Document #2144724
USDOS – US Department of State (Author)
Country Overview: The primary terrorist threats in Iraq are the remnants of ISIS and IAMGs. These include U.S.-designated groups such as Kata’ib Hizballah (KH), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Harakat al-Nujaba. Separately, the U.S.-designated PKK is headquartered in the mountains of northern Iraq.
In 2024, ISF pressure prevented ISIS from controlling Iraqi territory, forcing ISIS to launch periodic attacks in al-Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din. At times, Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) joined the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service operations. By law, all PMF must operate within the ISF, but some PMF groups ignored the Government of Iraq (GOI) authority and carried out violent, destabilizing acts in Iraq and Syria.
Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council informally opened the National Center for International Judicial Cooperation in November. The center serves as the central authority for mutual legal assistance in terrorism investigations. Iraqi authorities frequently arrested suspects—particularly in Sunni areas—without warrants and held them for long periods without charge. The government often shifted charges to defamation or threatening state security. These claims were easier to substantiate in court but still carried long jail sentences. Warrants were generally observed in ISIS-related cases.
Border security and corruption remained critical vulnerabilities. The Ministry of Interior and the ISF increased their presence. However, challenges persisted, especially along the porous border with Syria near Türkiye. Iraq held preliminary discussions with INTERPOL and the Ministry of Interior to share biometric data with the United States and other partners upon request. Still, a formalized national biometric information sharing program was not finalized.
An estimated one million Iraqis remained internally displaced in Iraq. Of these, 108,000 lived in 20 camps in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Just over 17,000 Iraqis—mainly women and children—resided in al-Hol camp in Syria. In 2024, the GOI repatriated 2,662 Iraqi nationals, mostly women and children, from al-Hol. The GOI also repatriated 156 suspected Iraqi ISIS fighters from detention facilities in northeast Syria. Iraq acknowledged that returning, rehabilitating, and reintegrating family members of suspected ISIS supporters is important for preventing future terrorism. However, Iraq’s lack of institutional capacity continued to hamper returns from Syria.
Iraq continued its strategic messaging efforts to discredit ISIS, in part by providing significant content to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Communications Cell. In November, the FATF adopted Iraq’s Mutual Evaluation Report, which identified deficiencies in investigating and prosecuting non-ISIS-affiliated terrorist groups and in implementing targeted financial sanctions without delay.
2024 Terrorism Trends: Terrorist attacks in Iraq decreased in 2024, with IAMGs conducting 88 attacks targeting Combined Joint Task Force OIR personnel in Iraq and Syria. IAMG attacks from and within Iraqi territory resulted in the deaths of three U.S. servicemembers in Jordan and injured 43 U.S. servicemembers and personnel. IAMGs also launched numerous attacks toward Israel from Iraqi territory, including a UAS strike on October 3 that killed two IDF soldiers and injured 24.
Country Report on Terrorism 2024 - Chapter 4 - Ansar al-Islam (AAI) (Periodical Report, English)
Country Report on Terrorism 2024 - Chapter 4 - Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) (Periodical Report, English)
Country Report on Terrorism 2024 - Chapter 4 - Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Periodical Report, English)
Country Report on Terrorism 2024 - Chapter 4 - Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi (JRTN) (Periodical Report, English)
Country Report on Terrorism 2024 - Chapter 4 - Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) (Periodical Report, English)
Country Report on Terrorism 2024 - Chapter 4 - Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (Periodical Report, English)