The Pasdaran-e Inqilab (Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC) is commanded by Major General Yahya Rahim-Safavi (VIRI 20 May 2000; ibid. 20 July 2003) and subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) (MERIA Mar. 2001). However, the organization has its own ministry (Byman et al. 2001, 35) and headquarters, and its commander reports to the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, as opposed to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (MERIA Mar. 2001). According to a 2002 assessment of its operations, little is known of the Ministry of the Pasdaran (or IRGC Ministry [Byman et al. 2001, 35]) or its relationship with the broader Iranian intelligence and security apparatus (Global Security 13 Dec. 2002).

Although mandated by the Iranian Constitution to defend the regime (MERIA Mar. 2001), its role has "evolved ... to becom[e] a branch of the military establishment" (Global Security 13 Dec. 2002). An investigation into Iran's military and security policy co-authored by several Middle East specialists and published by the RAND Corporation also observed this evolution and stated that the "once-clear distinction between the [regular army] and the IRGC ... has diminished considerably in the last decade" (Byman et al. 2001, 102). The authors cite growth in the IRGC's professionalism and a decrease in "its Islamist ardor" as the reasons behind its similarities in behaviour to that of the regular army (ibid.).

Iran specialist Michael Eisenstadt noted that "the IRGC is a key institution in Iran today due to its role as guardian of the revolution, and due to the fact that many senior Revolutionary Guard officers have close personal and family ties to key members of Iran's clerical establishment" (MERIA Mar. 2001). Additionally, Eisenstadt emphasizes that the role the IRGC plays "in the selection, ideological indoctrination, professional development, and advancement of future senior officers" is "crucial" (ibid.). Furthermore, that the IRGC maintains considerable influence in domestic security affairs and particularly with respect to political opposition (Byman et al. 2001, 29).

The estimated size of the IRGC is between 100,000 and 120,000 men (Zerkalo 18 Aug. 2001; CNS 19 Feb. 2003; FAS 21 Aug. 1998; IranChamber.com n.d.; MERIA Mar. 2001), with another 350,000 persons in reserve (MSNBC n.d.). The IRGC bases are located near all major Iranian cities (MERIA Mar. 2001). In addition to ground forces, the IRGC has air and naval services, intelligence gathering capabilities (The Salt Lake Tribune 6 July 2003; MERIA Mar. 2001), controls Iran's missile and non-conventional weapons (ibid.) and oversees the Basiji militia (VIRI 20 July 2003; FAS 21 Aug. 1998) and the Qods (Jerusalem) Force (ibid.; MERIA Mar. 2001). With respect to its size and technological capability, Middle East specialist Dodge Billingsly noted that since the late 1980s, the IRGC has been the numerical and technological match to the regular army (The Salt Lake Tribune 6 July 2003). On the other hand, Eisenstadt argues that "by all measures," the regular army is "a much larger and better-equipped organization than the IRGC" (MERIA Mar. 2001). Pasdaran intelligence gathering capabilities report to "a subset of the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS), including the President, the Supreme Religious Leader and the Minister of Intelligence" (Byman et al. 2001, 23).

With respect to its construction activities, a 2000 report noted that the IRGC engineering corps had implemented 1,304 development projects in Iran, of which 70 per cent were completed (VIRI 20 May 2000). These ventures included building roads, bridges, dams, railways and factories (MEED 7 Oct. 1994). IRGC involvement in the construction of the Karkheh Dam project was the subject of IRN41818.E of 29 July 2003.

Since 1984, the IRGC's Construction Jihad has established its own military industries (FAS 30 Nov. 1998; NIC June 2001). In 1989, elements of the IRGC and the Ministry of Defence were "merged to form the Ministry of Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and their production facilities were merged into the Defense Industry Organization" (FAS 30 Nov. 1998). Known by the acronym SASAD (SalamIran Magazine Nov. 1998), the industrial group has 110 factories, workshops and other facilities in Iran (Iran Mojahedin 7 July 2001). In addition, a report refers to the IRGC involvement in the Aerospace Industries Organization or Sanam Industrial Group (World Tribune 4 Oct. 2002).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Please find below the list of additional sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Byman, Daniel L., Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Jerrold Green. 2001. Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1320 [Accessed 11 Aug. 2003]

Cybercast News Service (CNS). 19 February 2003. Patrick Goodenough. "Members of Iran's 'Terror-Sponsoring' Brigade Among 300 Dead in Airline Crash." (Crosswalk.com News Channel/Global Security) http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/030219-pasdaran01.htm [Accessed 28 July 2003]

Federation of American Scientists (FAS). 30 November 1998. John Pike. "Revolutionary Guards' Pasdaran Construction Jihad." http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/agency/jihad [Accessed 12 Aug. 2003]

_____. 21 August 1998. John Pike and Steven Aftergood. "Qods (Jerusalem) Force, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC - Pasdaran-e Inqilab)." http://www.fas.org/irp/world/iran/qods [Accessed 28 July 2003]
Global Security [Alexandria, VA]. 13 December 2002. John Pike. "Pasdaran." http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/pasdaran.htm [Accessed 28 July 2003]