The Somali nation has evolved from a pastoral society divided into six main clan-families, which are, in turn, divided into many more sub-clans (see attached chart). The Majerteen is one of Somalia's major clans. The Majerteen held the main pre-colonial kingdom, the Sultanate of Boqor Ismaan Mahamoud, on the East coast of the country. [ David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 48.] As an Italian protectorate, the clan continued to hold a predominant position. [ Ibid, p. 52.] During the civilian rule preceding the present dictatorship, which seized power in 1969, all clans participated and were represented in government; this participation reportedly tended to ease clan rivalries and conflicts. [ Ibid, pp. 90-91.]

Since the early years of his dictatorship, General Siyaad Barre has limited the participation in government of members of the Majerteen clan, the predominant group during the civilian era. This has led to a confrontation, with Barre alluding to the Majerteen as his enemies, and ultimately identifying enemies to his regime according to clan membership. [ Ibid, p. 91.] Barre is, according to a report, particularly paranoid of the Majerteen, mostly because of their past influence. [Ibid,p.156.]

In retaliation for a coup attempt in 1971, Barre executed members of the three leading clans (Majerteen being one of them) and has since institutionalized clan membership as the predominant feature of Somali politics. [ Ibid.] Barre has also reportedly promoted interclan divisions and in-fighting to maintain himself in power. Members of the Majerteen, Isaaq and Hawiye clans have voiced uncertainty about their status under Siyaad Barre's rule as he has formed a ruling coalition of the Mareehan, Ogadeen and Dolbahanta clans (an alliance often referred to as MOD). [ Ibid, pp. 91-92.] Presently, the Marehan clan, to which Barre belongs, dominates Somalia's political and economic system. [ Critique to the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1987, (Washington: Human Rights Watch, 1988), pp. 133-134.]

Tensions between the Somali government and the two main opposition groups, the Somali National Movement (SNM), a mainly Isaaq-clan organization, and the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS), linked to the Majerteen clan, arose about a decade ago. This apparently gave the government an excuse to increase its abuses, which reportedly have increased sharply since the start of the civil war. [ Somalia: Imprisonment of Members of the Isaaq Clan since Mid-1988, various pages; "Somalia: Showdown in the North", in Africa Confidential, 29 July 1988, pp. 1-3, and Beyond the Headlines: refugees in the Horn of Africa, (American Council for Nationalities Service, 1988), p. 38.] Reprisals against the Majerteen were evidenced by the government's use of extra-judicial executions, rape, the killing of livestock and the destruction of reservoirs. [ Somalia: A Government at War with its Own People, An Africa Watch Report, Washington: Human Rights Watch, January 1990, pp.28-29.] This scorched-earth government policy was reportedly intended to deprive the SSDF of political and social support from Majerteen civilians. [ Africa Watch, ibid.] At the present time, interclan enmity is reported to be worse and potentially more violent than in any period of Somalia's history. [ Somalia: Nation in Search of a State, p.94.] Feuding clans often resort to reciprocal assassination of one another's elders in order to deprive a rival clan of its able leadership. [ Ibid, p. 161.] The SNM has allegedly killed members of rival clans (non-Isaaq), often on the suspicion that they were opposed to the SNM. [ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988, (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1989), p. 308.] Although a report states that many Majerteen military officers do not actively participate in clan politics, [ Somalia: Nation in search of a state, p. 156.] the army has also been riddled with internal clan-based divisions, resulting in desertions and arbitrary detentions. [ "Somalia; Generals fall out", in Africa Confidential, 23 September 1988, pp. 1-2, and "Somalia: Showdown in the North", 29 July 1988, p. 2.] Moreover, since the outbreak of the civil war, the government has increased its efforts to eliminate opposition throughout the country. [ Amnesty International (1988): Somalia: A long term human rights crisis and Somalia: Imprisonment of members of the Isaaq clan since mid-1988; Africa Confidential, 16 December 1988, 6 January 1989, 20 January 1989.] Amnesty International reports that being a member of a particular clan can be enough to arise suspicion among Somali authorities, who work on the assumption that many clan-members support particular opposition groups. [ Somalia: A long term human rights crisis and Somalia: Imprisonment of members of the Isaaq clan since mid-1988, various pages.]

The Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS; sometimes referred to as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front or SSDF), one of the two major armed opposition groups, is reportedly based in Addis Ababa and derives most of its support from the Majerteen clan. [ "Somalia: Showdown in the North", in Africa Confidential, 29 July 1988, pp. 1-3; Somalia: Nation in search of a state, p. 157; Somalia: Imprisonment of Members of the Isaaq Clan since Mid-1988, (London: Amnesty International, 1988).] Ethiopian forces reportedly imprisoned the leader of the DFSS, Colonel Yuusuf, in 1987 after a power struggle within the DFSS which resulted in Yuusuf's executing of four high-ranking members of the Front. [ Somalia: Nation in search of a state, p. 158.]

The DFSS has been recently described as virtually inactive, in spite of having over 1,000 fighters reportedly armed with Libyan-supplied weapons in bases which, according to recent reports, were still located in Ethiopian territory, [ Africa Confidential, 29 July 1988 and 18 November 1988, p. 3.] despite the 1988 agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia to cut off support and bases in neighbouring countries for rebel forces. [Keesing's Record of World Events (London, Longman Publishing Group), p. 36007.]

After Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden war with Ethiopia, many Ogadeni felt cheated that the intervention of the Somali army contributed to their defeat in the war and in their need to seek refuge in Somalia. Furthermore, the Somali army felt humiliated by President Siyaad Barre's policies. [ "Somali: Ogadeni's Misfortune", Africa Confidential, (London: Miramoor Publications Ltd., 17 October 1984), p.6.] Consequently in 1978, in a bid to oust Siyaad Barre, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Col. Mohamed Osman led an unsuccessful coup attempt, [ibid.] in which 20 army officers were killed. [George T. Kurian, Encyclopedia of the Third World, vol.II, (New York: Facts On File, Inc., 1978), p.1304.] Col. Mohamed Osman was executed along with several other officers, but Col. Abdullahi Yusuf was able to flee to Kenya and eventually to Ethiopia. [ibid.] There he formed the first anti-Barre front, the Somali Salvation Front (SOSAF) which started armed struggle in 1979. [ibid.] Its name was changed to the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS). [ibid.]

The major weaknesses of the DFSS was its domination by Majerteen people from central Somalia and the negative Somali view of the group's reliance on Ethiopia, the arch-enemy. [ibid.] In 1984 many members of DFSS took advantage of the amnesty offer made by Siyaad Barre, reportedly following a split within the group over the question of Col. Abdullahi's leadership. [ C. Legum, ed., African Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1984-1985, (New York: Africana Publishing Company 1985), p.B353.] This split is evidenced in the breakaway group that formed the Somali Popular Liberation Front in Aden in 1983. [Africa Confidential, 13 November 1985, p.7.]

The Ethiopian Government "lost patience" with divisions in the DFSS and on 1 October 1985, Ethiopian security forces shot four of Col. Abdullahi's closest supporters and then detained the Colonel in Addis Abeba. ["Somalia: Opposition Bust-Up", Africa Confidential, 13 November 1985, p.7.] The president of the Northern Somali Association in Ottawa, asserts that, to his knowledge, Col. Abdullahi Yusuf was still in detention in Ethiopia in February 1988.

Little SSDF military activity has been reported in the last few years. According to an 18 November 1988 Africa Confidential report, the SSDF has been in disarray since Ethiopia detained its head, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, in 1985. The report further noted that "although racked by desertion, the Front does still have well over 1,000 fighters" and recently the front was reportedly still located in Ethiopian territory, [ Africa Confidential, 29 July 1988, and 18 November 1988, p. 3.] despite an agreement in April 1988 between Ethiopia and Somalia to cut off support and bases in neighbouring countries for rebel forces. [ Keesing's Record of World Events, (London, Longman Publishing Group), p. 36007., "Somalia: Wounded North, Bruised South", Africa Confidential, 18 November 1988, p.3.] Although the SSDF is said to have been fairly moribund throughout 1989, Africa Events reported in December 1989 that "efforts are now being made to reactivate [the Front]". [ "Hanging by Their Nails", Africa Events, December 1989, p. 24.]

For more information on the DFSS please consult the attached excerpts from the following documents:

"Somalia: Opposition Bust-Up", Africa Confidential, London: Miramoor Publications Ltd., 13 November 1985, p.7.

"Somalia: The Ogadeni's Misfortune", Africa Confidential, 17 October 1984, pp. 1, 5-7.

"Somalia: Generals Fall Out", Africa Confidential, 23 September, 1988, pp. 1-2.

George T. Kurian, Encyclopedia of the Third World (2nd Edition), vol.II, New York: Facts On File, Inc., 1978, p.1304.

David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State, London: Westview Press, 1987, pp. 92-93, 142.

I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, pp. 244-247, 250-255.

For background information on the DFSS, please consult the copy of Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, (London: Longman Publishing Group, 1988), p. 324, available at your regional Documentation Centre.