No reports of a demonstration which took place in Akure, Nigeria on 3 August 1993 could be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Africa Confidential [London]. August 1993. Vol. 34. Nos. 16-17.

Amnesty International. 1993. Amnesty International Report 1993. New York: Amnesty International USA.

Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series. August - September 1993. Vol. 30. Nos. 8-9.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993. 1994. United States Department of State. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

Keesing's Record of World Events [Cambridge]. September 1993. Vol. 39. No. 9.

Resource Centre Country File. Nigeria. August 1993.

West Africa [London]. August 1993. Nos. 3958 - 3962.

Electronic sources: IRB Databases, LEXIS/NEXIS, Internet, REFWORLD, World News Connection (WNC).

On 21 December 1997 the government arrested top army officials including the Deputy Head of State, Lieutenant General Oladipo Diya, Major General Tunji Olanrewaju, Major General Abdulkarim Adisa, and eight others for allegedly plotting to "violently" overthrow the government of General Sani Abacha (AC 23 Jan. 1998, 1-2; ibid., 9 Jan. 1998, 8; AFP 14 Feb. 1998; NA Feb. 1998; WA 12 - 18 Jan. 1998). The eight others included colonels Daniel Akintonde, Edwin Jando, Peters Alinyode, Emmanuel Shode, Major Olusegun Fadipe, and Diya's political advisor, professor Femi Odekunle (AC 9 Jan. 1998, 8).

The reasons for the alleged coup plot are obsure. Although Diya was reportedly known for his "quiet" opposition to Abacha's presidential aspirations, Olanrewaju and Adisa were regarded "as ultra-loyalists who enthusiastically endorsed an extension of Abacha's presidential tenure" (AC 9 Jan. 1998, 8). Only one week before his arrest, Diya had allegedly narrowly missed becoming the victim of a bomb explosion at Abuja Airport when he was on his way to represent President Abacha at the funeral of the mother of Major-General Lawrence Onoja in Benue state (ibid.). Diya's personal guards had also been gradually reduced and replaced by Special Bodyguards (SB), described as members of a "carefully selected" private army of 3,000 men trained in Libya and North Korea. The SB is reputed for its "quiet efficiency and brutality;" they are personally loyal to the president and take "orders from the presidential security chief, Maj. Hamza al-Mustapha" (AC 23 Jan. 1998, 1).

A 12-person military board was established and charged with questioning the suspects and making recommendations to the government within four weeks as to which suspects should be charged (AP 21 Jan. 1998). The board was headed by Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba, a well respected officer, who played "an assertive" role in the UN peacekeeping to Angola (AC 23 Jan. 1998, 1; ibid., 9 Jan. 1998, 8). By mid-January more than 60 people had been arrested (AP 21 Jan. 1998; AC 23 Jan. 1998, ibid., 1 May 1998). AP speculated that the arraigned suspects would be tried before a secret military tribunal and that the death penalty was often imposed in such circumstances ( 21 Jan. 1998).
Abacha's critics dismissed the coup plot as part of his machinations to marginalize and crack-down on potential challengers to his presidential ambitions (AC 23 Jan. 1998, 1, ibid., 9 Jan. 1998; AP 21 Jan. 1998; NA Feb. 1998). The National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), particularly, claimed that the coup plot and subsequent arrests were a "stratagem" by the government designed to divert "attention from the recent death of former vice-president Musa Yar'Adua" (ibid.). The death of this eminent northerner had embarrassed Abacha, angered the northerners, and reportedly split the northern solidarity. There is speculation that Abacha, himself a northerner, may have used the alleged coup plot as a ploy to regain the support of northerners: ten of the original twelve persons arrested were Yoruba (AC 9 Jan. 1998, 8). The New African Magazine reports the insiders as saying that "Abacha had to concoct a coup attempt led by 'Southern' Yoruba officers to make it appear as if the South was out to get the north ... out of power" (Feb. 1998).

In order to counteract critics' claims that the plot was a hoax, and to demonstrate the seriousness of the coup plot allegation, the government played video and audio tapes, allegedly made while suspected coup plotters were under surveillance and also during interviews with them after their arrests, to

carefully selected retired military officers, traditional rulers, journalists and other prominent figures ... the regime has also orchestrated mobs of demonstrators to march singing Abacha's praises and heap abuse on the 'coup plotters'. All this seems to be intended to portray Abacha as a national saviour who must stand (probably) alone in August's scheduled presidential election. But the evidence of plot disclosed so far remains highly ambiguous ... [and] are among the most controversial revelations (AC 23 Jan. 1998, 1).

The Nigerian Bar Association asked the government to stop showing the tapes but the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Lt. Gen. Jeremiah Useni, refused and added that the tapes would eventually be aired on state television (ibid.). Although the videos showed the suspects begging for mercy, a February 1998 New African report claims that the videos prejudiced "any prospect of a fair trial" because they were shown before giving the accused an opportunity to defend themselves.

The trials began on the weekend of 14 February 1998 in the central city of Jos; and they were conducted by "a seven-member panel headed by Major-General Victor Malu, ex-commander of a West African peacekeeping force in Liberia and Sierra Leone" (AFP 14 Feb. 1998; AI 20 Feb. 1998; IPS 19 Feb. 1998; WA 16-22 Feb. 1998, 214 ). 26 civilians and soldiers were accused of treason and faced the death penalty if found guilty (AFP 14 Feb. 1998; IPS19 Feb. 1998; WA 16-22 Feb. 1998, 214) "No appeal will be allowed once the verdicts and sentences are announced" and the only recourse left to the accused would be to seek clemency from the Provisional Council, the regime's highest court composed of army officers (AFP 14 Feb. 1998). The accused were allocated defence lawyers provided by the state (ibid.; WA 16 - 22 Feb. 1998, 214).

The trial drew condemnation from various human rights groups, and Nigeria's renowned human rights activist and lawyer, Femi Falana, who claimed that the fairness of the trial had already been prejudiced by the showing of the video clips (IPS 19 Feb. 1998). Both Femi Falana and the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR) called for an open-court trial for the accused suspects. Throughout the trial, Gen. Oladipo Diya maintained that he had been framed (IPS 19 Feb. 1998; WA 16 - 22 Feb. 1998, 214).

At the end of the two-month trial, the military tribunal gave the death sentence to six including Lt. Gen. Oladipo Diya, Maj. Gen. Tajudeen Olanrewaju and Maj. Gen. Adulkareem Adisa, and a civilian (The Washington Post 29 Apr. 1998, AC 1 May 1998, 3). Five of the 20 other accused reportedly received prison sentences from 2 to 14 years while 15 others were set free (The Washington Post 29 Apr. 1998). Africa Confidential reports that 14 were released and the remaining 6 sentenced to prison for two years to life (1 May 1998, 3). The six persons sentenced to death, and most of the 20 others, are Yorubas. The situation has reportedly to increased tension within the Yoruba community (Washington Post 29 Apr. 1998; AC 1 May 1998, 3). For additional information, please consult the attached dccuments

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Africa Confidential [London]. 1 May 1998. Vol. 39, No. 9. "Nigeria: Army Arguments: The Coup Plot Trial Has Brought Some Military Divisions to the Surface."

_____. 23 January 1998. Vol. 39. No. 2. "Plots, Lies and Videos."

_____. 9 January 1998. Vol. 39. No. 1. "Nigeria: Rotters or Plotters?"

Agence France Presse (AFP). 14 February 1998. "Nigerian Coup Defendants Face Death Penalty." (NEXIS)

Amnesty International. 20 February 1998. "Nigeria: Government Should Not Impose Death Sentences." (AI Index: AFR 44/03/98).

Associated Press (AP). 21 January 1998. "Nigeria Says 60 have Been Arrested Since Alleged Plot Thwarted." (NEXIS)

Inter Press Service (IPS). 19 February 1998. Remi Oyo. "Nigeria-Politics: Alleged Coup Suspects on Trial." (NEXIS)

New African. February 1998. "Nigeria: Coups and Mayhem." (NEXIS)

The Washington Post. 29 April 1998. "Six Nigerians to Die for Alleged Coup Plot; Trial Said to Widen Rifts Within Military." (NEXIS)

West Africa [London]. 16 - 22 February 1998. "Nigeria: Coup Trial Begins."

_____. 12 - 18 January 1998. "Nigeria: Of Plots and the Day After."

Africa Confidential [London]. 1 May 1998. Vol. 39, No. 9. "Nigeria: Army Arguments: The Coup Plot Trial Has Brought Some Military Divisions to the Surface,"

pp. 3-4.

_____. 23 January 1998. Vol. 39. No. 2. " Nigeria: Plots, Lies and Videos Tapes,"

pp. 1-2.

West Africa [London]. 16 - 22 February 1998. "Nigeria: Coup Trial Begins," p. 214.

_____. 12 - 18 January 1998. "Nigeria: Of Plots and the Day After," pp. 20-21