ecoi.net featured topic on Nigeria: Security Situation

Please note: In ecoi.net’s English interface, the featured topics are presented in the form of direct quotations from documents. This may lead to non-English language content being quoted. German language translations/summaries of these quotations are available when you switch to ecoi.net’s German language interface.

1. Background Information
2. Central Nigeria and Abuja
2.1. Background Information
2.2. Current Situation
3. Northeastern States (Boko Haram and IS-West Africa)
3.1. Background Information
3.2. Current Situation
4. Nortwestern States (kidnappping for ransom and violence of armed groups)
4.1. Background Information
4.2. Current Situation
5. Southern Nigeria, Biafra and the Niger Delta (Piracy, criminality, militant groups, separatist movement, Police violence)
5.1. Background Information
5.2. Current Situation
6. Further Information on the security situation in Nigeria
7. Sources

 

1. Background Information

“Nigeria hat über 190 Millionen Einwohner·nnen. Damit lebt fast die Hälfte der Bevölkerung Westafrikas in Nigeria. Die Wirtschaft des Landes ist weitgehend von den Einnahmen aus dem Erdölgeschäft abhängig. Der rückläufige Ölpreis, interne Konflikte und der Wertverfall der Landeswährung haben Nigeria in eine Rezession geführt. Zwar erholt sich die Konjunktur allmählich, doch ein inklusives Wirtschaftswachstum liegt in weiter Ferne. Mehr als zwei Drittel der Bevölkerung leben nach wie vor in extremer Armut.” (GIZ, 31 December 2020)[i]

“Nigeria, häufig als "Gigant Afrikas" bezeichnet, stellt eine Regionalmacht in Westafrika dar. Mit seinen 196 Mio. Einwohner/innen ist Nigeria nicht nur das bevölkerungsreichste Land Afrikas, sondern rangiert aufgrund seiner reichhaltigen Erdölvorkommen auch unter den weltweit acht größten Erdölexporteuren.” (GIZ, December 2020, p. 1)

“Nigeria ist in 36 Bundesstaaten mit 768 Local Government Areas (LGAs) als kommunale

Verwaltungseinheiten sowie dem Bundesterritorium Abuja Federal Capital Territory (FCT) mit sechs ‘Area Councils’ als Stadtteilräten, insgesamt 774 Bezirken, unterteilt. Jede Verwaltungseinheit verfügt über eine bestimmte Anzahl von ‘Councillors’, den Ratsmitgliedern, mit entsprechenden Verantwortlichkeiten. Jeder der 36 Bundesstaaten wird von einer Regierung unter der Leitung eines Gouverneurs (State Governor) und eines Landesparlamentes (State House of Assembly) geführt.“ (GIZ, December 2020, p. 17)

“Verschiedene gesellschaftspolitische Spannungsfelder führen dazu, dass es in Nigeria immer wieder zu - oftmals gewaltsam ausgetragenen - Konflikten kommt”. (GIZ, December 2020, p. 22)

“Aufgrund seiner großen Erdöl- und Erdgasvorkommen gilt Nigeria als die stärkste Volkswirtschaft des Kontinents. Die Konzentration auf das Erdöl hat jedoch zur Vernachlässigung des landwirtschaftlichen Sektors geführt. Trotz der immensen Einnahmen aus dem Erdölexport hat ein Großteil der Bevölkerung mit Armutsproblemen zu kämpfen.” (GIZ, December 2020, p. 31)

“Nigeria faces security challenges on several fronts. In the northeast, conflict between the military and two U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) – Boko Haram and an Islamic State-affiliated splinter faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) – has killed tens of thousands over the past decade, displaced millions, and caused a protracted humanitarian crisis. […] In Nigeria’s northwest, conflict between pastoralists and farmers recently has escalated amid a broader deterioration in security conditions involving cattle rustling, kidnapping, ethnic massacres, and emergent Islamist extremist activity. Farmer-herder violence also has surged in the central Middle Belt, where disputes over resource access coincide with ethno-religious cleavages between Christian and Muslim communities. In the south, criminality and militancy in the oil-rich Niger Delta have impeded development and contributed to insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea for decades.” (CRS, 18 September 2020, Summary)

“Yet corruption, infrastructure gaps, insecurity, and a failure to diversify the economy away from petroleum production have constrained economic growth and development.” (CRS, 18 September 2020, Summary)

“1983 December - Maj-Gen Muhammad Buhari seizes power in bloodless coup.” (BBC, 18 February 2019)[ii]

“1999 - Parliamentary and presidential elections. Olusegun Obasanjo sworn in as president.

2000 - Adoption of Islamic Sharia law by several northern states in the face of opposition from Christians. Tension over the issue results in hundreds of deaths in clashes between Christians and Muslims.

2001 - Tribal war in Benue State, in eastern-central Nigeria, displaces thousands of people. Troops sent to quash the fighting kill more than 200 unarmed civilians, apparently in retaliation for the abduction and murder of 19 soldiers.” (BBC, 18 February 2019)

“2006 January onwards - Militants in the Niger Delta attack pipelines and other oil facilities and kidnap foreign oil workers. The rebels demand more control over the region's oil wealth.” (BBC, 18 February 2019)

“2010 May - President Umaru Yar'Adua dies after a long illness. Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan, already acting in Yar'Adua's stead, succeeds him.

2011 March - Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan wins presidential elections.” (BBC, 18 February 2019)

“2015 March - Muhammadu Buhari wins the presidential election, becoming the first opposition candidate to do so in Nigeria's history.” (BBC, 18 February 2019)

“More than 15 million Nigerians chose Muhammadu Buhari as their president in 2019, close to the number that elected him in 2015, indicating that four years in office have not diminished his appeal.” (BBC, 27 February 2019)

“Die unabhängige nigerianische Wahlkommission INEC (Independent National Electoral Commission) hat am Mittwoch, den 27. Februar 2019, den amtierenden Präsidenten Muhammadu Buhari zum offiziellen Wahlsieger erklärt. Mit etwa 15,2 Millionen Stimmen erhielt er fast 4 Millionen Stimmen mehr als Atiku Abubakar (11,3 Millionen Stimmen). Insgesamt waren 82,3 Millionen Menschen wahlberechtigt, 28,6 Millionen Stimmen wurden abgegeben, davon waren 27,3 Millionen gültig. Der Wahlsieger Buhari bekam 55,6%, Abubakar 41,2% der Stimmen.” (SWP, 21 April 2019, p. 1)[iii]

“Der 76-jährige Buhari führte Nigeria bereits von 1983 bis 1985 als Staatsoberhaupt – er hatte sich an die Macht geputscht. Nach drei erfolglosen Versuchen, auf demokratischem Weg noch einmal Präsident zu werden, gelang es ihm 2015, sich gegen Goodluck Jonathan durchzusetzen. In seinem damaligen Wahlkampf versprach er, die Sicherheit angesichts der Bedrohung durch Boko Haram wiederherzustellen, die Korruption zu bekämpfen und die am Boden liegende Wirtschaft anzukurbeln.” (SWP, 21 April 2019, p. 2) [iv]

“1900 wurden die britischen ‘Protektorate’ Nord- und Südnigeria gegründet. Unter Gouverneur F. Lugard, dem Erfinder der ‘indirect rule’, fand schließlich 1914 ein Zusammenschluss der drei Herrschaftsbereiche - Lagos, Süd- und Nordnigeria - zu einem einheitlichen Gebiet Nigeria ‘Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria’ statt.” (GIZ, December 2020, p. 13)

“Nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg wurden die Forderungen der einheimischen Bevölkerung nach einer Beteiligung an der Verwaltung der Kolonialregierung lauter. Zwischen 1944 und 1951

erfolgten die ersten Gründungen politischer Parteien im Land, die auf ethnisch-regionalen Zugehörigkeiten basierten.” (GIZ, December 2020, p. 14)

“1963 wurde Nigeria - nach seiner Unabhängigkeit im Oktober 1960 - eine föderative Republik. Die erlangte Unabhängigkeit führte jedoch nicht zur inneren Einheit unter den Volksgruppen. Im Gegenteil: Aufgrund regionaler Spannungen, die durch ethnische Differenzen hervorgerufen wurden, übernahm das Militär 1966 die Macht.” (GIZ, December 2020, p. 14)

“Regionale Aufteilung – Die aus der Kolonialzeit stammenden regionalen Aufteilungen des Landes (Nord, Ost, West und Lagos) sowie neuere geopolitische Gliederungen in sechs Regionen sind die wichtigsten Ursachen für die andauernden Konflikte in Nigeria. Zu den Konfliktregionen gehören die Minoritätengebiete des Nordens - der sog. ‘Middle Belt’ und die ‘Former Midwest’ (das von Minderheiten bewohnte Gebiet zwischen den Yoruba und Igbo). Alle diese Gebiete spielen bei der Verteilung der Erdöleinkünfte und Posten innerhalb des Staatsapparats oder auch bei der Besetzung von Parteihierarchien, inklusive der Präsidentschaftskandidaten, eine ausschlaggebende Rolle. Dabei bestehen Rivalitäten um die

Machtansprüche und die Verteilung der Erlöse aus dem Ölgeschäft, hauptsächlich zwischen den drei Hauptethnien Hausa, Yoruba und Igbo.

Religiös bedingte Konflikte – Wie stark Nigeria entlang der Religionslinie gespalten ist, zeigen die Konflikte zwischen Muslimen und Christen in mehreren Bundesstaaten des Nordens seit Einführung der Scharia. Ein Brennpunkt dieser Konflikte ist der Bundesstaat Plateau in Zentral-Nigeria mit seiner Hauptstadt Jos, wo zwischen Januar und März 2010 mehrere hundert Menschen durch blutige Unruhen ums Leben kamen. Durch die zunehmende Verfolgung von Christen im Nordosten des Landes durch die radikal-islamistische Terrorgruppe Boko Haram befindet sich Nigeria auf dem Weltverfolgungsindex 2020 auf Rang 12 von 50 Positionen.” (GIZ, December 2020, p. 22)

“Maiduguri is where Boko Haram Islamist militants were first based when they began their insurgency six years ago.

Some 17,000 people are said to have been killed in that time and attacks by the group have intensified since Muhammadu Buhari became president in [2015], vowing to defeat the insurgents.” (BBC, 2 October 2015)

“Da die ethnischen Spannungen nicht gelöst werden konnten, rief Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu für die Region im Südosten (in denen die Igbos dominieren) im Mai 1967 den neuen Staat ‘Biafra’ aus. […] Die Abspaltung Biafras wurde von der nigerianischen Zentralregierung jedoch nicht akzeptiert und so entwickelte sich zwischen 1967 und 1970 ein blutiger Bürgerkrieg (Biafra-Krieg, bekannt in Nigeria als ‘Civil War’). In dem Bürgerkrieg und der dadurch ausgelösten Hungersnot starben zwischen 500.000 und drei Millionen Menschen.” (GIZ, December 2020, p. 14)

“Das Verhältnis zwischen den Anhängern der beiden großen Religionen, den Muslimen und den Christen, ist äußerst angespannt. Oft genügt ein geringer Anlass, um blutige Unruhen auszulösen. Ein auch nur annähernd religiös bedingter Vorfall im christlichen Süden gegen Muslime wird sofort Reaktionen im Norden hervorrufen, die immer wieder zum Tod von sog. Nichtgläubigen führen (Pogrome). Diese gehören mittlerweile zum Alltagsgeschehen in Nigeria. Seit dem Jahr 2000 sprechen die offiziellen Zahlen von über 11.500 Toten (Christen) aufgrund von religiösen Unruhen. Die tatsächlichen Zahlen dürften um ein Vielfaches höher liegen.

Lesenswert dazu ist die Einschätzung der Globalsecurity. Mit der Einführung der Scharia in den 12 nördlichen Bundesstaaten und der Terror durch Boko Haram in den drei Nordostbundesstaaten haben sich die Spannungen weiter verschärft, sodass der Norden Nigerias auf dem Weltverfolgungsindex 2020 bereits Rang 12 von 50 Positionen insgesamt einnimmt.” (GIZ, December 2020, p. 52)

“Vor 20 Jahren gab der erste Gouverneur im Norden Nigerias die Einführung der Scharia bekannt. Das Rechtssystem sollte dem sozialen Frieden dienen. Die Hoffnungen auf besser Lebensverhältnisse wurden enttäuscht. Konflikte zwischen Muslimen und Christen haben sich verschärft.” (Deutschlandfunk, 24 October 2019)[v]

“Since 2009, an Islamist insurgency based in northeastern Nigeria has killed tens of thousands of people and triggered a massive humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Basin region of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger […]. Founded in the early 2000s as a Salafist Sunni Muslim reform movement, Boko Haram, which roughly translates to ‘Western cultureis forbidden,’ has evolved into one of the world’s deadliest Islamist armed groups. Since 2016, an Islamic State (IS)-affiliated splinter faction, the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (IS-WA, aka ISIS-WA or ISWAP) has surpassed Boko Haram in size and capacity, and now ranks among IS’s most active affiliates.” (CRS, 26 March 2021, p. 1)

“Nigeria’s North East, especially Borno state, but also parts of Adamawa and Yobe states, are continually under siege by two jihadist factions, the Islamic State in West Africa Province and Jamaat Ahl al-Sunna li-Dawa wal-Jihad, collectively referred to as Boko Haram. In many other states across the North West and North Central zones, the presence of armed groups, whom authorities and the media loosely refer to as ‘bandits’, has left residents and travellers vulnerable to robbery and kidnapping for ransom, especially on roads, on farms and, more recently, in schools. Elsewhere, intra and inter-communal conflicts pose security risks.” (ICG, 4 May 2021, p. 17)[vi]

“Farmer-herder violence also has surged in the central Middle Belt, where disputes over resource access coincide with ethno-religious cleavages between Christian and Muslim communities.” (CRS, 18 September 2020, Summary)

“In the Middle Belt – a loosely defined region spanning Nigeria’s North Central geopolitical zone and adjacent parts of the North East and North West […] – violence between sedentary farmers and mobile livestock herders has surged in recent years.” (CRS, 18 September 2020, p. 8)

“Political unrest, criminality, and intermittent bouts of armed militancy linked to grievances over perceived exploitation and environmental degradation have afflicted the southern, oil-rich Niger Delta region for decades.” (CRS, 18 September 2020, p. 10)

“In 2009, in response to a wave of attacks on oil infrastructure that sharply reduced output, the government launched an amnesty and monthly stipend for militants. The program has curbed large attacks on oil facilities, but root causes of insecurity remain unaddressed and ex-militants routinely threaten to resume violence.” (CRS, 18 September 2020, p. 11)

“The Niger Delta also is the epicenter of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea: for several years, waters off Nigeria have ranked among the world’s most dangerous for attacks at sea. The region has become a hotspot for kidnappings targeting shipping personnel, as attackers exploit vast river networks to hide abducted crew while negotiating ransoms.” (CRS, 18 September 2020, p. 11)

“Militante Gruppen, die für eine Beteiligung an den Einnahmen aus dem Ölgeschäft kämpfen, geben sich nicht nur mit Erpressungen, Entführungen und Geiselnahmen meist ausländischer Ölmitarbeiter zufrieden, sondern bekämpfen sich auch gegenseitig. Die nigerianischen Sicherheitskräfte antworten oft mit Gewalt. Die Konflikte spielen sich dabei meist im Nigerdelta ab.

2016 sind die Unruhen im Nigerdelta verstärkt wieder aufgeflammt.” (GIZ, December 2020, p. 25)

“On 4 October 2020, a video went viral showing SARS officers dragging two men from a hotel and shooting one of them outside. A few days later, protests erupted across Nigeria. On 11 October, SARS is disbanded. But it was the 5th time since 2015 that the Nigerian authorities pledged to reform the police and disband SARS. Protests continued demanding more than empty promises.

On 20 October, the Nigerian army violently repressed a peaceful protest at the Lekki toll gate, shooting at the protesters and killing at least 12 people. Since that day, the Nigerian authorities have tried to cover up the events of the Lekki Toll Gate Shooting. They froze protests leaders' bank accounts and fined news agencies who diffused videos of the shooting.

But the ‘Soro Soke (‘Speak up’ in Yoruba) generation won't give up the fight for justice. They demand answers” (AI, undated)

 

2. Central Nigeria and Abuja

(States: Adamawa, Benue, Federal Capital Territory, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, Taraba)

2.1. Background Information

“Although Nigeria chiefly is known for its oil and gas production, agriculture employs about 70 per cent of its labour force. Small-holders in the country’s centre and south harvest most of the country’s tuber and vegetable crops while pastoralists in the north raise most of its grains and livestock. […] Historically, relations between herders and sedentary farming communities have been harmonious. By and large, they lived in a peaceful, symbiotic relationship: herders’ cattle would fertilise the farmers’ land in exchange for grazing rights. But tensions have grown over the past decade, with increasingly violent flare-ups spreading throughout central and southern states; incidents have occurred in at least 22 of the country’s 36 states.” (ICG, 19 September 2017, p. 1)

“Amnesty International visited 56 communities in Adamawa, Benue, Kaduna, Taraba, and Zamfara states affected by the clashes and conducted 262 interviews, including remotely with members of communities in Nasarawa and Plateau states. In all these communities, members of farmer communities said they had lived in peace with members of herder communities, who are Fulani. The Fulani herders also said the same thing about living in peace with the farmers. In some communities, farmers said problems started over the destruction of their crops due to the animals of the herders grazing on their farmlands, while in other communities, they could not explain the reasons for the attacks. In some cases, farmers received prior information or heard rumours that they would be attacked, but in other cases, the attacks were unexpected. The Fulani herders blamed farmers for trying to chase them out of their communities by rustling their cattle and attacking them.” (AI, 17 December 2018, p. 6)[vii]

“A Fulani chief in Adamawa State explained how trouble began between farmers and herder communities in the state: ‘We have been trying to manage the crisis by creating grazing areas because a number of the grazing routes have been occupied. Farmers farm on the cattle routes. There are international cattle routes that other Fulani [herders] from Mali and other countries frequently use and once they find the routes have been occupied [and used as farmlands], they go ahead and pass along the routes because to them, that is supposed to be their way.’ Amnesty International’s research revealed that one of the major causes of the clashes between herders and farmers is the scarcity of and competition for resources, mainly land, water and pasture.” (AI, 17 December 2018, p. 12)

“In the early 1970s, livestock production was distinctly separate from crop production, particularly in northern Nigeria, where the main links between the two were in the area of cattle grazing on crop residues after harvest and some farmers making use of draught oxen. During this time (as recent as the early 1970s), herders did not have established land rights because land was communally owned and in the hands of traditional rulers and family heads. The herder received permission (grazing permits) to graze their cattle in areas not under agricultural use.” (AI, 17 December 2018, p. 13)

“But over time, it has become difficult to separate the two means of livelihood [crop production and livestock production] because increasingly, the Fulani herders are taking to farming crops as a means of livelihood, while members of farming communities also now own cattle.” (AI, 17 December 2018, p. 14)

“This increase in farming and other large scale developmental activities such as schools, petrol stations, markets and power installations in the country, have resulted in growing encroachment on what used to be grazing routes or reserves, meaning access to land for grazing or passage is diminishing at the same time the region is seeing a growing cattle population.” (AI, 17 December 2018, p. 15)

“Amnesty International has documented 312 incidents of attacks and reprisal attacks in 22 states and Abuja between January 2016 and October 2018. As a result of these attacks Amnesty International estimates that at least 3,641 people may have been killed, 406 injured, 5,000 houses burnt down and 182,530 people displaced.” (AI, 17 December 2018, p. 16)

“Violent conflict between largely Muslim Fulani herders and ethnically diverse farmers in predominantly Christian areas has taken on tribal, religious and regional dimensions. Clashes across the central belt and spreading southward, are killing some 2,500 people a year. The conflict is now so deadly that many Nigerians fear it could become as dangerous as the Boko Haram insurgency. Escalating internally, the conflict could also spread regionally: herders might seek to draw fighters from their kin in other West and Central African countries, as some Fulani leaders have warned. This in turn could undermine a fragile region already struggling to defeat the Boko Haram insurgents.” (ICG, 20 July 2017)

“Land disputes, competition over dwindling resources, ethnic differences, and settler-indigene tensions contributed to clashes between herdsmen and farmers throughout the north-central part of the country. Ethnocultural and religious affiliation also were factors attributed to some local conflicts. Nevertheless, many international organizations, including International Crisis Group, assessed that these divisions were incidental to the farmer-herder conflict. During the past year, the conflict between herdsmen and farmers in north-central states steadily slowed due to government policies and civil society conflict-resolution mechanisms. ‘Silent killings,’ in which individuals disappeared and later were found dead, occurred throughout the year. Conflicts concerning land rights continued among members of the Tiv, Kwalla, Jukun, Fulani, and Azara ethnic groups living near the convergence of Nasarawa, Benue, and Taraba States.” (USDOS, 11 March 2020, Section 6)[viii]

“More than 1,531 people died and thousands were displaced in inter-communal violence mostly between herdsmen and farming communities, as well as in attacks by bandits, in the north-central and north-western regions. More than 1,015 people were taken hostage by unidentified gunmen; in December, over 300 students of Government Science Secondary School in Kankara in Katsina state were abducted from their hostels, although they were released a few days later. The violence forced many farming families to flee to urban areas or displacement camps.” (AI, 7 April 2021)

“Land disputes, competition over dwindling resources, ethnic differences, and settler-indigene tensions contributed to clashes between herdsmen and farmers throughout the north-central part of the country. […]

Conflicts concerning land rights continued among members of the Tiv, Kwalla, Jukun, Fulani, and Azara ethnic groups living near the convergence of Nasarawa, Benue, and Taraba States.” (USDOS, 30 March 2021, Section 6)

Incidents on conflict between herders and farmers are also covered in the section on Northern Nigeria.

2.2. Current Situation

“Herder-farmer and intercommunal violence rose in several states. Notably, gunmen killed at least 17 farmers in Guma area, Benue state, 23-24 April; 14 farmers in Doma and Keana areas, Nasarawa state, 24-27 April; 19 herders in Awkuzu town, Anambra state, 26 April. Violence involving Fulani traders and vigilantes, followed by armed attacks on villages 19-22 April left at least 83 killed in Maru, Bakura and Maradun areas of Zamfara state. Local militia 8 April killed 11 soldiers amid intercommunal violence in Konshisha area, Benue state.” (ICG, May 2021)

“In North West and North Centre, kidnappings for ransom and other violence ran high. In Niger state, gunmen 31 March-1 April killed at least 14, including six soldiers, in Shiroro area, 21 April attacked military camp in Munya area, and 24 April kidnapped 35 in Shiroro and Munya areas.” (ICG, May 2021)

 

3. Northeastern States (Boko Haram and IS-West Africa)

(States: Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Yobe,)

3.1. Background Information

“Boko Haram grew out of a group of radical Islamist youth who worshipped at the Al- Haji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, capital of Borno state, in the 1990s. Its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, began as a preacher and leader in the youth wing, Shababul Islam (Islamic Youth Vanguard), of Ahl-Sunnah, a Salafi group. […] Most accounts date the beginning of Boko Haram – its formal Arabic name is Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad) – to 2002, when it began to attract official attention.” (ICG, 3 April 2014, p. 7)
“Initially referred to as the Yusufiyya or Nigerian Taliban and later as Boko Haram, it also rejected all secular authority.” (ICG, 3 April 2014, p. 9)

“In 2014 Boko Haram killed more than 4,000 people, although the true figure is almost certainly higher. In the first three months of 2015, Boko Haram fighters killed at least 1,500 civilians. The group bombed civilian targets across Nigeria, raided towns and villages in the north-east and from July 2014 began to capture major towns. By February 2015, it controlled the majority of Borno state, as well as northern Adamawa state and eastern Yobe state. In August 2014, Abubakar Shekau, the group’s leader, proclaimed this territory to be a caliphate. Tens of thousands of civilians were subjected to Boko Haram’s brutal rule.” (AI, 13 April 2015, p. 3)

“Boko Haram wurde ungefähr 2002 vom salafistischen Prediger Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, der Hauptstadt des nigerianischen Bundesstaats Borno, gegründet. Yusuf lehnte den nigerianischen Staat als "unislamisch" ab und plädierte für die Einführung der Scharia. Sein Vorgehen war zunächst gewaltlos und zielte darauf ab, die Bevölkerung für sich zu gewinnen. Aufgrund der hohen Armut und Arbeitslosigkeit im Norden Nigerias konnte die Gruppe zu Beginn einen hohen Zulauf junger Menschen verzeichnen. 2009 wurde Yusuf von nigerianischen Sicherheitskräften getötet. Anschließend lag die Führung bei Abubakar Shekau. Unter ihm begann Boko Haram damit, das nigerianische Militär, Polizeistationen und Zivilisten zu attackieren. Es gibt regelmäßig Terroranschläge auf Kirchen und öffentliche Plätze sowie staatliche Institutionen wie Universitäten und Schulen. Dabei werden auch Kinder als Selbstmordattentäter eingesetzt. Shekau soll laut der nigerianischen Armee 2016 während eines Luftangriffs getötet worden sein.” (Die Zeit, updated on 29 March 2018)[ix]

“In March 2015, BH [Boko Haram] pledged allegiance to ISIS in an audiotape message. ISIS accepted the group’s pledge and the group began calling itself ISIS-West Africa. In August 2016, ISIS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was to replace Abubakar Shekau as the new leader of the group. Infighting then led the group to split. Shekau maintains a group of followers and affiliates concentrated primarily in the Sambisa Forest; this faction is known as Boko Haram. The Governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria routinely call both groups Boko Haram, with some differentiation on the ‘Shekau faction’ versus the ‘al-Barnawi faction.’” (USDOS, 19 September 2018)

“’We are in an Islamic caliphate,’ said Mr Shekau, flanked by masked fighters and carrying a machine gun. ‘We have nothing to do with Nigeria. We don't believe in this name.’” (BBC, 24 November 2016)

“Boko Haram overtakes ISIL to become the most deadly terrorist group in the world. Deaths attributed to Boko Haram increased by 317 per cent in 2014 to 6,644.“ (IEP, November 2015, p. 4)[x].

“Counterinsurgency efforts are reported to have become more effective following the inauguration in May 2015 of Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari. By cutting off supply routes and targeting insurgent safe havens, the insurgents were driven from most of the territories they had previously occupied. Following their territorial losses, the insurgents reportedly changed their tactics towards asymmetric warfare, including the use of kidnapping, rape, forced recruitment of children and youth, suicide bombing, and sexual slavery. However, according to analysts a comprehensive military victory is unlikely, and the insurgents continue to pose a considerable security threat.“ (UNHCR, October 2016, p. 1-2) [xi]

“Boko Haram and ISIS-WA attacked population centers and security personnel in Borno State. Boko Haram also conducted limited attacks in Adamawa, while ISIS-WA attacked targets in Yobe. These groups targeted anyone perceived as disagreeing with the groups’ political or religious beliefs or interfering with their access to resources. While Boko Haram no longer controls as much territory as it once did, the two insurgencies nevertheless maintained the ability to stage forces in rural areas and launch attacks against civilian and military targets across the Northeast. Both groups carried out infrequent attacks through roadside IEDs. ISIS-WA maintained the ability to carry out effective complex attacks on military positions.” (USDOS, 11 March 2020, Section 1g)

“Nigeria had the second largest fall in total deaths, owing largely to a 72 per cent reduction in fatalities attributed to Fulani extremists. Despite this decrease, the number of deaths attributed to Boko Haram increased by 25 per cent from 2018 to 2019. Renewed activity by Boko Haram in Nigeria and neighbouring countries, including Cameroon, Chad and Niger, remains a substantial threat to the region.” (IEP, November 2020, p. 13)

“Boko Haram and ISIS-WA attacked population centers, security personnel, and international organization and NGO personnel and facilities in Borno State. […] While Boko Haram no longer controlled as much territory as it did in 2016, the two insurgencies nevertheless maintained the ability to stage forces in rural areas and launch attacks against civilian and military targets across the Northeast. […]

Arbitrary arrests reportedly continued in the Northeast, and authorities held many individuals in poor and life-threatening conditions. There were reports some of the arrested and detained included children believed to be associated with Boko Haram, some of whom may have been forcibly recruited.” (USDOS, 30 March 2021, Section 1g)

“Boko Haram continued to commit grave human rights abuses in the north-east, including killings and abductions of civilians, which amounted to war crimes and may have constituted crimes against humanity. More than 420 civilians died in around 45 attacks, many of them in Borno state, but also in Adamawa and Yobe. Meanwhile, Boko Haram continued to recruit child soldiers.” (AI, 7 April 2021)

“Boko Haram and its splinter faction ISWAP continued attacks against civilians and humanitarian workers in the northeast.” (HRW, 13 January 2021)[xii]

 

3.2. Current Situation

“The Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) militant group said in an audio recording heard by Reuters on Sunday that Abubakar Shekau, leader of rival Nigerian militant Islamist group Boko Haram, was dead.

Shekau died around May 18 after detonating an explosive device when he was pursued by ISWAP fighters following a battle, a person purporting to be ISWAP leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi said on the audio recording.” (Reuters, 7 June 2021)[xiii]

“Two people familiar with al-Barnawi told Reuters the voice on the recording was that of the ISWAP leader.” (Reuters, 7 June 2021)

“Boko Haram's leader was reported to have been killed on several occasions over the last 12 years, including in announcements by the military, only to later appear in a video post.

In the audio recording, the man identified as al-Barnawi said his fighters had sought out the warlord on the orders of the Islamic State leadership, and battled Boko Haram insurgents until Shekau fled.

ISWAP chased him down and offered him the chance to repent and join them, he said.

‘Shekau preferred to be humiliated in the afterlife than getting humiliated on earth, and he killed himself instantly by detonating an explosive,’ he said.” (Reuters, 7 June 2021)

“Neither Boko Haram nor the Nigerian government have confirmed his death.” (BBC, 7 June 2021)

“In North East, jihadists stepped up attacks as Ramadan started 12 April. Notably, Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) 10-14 April launched three attacks on Damasak town, Borno state, killing at least 20 civilians and displacing about 65,000. Boko Haram combatants from Abubakar Shekau-led faction (JAS) 9 April killed at least 11 civilians in Hong area, Adamawa state, with 5,000 more displaced. ISWAP 23-28 April seized strategic Geidam town, Yobe state, 26 April overran army camp in Mainok town, Borno state, killing about 33 soldiers.” (ICG, May 2021)

“In Borno state in north east, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) targeted major humanitarian hub and military base despite military operations. Insurgents 1-2 March attacked Dikwa town, setting UN office ablaze and forcing evacuation of aid workers from Dikwa, Monguno and Ngala towns. ISWAP 11 March ambushed military convoy near Gudumbali town, reportedly killing 15 soldiers and four Multinational Joint Task Force troops, and 14 March attacked army’s super camp in Damasak town, killing at least 12 soldiers. Special forces 15 March reportedly killed 41 jihadists in operations near Gamboru and Ngala towns; 27 March killed 48 members of Boko Haram faction led by Abubakar Shekau (JAS) around Chibok and Askira towns. UN humanitarian office 16 March reported “worst [humanitarian] outlook in four years” in north east, with close to 2mn people internally displaced and up to 5.1mn facing hunger during lean season.” (ICG, April 2021)

“Boko Haram (BH) attacks continued in Borno state (north east) despite military operations. Army 9-10 Feb repelled insurgent attacks on base in Rann town and on Askira Uba town, killing at least 50 combatants. BH splinter group Islamic State West Africa Province 15 Feb killed at least seven soldiers in Marte area; next day launched coordinated attacks in Marte and Gubio areas, death toll unknown; 19 Feb raided several villages in Dikwa area, displacing thousands. BH rocket attack on state capital Maiduguri 23 Feb reportedly left 16 dead. Military 15 Feb said troops had killed some 80 insurgents from BH faction led by Abubakar Shekau (JAS) in “recent” operations in Sambisa forest; at least two senior JAS figures reportedly among those killed.” (ICG, March 2021)

 

4. Nortwestern States (kidnappping for ransom and violence of armed groups)

(States: Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara)

4.1. Background Information

“In Zamfara, as in the rest of the northwest, the term ‘bandit’ is shorthand for nomadic Fulani pastoralists. The elision not only stigmatises an entire community but skates over a complicated shared history with the politically dominant majority Hausa population.

Competition with Hausa farmers has sharpened over the past decade with both the intensification of agriculture and a drying climate. The expansion of farms across stock routes has meant access to both grazing and water have become issues of lethal contention.

Fulani herders are typically accused of ignoring boundaries, and their young men of being quick to violence. But the Fulani have also been victims of land-grabbing by the well-connected, and of extortion by local authorities when it comes to the levying of fines.

Organised Fulani raids began on Hausa villages from around 2014 in an escalation of what had been more localised conflicts. In self-defence, vigilante groups formed with the backing of the state government, but their revenge was often indiscriminate – turning towns into no-go areas and driving some Fulani communities into the forests.

Fulani militia responded with even greater ferocity – and better weaponry – calling on nomadic kin from across the region for assistance. Sweeping into Hausa villages on motorbikes, they typically killed all the men they could find, on the assumption they were all vigilantes.” (TNH, 19 January 2021)[xiv]

“In the northwest, when village-based Yan Sai Kai vigilante were formed to combat bandits, they tended to target Fulani – whether involved in criminality or not. That set off a chain reaction of tit-for-tat violence that has forced more than 280,000 people from their homes and disrupted farming – raising concerns for this season’s harvest.” (TNH, 8 April 2021)

“What happened in Unguwar Haraha Gofe has been replicated in scores of villages in Southern Kaduna in recent years. At least 366 people were killed in communal violence in the first seven months of this year alone – deepening the bitterness that has complicated the many attempts to find peace.

This fertile agricultural zone is home to at least 30 ethnic groups – predominantly Christian farming communities. Collectively, they are a minority within Kaduna state, where political and economic power is held by the Hausa-Fulani majority, who are almost exclusively Muslim.

The flashpoint for conflict is typically a dispute between “indigenous” farmers and Fulani pastoralists, who range across West Africa with their herds. The expansion of settled farmland has blocked legally-demarcated stock routes, and when crops have been trampled and water points fouled – or cattle killed or stolen – trouble has quickly followed in a tit-for-tat spiral of ever-worsening violence that has displaced an estimated 50,000 people in recent years.” (TNH, 17 December 2020)

“The Nigerian authorities have left rural communities at the mercy of rampaging gunmen who have killed at least 1,126 people in the north of the country since January, Amnesty International said today.

The organization interviewed civilians in Kaduna, Katsina, Niger, Plateau, Sokoto, Taraba and Zamfara states, who said they live in fear of attacks and abductions as insecurity escalates in rural areas. Many of those interviewed described how security forces often arrive hours after attacks have ended, even when officers have been given information about impending attacks. During one attack in Unguwan Magaji in Kaduna state, security forces arrived at the scene but left when they saw the sophisticated ammunition the attackers were using. By the time they returned, at least 17 people had been killed.

Amnesty International has documented an alarming escalation in attacks and abductions in several states in north west and north central Nigeria since January 2020. Worst affected are villages in the south of Kaduna State, where armed men killed at least 366 people in multiple attacks between January and July 2020.” (AI, 24 August 2020)

“Intercommunal violence continued in many parts of the country. In April, armed bandits killed at least 47 people in a coordinated attack on several villages in Katsina State in the northwest. According to the UN refugee agency, at least 1,126 people died between January and June in the northwest region, 210,000 people were internally displaced and over 70,000 fled to seek refuge in Niger as at August due to the insecurity in the region.” (HRW, 13 January 2021)

 

4.2. Current Situation

“In Kaduna state, gunmen 20-22 April abducted 100 in Chikun and Kajuru areas, later killing at least five of them.” (ICG, May 2021)

“In north west, armed group violence remained high. Notably, in Zamfara state, unidentified gunmen 16 March attacked Kabasa village, killing at least ten, including three soldiers; army said troops thwarted attack, killing scores. Also in Zamfara, 279 female students kidnapped late Feb released 2 March. In neighbouring Kaduna state, unidentified gunmen 11 March abducted 39 students in Afaka town; 15 March abducted several students and three teachers at primary school in Birnin Gwari area, later freed all children; 18 March killed 13 and burnt 56 houses in Zangon Kataf, Kauru and Chikun areas.” (ICG, April 2021)

“Criminal groups in Feb reportedly killed at least 112 and kidnapped over 450 people, mostly in Katsina, Kaduna, Sokoto and Zamfara states (north west), but also in Niger state (Middle Belt). Notably, armed group 17 Feb abducted 42 students and school personnel in Niger state, released them 27 Feb; 26 Feb kidnapped 279 girls in Zamfara state. Meanwhile, Auwalun Daudawa, who masterminded Dec 2020 abduction of 344 students in Katsina state, 8 Feb laid down arms along with five of his troops.” (ICG, March 2021)

 

5. Southern Nigeria, Biafra and the Niger Delta (Piracy, criminality, militant groups, separatist movement, Police violence)

 (States: Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Anambra, Bayelsa, Cross River State, Delta, Edo, Enugu, Imo, Ondo, Rivers)

5.1. Background Information

“The Niger Delta, in southern Nigeria, is a paradox, rich in resources but poor and racked by insecurity. A combination of local grievances over oil and gas pollution, infrastructure, poverty, unemployment, the region’s share of oil revenues and its marginalisation in national politics led to protests that evolved into a full-blown insurgency in 2006. That rebellion, waged by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), severely disrupted Nigeria’s oil industry, slashing earnings from its exports, the country’s major revenue source. A June 2009 presidential amnesty for the militants ended the insurgency, restored some stability and created an opportunity for the government to address the multiple grievances and demands at their roots. That opportunity was lost to political inertia and bad governance. Many issues that triggered the conflict remain largely unaddressed. The presidency of Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015), the first national leader from the region, stipends and training for the former militants and arrangements with insurgency leaders kept a lid on local agitation and conflict.” (ICG, 29 September 2015, p. 1)

“Incidences of petroleum pipeline vandalism in Nigeria have spiralled over the years. By way of example, such occurrences surged from 57 incidents in 1998 to over 2 500 incidents in 2008. This is rather ominous, considering the primacy of the petroleum sector vis-a-vis the sustenance of the Nigerian economy.” (African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 5 September 2019) [xv]

“Since its advent in the 1970s, the petroleum sector has predominantly sustained the Nigerian economy. The sector has also been a centre for petro-rentier politics and corruption – more specifically crime and violence, including oil theft sabotage and pipeline vandalism. […] The characteristics of the Niger Delta social context have informed three patterns of petro-pipeline vandalism, represented in the “need-greed-grievance” schema. Need-based vandalism is driven by the imperative for subsistence and survival, while greed-based vandalism is associated with the quest for primitive accumulation of petro-wealth. Grievance-based vandalism, on the other hand, refers to pipeline vandalism as an avenue for the advancement of an environmental justice cause. What is common across all these patterns of petroleum pipeline vandalism is that each of them is driven by a socio-existential imperative.” (African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 5 September 2019)

“Other organized criminal forces in the southern and middle parts of the country committed abuses, such as kidnappings. The overall level of violence in the Niger Delta, which declined briefly after a 2009 general amnesty, rose during the year.” (USDOS, 25 June 2015, Executive Summary)

“While amnesty lasted, there was some reprieve as militants sheathed their swords. However, there has been recourse to arms in the region in recent times as new militant groups emerged in 2016 with various demands. While the new names that emerged this time differ from the past ones, there is no doubt that this was old wine in new bottles. The new militants are still insisting on resource control and bombing of oil installations, which is re-immersing the country in conflict once again.” (African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 12 September 2017)

“Militants in the Niger Delta have not launched any major attacks on oil installations since the federal government engaged the region’s ethnic and political leaders last November, pledging to revive infrastructure projects, clean up the polluted Ogoni environment and allow local communities to set up modular refineries. Yet the region’s situation remains fragile. Attacks against Igbos or other southerners in the north might lead some delta militants to target oil companies, either to pressure the federal and northern state governments to stop anti-Igbo violence, or to cover criminal activities.” (ICG, 20 July 2017)

“Criminal groups abducted civilians in the Niger Delta and the Southeast, often to collect ransom payments. Maritime kidnappings remained common as militants turned to piracy and related crimes to support themselves. On July 13, for example, Nigerian pirates boarded a cargo vessel off the coast of Bayelsa, kidnapping 10 Turkish sailors and taking them away by speedboat. The pirates, initially demanding three million dollars as a ransom payment, reportedly released the sailors in August after weeks of negotiations.” (USDOS, 11 March 2020, Section 1b)

“Kidnappings by pirates in the Gulf of Guinea hit a record in 2020, with well-armed and violent gangs defying regional navies and marauding further out to sea, a report from the International Maritime Bureau said on Wednesday. Pirates in the West African region kidnapped 130 seafarers in 22 separate incidents, accounting for all but five of those seized worldwide last year. The previous record, in 2019, was 121.” (Reuters, 13 January 2021)

“Maritime kidnappings remained common as militants turned to piracy and related crimes to support themselves. For example, in July, Nigerian pirates attacked a Floating Production Storage and Offloading vessel near Rivers State, kidnapping 11 crew members.” (USDOS, 30 March 2021, Section 1b)

“In October, security forces used excessive force to disperse peaceful protests and assemblies, including the #EndSARS demonstrations, resulting in the deaths of 56 protesters, bystanders and members of the security forces.” (AI, 7 April 2021)

“The Nigerian army has rejected claims it killed unarmed protesters at a rally in Lagos in October, saying its soldiers were firing blank bullets.

Brigadier General Ahmed Taiwo presented video evidence to back up his claims made to a panel of inquiry.

Amnesty International says 12 people were killed when soldiers opened fire on a protest about police brutality in the wealthy Lagos suburb of Lekki.

Multiple eyewitnesses have told the BBC they saw soldiers shoot people.

Some 1,000 protesters had gathered at the Lekki toll gate on 20 October to prevent cars using a major motorway. Soldiers were reportedly seen barricading the protest site moments before the shooting started.

In video footage shared on social media at the time, shots could be heard as protesters sat down, locked arms and sang the national anthem together. Live footage was also streamed from the scene showing protesters tending to the wounded.

The attack had followed days of protests against the much-hated police unit, the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (Sars), which had morphed into greater calls for better governance.” (BBC, 15 November 2020)

 

5.2. Current Situation

“In South East and South South, gunmen stepped up attacks on security personnel and facilities, but also ethnic Hausa and Fulani northerners, killing 13 northerners in Enugu and Imo states 29 March-3 April, and freeing over 1,800 inmates at Owerri prison in Imo state 5 April. Authorities blamed Eastern Security Network (ESN), armed wing of outlawed separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), and security forces 24 April raided ESN headquarters in Awomama town, Imo state, killing 11 including senior commanders. IPOB immediately promised “hell” to those involved.” (ICG, May 2021)

“Herder-farmer relations continued to deteriorate in south, with many incidents of violence, notably 27 people killed 28-29 March in attacks on four farming villages in Ebonyi state (south east) by suspected herders.” (ICG, April 2021)

“Also in south east, attacks on police personnel and facilities by suspected members of Eastern Security Network (ESN), paramilitary wing of secessionist group Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), continued; troops 24 March killed 16 ESN in Aba town, Abia state.” (ICG, April 2021)

“Amid rise in herder-farmer and intercommunal violence in south since Jan, clashes between ethnic Hausa and Fulani on one hand, and ethnic Yoruba on the other, early Feb killed two dozen people in Oyo state capital Ibadan (south west). Nobel laureate in literature Wole Soyinka 6 Feb warned situation could spiral into civil war and former President Abdulsalam Abubakar 16 Feb said it could lead to “point of no return”.” (ICG, March 2021)

“In Imo state (south east), security forces stepped up operations against Eastern Security Network (ESN), paramilitary wing of outlawed secessionist group Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB); army 18 Feb deployed helicopters and hundreds of troops in Orlu and Orsu areas, razing several ESN camps; IPOB same day said govt had triggered “second Nigeria-Biafra war”.” (ICG, March 2021)

“SARS - the Special Anti-Robbery Squad - is a unit of the police tasked with fighting violent crime.” (AI, 7 April 2021)

“The government took some steps to investigate alleged abuses by police, including the Special Anti-Robbery Squad and military forces, but impunity remained a significant problem.” (USDOS, 30 March 2021)

“In October, security forces used excessive force to disperse peaceful protests and assemblies, including the #EndSARS demonstrations, resulting in the deaths of 56 protesters, bystanders and members of the security forces.” (AI, 7 April 2021)

“From the 12 June 1993 pro-democracy protests, occupy Nigeria protest of 2012, to the #EndSARS protest of 2020 Nigerian authorities continue to violently repress peaceful protests.

‘We are concerned that the civic space is shrinking and the fear of violence by security forces and sponsored thugs are undermining the right to peaceful protest, and having profound impact on other human rights,’ said Osai Ojigho

The use of excessive force by the police remains an unresolved human rights issue. In 2004, 2009, 2016 and 2020, Amnesty International published reports on the same issue; documenting increasing violation of human rights by the Nigerian police. All the claims of reforming the police turned out to be ineffective. Despite the systemic human rights violations perpetrated by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) no one has been held accountable.” (AI, 28 May 2021)

“On October 24, in the wake of “#EndSARS” (referring to the Special Antirobbery Squad [SARS] arm of police) protests against alleged police brutality, Christian Igbo youths allegedly killed 11 Muslims in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, and burned down the central mosque in Orlu, Imo State. In November, Enugu State governor Ifeanyi Ugwuanyi ordered the immediate rebuilding of two mosques that had been destroyed during the #EndSARS protests in the Nsukka Local Government Area in the predominantly Christian state.” (USDOS, 12 May 2021)

“On 23 August, security forces opened fire on unarmed members of the separatist group the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), who were holding a meeting at a school in Emene in Enugu state, killing at least four people. Witnesses said officers of the Department of State Services (DSS), police and military were at the scene, some of whom shot directly at IPOB members who were carrying stones and sticks. The authorities said two security force officers were also killed in the incident.” (AI, 4 April 2021)

 

6. Further Information on the security situation in Nigeria

Please see the following link to access the database of Nigeriawatch[xvi]:

• Nigeriawatch: The Database; List of Events, no date
  http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtListe&cherche=1

For further information on security incidents please also see:

ACAPS[xvii]: Crisis Updates; Nigeria; Complex Crisis, no date
https://www.acaps.org/country/nigeria/crisis/complex-crisis

For maps on security incidents in Nigeria please also see:

• CFR - Council on Foreign Relations[xviii]: Nigeria Security Tracker; Mapping Violence in Nigeria, no date
  http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483
• P4P - Partners for Peace[xix]: Peace Building Map, no date
  http://www.p4p-nigerdelta.org/peace-map/

 

7. Sources

(all links accessed on 7 June 2021)

This featured topic was prepared after researching solely on ecoi.net and within time constraints. It is meant to offer an overview on an issue and is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status, asylum or other form of international protection. Chronologies are not intended to be exhaustive. Every quotation is referred to with a hyperlink to the respective document.

Associated documents