Document #2144351
International Crisis Group (Author)
Crisis Group expert Fulbert Ngodji sheds light on an air raid in Chad that is believed to have destroyed trucks carrying supplies for one of the main belligerents in the Sudanese civil war.
On 22 August, the Chadian army accused its Sudanese counterpart of attacking a convoy in eastern Chad. In a televised statement, the army spokesman said Sudanese army aircraft and drones had pursued the trucks over 100km into Chad two days earlier before striking them in Mourdi department, Ennedi-Est province. Pro-Sudanese army online platforms circulated images purporting to show the army disabling several vehicles carrying supplies for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary group it has been fighting for control of Sudan since April 2023. The Sudanese army has not directly responded to the allegation, merely affirming its “respect for Chad’s sovereignty” in a 27 August statement.
Open-source data and confidential sources have allowed Crisis Group to piece together a plausible account of what happened. A convoy of around 200 military pickup trucks reportedly left Libya and crossed Chad en route to Sudan. The Sudanese army or one of its allies then appears to have attacked the trucks near the Chadian border, as part of a months-long aerial campaign to disrupt RSF supply lines from Libya. About 70 vehicles tried to escape by crossing back into Chad, where they were destroyed. Satellite imagery showing smoke rising from the area seems to corroborate the Chadian army’s charge. It is unclear, however, who was driving the trucks and what they were carrying. The Chadian army did not address these questions.
The conflict in Sudan has repeatedly spilled into Chad, primarily through an influx of refugees and, more recently, cross-border violence. Since December 2025, Chad’s eastern border has seen at least eleven incursions and drone strikes, which reportedly have killed about 30 civilians and soldiers. N’Djamena has typically sent military reinforcements or closed the border in response, but to this point it had refrained from blaming either of the main warring parties in Sudan.
The 22 August statement is a departure from the previous caution, raising concerns that Chad will be drawn deeper into the civil war next door. Not only could Chad’s allegation sharpen tensions with the army-aligned authorities in Khartoum, but it could also reinforce perceptions that N’djamena has chosen sides in Sudan’s war, indirectly supporting the RSF. These perceptions are based on evidence that the United Arab Emirates has been using Chadian territory to provide the RSF with weapons and equipment. N’Djamena and Abu Dhabi have consistently denied these claims.
Even so, escalation is unlikely: a confrontation would be costly for both N’Djamena and the Sudanese army. President Mahamat Déby is struggling to contain anger among his Zaghawa ethnic group, which has dominated Chad’s ruling elite since 1990. Many Zaghawa resent the government’s alleged backing of the RSF. The Sudanese army, meanwhile, controls Khartoum and much of central, northern and eastern Sudan, but remains locked in a war of attrition with no end in sight. Still, if the Sudanese army did in fact conduct the strike, its scale sets a dangerous precedent and could pave the way for more attacks by Sudanese belligerents, fuelling risks of a response by N’Djamena.