Document #1192520
IRB – Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (Author)
Somalia, located in the "Horn of Africa"
with a population of about 5.8 million, has few natural resources
and has undergone severe environmental degradation during the past
decade. The country is presently affected by a civil war which
erupted in the Northern part of the country in May 1988. The
fighting broke out after the main opposition force, the Somali
National Movement (SNM), crossed the Ethiopian border and launched
major attacks in towns of the North, including Burao and Hargeisa.
["The Somali-South African Connection", in Africa Events,
April 1989, p. 32.] The government response included bombings of
civilian populations, causing thousands of deaths and the
displacement of about two million people. [ Somalia:
Imprisonment of Members of the Isaaq Clan since Mid-1988,
(London: Amnesty International, 1988), p. 2.]
Since 1969, Somalia has been governed by a
military dictatorship lead by Siyaad Barre. The regime has been
repeatedly accused of violations of human rights. The army, police
and, in particular, the National Security Service (NSS), have been
most frequently identified as the agencies which commit such
abuses. [Critique to the U.S. Department of State's Country
Reports, 1986, 1987, 1988: Somalia, (Washington: Human Rights
Watch, 1986, 1987, 1988); Amnesty International Reports
1979-1988 and Somalia: a long term human rights crisis,
(London: Amnesty International, 1979-1988, September 1988);
Scientists and Human Rights in Somalia, (Washington:
National Academy of Sciences and Institute of Medicine, 1988).] The
NSS has unlimited powers of arrest, search and confiscation, and
has detained thousands of people for political or unspecified
reasons in recent years. [ Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1988, (Washington: U.S. Department of State,
1989), p. 308.] Prisoners are reported to be subject to torture and
extra-judicial executions. [ Somalia: a long term human rights
crisis, and Critique, various pages.]
Tensions between the Somali government and
the two main opposition groups, the Somali National Movement (SNM),
a mainly Isaaq-clan organization, and the Democratic Front for the
Salvation of Somalia (DFSS) linked to the Majerteen clan, arose
about a decade ago; this apparently gave the government an excuse
to increase its abuses, which reportedly have increased sharply
since the start of the civil war. [ Somalia: Imprisonment of
Members of the Isaaq Clan since Mid-1988; "Somalia: Showdown in
the North", in Africa Confidential, 29 July 1988, pp. 1-3,
and Beyond the Headlines: refugees in the Horn of Africa,
(American Council for Nationalities Service, 1988), p. 38.]
International institutions, including the
Canadian Centre for Torture Victims and the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, report torture, abduction, rape, extortion and other
abuses being committed throughout the country, mostly, but not
exclusively, by the NSS. [ Critique, p. 135.] Dr. Wendall
Block, on behalf of the Canadian Centre for the Investigation and
Prevention of Torture, reports in November 1987 that the Somalis he
interviewed were detained and tortured for presumed reasons such as
fund raising for the SNM, verbal criticism of government policies
and simply for being a relative of a member of an opposition
organization. [Somalia: A Long Term Human Rights Crises,
(London: Amnesty International, 1979-1988, September 1988), p.44.]
Everyone denied being formally charged or brought to trial. Their
detentions ranged from a week to three and a half years. [ibid. ]
Some of them were detained in military camps but most were kept in
NSS centres. Aside from the inhuman conditions, there were regular
beatings, including the "Mig" (chest to floor, arms and legs pulled
back so that wrists are tied to ankles). [ibid. p.45]
Political, labour and individual rights are
severely restricted and controlled by the government. Independent
unions and demonstrations are banned, and the government routinely
intervenes with personal communications. Freedom of movement within
Somalia and the right to leave the country are limited by the
authorities. [ Country Reports for 1988: Somalia, various
sections.] Somali officials allegedly demand large bribes from
members of the Somali community who return from abroad and attempt
to leave the country again. [ Critique, p. 136.] Young men
are reportedly recruited at gunpoint for military service in order
to maintain a sufficient number of armed forces in the North. [
"Somalia: The Mogadishu factor", in Africa Confidential,
(London: Miramoor Publications, Limited), 16 December 1988, p. 2.]
A curfew is currently in effect throughout the northern region of
the country. [ Critique, p. 136.] Government hostility
towards and interference with religious leaders is also reported to
have increased in recent years. Instances of imprisonment and
execution of religious leaders who have criticized restrictions
placed on the freedom of worship have been reported. [ Ibid,
p. 139.]
The Somali nation has evolved from a
pastoral society divided into six main clan-families, which are, in
turn, divided into many more sub-clans (see attached chart). The
Majerteen is one of four pastoral clans which has inhabited the
central and eastern regions of Somalia. [C. Legum, ed. Africa
Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents 1986 - 1987.,
vol. XIX, (New York: Africana Publishing Company., 1987), p. B410.]
During the civilian rule preceding the present dictatorship, all
clans participated and were represented in government; this
participation tended to ease clan rivalries and conflicts.
[Ibid, pp. 90-91.]
Since the early years of his dictatorship,
general Siyaad Barre has limited the participation in government of
members of the Majerteen clan, the predominant group during the
civilian era. This has led to a confrontation, with Barre alluding
to the Majerteen as his enemies, and, ultimately, identifying
enemies of his regime according to clan membership. [ Ibid,
p. 91.] In retaliation for a coup attempt in 1971, Barre executed
members of the three leading clans (Majerteen being one of them)
and has since institutionalized clan membership as the predominant
feature of Somali politics. [ Ibid.] Barre has also
reportedly promoted interclan divisions and in-fighting to maintain
himself in power. Members of the Majerteen, Isaaq and Hawiye clans
have voiced uncertainty about their status under Siyaad Barre's
rule as he has formed a ruling coalition of the Mareehan, Ogadeen
and Dolbahanta clans (an alliance often referred to as MOD).
[Ibid, pp. 91-92.] Having lost influence in political,
social and economic life, the Hawiye, Majerteen and Issaq clans,
although numerous, have limited access to the country's wealth. [
Ibid, p. 156.] Presently, the Marehan clan, to which Barre
belongs, dominates Somalia's political and economic system.
[Critique, pp. 133-134.]
The SSF, Somali Salvation Front, was
established in February 1979 by Osman Nur Ali, a former minister in
Siyaad Barre's first cabinet in 1969. The SSF was based mainly on
members of the Majerteen tribe. [Revolutionary and Dissident
Movements, An International Guide., (London: Longman Group UK
Ltd.) 1988., p.325] In October 1981, the SSF along with the DFLS,
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia, and the SWP, Somali
Workers' Party created the DFSS, Democratic Front for the Salvation
of Somalia. [ibid.] Prior to 1985 DFSS fought mainly in southern
Somalia. In 1982 two small border towns, Goldogob and Balambale,
were occupied by FDSS. [Somalia: A Long Term Human Rights
Crises, Amnesty International, p.6.] In October 1982 DFSS
announced that it would form a Joint Military Committee with the
SNM, a move which was to eventually lead to the unification of the
two movements. [Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, p.
325.]
At the present time, interclan enmity is
reported to be worse and potentially more violent than in any
period of Somalia's history. [ Somalia: Nation in Search of a
State,
p. 94.] Feuding clans often resort to reciprocal assassination of
one another's elders in order to deprive a rival clan of its able
leadership. [ Ibid, p. 161.] The SNM has allegedly killed
members of rival clans (non-Isaaq), often on the suspicion that
they were opposed to the SNM. [ Country Reports for 1988, p.
308.] The army has also been riddled with internal clan-derived
divisions, resulting in desertions and arbitrary detentions.
["Somalia; Generals fall out", in Africa Confidential, 23
September 1988, pp. 1-2, and "Somalia: Showdown in the North".]
Moreover, since the outbreak of civil war, the government has
increased its efforts to eliminate opposition throughout the
country, [Somalia: A long term human rights crisis and
Somalia: Imprisonment of members of the Isaaq clan since
mid-1988; Africa Confidential, 16 December 1988, 6
January 1989, 20 January 1989.] and Amnesty International reports
that being a member of a particular clan can be enough to arouse
suspicion among Somali authorities, who work on the assumption that
many clan-members support particular opposition groups. [
Somalia: A long term human rights crisis and Somalia:
Imprisonment of members of the Isaaq clan since mid-1988,
various pages.]
Lately, the SNM has
reportedly tried to open a southern front
by gaining support from the Hawiye clan, but only two sub-clans (no
specific names available) have assisted the SNM in its endeavour. [
"Somalia: Showdown in the north", in Africa Confidential, 29
July 1988, p. 2. ] Prior to a major SNM campaign last year, small
groups of Hawiye troops deserted the Somali army. [ Ibid.]
Hawiye elders, however, have refused to put Hawiye urban and
business interests at risk, particularly after the government's
indiscriminate attacks on populations of other clans in the North.
[ Ibid.] Nonetheless, there are reports of widespread
resentment among the Hawiye, as this clan has been most affected by
the army's conscription campaign in the Mogadishu and Southern
areas, prompting differing views on whether to form a militia to
compensate for the clan's lack of political power. [
Ibid.]
Attached is a chart showing the clan and
sub-clan families and a map indicating the general distribution of
the major clans.
CONCLUSION
A repressive regime which has increased its
abuses against opposition groups as a part of its strategy to
entrench its position during the recent civil war, a society
riddled with inter and intra-clan rivalries, as well as severe
environmental and economic hardships, have forced numerous Somalis
out of their country. [ Somalia: Imprisonment of Members of the
Isaaq Clan Since Mid-1988.] In addition to the large numbers of
Somalis who had previously escaped the Barre regime and sought
refuge abroad, over half a million moved into Ethiopia during the
first months of the civil war, [ Ibid, pp. 2-3.] and the
flow has continued and extended into other countries, from
neighbouring Djibouti to as far away as Canada.
For the internally displaced, the situation
has worsened: international relief agencies such as the
International Red Cross and the Australian Community Aid Abroad
have left Somalia in the face of increasing brutality. [ "U.N. ends
Somali refugee work", in The Guardian, 11 January 1989.]
These agencies gave relief to internally displaced and homeless
refugee groups which, by late 1988, were estimated to number a
million and a half people from the northeastern areas of conflict.
[ Somalia: Imprisonment of Members of the Isaaq Clan since
Mid-1988.] The UNHCR also reported that Ethiopian refugees
living in refugee camps inside Somalia are being armed and
conscripted by the Somali government. [ Ibid.] A group of
Western ambassadors that visited the areas affected by conflict,
expressed serious concern about the fact that the army controls the
distribution of food and water. ["Somalia: Wounded North, Bruised
South", p. 3.]
Because of the Ogaden war in the late
seventies, in which Somalia launched an ill-fated military campaign
against Ethiopia, the support given by Somalia to the Ethiopian
rebel groups on one hand, and the establishment of Somali rebel
bases in Ethiopian territory on the other, Somali-Ethiopian
relations are tense, to the point where occasional incursions and
clashes in border areas occur. [ "The Somali-South African
Connection", pp. 32-33. ]
The present repression, instability and
violence, together with social and economic problems and tension
along the Ethiopian border, seem to be decisive factors in
generating the large exodus of Somalis that has occurred in the
last few years. No immediate solution to Somalia's internal
problems seems likely, as reports describe Siyaad Barre's regime as
a very stable one, and inter-clan rivalries are deeply rooted.
[Somalia: Nation in Search of a State, pp. 153-167.] The SNM
rebel group is reported to pose a limited threat, as the extension
of supply lines from Ethiopia hamper its military capacity, while
the DFSS is described as virtually inactive in spite of a force
stationed in bases in Ethiopia numbering approximately 2,000 men. [
"Somalia: Showdown in the North", pp. 1-3.] It has been in disarray
since Ethiopia detained its head, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf in 1985.
A number of DFSS members have accepted Siyaad Barre's offer of
amnesty. [Somalia: Nation in Search of a State. p. 99.]
From 1969 to 1980 there have been 61 public
executions. The charges have been anti-social, anti-revolutionary
or anti-government activities. [Somalia: Nation in Search of a
State. p. 98.] In February 1988, 22 Somalis finally faced
trials before the National Security Court in Mogadishu, six years
after they were arrested. Six of the defendants were former Members
of Parliament. [Somalia: A Long Term Human Rights Crises.
p.28.] After international appeals for clemency, eight death
sentences were commuted by Siyaad Barre. The revised sentences were
24 years imprisonment. [ibid. p.29]