Country Report on Terrorism 2024 - Chapter 1 - Sudan

Country Overview:  Fighting in the Darfur and Kordofan regions expanded to other states, significantly limiting government services.  The Transitional Sovereignty Council relocated all government departments to Port Sudan.  The Sudanese Armed Forces and the Transitional Sovereignty Council exercised governmental authority in most northern and eastern states, while control of Khartoum and the remainder of the country remained contested or dominated by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).  The ongoing conflict rendered General Intelligence Service (GIS) counterterrorism efforts largely ineffective beyond collecting limited information.  ISIS and al-Qa’ida continued communicating with parent organizations from within Sudan.  These entities’ main objective appeared to be exploiting Sudan’s instability to use the country as a facilitation hub; however, most efforts likely stalled.

Sudanese security forces devoted few resources to proactively detecting, deterring, and preventing terrorism in Sudan, focusing instead on the RSF, its aligned militias, and individuals and groups suspected of supporting the RSF.  The conflict damaged, abandoned, or overran many prisons.  Prisoners, some accused of terrorism, escaped or were released.  Sudanese security forces deployed limited resources to deter terrorist travel across borders within the territory they controlled.  The country’s western and southern borders were largely uncontrolled and porous.  The GIS did not interdict terrorist materiel at Port Sudan or other ports of entry.  Sudan’s government continued viewing FTFs as a threat.  Although Sudanese authorities announced a commitment to return all Sudanese FTFs, no further repatriations occurred after the war’s outbreak.  Sudan’s counterterrorist financing efforts remained consistent with previous years.  Sudan continued supporting counterterrorism efforts in regional and multilateral organizations.

2024 Terrorism Trends:  Sudan reported no terrorist incidents in 2024.