Document #1036743
IRB – Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (Author)
1) A Canadian academic expert on Chinese
politics states that the treatment of the children of former
Kuomintang officers depends upon what the parents' rank had been
and in what part of the country they now reside. The rank of
officer will impart more significance because the attainment of
this rank would have involved more active participation in
politics. Otherwise, ordinary soldiers conscripted by the
Kuomintang are of less concern to the Communist authorities. The
person's residence is an important factor because the impact of the
father's Kuomintang linkwhich comes under the category of political
background and is most likely noted on the personal dossier kept on
every Chinese citizenis assessed at the discretion of local
officials. (According to this source, there is a strong Chinese
cultural tradition that sins of the father can be visited upon his
children.)
A second academic source contacted on this
request for information observes that a person with the
abovementioned type of background might be discriminated against in
such areas as employment.
The Department of External Affairs adds
that since the events of the first weekend of June, there is a
stronger possibility that such a person would encounter
difficulties. Before that time, it appears that in the interests of
fostering cordial relations with Taiwan (which is still governed by
the Kuomintang), people with links to former Kuomintang officials
were not harassed. The Departmental spokesperson corroborated the
fact that the current treatment depends very much on the locale and
rank factors.
As an additional note on this topic, some
recent press and periodical articles have mentioned the Taiwanese
and Kuomintang factors in the current unrest and the fact that
authorities in the PRC have fallen back into the xenophobia of the
earlier years of the Communist Regime. [Roumain Franklin, "Le
pouvoir relance la Xénophobie", Libération, 6
July 1989; Jeffrey Bartholet, "China's New Long March",
Newsweek, 7 August 1989; "Note the Contrast", The
Economist, 1 July 1989; and Jan Wong, "Great Leap Backward",
The Globe and Mail, 31 July 1989.]
2) According to the World Encyclopedia
of Political Systems & Parties, less than four percent of
the Chinese population is a member of the Communist Party. The
attached excerpt from this document outlines the basic requirements
for party admission. On the topic of voluntary resignation from the
Party, there is not very much information. According to one of the
academic sources mentioned above, such voluntary resignations have
become known to China watchers only recently. Party membership is
the apex of prestige in Chinese society and voluntary withdrawal is
unheard of because of this. Recently, however, there have been some
highly publicized cases of withdrawal, including the case of a
young university lecturer in Beijing, and another case involving
the daughter of one of China's most famous Marshals. Such actions
involve "very major consequences", but the academic commentator
could not be more specific.
The second academic expert on China
corroborates this in some measure by claiming that a person
voluntarily withdrawing from the Communist Party would be denying
themselves a great deal of opportunity. But the professor equates
Party Membership with a full-time job which places great demands
upon the time and abilities of the cadre. Consequently, some people
do leave the party because of the strains of membership. On the
other hand, some people may be given the option to leave the party
"voluntarily", rather than face being purged much like a corporate
director in the West resigns a position to avoid being fired. In
these cases, according to available information, there is usually
no further action taken against the former Party member.
No further information is available to the
IRBDC at this time which corroborates the information provided by
these academic sources.
3)
Despite Western press interest in the
recent events in China, the Southern city of Guangzhou (Canton) has
been largely ignored. As the attached press clippings indicate,
this may be due to the fact that the demonstrations and aftermath
in that city were of a lesser magnitude than in Beijing. This, in
turn, has been attributed to the relative prosperity of the
Guangdong region and the fact that Cantonese have access to Hong
Kong television and thus were well aware of the violent government
crackdown which the demonstrations in Beijing provoked (The
Times 14 June 1989). For details of the demonstrations in
Guangzhou, please see the attached articles from the IRBDC'S
newsline service.
With regard to government reprisals against
the students, according to The Times, troops were brought
into Guangzhou but remained out of sight. When news of the events
in Beijing reached the demonstrators in Guangzhou, they reportedly
blocked the Haizhu Bridge for two days but dispersed without major
incident after stern warnings from the regional (Guangdong)
government. A report in The Globe and Mail, dated 06 June
1989, notes that besides blocking the five main bridges in
Guangzhou, the demonstrations had brought the city to a standstill
with people refusing to work or attend classes. The article from
The Times further claims that about a dozen people were
known to have been detained, mostly unemployed labourers from the
rural areas. A shortwave broadcast by a Hong Kong source, monitored
by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), reported on 14 June
1989 that a "combing out" movement is underway in Guangzhou.
"Combing out" is a Communist Party order for all personnel in
Party, government and army organs, as well as in certain
enterprises, to state whether they had participated in or expressed
support for the demonstrations. For further details, please consult
the attached documentation.