The relationship between the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM); recent human rights violations committed by HM; whether HM practices forced recruitment in Azad Kashmir [PAK41668.E]

Relationship Between the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)

The relationship between the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) is unclear. According to some reports, HM is the armed or militant wingof JI (Hindustan Times 21 May 2003; AFP 13 May 2003; Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 2002, 134; UK Apr. 2003; Grare 2001, 75; Dawn 6 Jan. 2001; ibid. 16 Jan. 2001; Herald Oct. 2001; The Christian Science Monitor 6 Mar. 2000). Other reports indicate that HM has "strong links" with (IDSA Feb. 2000), is "close" to (Dawn 6 Dec. 2000) or is "closely linked with" (ibid. 29 Sept. 2001) the JI. One report states that JI is "supposedly the godfather" of HM (ibid. 1 Aug. 2000), another says that JI is the "political arm" of HM (Dawn 1 July 2002), still another calls the HM a "sister organization" of JI (ibid. 17 Aug. 2002) and, finally, another writes that the HM is "the only significant militant group to be linked to a political party-the Jamaat-i-Islami" (Dawn 5 Aug. 2000a).

In July 2000, HM announced a three-month cease-fire in Kashmir (The Bulletin Jan.-Feb. 2001), the conditions of which included: "cessation of military offensive against the militants in Kashmir, an end to all human rights violations and the freedom for all political parties to express their views publicly" (Dawn 5 Aug. 2000a). This decision was taken without consulting JI (The Hindu 27 July 2000). According to the Hizbul Supreme Commander, HM made this decision "'independently'" and that "'[i]f the mujahideen had to do consultations with anybody, they would have held consultations with the Jamaat-i-Islami because there is an ideological link between the Hizbul Mujahideen and the Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan'" (Nawa-i-Waqt 16 Aug. 200). One news source reported that as a result of this, JI had "severed its ties" with HM (The Hindu 27 July 2000). Another source writes that this situation was "intensely embarrassing" for JI, and that JI "had no alternative but to distance itself from the Hizbul Mujahideen and notably from its chief who was asked to go back on his offer [to cease fire]" (Grare 2001, 81).

In June 2002, Syed Ali Gilani, the former JI representative on the executive council of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), was arrested on charges of funding HM (Dawn 26 May 2003). APHC is "the umbrella organization of parties fighting for freedom in Kashmir" (ibid. 1 Aug. 2000), and Gilani was the JI's member on it until he was replaced by the "moderate leader" Sheikh Ali Mohammed in May 2003 (ibid. 26 May 2003). Gilani had been "believed to be close to the main Hizbul Mujahideen" as early as December 2000 (ibid. 18 Dec. 2000).

According to a report by the South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG), JI has "disputed" descriptions of HM as its military wing (29 May 2003). Furthermore, in late May 2003, the chief of JI, Hussein Ahmed, "categorically stated that his party had no links with the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) and added [that] the jihadi outfit was based in Indian Held Kashmir and fighting indigenously for the right of self-determination of the Kashmiris" (Gulf News 29 May 2003). When asked about HM offices in Pakistan that were reportedly being run by JI workers, Ahmed said that they were set up by HM sympathizers in the party and not by the JI (ibid.). Since their denial, JI has asked the HM to move its offices from the premises of the Jamaat offices, and to remove all hoardings and signboards from Jamaat offices across the country (ibid.). According to Gulf News, "Hizb spokesman Abdul Saleem denied the organization had any offices in Pakistan" (ibid.).

Please refer to the attached Hidustan Times article entitled "Hizb-ul-Mujahideen - A Dreaded Group" for additional information on the relationship between JI and HM.

Recent Human Rights Violations Committed by HM

The HM is the largest and most powerful militant organizations in Kashmir (UK Apr. 2003; Hindustan Times 21 May 2003; Grare 2001,75; Nawa-i-Waqt 1 Oct. 2001; The Hindu 27 July 2000). According to Agence France Presse (AFP), HM has been "waging a gruesome insurgency against Indian rule in the New Delhi-ruled zone of Kashmir for 14 years" (13 May 2003). Its aim is the unification of all of Kashmir with Pakistan (UK Apr. 2003; Grare 2001, 76; Nawa-i-Waqt 16 Aug. 2000). Led by Syed Salahuddin, HM is "focused on Indian security forces and politicians in [Indian-held] Kashmir" (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 2002, 134). HM "has conducted operations jointly with other Kashmiri militants" and "occasionally [it] strikes at civilian targets in Kashmir, [though it] has not engaged in terrorist acts elsewhere" (ibid.).

Speaking at a seminar on the situation of Kashmir, the supreme commander of the HM said that the HM receives some assistance from Pakistan (Nawa-i-Waqt 16 Aug. 2000), although "the government in Islamabad claims that it provides them only [with] political and moral support" (Dawn 12 Aug. 2000). However, according to an editorial in the English-language, daily newspaper Dawn, Pakistan "trains, arms and finances" HM (Dawn 5 Aug. 200b).

Despite announcing a cease-fire in July 2000, HM carried out "a series of attacks that killed more than 80 people" (Bulletin Jan.-Feb. 2001). In August 2000, HM "claimed responsibility for a fatal bombing in Indian Kashmir" that killed about ten people and injured another 27 (ICT 10 Aug. 2000).

In January 2001, Dawn reported that HM "claims it is responsible for 90% of the attacks against Indian troops" (16 Jan. 2001).

In April 2003, two HM members were apprehended and arrested in New Delhi for allegedly conducting a survey to be used in carrying out killings of policemen, "'particularly in busy market areas to create terror'" (Daily Excelsior 5 Apr. 2003).

In May 2003, it was announced that although there was no ban on the movement of HM leaders and activists, the government had imposed a ban on the group's organizational activities (Dawn 22 May 2003). For additional information in this regard, please refer to the attached Hindustan Times article entitled "Hizb Not Banned, Only Barred, Clarified Pakistan."

HM's Links to Terrorism

Musharraf allegedly refers to militants in Kashmir as "'freedom fighters'" and criticizes the West for "confusing" jihad with terrorism (The Bulletin Jan.-Feb. 2001). According to HM's deputy supreme commander, Maulana Muhammad Javed Kasuri, HM is "the biggest jihadi organization ... and has never been involved in terrorism" (Nawa-i-Waqt 1 Oct. 2001). He maintained that

... India has been committing terrorism by targeting unarmed people. It started the terrorism in 1947 by sending its forces into Kashmir and since then it has been busy in the massacre of unarmed and innocent Muslims of Kashmir.
He said the Hizbul Mujahideen has been fighting against Indian terrorism for the last 13 years and this is its legal and constitutional right (ibid.).

In his book entitled Political Islam in the Indian Subcontinent: The Jamaat-i-Islami, Frédéric Grare, the Director of Centre de Sciences Humaines in New Delhi, refers to this explanation as a "strategy" (2001, 77). He writes:

The strategy adopted by Pakistan in Kashmir consists of the propagation of religious fundamentalism in order to promote separatism; the training and indoctrination of leaders selected in the Valley to form groups of activists; the training of young people in acts of sabotage and attack on the security forces, in the use of automatic weapons and the handling of explosives; and the training of special teams of agitators to trigger incidents to tarnish the image of a democratic and secular India. These agitators then approach different organizations of activists. By increasing unrest in the region, they incite the Indian government to respond with brutality and thus try to convince international public opinion that Delhi is constantly engaged in the large scale violation of human rights in Kashmir (ibid.).

In Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, HM was among those listed under "Other Terrorist Groups," or groups other than those terrorist groups that the United States Secretary of State has identified as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), a designation which carries legal consequences (2002, 134).

Recruitment Practices of the HM

A Dawn editorial reported that HM "draws its cadres primarily from indigenous Kashmiris" (5 Aug. 2000a), while Nawa-i-Waqt, a Pakistan daily newspaper published in Urdu, reported the group's supreme commander as saying that "[s]eventy per cent of the workers and members of the Hizbul Mujahideen come from Kashmir" (16 Aug. 2000). Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 also stated that HM "is made up primarily of ethnic Kashmiris" (2002, 134).

However, according to an article in Dawn, 90 per cent of HM militants are Kashmiri youths (7 June 2003). The article also makes reference to a study on Kashmiri militancy, which revealed that

... most of the Hizbul Mujahideen's cadres come from the political families of the disputed state. Even a good number of boys belong to the ruling as well as elite class and many of them are from well-off families.
Over half of its strength is derived from the urban areas of the state. ...
... Whenever Hizb-ul-Mujahideen gave call for a strike, there had been an enthusiastic response (Dawn 7 June 2003).

According to a research associate for the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in New Delhi, because HM recruits its members "mainly from amongst the workers of the Jamaat's student wing, the Islami Jamiate Talaba," most of them are college and university graduates (Feb. 2000).

Information on whether the HM practices forced recruitment in Azad Kashmir could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within time constraints. However, please refer to the attached article entitled "Real Face of Jehad in J&K: Kashmiri Children Abducted at Gun Point for 'Jehad'" for several first-person accounts of forced recruitment and to the excerpted attachment taken from Islam in Pakistan: Unity and Contradictions by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) for background and contextual information.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Please find below the list of additional sources consulted in researching this Information Request.


Agence France Presse (AFP). 13 May 2003. Tariq Naqash. "Rebel Commander Says Kashmir Truce Possible Only if India Pulls Back." (NEXIS)

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. January/February 2001. Vol. 57, No. 1. Jessica Stern. "Meeting with the Muj." [Accessed 14 July 2003]

The Christian Science Monitor [Boston]. 6 March 2000. Robert Marquand. "Kashmir Dispute as a Jihad." [Accessed 14 July 2003]

Daily Excelsior [Jammu]. 5 April 2003. "India: Two 'Pakistan-Backed' Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Terrorists Arrested in New Delhi." (FBIS-NES-2003-0405 7 Apr. 2003/Dialog)

Dawn [Karachi]. 7 June 2003. Ershad Mahmud. "Without Militants, Talks Cannot Succeed." [Accessed 23 June 2003]

_____. 26 May 2003. "Differences Led to Removal, Says Kashmiri Leader." [Accessed 11 July 2003]

_____. 22 May 2003. Syed Irfan Raza. "Case Against Mujahideen Leader's Guard Filed." [Accessed 14 July 2003]

_____. 17 August 2002. Zulfiqar Ali. "Jihadis Active in the North." [Accessed 11 July 2003]

_____. 1 July 2002. Jawed Naqvi. "US Pressures APHC to Contest Polls." [Accessed 11 July 2003]

_____. 29 September 2001. Jawed Naqvi. "Indian Muslims Are Not Terrorists, Says Vajpayee." [Accessed 11 July 2003]

_____. 16 January 2001. Ashfak Bokhari. "Taking the Jihadis into Account." [Accessed 11 July 2003]

_____. 6 January 2001. Jawed Naqvi. "APHC Chief Meets Pakistan Envoy Amid Suspense." [Accessed 11 July 2003]

_____. 18 December 2000. Jawed Naqvi. "All Parties Hurriyat Conference Resolves to Stay United." [Accessed 11 July 2003]

_____. 6 December 2000. Jawed Naqvi. "New Delhi Rejects Tripartite Parleys." [Accessed 11 July 2003]

_____. 12 August 2000. Zubeida Mustafa. "Kashmir: Did Hizb Act in a Hurry?" [Accessed 11 July 2003]

_____. 5 August 2000a. Afzaal Mahmood. "A Breakthrough in Kashmir?" [Accessed 11 July 2003]

_____. 5 August 2000b. Kuldip Nayar. "Ceasefire: Delhi Caught Napping" [Accessed 11 July 2003]

_____. 1 August 2000. "Making the Most of This Opening." [Accessed 11 July 2003]

Grare, Frédéric. 2001. Political Islam in the Indian Subcontinent: The Jamaat-i-Islami. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors and Centre de Sciences Humaines.

Gulf News [Dubai]. 29 May 2003. Abdullah Iqbal. "Jamaat-e-Islami Denies Links with Hizbul Mujahideen." (Dialog).

Herald [Karachi]. October 2001. Vol. 32, No. 10. M. Ilyas Khan. "Waiting for the Storm." (NEXIS)

The Hindu [Chennai]. 27 July 2000. B. Muralidhar Reddy. "Jamaat Severs Ties with Hizbul." [Accessed 14 July 2003]

Hindustan Times [New Delhi]. 21 May 2003. "Hizb-ul-Mujahideen - A Dreaded Group." (Google cache),0008.htm [Accessed 23 June 2003]

The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) [New Delhi]. February 2000. O.N. Mehrotra. "Madarsa in Pakistan: The Chief Promoter of Islamic Militancy and Terrorism." [Accessed 14 July 2003]

International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). 10 August 2000. "Hizb-ul Mujahideen Claims Car Bomb in Kashmir." [23 June 2003]

Nawa-i-Waqt [Rawalpindi, in Urdu]. 1 October 2001. "Pakistan: Hizbul Mujahideen Denies Involvement in Terrorism." (FBIS-NES-2001-1002 3 Oct. 2001/Dialog)

_____. 16 August 2000. "Hizbul Mujahideen Defends Cease-Fire Decision." (FBIS-NES-2000-0817 21 Aug. 2000/Dialog)

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. 2002. United States Department of State. Washington, DC. [Accessed 14 July 2003]

South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG). 29 May 2003. No. 699. B. Raman. "Jamaat-e-Islami, Hizbul Mujahideen and Al Qaeda." [Accessed 23 June 2003]

United Kingdom (UK). April 2003. Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Home Office. "Pakistan Assessment." Country Assessments. [Accessed 11 July 2003]


Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) [Washington]. 7 October 2002. Mandari Mehta and Teresita C. Schaffer. Islam in Pakistan: Unity and Contradictions. Pp. 16-17. [Accessed 16 July 2003]

Hindustan Times [New Delhi]. 21 May 2003. "Hizb-ul-Mujahideen - A Dreaded Group." (Google cache),0008.htm [Accessed 23 June 2003]

_____. 21 May 2003. "Hizb Not Banned, Only Barred, Clarifies Pak.",001300270001.htm [Accessed 15 July 2003]

The Truth About Kashmir. n.d. "Real Face of Jehad in J&K: Kashmiri Children Abducted at Gun Point for 'Jehad'." [Accessed 16 July 2003]

Additional Sources Consulted

IRB Databases

Internet sites, including:


Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2000

Extremist Groups: An International Compilation of Terrorist Organizations, Violent Political Groups, and Issue-Oriented Militant Movements. 2002. 2nd ed. Edited by Sean D. Hill. Huntsville, TX: Office of International Criminal Justice.

Federation of American Scientists

Political Parties of the World. 2002. 5th ed. Edited by Alan J. Day. London: John Harper Publishing.

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