Korea] Who Have Escaped from North Korea" issued by the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, the director of a settlement support facility shall submit a resident registration report to the head of the town, township or sub-ward specified by the Ministry of the Interior and Safety in order that a resident registration number be issued for the person eligible for protection.
2. Pursuant to paragraph (1), the director of a settlement support facility to whom a resident registration number has been reported by the head of the town, township or sub-ward, shall issue a temporary identity certificate recording the resident registration number to the person eligible for protection.
3. A person eligible for protection shall, after leaving a settlement support facility, present his or her temporary identity certificate to the head of the town, township or sub-ward that is his or her place of residence and shall apply for a moving-in report and a resident registration certificate to be issued. (Republic of Korea 2021-11-11, Art. 10)

Article 19-3 of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act provides the following concerning a defector's resident registration number:

1. Any person, among North Korean defectors, who has received a resident registration number based on the location of the relevant settlement support facility may apply for correction of his or her resident registration number only once with the head of a Si/Gun/Gu [city/county/district] or the Special Self-Governing Province Governor having jurisdiction over his or her place of residence.
2. Unless any special reason exists, the head of a Si/Gun/Gu or the Special Self-Governing Province Governor who has received an application under paragraph (1) shall correct the resident registration number based on the present place of residence. (Republic of Korea 1997a, Art. 19-3)

According to the MOU, defectors can "register residentship" during their "initial reception and resettlement education programs" at Hanawon (Republic of Korea 2023-01-16). The NKDB Director of International Cooperation stated that after completing the NIS's initial screening procedure, defectors are issued a temporary identification card, which "acts as a placeholder" until they receive their Resident Registration Card following the Hanawon process (NKDB 2023-01-09). In an interview with the Research Directorate, a lawyer at GongGam Human Rights Law Foundation (GongGam) [4] – who also served as the principal drafter of South Korea's 2013 Refugee Act – noted that South Korean authorities will begin the process of issuing defectors a South Korean Resident Registration Card upon completion of the NIS's initial screening investigation (Lawyer 2023-01-05). The Executive Director of HRNK stated that while defectors are at Hanawon, their South Korean identity documents – including their Resident Registration Card – are being prepared for them, as these documents take approximately three months to prepare for their issuance upon the individual's completion of the Hanawon process (HRNK 2023-01-06). According to the NKDB Director of International Cooperation, a North Korean defector's Resident Registration Card does not contain information that would reveal their North Korean origins (NKDB 2023-01-09).

According to the HRNK Executive Director, during the Hanawon process the individual is presented with the option of changing their name; those adopting a new name would have their new name applied to their eventual Resident Registration Card (HRNK 2023-01-06). The Associate Professor stated that most defectors change their name upon resettling in South Korea as citizens (2023-01-09). The NKDB Director of International Cooperation stated that "quite a lot" of defectors opt to change their name during the NIS screening procedure, and noted that sometimes these name changes are a result of their own decision, but sometimes NIS will encourage them to change their name or recommend particular new names to adopt (NKDB 2023-01-09). The same source added that many defectors also choose to change their names after they enter South Korean society (NKDB 2023-01-09).

The NKDB Director of International Cooperation added that while at Hanawon, defectors are issued a Family Relations Certificate [5] (NKDB 2023-01-09).

According to sources, defectors are permitted to apply for a passport once they complete the Hanawon process (Republic of Korea 2023-01-16; Lawyer 2023-01-05). In contrast, in correspondence with the Research Directorate, the South Korea Country Director for Liberty in North Korea (LiNK) [6], stated that defectors must wait 6 months following their graduation from Hanawon before they can apply for a passport (LiNK 2023-01-24). The HRNK Executive Director reported that upon applying for a passport, a defector would be subject to the same processing times as any South Korean citizen (HRNK 2023-01-06) and the GongGam lawyer stated that it would not take "an extraordinary amount of time relative to other South Korean citizens" (Lawyer 2023-01-05).

2.5 Travel Restrictions

When asked if there were any international travel restrictions for defectors who had obtained a South Korean passport, the MOU stated that "[b]asically, there are no restrictions" on their international travel (Republic of Korea 2023-01-16). Asked the same question, the HRNK Executive Director noted that there were no such restrictions (HRNK 2023-01-06), and the GongGam lawyer indicated that they were not aware of any such restrictions (Lawyer 2023-01-05). The NKDB Director of International Cooperation indicated that travel could be restricted for individuals deemed by NIS to be a "'risk,'" and added that such considerations depend on that individual's specific circumstances and their behaviour since defecting (NKDB 2023-01-09). The same source noted that there have been cases in which a defector was prevented from traveling to China because NIS had obtained information indicating that they were either trying to return to North Korea, or were trying to "get in contact with" someone at the Chinese-North Korean border (NKDB 2023-01-09).

3. Settlement and Support Services
3.1 Support and Services

The MOU white paper provides the following information regarding settlement benefits available to defectors:

The government provides North Korean defectors with various settlement benefits to help them during the initial period of settlement. The settlement benefits consist of a certain amount of money necessary for their settlement in South Korean society for a certain period of time after completing the Hanawon program. They include basic settlement benefits, housing subsidies, additional benefits (depending on certain conditions), incentives for stable employment, and employment subsidies for business owners who hire North Korean defectors.

The amount of the basic settlement benefit depends on the size of one's household. An initial payment is granted immediately upon completion of the Hanawon program, and the remainder is paid in three quarterly installments starting three months after the recipient moves to his or her residence. For housing subsidies, the government subsidizes the rental deposit required for the housing rental. To encourage residence outside of Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area (GSMA), the government offers incentives for defectors to live and work in non-GSMA. The government grants additional benefits to the following vulnerable groups: senior citizens of an advanced age, the mentally or physically challenged, people undergoing long-term medical treatment, children of single-parent families, and children born in a third country. To help North Korean defectors become financially independent, the government grants various financial incentives to those who receive vocational training, obtain a certificate of qualification, and/or get a job. The government increased its employment incentives as of January 1, 2021. The incentives provided after three years of continuous work rose from KRW [South Korean Won] 16.5 million to KRW 18 million [C$18,054 - $19,702] in GSMA and from KRW 19.5 million to KRW 21 million [C$21,344 - $22,985] in non-GSMA. (Republic of Korea 2022, 174-175)

The MOU's website [updated in 2022] provides the following information and figures regarding support benefits available to defectors upon their completion of the Hanawon process:

Category	Item	Description
Settlement benefits	Basic settlement benefits	KRW 8 million [C$8,759] for a single-person household
Financial incentives	A maximum of KRW 25.1 million [C$27,303] for those who receive vocational training, obtain a certificate of qualification, or get a job
Additional benefits	A maximum of KRW 15.4 million [C$16,859] for seniors aged 60 years or older, the mentally or physically challenged, people in long-term medical treatment, children of single parents, and children born in third countries
Housing	Housing arrangement	Arranging rental apartments
Housing subsidies	KRW 16 million [C$17,404] for a single-person household
Employment	Vocational training	A training allowance (Ministry of Employment and Labor)
Employment subsidies (paid to employers)	Half of pay (up to half a million won) per worker for a maximum of four years Those who entered South Korea before November 29, 2014
Employment support workers	Offering career counseling and job placement at 65 employment centers nationwide
Others	Employment protection (preferential purchasing), settlement support for those aspiring to be farmers, and special employment
Social welfare	Livelihood benefits	Those who receive Basic Livelihood Security Program (BLSP) benefits
Medical care	Free healthcare for those who receive Tier 1 Medical Benefits of the BLSP
Pension exception	Allowing subscription by exception to the national pension plan for those aged between 50 and 59 at the time of making decisions on protection
Education	Special admission and transfer to schools	Offering special admission for those who want to go to college
Support for tuition	Exemption from tuition for those enrolled in middle school, high school, a national or public university and subsidizing 50% of tuition for study at a private university
Settlement assistants		Designating one or two settlement assistants for each household in the initial period of settlement Support workers
Support workers		Support workers system: community services (244 persons at local governments), employment counseling (65 persons at employment centers), and personal protection (900 persons at police stations)

(Republic of Korea [2022])

The NKDB Director of International Cooperation stated that only "protected" defectors receive the "full package" of state support, which includes subsidized housing accommodations and financial resettlement support (NKDB 2023-01-09). The same source added that "unprotected" defectors receive subsidized housing accommodations but are not eligible for financial resettlement funds (NKDB 2023-01-09).

According to the MOU white paper, upon joining South Korean society, the central government, local governments, the Korea Hana Foundation [7], regional Hana Centers, and NGOs coordinate their support for defectors (Republic of Korea 2022, 154).

According to a 2021 report analyzing the social and economic integration of North Korean defectors in South Korea, jointly published by NKDB and North Korean Social Research (NKSR) [8] and based on a survey of 407 defectors, after completing the Hanawon process defectors receive the first 5 million KRW [C$5,473] of their 8 million KRW [C$8,759] basic settlement support, and then receive three 1 million KRW [C$1,094] installments quarterly (2021-12, 12). Without providing further details, the same source adds that at the time of their survey, 1.5 percent of the respondents indicated that they had received this financial support (NKDB and NKSR Dec 2021, 12).

The MOU white paper states that upon completion of the Hanawon process, individuals are assigned rental housing accommodations in a location of their choosing (Republic of Korea 2022, 174).

The MOU white paper indicates that individuals "who need more mental health support" following completion of the Hanawon process are provided their necessary treatments at "local medical institutions and/or psychological counseling centers through a network of professional psychologists at 25 Hana centers nationwide" (Republic of Korea 2022, 166).

The MOU white paper states that in June 2020 Hanawon opened a Vocational Training Center, to assist defectors to advance their vocational skills and gain financial independence (Republic of Korea 2022, 161). The same source notes that Hanawon houses the Hanadul School, which provides customized schooling to people aged 24 or under (Republic of Korea 2022, 163). According to the source, the health care of defectors while at Hanawon is managed by its Hana Clinic, which has departments specializing in "internal medicine, dentistry, oriental medicine, and psychiatry" (Republic of Korea 2022, 164). The NKDB and NKSR report states that 61.2 percent of respondents had received vocational training (2021-12, 14).

The MOU white paper notes that during the COVID-19 pandemic, the government distributed emergency living expense funds to "particularly vulnerable groups among the defector community, including senior citizens who live alone, single-parent families, medical patients, children, and young people" (Republic of Korea 2022, 154).

3.2 Loss of Benefits

The MOU white paper notes that 2021 amendments to the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act expanded "protection" to "defectors who entered South Korea after living overseas for more than 10 years" (Republic of Korea 2022, 154-155). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the MOU stated that defectors who had "residency in a third country as a lawful resident" before entering South Korea would have "restrictions" to their entitled "benefits" in South Korea, which include "settlement money, accommodation support," and access to the "social security net" (Republic of Korea 2023-01-16).The NKDB Director of International Cooperation noted that most North Koreans who have lived in a third country for over 10 years are women who lived in China without legal residency, and often these women were "living in hiding" in China after having been "trafficked" (NKDB 2023-01-09). The same source added that some of these women were non-consensually married to a Chinese spouse during their time in China (NKDB 2023-01-09). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

Article 27 of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act, concerning alteration of a defector's protection, provides the following:

1. Where a person eligible for protection falls under any of the following cases, the Minister of Unification may suspend or terminate protection and settlement support, following deliberation by the Consultative Council:
   
   1. Where he or she is sentenced to imprisonment with or without labor for at least one year and his or her sentence is made final and conclusive;
   2. Where he or she intentionally provides false information contrary to the interest of the State;
   3. Where he or she is declared dead or missing by court;
   4. Where he or she attempts to go back to North Korea;
   5. Where he or she violates this Act or any order issued under this Act.
   6. Where he or she falls under grounds prescribed by Presidential Decree.
2. The head of a local government may request the Minister of Unification via the Minister of the Interior and Safety to suspend or terminate protection and settlement support for persons eligible for protection prescribed in paragraph (1) or to reduce or extend the period therefor under the proviso of Article 5 (3).

… (Republic of Korea 1997a, Art. 27, amendment notes omitted)

Article 48 of the Enforcement Decree of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act, concerning the grounds for "[a]lteration of [p]rotection," provides the following:

"Grounds prescribed by Presidential Decree" in Article 27 (1) 6 of the Act means any of the following cases:

1. Where a person eligible for protection has been specially appointed as a public official of Grade V, public official in general service belonging to the Senior Executive Service, or field-grade officer;
2. Where a person eligible for protection has been employed in professions such as a professor and researcher, or his or her professional qualifications as those as a doctor, have been recognized;
3. Where the amount of assets acquired by a person eligible for protection, including due gratuity provided in Article 40, is at least 300 million won;
4. Where it is ascertained that a person eligible for protection has applied for asylum in a third country;
5. Where a person eligible for protection has received, or attempted to receive, protection and support under the Act or this Decree by fraud or other improper means;
6. Where a person eligible for protection has helped, or attempted to help, another person to receive protection and support under the Act or this Decree by fraud or other improper means;
7. Where a person eligible for protection has engaged in conduct that has caused serious harm to national security. (Republic of Korea 1997b, Art. 48, amendment notes omitted)

4. Situation and Treatment

Sources report that "some" defectors experience "societal discrimination" (Freedom House 2022-02-24, 16) or that there is "a lot of discrimination" against defectors (NKDB 2023-01-09), and the NKDB Director of International Cooperation added that there remains a "fear of North Koreans" within South Korean society (NKDB 2023-01-09). The Associate Professor noted that defectors, including children, are "discriminated against," and they added that some are "exploited financially" (2023-01-09). The NKDB Director of International Cooperation stated that "many" defectors will not reveal their identity as such, and young defectors put considerable effort into altering their speech to resemble that of a native South Korean (NKDB 2023-01-09). The same source stated that they are aware of cases of police officers engaging in "sexual harassment or molestation" of defectors, but they added that these are not common occurrences (NKDB 2023-01-09). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The NKDB Director of International Cooperation noted that "'personal security officer[s]'" who are members of the local police force are assigned to each defector, and that their duties include protecting defectors from threats and checking on their wellbeing, as well as "gather[ing] information on them in case they are threats to South Korean society" (NKDB 2023-01-09). The same source added that each local police station keeps a list of defectors that they "should keep an eye on" (NKDB 2023-01-09). The GongGam lawyer noted that defectors are "basically under [the] surveillance" of their personal protection officer after entering South Korean society (Lawyer 2023-01-05). The NKDB Director of International Cooperation stated that personal security officers have no contact with their assigned defectors beyond the five years following their defection (NKDB 2023-01-09).

The North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act, provides the following:

Article 22-2 (Personal Protection in Place of Residence)

1. The Minister of Unification may request cooperation from the Minister of National Defense or the Commissioner General of the Korean National Police Agency for the personal safety of persons eligible for protection after they move into the place of residence pursuant to Article 22, and the Minister of National Defense or the Commissioner General of the Korean National Police Agency requested to provide such cooperation shall comply with such request.
2. Matters necessary for personal protection prescribed in paragraph (1) shall be determined in consultation with the Minister of National Defense, the Director General of the National Intelligence Service, or the Commissioner General of the Korean National Police Agency. For matters concerning personal protection following an overseas trip, opinions from the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of Justice may be heard.
3. The period of personal protection prescribed in paragraph (1) shall be five years: Provided, That the Minister of Unification may extend such period following deliberation by the Consultative Council, based on the intention of a person eligible for protection, the necessity for continuing personal protection, etc. (Republic of Korea 1997a)

A January 2022 article by the Washington Post states that a North Korean defector, who had resettled in South Korea 14 months prior, in a "rare" act, "defect[ed]" back to North Korea by "evad[ing] security controls and hopp[ing] over two 10-foot-high razor-wire fences" separating the North Korea-South Korea land border (2022-01-15). The same source, citing a Seoul police official, reports that in 2021 the man was twice "flagged to local police as a potential flight-risk" (The Washington Post 2022-01-15).

An October 2022 Washington Post article indicates that in 2019 a North Korean man who had defected to South Korea travelled back to North Korea via China in an effort to assist his mother in defecting to South Korea (2022-10-06). The same source notes that upon returning to Seoul, the man received a telephone call from a South Korean intelligence official and learned that South Korean authorities had "tracked" his travels using cellphone records (The Washington Post 2022-10-06). The article notes that the man was then "interrogated for weeks" by police to determine if he was "a spy" (The Washington Post 2022-10-06). The same source adds that although the man could have been sentenced for a maximum of three years in prison for travelling to North Korea, "the judge showed leniency" and reduced his sentence to six months in prison and two years of probation (The Washington Post 2022-10-06).

The NKDB and NKSR report indicates that, based on their survey conducted between November and December 2021, 35.1 percent of respondents noted that in the past year, they had "continually felt sad or hopelessness for more than 2 weeks, which negatively affected their daily lives" (2021-12, 15). The same source notes that 95.1 percent of respondents reported feeling a "sense of belonging" as a citizen of South Korea, and 88.7 percent reported feeling "a sense of belonging" as a member of their local community in South Korea (NKDB and NKSR 2021-12, 16).

According to the NKDB and NKSR report, over the course of the survey it became "clear" that "many" defectors "do not understand the different types of discrimination"; the report noted that the provision of education on this topic could help defectors to "clearly comprehend their rights and recognize when those rights are being violated" (2021-12, 16). According to the survey, 20.9 percent of respondents noted that they had been exposed to discrimination, and 45.5 percent stated that they had been discriminated against in employment (NKDB and NKSR 2021-12, 16). The same source notes that 61 percent of respondents reported that they found it "difficult to be equal to South Koreans because of their background" (NKDB and NKSR 2021-12, 17).

The NKDB and NKSR report states that 39.1 percent of respondents noted that they are "very satisfied with life in South Korea," and 35.1 percent reported being "somewhat satisfied" with it (2021-12, 17). However, the same report advises "cautio[n]" in the interpretation of these figures as respondents wish to be perceived as "well-adjusted members of society," and as such, they "may" "overstat[e]" their level of satisfaction (NKDB and NKSR 2021-12, 17). According to the NKDB and NKSR report, when survey participants were asked if they had thought of emigrating from South Korea to countries such as the US, UK, or China, 26.3 percent of respondents indicated that they had (2021-12, 13).

4.1 Economic Integration

According to the NKDB and NKSR report, 66.8 percent of defector respondents indicated that they were economically active, and 64.9 percent stated that they were employed (2021-12, 4). The same report states that, according to their survey results, defectors employed and salaried in South Korea earn around 70.4 percent of the average income earned by the same group in the general South Korean population (NKDB and NKSR 2021-12, 9). The NKDB and NKSR report notes that average wages earned by defectors declined from their 2020 average, while the general population's wages increased during the same period (2021-12, 9).

The NKDB and NKSR report states that 51.8 percent of its survey respondents had acquired additional education since arriving in South Korea, and 39.3 percent were currently pursuing, or had already obtained, university-level education or higher (2021-12, 14).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] The Resident Registration Card is a plastic identity card, available to be issued to any Korean national over the age of 17, which "certifies the individual is a resident of South Korea as a Korean national" (US n.d.).

[2] The advisory council of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) includes representatives of political parties and governments from North American, European and Asia-Pacific countries (HRNK n.d.a).

[3] Voice of America (VOA) is an American international broadcaster funded by the US Congress (VOA n.d.).

[4] GongGam Human Rights Law Foundation (GongGam) is non-profit, public interest lawyers' organization in South Korea focused on human rights protections for groups including migrants and refugees (GongGam n.d.)

[5] A Family Relations Certificate is a document that "can be issued to Korean nationals," and which provides information on immediate family members including biological and adopted parents, spouses, and children. The document is updated upon any changes of status to any family members, such as name changes, alterations to custody arrangement, and death (US n.d.).

[6] Liberty in North Korea (LiNK) is an international NGO, with offices in the US and South Korea, which "helps North Korean refugees" to escape North Korea and support them after their resettlement elsewhere (LiNK n.d.).

[7] The Korea Hana Foundation (KHF) is a "non-profit public organization" established by the Ministry of Unification (MOU) working to support North Korean defectors settling in South Korea (Republic of Korea n.d.).

[8] North Korean Social Research (NKSR) is an organization focused on researching the politics, economy, and society of North Korea, as well as the resettlement status of North Korean defectors in South Korea (NKDB 2020-12-29).

References

Al Jazeera. 2022-07-07. "S Korea Opens Probe Against Ex-Spy Chiefs Over N Korea Cases." [Accessed 2023-01-25]

Associate Professor, Carleton University. 2023-01-09. Interview with the Research Directorate.

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2019-11-07. "North Korean Fishermen 'Killed 16 Colleagues' Before Fleeing to South." [Accessed 2023-01-18]

The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). 2023-01-06. Interview with the Executive Director.

The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). N.d.a. "Advisory Council." [Accessed 2023-0201]

The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). N.d.b. "About HRNK." [Accessed 2023-01-04]

Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB). 2023-01-09. Interview with the Director of International Cooperation.

Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB). 2020-12-29. "2020 Survey on South Koreans' Perception of Human Rights in North Korea." [Accessed 2023-01-11]

Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB). N.d. "About the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB)." [Accessed 2023-01-04]

Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) and North Korea Social Research (NKSR). 2021-12. Gayoung Kim, Minju Sung and Soon-hee Lim. 2021 Social and Economic Integration of North Korean Defectors in South Korea. Translated and summarized in English by Juyeon Ok. [Accessed 2023-01-04]

The Diplomat. 2022-12-23. Chelsie Alexandre. "South Korea’s Former NSA Arrested Over Handling of Border Killing." [Accessed 2023-01-25]

The Diplomat. N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 2023-01-31]

Freedom House. 2022-02-24. "South Korea." Freedom in the World 2022. [Accessed 2023-01-04]

GongGam Human Rights Law Foundation (GongGam). N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 2023-01-10]

Greitens, Sheena Chestnut. 2021-03. "The Geopolitics of Citizenship: Evidence from North Korean Claims to Citizenship in South Korea." Journal of Korean Studies. Vol. 26, No. 1: 117-151. Sent to the Research Directorate by the author, 2023-01-06.

Lawyer, GongGam Human Rights Law Foundation (GongGam). 2023-01-05. Interview with the Research Directorate.

Liberty in North Korea (LiNK). 2023-01-24. Correspondence from the South Korea Country Director with the Research Directorate.

Liberty in North Korea (LiNK). "About Us." [Accessed 2023-02-03]

The New York Times. 2019-12-19. Choe Sang-Hun. "2 North Koreans Tried to Defect. Did Seoul Send Them to Their Deaths?" (Factiva) [Accessed 2023-02-03]

Republic of Korea. 2023-01-16. Ministry of Unification (MOU). Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Republic of Korea. 2022. Ministry of Unification (MOU). 2022 Unification White Paper. [Accessed 2023-01-03]

Republic of Korea. [2022]. Ministry of Unification (MOU). "Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors." [Accessed 2023-01-03]

Republic of Korea. 2021-11-11. Ministry of Unification (MOU). "Established Rule Concerning Residence Protection and Identity Confirmation of Residents [of the Republic of Korea] Who Have Escaped from North Korea." Excerpts translated by the Translation Bureau, Public Services and Procurement Canada. [Accessed 2023-01-10]

Republic of Korea. 1997a (amended 2021). North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act. Ministry of Unification (MoU). [Accessed 2023-01-03]

Republic of Korea. 1997b (amended 2022). Ministry of Unification (MOU). Enforcement Decree of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act. [Accessed 2023-01-03]

Republic of Korea. 1948a (amended 1987). Constitution of the Republic of Korea. [Accessed 2023-01-03]

Republic of Korea. 1948b (amended 2018). Nationality Act. [Accessed 2023-01-03]

Republic of Korea. N.d. Korea Hana Foundation. "Who We Are." [Accessed 2023-02-02]

US. N.d. Department of State. "South Korea Reciprocity Schedule." [Accessed 2023-01-18]

Voice of America (VOA). 2022-07-15. William Gallo. "Forced Repatriation Spurs Political, Legal Debate in South Korea." [Accessed 2023-01-18]

Voice of America (VOA). N.d. "Mission and Values." [Accessed 2023-01-30]

The Washington Post. 2022-10-06. Michelle Ye Hee Lee and Min Joo Kim. "He Escaped North Korea, Then Risked Everything to Go Back for His Mom." [Accessed 2023-01-25]

The Washington Post. 2022-01-15. Michelle Ye Hee Lee and Min Joo Kim. "After a North Korean Defector Returned Home, a Struggle for Clues To His Life in the South." [Accessed 2023-01-25]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Center for Strategic and International Studies; Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights; HanVoice; professor of government at a university in Washington, DC who specializes in Korean security; professor of social anthropology at a university in the UK who specializes in North Korean defectors in South Korean society; Republic of Korea – Korea Hana Foundation; research fellow at the Korean Institute for National Unification; UN – International Organization for Migration; US Institute of Peace.

Internet sites, including: Australia – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Austrian Red Cross – ecoi.net; Bertelsmann Stiftung; Center for Strategic and International Studies; CNN; EU – European Union Agency for Asylum; The Guardian; HanVoice; Human Rights Watch; International Crisis Group; The Korea Times; Radio Free Asia; Reuters; UK – Home Office; Wilson Center.