Bangladesh: The Bangladesh Nationalist Party [Bangladesh National Party] (BNP), including its structure and leadership, its membership and membership documents, its factions and associated organizations, and its political platform and activities; its relationship with the authorities and its treatment of members and supporters of opposition parties (2024–April 2026) [BGD202582.E]

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Overview

The BNP was established in 1978 and has since formed government multiple times (Australia 2025-07-23, para. 3.93; BNP n.d.a). Sources indicate that the BNP won a "two-thirds majority" in the February 2026 parliamentary elections (CIVICUS 2026-03-23; NPR 2026-02-16).

According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), a US-based non-profit organization that collects data on political violence and protest around the world (ACLED n.d.), the BNP is a "center-right" party (2026-02-05). Citing "analysts," the BBC reports that the BNP is "now moving to occupy the liberal-centrist space" that had been occupied by the former ruling party, the Bangladesh Awami League (AL) (2026-02-09). However, Al Jazeera indicates that the BNP "no longer position[s] itself as a centre-right" party, as it is "attempting to transform into a broad democratic platform that absorbs former Awami League voters, urban liberals, minority communities, and politically awakened youth" (2025-12-09). According to a report by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the BNP "has traditionally been more accommodating of political Islam, conservative and urban-based, with an anti-India perspective" (Australia 2025-07-23, para. 3.76).

DFAT reports that historically, the BNP and its rival, the AL, have "dominated" national politics (Australia 2025-07-23, para. 3.76). For more information on the AL and its structure, activities, and membership, see Response to Information Request BGD202589 of May 2026.

According to Human Rights Watch, the AL governed Bangladesh under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina from 2009 until her resignation in August 2024 (2024-08-06). Al Jazeera reports that after the fall of the Hasina government, Muhammad Yunus served as Bangladesh's "chief adviser" and led an interim government to oversee the country's "post-uprising transition" from August 2024 to February 2026 (2026-02-16). For information on the AL, including the events leading up to Hasina's resignation and the establishment of an interim government, see Response to Information Request BGD202592 of May 2026.

2. BNP

2.1. Structure

A report published by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, authored by Liesbet Hooghe and Caroline Lancaster, explains the 4 levels of administrative division of Bangladesh as follows:

  1. divisions (bibhag);
  2. districts (zila);
  3. subdistricts (upazila, formerly thana); and
  4. city corporations / municipalities (pourashava) or union councils (parishad) (Hooghe & Lancaster 2020-11, 1).

The BNP's 2016 constitution provides the following regarding the party's structure across administrative levels:

[The Bangladesh] Nationalist Party will be organized from the primary level of the country at the Union and Pouroshova /City corporation ward level and expand to the national level. The organizational structure of the team will be as follows:

  1. Union Ward Council and Union Ward Executive Committee
  2. Pouroshova/Metropolitan, Ward Council and Pouroshova/Metropolitan, Ward Executive Committee
  3. Union Council and Union Executive Committee
  4. Upazila /Thana Council and Upazila/Thana Executive Committee
  5. Pouroshova Council and Pouroshova Executive Committee
  6. Metropolitan Council and Metropolitan Executive Committee
  7. Zilla Council and Zilla Executive Committee
  8. National Council
  9. National Standing Committee
  10. National Executive Committee
  11. Parliamentary Board
  12. Parliamentary Party
  13. Organizations abroad. (BNP 2016-03-19, Art. 6.a)

Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), the national news agency of Bangladesh (BSS n.d.), reports that the BNP's "highest decision-making body" is its [National] Standing Committee (2026-02-17). According to the party's official website, the BNP's National Standing Committee includes the party's chairman, who oversees the body, and the party's senior vice chairman and general secretary, and totals 19 members (2016-03-19).

The information in the following paragraph is provided by the BNP's constitution:

The National Standing Committee's responsibilities include formulating and introducing party policies and programs, and taking and reviewing disciplinary actions against party officers and members, except for the removal of the Chairman. The party's National Council implements the policies and programs introduced by the National Standing Committee and holds elections for its members. The National Executive Committee oversees the various committees of the party and recommends disciplinary actions against committee members. Finally, the BNP's Parliamentary Board, which includes the members of the National Standing Committee, nominates party candidates for national parliamentary elections or any other election (2016-03-19).

2.2. Leadership

The website of the Bangladesh Parliament lists the following BNP leaders within government [as of February 2026]:

  • Tarique Rahman, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and head of the Armed Forces Division;
  • Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, Minister of Local Government, Rural Development and Co-operatives;
  • Amir Khasru Mahmud Chowdhury, Minister of Finance and Minister of Planning;
  • Salahuddin Ahmed, Minister of Home Affairs;
  • Khalilur Rahman, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
  • Md. Asaduzzaman, Minister of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (Bangladesh [2026-03-25]); and
  • Hafiz Uddin Ahmed, Speaker of Parliament (Bangladesh [2026]).

The BNP website identifies the following BNP leaders within the party, among others:

  • Tarique Rahman, Chairman;
  • Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, Secretary General; and
  • Ruhul Kabir Rizvi, Senior Joint Secretary General (BNP n.d.b).

A membership list of the BNP's National Executive Committee is available on the BNP's website (BNP n.d.b).

According to the BNP, Tarique Rahman "formally" assumed the chair of the party in January 2026, after the passing of his mother, Deshnetri Begum Khaleda Zia (2026-01-09). Khaleda Zia served as the BNP's chairperson from 1984 until her death in December 2025 (Prothom Alo 2025-12-30; BSS 2025-12-30). Tarique Rahman had been serving as the BNP's "acting chairman" since 2018 (The Daily Star 2026-01-10; Dhaka Tribune 2026-01-09).

Media sources report that as of May 2025, the High Court overturned "all" convictions against Tarique Rahman on appeal (Dhaka Tribune 2025-05-28; BanglaNews24.com 2025-05-28), acquitting him of cases relating to money laundering, defamation, and illegal wealth acquisition (BanglaNews24.com 2025-05-28). The Daily Star, an English-language daily newspaper in Bangladesh [1], reports that Tarique Rahman lived in exile in the UK for 17 years before returning to Bangladesh in December 2025 (2026-01-10).

2.3. Membership and Membership Documents

Information on membership of the BNP was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

Sources report, according to BNP estimates, that the party had 5 million members in the lead-up to the 2024 elections (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2026, 12; The New York Times 2023-09-02).

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a Bangladesh-based journalist who writes about Bangladeshi politics and governance in national and international media publications indicated that there is "no widely standardised system of membership cards issued" by the BNP (Journalist 2026-04-16). The same source indicated that party membership is "generally more informal" and "varies depending on local party structures rather than a centralised system" (Journalist 2026-04-16). A public policy columnist based in Canada who writes about Bangladeshi politics in Bangladeshi news publications, stated in correspondence with the Research Directorate, that the BNP has a "formal registration process" that is "better understood" as "an organized membership system rather than simply a uniform physical card system" (Public policy columnist 2026-04-20). The same source noted the distinctions between the BNP and the party's "student, youth, and labour wings," which may have membership or registration processes of their own (Public policy columnist 2026-04-20).

According to the journalist, information shared by "a BNP activist working within the party's media cell" indicates that new members "usually pay a small membership fee and receive a receipt, which can serve as proof of membership," but that the receipt is "not a formal identity document and may differ in format across different local units" (2026-04-16). The same source stated the following:

A more formal indication of involvement comes through party committee structures. When BNP forms committees at various levels—such as local units, city committees, or affiliated bodies like Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chatradal and Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Jubo Dal—official notices are issued listing members' names and positions. Inclusion in such committees is often treated as stronger and more verifiable proof of active membership. (Journalist 2026-04-16)

Corroborating information on the existence of membership lists being published by BNP local committees could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The BNP's constitution states the following regarding applications for party membership:

Qualification for membership

Any Bangladeshi citizen of the age of 18 years or above can be primary member of this party. The aspirants have to declare adherence to the party’s proclamation, constitution and programmes.

The application at schedule 1, form 'Ka' of the constitution will be filled up for primary membership. This form will be available at the party office. No other form will be accepted for membership but when not available, printing of same form will be allowed for application of membership.

If the form is accepted for consideration, identification (Schedule 1, Form ‘kha’) will have to be collected as evidence.

Subscription fee is Tk 10 [C$0.11] only for primary membership. Annual subscription fee after getting membership is Tk 10 only. The subscription from the members will be taken by receipt and the receipt will be provided from the party’s central office.

Every Upazila/Thana Office shall maintain the list of every primary member post in their respective areas.

The total number of members of the party, along with the names and addresses of the members will be legally preserved in the national headquarters i.e. the central office of the party in Dhaka. (BNP 2016-03-19)

Information on the appearance of, and procedures for obtaining membership documents for BNP party members could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

2.4. Associated Organizations

According to the DFAT report, political parties in Bangladesh, including the BNP, have "large auxiliary" organizations including "'wings' for students, volunteers, youth and professionals" (Australia 2025-07-23, para. 3.106).

The information in the following paragraphs is provided by the BNP's constitution:

The party's "organ organizations will have their own manifesto, constitution, flag and office," but will fall "under the discipline of the parent party." The following associated organizations have received the "approval of the chairman":

  • Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Muktijoddha Dal [freedom fighters' wing]
  • Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Jubodal [Jubo Dal] [youth wing]
  • Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Mohila Dal [women's wing]
  • Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Samajik Sangskritik Sangstha [cultural wing]
  • Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Krishak Dal [farmers' wing]
  • Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Swecchashebok Dal [volunteers' wing]
  • Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Tati Dal [weavers' wing]
  • Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Ulama Dal [religious wing]
  • Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Matsyajeebi Dal [fishermen's wing]

Professional groups that "believe in the principles, ideals, objectives and programs" of the BNP can organize to protect their interests under "affiliated organizations," with the approval of the chairman. However, the Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chatradal [Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal] [student wing] and the Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Shramik Dal [labour wing] "will be governed according to their respective constitutions" (BNP 2016-03-19).

2.4.1. Youth and Student Organizations

Sources indicate that the Jubo Dal is the "youth wing" of the BNP (BNP n.d.c; Dhaka Tribune 2025-06-17). Abdul Monayem Munna is the Jubo Dal's President (Prothom Alo 2026-02-01; BSS 2025-10-28), appointed in July 2024 (BSS 2025-10-28). In July 2024, Nurul Islam Nayan began his tenure as Secretary General of the Jubo Dal (BSS 2025-10-28; BNP 2024-07-09). The Daily Star indicates that prior to July 2024, Sultan Salahuddin Tuku held the Jubo Dal's presidency, while Abdul Monayem Munna was Secretary General (2024-06-14). Sources note that both were appointed to the positions in May 2022 (Daily Observer 2022-05-27; The Daily Star 2022-05-27).

According to the BNP, the Jatiotabadi Chatradal is an "affiliate [o]rganization" of the party (n.d.d). Citing a press release from the BNP's senior joint secretary, media sources report that in March 2024, Rakibul Islam Rakib was appointed President of the Chhatra Dal and Nasir Uddin Nasir became Secretary General (UNB 2024-03-01; Daily Sun 2024-03-01). Prior to that, Rashed Iqbal Khan served as the Chhatra Dal's acting president beginning in August 2023 (UNB 2023-08-09; Prothom Alo 2023-08-08).

2.5. Factionalism

Odhikar, a Bangladeshi human rights organization (Odhikar n.d.), reports that between 13 February 2026 and 28 February 2026, 29 out of 104 incidents of "post-election violence" involved "factional clashes within the [BNP] or its splinter groups" (2026-03-04). ACLED states that "[n]early" 20% of the "violence between political parties" that it recorded in Bangladesh between 11 December 2025 and 30 January 2026 "stemmed from factional disputes, as different BNP groups vie for candidature, party appointments, and the powers and perks that would follow a likely win at the polls" of the February 2026 parliamentary elections (2026-02-05). In a Facebook publication summarizing the findings of its 2025 report, Human Rights Support Society (HRSS), a Bangladeshi human rights organization (HRSS n.d.), indicates that of the 914 incidents of '"political violence'" that it recorded in 2025, 486 cases stemmed from "internal conflicts within the BNP and its affiliated and allied organizations," which accounted for injuries to 4,716 people and 82 deaths (2026-01-04). According to the same source, 767 of the incidents stemmed from feuds within the BNP or between the BNP and other political parties (HRSS 2026-01-04).

Sources indicate that since the fall of the Hasina government, factions of the BNP [and their supporters (Australia 2025-07-23, para. 2.49)] have been involved in "clashes" to assert influence (Australia 2025-07-23, para. 2.49; The Hindu 2025-04-24) and to "establish community-level control and/or fight over properties and businesses previously owned" by members of the AL (Australia 2025-07-23, para. 2.49). The Hindu, an Indian English-language daily newspaper, reports that during this period, "violence within BNP circles" led to "at least" 1,697 injuries and 31 deaths (2025-04-24). DFAT indicates that the BNP has "expelled a number of members for violating party discipline" (Australia 2025-07-23, para. 2.49). According to the Hindu, the BNP senior leaderships' "warnings" to its leaders and activists of "stern action" in cases of "wrongdoing" have "largely gone in vain" and "have failed to prevent the recurrence of such incidents" (2025-04-24).

Sources describe the following incidents of intra-party violence involving the BNP:

  • On 23 March 2026, following a "clash" between "supporters" of two BNP factions in Sujanagar Upazila in Pabna District, a woman was killed and "at least" 10 other people were injured (bdnews24.com 2026-03-23; Prothom Alo 2026-03-23). The same day, during a separate clash involving the same BNP factions, "at least" 15 people and a number of police officers sustained injuries in Pabna's Ishwardi municipality (Prothom Alo 2026-03-23). As reported by sources, police and local sources indicate that "supporters" of a former president of the Hatkhali union of Chhatra Dal and "supporters" of a BNP leader had been involved in a "long-standing dispute over local dominance" (bdnews24.com 2026-03-23; Prothom Alo 2026-03-23).
  • In December 2025, following a clash between supporters of a former BNP president and "rival activists" in Mirsarai [Mirsharai] in Chittagong District, one "activist" from Chhatra Dal was stabbed to death by a BNP "leader," and "[a]t least" five other individuals were injured (Dhaka Tribune 2025-12-11).
  • In November 2025, 5 BNP activists sustained injuries from gunfire from a rival party faction due to a dispute over "dominance" in Chittagong District's Raozan Upazila (Dhaka Tribune 2025-11-06; The Hans India 2025-11-06).
  • In June 2025, an activist from Jubo Dal died of a gunshot wound following a clash between 2 BNP factions in Rupganj, Narayanganj District (Dhaka Tribune 2025-06-17; Prothom Alo 2025-06-11).

2.6. Political Platform

In early 2026, the BNP released its electoral platform which includes the following elements:

  • Provide monthly financial assistance to "marginal and low-income families";
  • Support farmers through "access to subsidies, easy loans, … and state-managed markets" to "ensure fair prices" for their produce;
  • Establish a "corruption-free and humane healthcare system" through the recruitment of 100,000 healthcare workers and the expansion of preventative care services;
  • Build an "employment-oriented education system," and formulate a "skills- and values-based education policy";
  • Support job creation, including "merit-based government recruitment";
  • Solidify "religious and social harmony" by introducing a "government stipend" and "training-based welfare" programs for "religious leaders of all faiths";
  • "[P]rotect the environment and strengthen climate resilience";
  • Strengthen the "digital economy and global connectivity" (BNP 2026, 5, 13, 14).

Sources indicate that one of the BNP's electoral promises is the implementation of the July National Charter (July Charter) (BNP 2026, 6; Dhaka Tribune 2026-04-12). According to an article by Emma Kenny, Associate Programme Officer for the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), the July Charter is a "landmark document" with "over" 80 reform proposals created by the interim government based on

recommendations from six reform commissions focused on the constitution, judiciary, electoral system, police, public administration and anti-corruption. Key charter reforms include increasing women’s political representation, imposing prime ministerial term limits, enhancing presidential powers, expanding fundamental rights, and protecting judicial independence. (Kenny 2026-02-10)

2.7. Activities

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a PhD student in political science at the University of Colorado Boulder who has published on political transitions and security dynamics in Bangladesh, stated that following the resignation of the AL government in August 2024, the BNP's activities have centered around "consolidating and strengthening its foothold in the local political economy" (PhD student 2026-04-13). The same source indicated that prior to its electoral victory in February 2026, the BNP focused on "restructuring its grassroots networks, mobilising its support base, and working to place loyalists within the bureaucracy and public services" (PhD student 2026-04-13).

The journalist indicated that the BNP has "traditionally" used "mass mobilisation" as its "main political strategy," and it "often" organizes "rallies, protests, hartals (strikes), and blockades" as a way to "press its demands and mobilise public support" (2026-04-16). According to DFAT, between October 2023 and January 2024, the BNP organized "several hartals" against the AL government (Australia 2025-07-23, para. 3.115). According to the journalist, the BNP "also takes part in formal political processes" through "negotiations, alliance-building, and participation in elections" (2026-04-16).

Oral sources consulted by the Research Directorate noted that the party organizes non-political activities that include natural disaster relief efforts (Freelance journalist 2026-04-22; journalist 2026-04-16), and the distribution of winter clothing and free medical camps (Journalist 2026-04-16). The same oral sources indicated that the BNP has "networks" among the diaspora [particularly in the UK, US, Europe and the Middle East (Freelance Journalist 2026-04-22)] that hold events to engage with foreign diplomats (Freelance Journalist 2026-04-22; Journalist 2026-04-16), media, and foreign policymakers (Freelance Journalist 2026-04-22). A freelance journalist based in Dhaka who has published on Bangladeshi politics for national and international news outlets, added, in correspondence with the Research Directorate, that the activities of the BNP abroad also include organizing political meetings and conferences, fundraising, providing "organisational support," and conducting democracy and human rights advocacy (Freelance Journalist 2026-04-22).

3. Treatment of BNP Members and Supporters by Authorities

3.1. Under the AL Government of January to August 2024

3.1.1. From January to July 2024

The journalist stated that under the AL government's rule from 2009 to 2024, BNP "leaders and activists" experienced "widespread legal and administrative targeting" (2026-04-17). Freedom House notes that the BNP "faced operational restrictions, particularly during elections," adding that "political space closed significantly" after the "opposition's decision to boycott the [January 2024] elections and deploy strikes and blockades to protest the process" (Freedom House 2026-02-26, Sec. B1).

Freedom House reports that between the end of October 2023 and January 2024, "nearly" 25,000 BNP members were "reportedly imprisoned" and "at least" 8 party members "died in custody" by the end of 2023 (2026-02-26, Sec. B1). Citing information from the BNP, New Age, a Dhaka-based English language daily newspaper (New Age n.d.), reports that "at least" 9 BNP activists died in prison between October 2023 and January 2024 (2024-01-04). In its 2024 report, Odhikar indicates that "several BNP leaders" died in prison while being "deprived of access to medical care" (2025-02-10, 44). The same source notes "alleged" cases of BNP leaders and activists being "tortured and killed by the police" in that same year (Odhikar 2025-02-10, 3).

3.1.2. July-August 2024 Protests

DFAT, citing "[i]n-country sources," reports that there were "widespread" and "arbitrary" arrests and detentions of "government critics, particularly those belonging to the BNP," during the "anti-government protests" of July and August 2024 (Australia 2025-07-23, para. 4.16). According to a fact-finding report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), beginning on 19 July 2024, "security forces" made a "series of coordinated arrest operations targeting opposition leaders from BNP" (2025-02-12, 47).

As reported by the Guardian, a "BNP spokesperson" indicated that "about" 1,500 BNP members were arrested in the context of the protests (2024-07-23). OHCHR indicates that police "fired shotguns loaded with lethal ammunition" at a BNP rally in Sylhet in July 2024 (UN 2025-02-12, 48). Citing the BNP, New Age reports that "at least" 198 party "leaders and activists" were "killed" in the July−August 2024 protests (2024-08-21). OHCHR adds that "many" BNP leaders "arrested around Dhaka" were "extensively interrogated and often subjected to torture and other ill-treatment" (UN 2025-02-12, 47). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

3.2. Under the Interim Government of August 2024 to February 2026

Oral sources noted that the interim government's rule brought about an "expansion of political space" for the BNP, compared with the previous administration (Freelance journalist 2026-04-22; journalist 2026-04-16). Citing "[i]n-country sources," DFAT reports that [between August 2024 and July 2025], the BNP "operated freely and was influential" (Australia 2025-07-23, para. 3.96). The PhD student stated that the interim government was "broadly perceived" to be "BNP-aligned" and that the BNP held "considerable influence" over "key decisions" such as the scheduling of elections (2026-04-13).

For instance, according to the PhD student, "several key figures" from the interim government joined the newly elected BNP-led government, including their Attorney General who became Minister of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (2026-04-13). Sources also report that the interim government's National Security Advisor now serves as Foreign Minister (Bangladesh 2026-04-02; The Indian Express 2026-02-18; PhD student 2026-04-13).

In addition, the journalist noted that under the interim government, BNP leaders were released from jail and resumed their political activities free of the previous "systematic obstruction" (2026-04-16). The same source added that courts granted "acquittals and weakened prosecutions indicating a rollback of earlier legal pressure" against the BNP (Journalist 2026-04-16). Similarly, a senior consultant who covers Bangladesh at International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) indicated in an interview with the Research Directorate that several legal cases against the BNP were "reviewed and dropped" during this period (Crisis Group 2026-04-20). According to Freedom House, the interim government "began overturning unsupported corruption cases" against BNP leaders, including its then-chairwoman Khaleda Zia (2026-02-26, Sec. C2). Citing "[i]n-country sources," DFAT states that "people belonging to the BNP" were able to "freely" enter and exit the country after August 2024 (Australia 2025-07-23, para. 5.23). The same source notes that BNP members, including those currently or previously facing "legal proceedings" in Bangladesh, have since August 2024 returned to the country (Australia 2025-07-23, para. 5.29).

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a researcher at a university in Asia who has published on Bangladeshi politics, indicated that there were "some accusations" against the interim government about "mistreating the BNP workers" (Researcher 2026-04-10). The freelance journalist stated that from late 2024 to 2025, as the BNP was engaged in reform discussions, there were "[s]ome" reports of "continued monitoring" of the party's political activities by law enforcement agencies (2026-04-22). The source added that while party leaders "at times alleged unequal treatment or administrative bias," the interim government asserted that "measures were applied uniformly" (Freelance journalist 2026-04-22).

According to the Senior Consultant at Crisis Group, while there was "tension" between the interim government and the BNP, there was "no systematic campaign" against party members by the authorities (2026-04-20). An associate at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) [2] whose research focuses on conflict, security, and politics in Bangladesh, indicated in correspondence with the Research Directorate that during this period, authorities "consulted extensively with BNP leadership on major political initiatives," and the party "was treated as an indispensable actor in the transition process" (Associate 2026-04-24).

4. Relationship Between BNP and Political Opponents

4.1. Under AL Government of January to July 2024

The Senior Consultant indicated that from January to July 2024, the BNP "was not engaged in political violence," adding that the party was "still on the receiving end" of political violence by the AL (Crisis Group 2026-04-20). In follow-up correspondence with the Research Directorate, the freelance journalist stated that there is "less evidence" of the BNP "engaging in a sustained campaign of violent action against political opponents" during this period (2026-04-23). The source added that "the more defining feature" of that period was the "severe political constraint under which BNP was operating" prior to the July-August 2024 protests (Freelance journalist 2026-04-23).

4.2. Under the Interim Government of August 2024 to February 2026

Odhikar notes "allegations" of "attack[s]" by BNP leaders and activists against AL leaders and activists following the fall of the AL government, including "looting and breaking into their homes, and committing arson" (2025-02-10, 34-35). For instance, citing "several eyewitnesses," OHCHR states that in August 2024, a "large group of men led by a local BNP supporter attacked a factory owned by a prominent Awami League supporter and assaulted workers to extort money from the owner"; the factory later burned down following a "second attack," neither of which were investigated by police (UN 2025-02-12, 54).

According to Odhikar, in 2024, local BNP leaders were "allegedly" "trying to harass their political opponents by filing cases against them," including by pursuing lawsuits against "deceased" AL members (2025-02-10, 37). Media sources report that in August 2024, during court proceedings in connection with a case over the killing of a shopkeeper the previous month, lawyers who support the BNP and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) [3] "assaulted" the lawyers of the two defendants, an adviser to former Prime Minister Hasina and an ex-law minister in her government, to prevent their legal representation (The Daily Star 2024-08-14; New Age 2024-08-22). For more information on the BJI, including the evolution of its relationship with the BNP, see Response to Information Request BGD202305 of July 2025.

The PhD student indicated that the BNP has now "largely pursued a strategy of co-optation" vis-à-vis the AL by "absorbing former Hasina supporters and local [AL] voters into its own political base in anticipation of the [2026] elections" (2026-04-13).

According to ACLED, between 11 December 2025 and 30 January 2026, inter-party violence "mainly involved" the BNP and the alliance comprising the BJI and the National Citizen Party (NCP) [4] (2026-02-05). The PhD student similarly noted "sporadic clashes" between the BNP and BJI, in addition to "occasional incidents involving NCP supporters" (2026-04-13). Former press minister of Bangladesh's High Commission in New Delhi under the interim government, Faisal Mahmud, writes in Frontline magazine that since 2024, BNP and BJI members have been involved in clashes that "erupted across many districts—sometimes over control of local institutions, sometimes over duelling rallies, often over sheer territorial dominance" (Mahmud 2025-12-05).

Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), the national chapter of the global anti-corruption organization (TIB n.d.), indicates based on data collected by Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK) [5] that the BNP was involved in 91.4% of the incidents of political violence within and between parties recorded between August 2024 and January 2026 (2026-04-30, 24). In reference to the same information from TIB, the journalist stated that "most of these incidents were not part of a centrally directed campaign" by the party's leadership but were "localised and often fragmented violence" by its "supporters" that were "heavily involved in coercive and sometimes violent political practices at the grassroots level" (2026-04-17). The Associate indicated that owing to "weak central discipline" within the BNP, "in many instances," leaders at the local level "acted autonomously – pursuing revenge, resource capture, or territorial control" (2026-04-24).

Sources describe the following incidents of inter-party violence involving the BNP during the period under the interim government:

  • In January 2026, "at least" 10 (Daily Sun 2026-01-31) or "at least" 12 (The Daily Star 2026-01-31) people sustained injuries in a "clash" between NCP and BNP activists during the inauguration of a ferry service in Noakhali (Daily Sun 2026-01-31; The Daily Star 2026-01-31).
  • In January 2026, supporters of the BNP and BJI were involved in a dispute over the seating chart for an event in Sherpur District's Jhenaigati Upazila, leading to a clash during which a BJI upazila secretary was killed (The Hindu 2026-02-06; The Daily Star 2026-01-29) and "at least" 65 people were injured (The Hindu 2026-02-06). The Daily Star adds that both the BJI and the BNP reported that 50 of their members were injured (2026-01-29).
  • In 2025, 40 activists sustained injuries during clashes between two student wings, the BJI-affiliated Chhatra Shibir and the BNP-affiliated Chhatra Dal (Bhattacharya 2026-02-17).

4.3. Post-BNP Electoral Victory of February 2026

The information in the following paragraph was provided by the PhD student:

Since forming national government in February 2026, the BNP's "top leadership" has promoted "messages of political harmony and coexistence." However, "in the immediate aftermath of the election," party "activists in various localities engaged in incidents of vandalism and violence targeting opponents," such as NCP and BJI supporters, through "attacks on businesses, residences, and establishments." "Over time," the "frequency and visibility" of similar incidents "appear to have diminished" (2026-04-13).

In contrast, the researcher stated that while the BNP-led government is in "confrontation with the opposition over the implementation of reforms," there is no "fighting on the streets" (2026-04-10). The journalist added that the BNP "has not been widely reported to have launched a centrally coordinated campaign of legal repression" (2026-04-16). However, the source noted that although the party's treatment of political opponents "appears less reliant on formal state repression," it is "still marked by localised intimidation, political violence and economic coercion" (Journalist 2026-04-16).

Based on Bangladesh media sources and internal data, ASK provides the following statistics on "[p]olitical [v]iolence" occurring between January and March 2026:

Parties Involved Number of Incidents Number of People Injured Number of Deaths
AL - BNP 5 57 1
BNP - BJI 120 935 8
BNP - NCP 11 97 0
Chhatra Dal - Chhatra Shibir 1 3 0

(ASK 2026-04-19)

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] The Daily Star is owned by Transcom Group, which also owns Prothom Alo (Shongjog MSP 2021-10-12; BBC 2025-05-16). [back]

[2] The GIGA is a social science research institute that analyzes "political, economic, and social developments in and across Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East" (GIGA n.d.). [back]

[3] The BJI is an "Islamist political party" in Bangladesh that was banned from participating in elections in 2014, 2018, and 2024 (Australia 2025-07-23, para. 3.98). [back]

[4] The NCP is a "student-led" political party that was "born out of the protest movement that toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina" in August 2024; it "casts itself as a centrist, reformist alternative to nepotism and two-party dominance" (Reuters 2025-12-28). [back]

[5] ASK is a Bangladeshi legal aid and human rights organization (ASK n.d.). [back]

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Oral sources: Ain o Salish Kendra; American Institute of Bangladesh Studies; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project; associate professor at a university in Bangladesh with publications on national politics; Bangladesh – High Commission for the People's Republic of Bangladesh to Ottawa; Bangladesh Nationalist Party; Human Rights Development Centre; journalist in Bangladesh covering national politics; journalist in India with publications on Bangladeshi politics; Odhikar; post-doctoral researcher at a university in Norway with publications on Bangladesh; professor of public administration at a university in Bangladesh with publications on national politics; researcher with expertise on Bangladesh at a university in the US; UN – Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Internet Sites, including: American Enterprise Institute; Amnesty International; Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada; Asia Times; Assam Tribune; Atlantic Council; Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies; Bangladesh Society for the Enforcement of Human Rights; Bangla Outlook; BD Digest; TheCitizen.in; The Diplomat; East Asia Forum; Economic and Political Weekly; Fédération internationale pour les droits humains; Fortify Rights; France – Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides; Germany – Federal Office for Migration and Refugees; Harvard University – Lakshmi Mittal and Family South Asia Institute; Himal Southasian; Human Rights Foundation; Human Rights Research Center; Indian Council of World Affairs; JusticeMakers Bangladesh in France; Lowy Institute − The Interpreter; National University of Singapore – Institute of South Asian Studies; NBC News; The New York Review of Books; The Sentinel; The Soufan Center; South China Morning Post; The Times; UK – Home Office; US – Department of State; United States Institute of Peace; Views Bangladesh; The Wire.

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