a-6820 (ACC-SDN-6824)
Das vorliegende Dokument beruht auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen, und wurde in Übereinstimmung mit den Standards von ACCORD und den Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI) erstellt.
Diese Antwort stellt keine Meinung zum Inhalt eines Ansuchens um Asyl oder anderen internationalen Schutz dar.
Wir empfehlen, die verwendeten Materialien im Original durchzusehen.
“The number of government-backed irregulars active in Darfur today is the subject of much debate. The only research specifically into the Northern Rizeigat has suggested that although rates vary dramatically among different communities, more than 50 per cent of Abbala in areas close to large urban centres could be receiving militia salaries, the only source of income for unskilled rural youth without livestock (Young et al., 2009, pp. 68, 76). Nevertheless, Darfur is drifting away from the government. Khartoum’s control over even the paramilitaries on its payroll is highly precarious, dependent on swift delivery of salaries and other benefits.” (Small Arms Survey, 16. Juni 2009, S. 48)
“The government initially denied any connection to or cooperation with the ‘janjaweed’, describing them as ‘bandits’. As evidence of cooperation mounted, however, officials acknowledged asking Darfurians ‘to help in protecting themselves against the rebellion’ and said this was ‘standard practice’ in Sudan (IRIN, 2004). But they continued to deny operational links with the militias— not only in early attacks in 2003, when irregulars often went out in advance of army units, but also in later attacks, including a massive ‘road-clearing’ offensive in South Darfur in 2004, when militias were fully integrated into battle formations.30 A mountain of evidence contradicted the government claims. Documents obtained by Human Rights Watch demonstrated an official policy of cooperation with the militias—from ‘allowing’ their activities and ‘securing their vital needs’ to ‘providing them with sufficient armoury’ and opening new camps ‘to protect civilians in major cities’. The documents also spoke of impunity: local officials were urged to tolerate ‘minor’ abuses of civilians (HRW, 2004a).” (Small Arms Survey, 16. Juni 2009, S. 23)
“Disenchanted with the government, but unable to find other patrons, Darfur’s militias are in the throes of a process of fragmentation that parallels that of the two original rebel movements—the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Government officials privately acknowledge that they are unable to control the militias, except temporarily through more money and more weapons.” (Small Arms Survey, 16. Juni 2009, S. 13)
Darüber hinaus bietet der Bericht eine detaillierte Schilderung der strategischen Beziehungen zwischen verschiedenen arabischen – oder sich auf arabische Wurzeln berufenden – Milizgruppen (die häufig als Janjaweed bezeichnet werden) und der Regierung in Khartoum.
„Im Januar 2008 versuchten die sudanesischen Streitkräfte, die Kontrolle über den von der JEM beherrschten Nordkorridor in Westdarfur zurückzugewinnen. Dabei kam es zu Angriffen auf die Dörfer Abu Suruj, Saraf Jidad, Silea und Sirba. Die Armee arbeitete hierbei nicht nur mit den Reitermilizen der Janjawid zusammen, sondern unterstützte die Bodenoffensiven auch aus der Luft. Humanitäre Organisationen und Hilfswerke der Vereinten Nationen hatten von Mitte Dezember 2007 bis März 2008 zu dem gesamten Gebiet keinen Zugang. Die Angriffe hatten die Vertreibung von etwa 30000 Menschen zur Folge, die häufig in Gebieten Zuflucht suchten, die für die Hilfswerke kaum erreichbar waren. Die Streitkräfte und Sicherheitsdienste hinterließen nach ihren wahllosen Angriffen geplünderte und niedergebrannte Dörfer. Auf das Eigentum der Zivilbevölkerung wurde keine Rücksicht genommen, mindestens 115 Zivilisten wurden getötet. Im Zusammenhang mit den Angriffen auf Sirba gab es auch Berichte über Vergewaltigungen.“ (AI, 28. Mai 2009)
“Six years after the start of Darfur's messy conflict and days before Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is expected to be charged with war crimes, the steady stream of people arriving at the region's aid camps is a reminder of the scale of humanitarian crisis in Darfur. […] [Yacoub Suleiman Hari] is one of 50,000 people displaced from the town of Muhajiriya in South Darfur after a rebel advance followed up by government and janjaweed reprisals in February.“ (CSM, 3. März 2009)
“Government forces bombed villages, killed civilians including internally displaced persons (IDPs), and collaborated with janjaweed militias and tribal factions to raze villages and perpetrate violence against women.“ (USDOS, 25. Februar 2009, Intro)
„The Ministry of Defense's Border Intelligence Force (BIF), a loosely-organized force composed of former janjaweed fighters in Darfur, also committed abuses.“ (USDOS, 25. Februar 2009, Sek. 1d)
„Government forces and government-aligned militias engaged in the deliberate killing of civilians, including continued aerial bombardment of civilian targets, such as homes, schools, and markets. According to several UN reports, the government painted white the aircraft used to conduct bombing raids and transport arms to Darfur, the same color as UN aircraft, in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1591. The aerial bombardment of villages was often followed by ground attacks by janjaweed and SAF vehicles.“ (USDOS, 25. Februar 2009, Sek. 1g)
„In Darfur hundreds of thousands remain internally displaced as the Sudanese government uses indiscriminate bombings and attacks on civilians by ground forces and allied Janjaweed militias in counterinsurgency. […] In February [2008], following an offensive by JEM in West Darfur, the government conducted some of the worst attacks on civilians since 2003-2005. Government forces and Janjaweed carried out a series of attacks on villages, killing and injuring hundreds of civilians, and carrying out widespread looting in violation of international humanitarian law. An estimated 40,000 people fled, 13,000 of them to Chad.“ (HRW, 14. Jänner 2009)
“Strong evidence has emerged of children and adults being used as slaves in Sudan's Darfur region, a study says. […] Thousands of people from non-Arabic speaking ethnic groups in Darfur have been targeted, says the report, published by the Darfur Consortium on Wednesday. The group of 50 charities says it has around 100 eyewitness accounts from former abductees. Victims have been rounded up during joint attacks on villages by the Arabic-speaking Janjaweed and the Sudanese Armed Forces, according to the study. Civilians are also tortured and killed while their villages are razed to ethnically cleanse areas, which are then repopulated with Arabic-speaking people, including nomads from Chad, Niger, Mali and Cameroon, it says.” (BBC, 17. Dezember 2008)
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