Specific information as to whether the structure of the army has changed since the October 1999 coup could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate. There are, however, several media articles which report on changes to personnel in the military and the role of the army since October 1999.

On 30 August 2000, AP reported that, according to army officials, General Mohammed Aziz, former Chief of General Staff (CGS), has been reassigned and named corps commander in Lahore. General Mohammed Yusuf was to replace him as CGS (ibid.).

In September 2000 Musharraf reshuffled "the army top brass for the first time since the October coup" (Times of India 2 Sept. 2000). Lieutenant General Muhammad Yusuf Khan, Commander Strike Corps, Multan, was appointed Chief of General Staff, a position which is described as the "second most important slot after the Chief of Army Staff, which is held by Musharraf himself" (ibid.).

Other personnel changes were:

Lieutenant General Khalid Maqbool as NAB [National Accountability Bureau] chairman, replacing Lieutenant General Syed Mohammad Amjad who was assigned the job of Corps Commander of Multan,...Lieutenant General Tahir Ali Qureshi, Corps Commander Bahawalpur, has been shifted to the General Headquarters Rawalpindi as Inspector General Training and Evaluation....

Musharraf also promoted Major General Munir Hafiez and Major General Javed Hassan to the rank of Lieutenant General. Hafiez will take over as Corps Commander Bahawalpur, while Hassan has been appointed Commandant National Defence College (ibid.).

In April 2000, Jane's Intelligence Review reported that there had been "no formal alteration to the army's role," although the army's "tasks now appear to include":

- maintenance of a high level of confrontation with Indian forces along the LoC in Kashmir;

- deterrence of Indian conventional operations along the international border;

- preparedness to undertake limited but powerful strikes (probably two) into India in order to seize and hold territory...;

- limited preparation for a nuclear engagement; and

- contribution to the civil administration of the nation (ibid).

Please see the attached article for more details.

While not specific to the structure of the army, according to a 21 October 2000 article in The Statesman, junior army officers have been placed in supervisory positions in civilian administrative structures to "extend military governance down to the grassroots level." Human Rights Watch in its October 2000 report, Reform or Repression? Post Coup Abuses in Pakistan, also writes of the army's new role in governance:

Upon seizing power, General Musharraf instituted a seven-member National Security Council, under whose guidance the cabinet was to operate. The council included the heads of the navy and air force, and was chaired by Musharraf himself. He subsequently set up a countrywide network of army monitoring teams to supervise and assist in the functioning of the civilian bureaucracy and appointed a serving general to head a newly empowered National Accountability Bureau. Military personnel have frequently taken part in arrests ordered by the bureau, and a military fortress at Attock has been used as the site of an accountability court and a place of pre-trial detention.

The Musharraf administration has stated that the purposes of the army monitoring teams are to monitor the functioning of the civilian bureaucracy; reduce corruption; provide "assistance" to government institutions; "monitor the impact of governance on public perceptions"; and provide input to the chief executive and National Security Council for "evolving policies," restructuring government machinery, and developing "a representative and effective system at the grassroots level." The teams are constituted at the provincial, regional, and district levels, and consist of army personnel, Directorate of Military Intelligence personnel, and members of the Inter-Service Intelligence agency's field units. Heads of the district monitoring teams have appointed officers to supervise individual departments within each district. According to official figures, there are presently 207 teams with a total staff of over 3,500. There have been a number of reported cases of army monitoring teams exceeding the functions for which they were purportedly established, often through the abusive exercise of police powers.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Please see below the list of additional sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Associated Press (AP). 30 August 2000. "Coup Leader Reassigned to Eastern Punjab." (NEXIS)

Human Rights Watch (HRW). October 2000. Reform or Repression? Post-Coup Abuses in Pakistan. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/pakistan/pakio09-03.htm#P216_37065 [Accessed 30 Oct. 2000]

Jane's Intelligence Review [Surrey, UK]. April 2000. Vol. 12, No. 4. Brian Cloughley. "Transition Time in Pakistan's Army."

The Statesman [India]. 21 October 2000. "Military Power: Pakistani Army Must be Tamed." (NEXIS)

The Times of India [New Delhi]. 2 September 2000. "Musharraf Reshuffles Top Brass in Pakistan Army." http://www.timesofindia.com/020900/02worl1.htm [Accessed 30 Oct. 2000]

Jane's Intelligence Review [Surrey, UK]. April 2000. Vol. 12, No. 4. Brian Cloughley. "Transition Time in Pakistan's Army." Pp. 24-29.

Pakistan Country File. Resource Centre.

LEXIS/NEXIS

World News Connection (WNC)

Internet Sites including:

Amnesty International

Asian Social Issues Program, Asia Society

AsiaWeek.com

CIA World Factbook 2000

Dawn [Karachi]

Defence Journal [Karachi]

The Globe [Karachi]

Immigration and Nationality Directorate, UK

www.regiments.org

South Asia Analysis Group

World Factbook of Criminal Justice Systems

Search Engines including:

Google

Hot Bot

Lycos