DFAT Country Information Report The Philippines

CONTENTS ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................... 2 GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................................. 3 1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE ......................................................................................................... 4 2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION .............................................................................................. 5 COUNTRY OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................. 5 DEMOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................... 5 ECONOMIC OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................... 5 POLITICAL SYSTEM ..................................................................................................................... 8 HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK ....................................................................................................10 SECURITY SITUATION .................................................................................................................11 3. REFUGEE CONVENTION CLAIMS .......................................................................................... 15 RACE/NATIONALITY ...................................................................................................................15 RELIGION .................................................................................................................................15 POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED) ..................................................................................17 GROUPS OF INTEREST ................................................................................................................19 4. COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION CLAIMS .............................................................................. 25 ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF LIFE ................................................................................................25 DEATH PENALTY ........................................................................................................................26 CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT ...................................................26 5. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS .................................................................................................. 28 STATE PROTECTION ...................................................................................................................28 INTERNAL RELOCATION ..............................................................................................................31 TREATMENT OF RETURNEES .......................................................................................................31 DOCUMENTATION .....................................................................................................................31     ACRONYMS ACLED   AFP   AFP-CLOAC  ASG   BARMM  BHRC   BIFF   BJMP   BTA   BuCor   CAB   CBCP   CHR   COMELEC  CSEM   DSWD   IAS   ILO   ISEA   LGBTQIA+  MILF   MNLF   NBI   NPA/CPP-NPA  NTF-ELCAC  NUJP   OFWs   PAOCC   PNP   POGO   PSA   WHO   Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Armed Forces of the Philippines Armed Forces of the Philippines Center for Law of Armed Conflict Abu Sayyaf Group Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Bangsamoro Human Rights Commission Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Bangsamoro Transitional Authority Bureau of Corrections Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the Bangsamoro Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines Commission on Human Rights  Commission on Elections Child Sexual Exploitation Material Department of Social Welfare and Development Internal Affairs Service International Labour Organization Islamic State – East Asia Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex and/or Asexual Moro Islamic Liberation Front Moro National Liberation Front National Bureau of Investigation New People’s Army/Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s Army National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict National Union of Journalists of the Philippines Overseas Filipino Workers Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission Philippine National Police Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators Philippine Statistics Authority World Health Organization 2 GLOSSARY Barangay Madrasahs Moro Sharia Tanod The smallest unit of local government; a village or urban community. Headed by an elected barangay captain. Islamic school Muslim peoples of the southern Philippines Islamic law Neighbourhood safety officers Terms used in this report Almost certain  Likely   Possibly  Unlikely   Rare   Official discrimination This treatment is expected to occur in nearly all circumstances. This treatment is expected to occur in most circumstances. This treatment may occur in some circumstances. This treatment is not expected to occur in most circumstances. This treatment is only expected to occur in exceptional circumstances.  1. legal or regulatory measures applying to a particular group that impede access to state protection or services that are available to other sections of the population (examples might include but are not limited to difficulties in obtaining personal registrations or identity papers, difficulties in having papers recognised, arbitrary arrest and detention) 2. behaviour by state employees towards a particular group that impedes access to state protection or services otherwise available, including by failure to implement legislative or administrative measures. Societal discrimination  1. behaviour by members of society (including family members, employers or service providers) that impedes access by a particular group to goods or services normally available to other sections of society (examples could include but are not limited to refusal to rent property, refusal to sell goods or services, or employment discrimination) 2. ostracism or exclusion by members of society (including family, acquaintances, employers, colleagues or service providers). 3 1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1.1 This report was prepared for protection status decision makers by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). It provides a factual overview distinct from Australian Government policy and does not contain policy guidance for decision makers. 1.2 1.3 According to Ministerial Direction 84 of 24 June 2019, issued under the Migration Act 1958: Where the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has prepared [a] country information assessment expressly for protection status determination processes, and that assessment is available to the decision maker, the decision maker must take into account that assessment, where relevant, in making their decision. The decision maker is not precluded from considering other relevant information about the country. The report was prepared with regard to the current protection visa caseload without reference to individual applications. It provides DFAT’s best assessment at the time of writing.  1.4 The report draws on in-country knowledge and discussions. It takes into account reporting from a range of credible sources including: other governments, United Nations agencies, human rights and civil society organisations, local and international media and academia. Source details may be omitted to protect sources. 1.5 This Country Information Report replaces the DFAT report on the Philippines published on 23 August 2021.  4 2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION COUNTRY OVERVIEW 2.1 The Philippines gained independence in 1946 after colonisation or occupation by Spain, the United States and Japan. President Ferdinand Marcos Senior declared martial law in 1972 in response to the perceived threat of communist insurgency. Martial law remained in force until 1981. Opposition to Marcos Senior led to the People Power Revolution in 1986 and the election of Corazon Aquino as the Philippines’ first female president. In the following years, presidents faced coup attempts, corruption charges, impeachments and forced resignations.  2.2 Rodrigo Duterte was elected president in 2016, serving a single six-year term (the maximum allowable under the Constitution). Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs’ resulted in thousands of arrests and alleged extrajudicial killings. In March 2025, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant for Duterte’s arrest for the crimes against humanity of murder and attempted murder, allegedly committed between 2011 and 2019 in the context of the ‘War on Drugs’ campaign (see Extrajudicial Killings and the 'War on Drugs'). On 12 March 2025, Philippine authorities surrendered Duterte to the ICC. In November 2025, Duterte’s request for an interim release from detention was denied. Duterte’s confirmation of charges hearing was held in late February 2026. At the time of writing, the ICC had not delivered its decision on whether to commit the case to trial.  2.3 In 2022, Ferdinand Marcos Junior (former President Marcos Senior’s son) and Sara Duterte (former President Duterte’s daughter) were elected president and vice president on the Uni-Team Alliance ticket. Marcos Junior assumed the presidency with 58.7 per cent of the vote, making him the first candidate to win majority support since the 1987 Constitution entered into force. In late 2024, the ruling coalition between President Marcos Junior and Vice President Duterte ended. The lower house voted to impeach Vice President Duterte in February 2025 accusing her of misusing public funds and other misdemeanours. In July 2025, the Supreme Court blocked the impeachment complaint, finding it unconstitutional. 2.4 The Philippines is highly prone to natural disasters. Six typhoons impacted the country between October and November 2024, affecting 13 million people in 17 out of 18 regions. In September 2025, the Philippines experienced two typhoons and a magnitude 6.9 earthquake. Floods, landslides and winds destroyed homes, schools and health facilities. Several regions also experienced heatwave conditions of above 50 degrees Celsius in 2024. In November 2025, Typhoon Kalmaegi impacted the Philippines killing at least 224 people. Only days later, Super Typhoon Fung-wong also hit the Philippines, killing at least eight and leaving 1.4 million people displaced.  DEMOGRAPHY 2.5 The Philippines’ population is officially estimated at 112.7 million. In 2020, around one quarter of the population reported Tagalog as their ethnicity. Other ethnicities reported were Bisaya/Binisaya (14.3 per cent), Ilocano and Cebuano (8 per cent each), Ilonggo (7.9 per cent), Bikol/Bicol (6.5 per cent), Waray (3.8 per cent), Kapampangan (3 per cent) and Maguindanao and Pangasinan (1.9 per cent each).  2.6 In the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), the top three ethnicities were Maguindanao (26.4 per cent), Tausog/Tausug (23.3 per cent) and Maranao (22.7 per cent). Indigenous people comprised 9.1 per cent of the population and Muslim tribes comprised 6.5 per cent. For further information on religious demography, see Religion. ECONOMIC OVERVIEW 2.7 According to the World Bank, the Philippines is scheduled to transition from lower-middle to upper-middle income status in 2028. The Philippines has a dynamic economy, owing to increasing urbanisation, a large and young population and strong consumer demand supported by a strong labour market and remittances. Remittances reached USD38.34 billion (AUD53.7 billion) in 2024, representing 8.3 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 7.4 per cent of Gross National Income. GDP grew by 4.4 per cent in 2025. The International Monetary Fund projected real GDP growth to be 5.6 and 5.8 per cent in 2026 and 2027, respectively. The poverty rate was 15.5 per cent in 2023, down from 16.7 per cent in 2018. In-country sources said while poverty was declining, inequality was still high.  5 2.8 Despite its history of conflict and instability, Mindanao’s economy is growing. The Davao region, Mindanao’s economic hub, is projected to experience 7.8 to 9.3 per cent growth from 2024 to 2028, driven by the region’s position as a major agricultural producer and exporter. According to the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), poverty rates in the BARMM reduced from 52.6 per cent in 2018 to 23.5 per cent in 2023.  Employment 2.9 The Philippines’ overall unemployment rate was 5 per cent with a labour force participation rate of 63.6 per cent in October 2025. The underemployment rate was 12 per cent. Services (60.6 per cent), agriculture (21.5 per cent) and industry (17.9 per cent) are major employers.  2.10 The informal sector makes a significant contribution to the economy, accounting for 34.1 per cent of GDP. The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates roughly half of all workers in the Philippines are in the informal sector, mostly employed in agriculture and services. Up to 80 per cent of those employed in the BARMM are in the informal sector. In 2023, the PSA recorded over 2.16 million overseas Filipino workers (OFWs), 55.6 per cent of those being women. Welfare 2.11 According to the ILO, social protection in the Philippines is continuing towards universal coverage and alignment with international standards. Recent reforms expanded maternity protection, restructured the Social Security System, institutionalised unemployment insurance and expanded compulsory insurance coverage for OFWs in the event of death, disability or repatriation while working overseas. The ILO characterises the Philippines’ social protection as a good example of a system prepared for climate shocks with the ability to scale during disasters. 2.12 The Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps), a conditional cash transfer program, provides support to poor and near-poor households containing children up to the age of 18 or pregnant women. The 4Ps supports around 4.4 million families. Access to assistance is conditional on school attendance and childhood vaccinations among other requirements. In-country sources said the program had good outcomes, particularly around reducing stunting, increasing school enrolments and coverage of neonatal health checks. The same sources said the use of out-of-date data reduced accuracy in targeting assistance. 2.13 The Walang Gutom, or Food Stamp Program, aims to stop involuntary hunger, malnutrition and stunting. Under the program, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) provides families PHP3,000 (AUD73.18) in food credits each month. The program had reached around 300,000 households by the end of 2024, with an aim of reaching 600,000 in 2025 and 1 million by 2027. Health 2.14 Article 2, Section 15 of the Constitution requires the state to ‘protect and promote the right to health of the people and instil health consciousness among them’. Article 13, Section 11 also requires the state to make healthcare available to people ‘at an affordable cost’ and includes an undertaking to ‘provide free medical care to paupers’. 2.15 The Philippines’ health care system comprises public and private services, with high private sector involvement. Under the Local Government Code 1991, public health care services are the responsibility of local government units (LGUs), with city and provincial governments responsible for most public hospitals. The public health system includes provincial or district hospitals, health centres or Rural Health Units and Barangay Health Centers (BHCs).  2.16 Hospitals in Manila are easy to access and provide good quality care. Long wait times impact access to services outside Manila. Public hospital services are generally not available in rural areas. Private hospitals typically offer higher quality care but are more expensive. BHCs provide primary health care (vaccinations, and treatment for minor illnesses and injuries) and health promotion (health and nutrition education and family planning services). BHCs operate in rural and urban areas. They are staffed by barangay health workers (BHWs) and midwives, supervised by nurses who often oversee multiple BHCs. Some BHWs have reported inadequate training, supervision and funding, limiting the accessibility of quality health care, particularly in areas underserved by public hospitals. 6 2.17 It is common for patients to approach specialists directly without requiring referrals from General Practitioners (GPs). In-country sources said the health system had an undersupply of GP services and an oversupply of specialist services.  2.18 Government-owned health insurance provider, PhilHealth, provides universal health insurance coverage for all Filipinos. In-country sources said accessing PhilHealth accredited facilities was difficult. The system was overly bureaucratic and paperwork difficult to complete. PhilHealth subsidised services attracted high out-of-pocket costs.  2.19 The COVID-19 pandemic infected more than 4 million people and killed more than 66,000.  Mental Health 2.20 The Mental Health Act 2018 protects the rights of patients and health professionals, mandates the provision of psychiatric, psychosocial and neurological services in all hospitals and promotes basic mental health services in community settings. There have been major increases in government spending on mental health programs and medications since 2022.  2.21 According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the Philippines has an undersupply of mental health facilities and trained mental health professionals such as psychiatrists, psychologists and counsellors. In 2020, there were four mental health hospitals, 46 psychiatric inpatient units and 29 outpatient mental health facilities in the country. Some mental health services can be accessed through PhilHealth but according to in-country sources it could be difficult to find accredited providers and wait times were often several months. The government is working to make mental health services more accessible by training physicians in local health units. 2.22 Stigma can be attached to mental illness in Filipino culture, with some attributing mental disorders to personal weaknesses, insanity or supernatural causes. Stigma and a lack of support from family members often prevents young people accessing mental health services. People with Disability 2.23 The Philippines ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2008. The Republic Act No. 7277 or Magna Carta for Disabled Persons provides a comprehensive policy for ‘the improvement of the total wellbeing of persons with disabilities and their integration into the mainstream of society’. Other policies ensure equitable access to social and public services, education, work and employment and civic participation for people with disability.  2.24 In-country sources reported people with disability, particularly in rural and remote areas, experience physical barriers in accessing public and social services. People with disability in areas frequently impacted by natural disasters face difficulties in accessing aid, including being evacuated and finding accessible and fit-for-purpose emergency shelters and services. 2.25 People with disability can apply for a People with Disability identification card (PWD ID) which provides discounted access to a range of goods and services, including medications and medical services. People with a non-physical disability are required to provide a Certificate of Disability from a doctor to receive a PWD ID. People with physical disabilities do not require a Certificate of Disability.  2.26 In-country sources said services were difficult to access without a PWD ID and it was difficult to be assessed as having a disability. DSWD and the National Council on Disability Affairs have established a new PWD ID system to strengthen verification of PWD IDs and reduce the number of fraudulent PWD ID cards in circulation.  People Living with HIV 2.27 According to the WHO, the Philippines has the fastest growing number of HIV cases in the Asia-Pacific. New HIV cases increased by 550 per cent from 4,400 in 2010 to 29,600 in 2024. In 2025, 252,800 Filipinos were estimated to be living with HIV. Only 66 per cent of Filipinos formally diagnosed with HIV are on antiretroviral therapy (ART). 2.28 ART and HIV testing is generally available and affordable for most Filipinos, though procurement issues sometimes limit the availability of medication and testing kits. According to the Department of Health, as of December 2024, there were 286 Department of Health-designated HIV treatment facilities nationwide. According to 7 in-country sources, accessing medications used to prevent the spread of HIV such as PrEP (pre-exposure prophylaxis) and PEP (post-exposure prophylaxis) was difficult in Mindanao.  2.29 The Republic Act No. 8504 or AIDS Prevention and Control Act 1998 criminalises discrimination against people living with HIV in the workplace ‘in any form from pre-employment to post-employment, including hiring, promotion or assignment, based on the actual, perceived or suspected HIV status of an individual.’ Termination from employment based on actual or perceived HIV status is unlawful. The Department of Labor and Employment enforces these laws mainly through workplace inspections and has conceded enforcement is inadequate. The law also provides penalties for medical professionals who violate the confidentiality of patients’ HIV status. 2.30 People with HIV in the BARMM are likely to experience stigma if their positive status is known, particularly when seeking employment. In-country sources said sexual education was poor and understanding of HIV and how it spread was limited. The same sources said early marriage was encouraged in the BARMM to prevent the spread of HIV (see Children). In the wider Philippines, there is a greater understanding of HIV and generally less stigma.  Education 2.31 The Constitution grants the right to education, including free public education at the elementary and high school levels. Poverty and displacement affect access. In 2022, 7 per cent of 16 and 17 year olds were not in school nationally, for reasons such as the need to work, marriage and a lack of personal interest. In the BARMM, 18 per cent of 16 and 17 year olds were not in school. Education, particularly in public schools, often varies in quality. Trinity University of Asia attributed this to insufficient funding, funding disparities between urban and rural schools, outdated curriculum and teacher shortages. 2.32 According to the PSA’s 2024 Functional Literacy, Education, and Mass Media Survey, the basic literacy rate (the share of people who can read, write and compute) was 93.1 per cent, with 70.8 per cent considered functionally literate, meaning they could also comprehend. 2.33 In recent years, authorities have taken steps to intervene in the operations of educational facilities. The Duterte administration, for example, closed dozens of indigenous primary schools in Mindanao after teachers were red-tagged (see Red-tagging) following allegations the schools taught communist ideology. POLITICAL SYSTEM 2.34 The Philippines is a constitutional republic with a popularly elected president and a bicameral Congress composed of a House of Representatives and Senate. The Philippines is governed as a centralised state divided into provinces, except for the BARMM, which has its own regional government. Elections for the Bangsamoro Parliament, succeeding the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority (BTA) Parliament, have been delayed multiple times and were yet to be held at the time of writing.  2.35 The president is head of state, head of government and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The president is elected by popular vote for a single six-year term, during which the president appoints and presides over a Cabinet. The vice president is elected separately, also for a six-year term, and may or may not be a member of Cabinet. While elected government officials and legislative representatives determine state policies, the president plays a dominant role due to a political system that grants key authorities to the executive branch.  2.36 Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court, composed of a chief justice as its presiding officer and 14 associate justices, appointed by the president from nominations submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council  (see Judiciary). 2.37 The Philippines has three levels of sub-national government. A governor leads a province, mayors lead independent and non-independent municipalities and cities. A barangay captain leads a barangay (villages or small communities within urban areas, of which there are over 40,000). All positions are limited to a maximum of three consecutive four-year terms. At the end of their third term, incumbents must let one term pass before they are able to run again. 8 2.38 Parties and candidates typically do not have strong ideological philosophies. The distribution of power is heavily affected by patronage and kinship networks. Parties tend to be led by powerful political families with the resources to fund the campaigns of their allies. Research in 2022 found almost 80 per cent of Congress and well over 50 per cent of all elected local government officials were from political families. The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) reports 71 of the 82 provincial governments are currently headed by members of political families. Women make up 20.8 per cent of the Senate and 28.3 per cent of the House of Representatives. Muslims and indigenous groups are not well represented in politics. 2.39 In its Freedom in the World 2024 report, Freedom House scored the Philippines 25 out of 40 on political rights. Freedom House assessed while the Philippines had a vibrant political landscape and elections were free from overt restrictions, political elites benefitted from structural advantages undermining fair competition. Advantages included highly organised disinformation campaigns and widespread vote buying. 2.40 The Philippines held mid-term elections on 12 May 2025 with voters choosing representatives for half the Senate’s 24 seats, all 316 district seats in the House of Representatives, 50 party-list slots (seats reserved for marginalised sectors and filled through a closed list proportional representative system in which voters cast their ballots for a party rather than individual nominees), as well as governors, vice-governors, mayors and councillors.  2.41 President Marcos Junior’s party and its allies have majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate following the 2025 mid-term elections. There is limited organised political opposition in Congress.  2.42 The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) reported the highest voter turnout in history for the 2025 mid-term elections at 82.2 per cent. Despite security concerns and reports of violence, mid-term election voter turnout in the BARMM was high at 77 per cent with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) securing strong results in the two Maguindanao provinces, Tawi-Tawi and Cotabato City. Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) 2.43 The BARMM is a Muslim majority region in the country’s southwest, established by the national government in 2019, with jurisdiction initially over six provinces, now five, and three major non-contiguous cities. The BARMM interim government is led by the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority (BTA). It consists of a chief minister and an 80-seat parliament, all positions are currently appointed by the president. Since creation of the BTA, the MILF has filled the position of chief minister and 41 (a simple majority) of parliamentary seats. In March 2025, President Marcos Junior removed the MILF Chair, Ahod ‘Murad’ Ebrahim as chief minister and appointed Abdulraof Macacua in his place. The president also reduced the MILF’s reserved parliamentary seats to 35, removing its majority. 2.44 Under the 2014 Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) between the MILF and the Philippine Government, the BARMM is transitioning from an appointed BTA government to a democratically elected government. Elections have been scheduled and delayed multiple times. On 1 October 2025, the Supreme Court declared the electoral laws governing the BARMM parliamentary elections were unconstitutional. As a result, the scheduled October 2025 elections did not proceed. At the time of writing, Congress was considering legislation to schedule the BARMM elections in 2026. Only the national legislature has the authority to determine election dates. 2.45 When held, the BARMM parliamentary election is set to see political dynasties explicitly prohibited from campaigning for the first time. The Bangsamoro Autonomy Act No. 35 or Bangsamoro Electoral Code prohibits regional parliamentary political parties from nominating candidates related by birth or marriage. The code also requires political parties to nominate women as at least 30 per cent of their candidates. The code further allows for at least 10 per cent of seats (eight seats) to be reserved for sectoral representatives. This representation includes two seats each for non-Moro indigenous people and settler communities and one seat each for women, youth, traditional leaders and the ‘Ulama (Islamic religious scholars). The non-Moro indigenous people, ‘Ulama and traditional leader seats will be elected through customary laws and practices. The remainder will be elected through popular vote from members of those sectors. 2.46 For further information on the BARMM, see Separatist violence and peace process in Mindanao. 9 Corruption 2.47 According to Freedom House, corruption is endemic in the Philippines and anti-corruption bodies struggle to uphold their mandates. In its 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International ranked the Philippines 114 out of 180 countries (where one is perceived least corrupt and 180 most corrupt). Taxes are not transparently applied or calculated. In-country sources reported businesses were able to negotiate their tax bill through the payment of bribes.  2.48 The Office of the Ombudsman is tasked with investigating and filing complaints against government workers and officials. In-country sources said the position was typically filled by someone who acted as a ‘gatekeeper’ for the Executive. In practice, corruption is generally exposed by the media or in disputes between rival political families.  2.49 Flooding events in mid-2025 uncovered widespread corruption in government-funded flood control projects. Lawmakers, contractors and public works officials were alleged to have misappropriated funding allocated for flood mitigation through ‘ghost projects’ (projects reported as completed but later discovered to be non-existent), overpricing and kickbacks. The controversy sparked widespread protests. President Marcos Junior set up a fact-finding commission known as the Independent Commission for Infrastructure in September 2025. Government investigators announced in October 2025 they had identified at least 421 ‘ghost projects’ nationwide.  2.50 For further information on corruption, see State Protection. HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 2.51 The Constitution institutionalises a Bill of Rights under Article 3 and ‘Social Justice and Human Rights’ under Article 13. The Philippines is also party to major international human rights conventions, including: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 2.52 The Presidential Human Rights Committee coordinates responses to human rights issues across multiple government agencies. The Senate has a Justice and Human Rights Committee and the House of Representatives has a Civil, Political and Human Rights Committee. The Special Committee on Human Rights Coordination seeks to improve the mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights. The Special Committee exists within the Presidential Human Rights Committee and has a membership comprised of secretaries of government agencies. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) holds observer status on both committees. Human Rights Watch criticised the Special Committee’s establishment in 2024 saying the body would have little authority to address serious abuses. In-country sources said the Special Committee lacked transparency and had not initiated key reforms since its establishment in 2024.  2.53 The independent CHR was established in 1987. It is fully compliant with the Paris Principles relating to the status of national human rights institutions and has an ‘A’ status with the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions. The CHR has monitoring and investigative capacity but no enforcement powers. It is headquartered in Manila and maintains regional offices throughout the Philippines except in the BARMM which has its own human rights body (see below). In March 2025, the CHR held the final session of its ‘Public Inquiry on the Current Situation of Human Rights Defenders with Focus on Incidents of Red-Tagging’. The Inquiry is set to make recommendations on redress mechanisms for victims of human rights violations due to red-tagging. See Red-Tagging for more information. 2.54 The Bangsamoro Human Rights Commission (BHRC) is the independent human rights institution in the BARMM mandated to promote and protect human rights through education and training, investigations and monitoring, advice to government, the protection of human rights defenders and as a transitional justice mechanism. The BHRC is also mandated to uphold international humanitarian law during armed conflict.  10 SECURITY SITUATION 2.55 A variety of security issues affect the Philippines, ranging from widespread crime, especially in urban areas, to active insurgencies. For decades the government has been challenged by a communist insurgency supported by the New People’s Army (NPA), armed Muslim separatist groups, violence by smaller transnational terrorist organisations such as Islamic State-East Asia, the Abu Sayyaf Group and by criminal syndicates. Interclan violence continued in Mindanao into 2025 causing civilian deaths and displacement according to the US Department of State and Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED).  2.56 According to the Philippine National Police (PNP), the national crime rate decreased by 16.5 per cent from January to August 2025 with 22,519 crime incidents recorded, compared with the same period in 2024 which saw 26,969 incidents. Petty crime (pickpocketing and bag snatching) is common and violent crimes, such as armed robbery, sexual assault and murder, occur regularly across the Philippines, including in Manila. Gun ownership is widespread and poorly regulated, contributing to the high crime rate.  Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s Army  2.57 The armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the CPP-NPA, has conducted a violent insurgency against the Philippine Government since the late 1960s. The insurgency has been in decline since recent high points in 2018 and 2019 which followed a 2017 break down in peace talks with the Philippine Government. The CPP-NPA is considered to be at its lowest capacity in recent history. The most recent available estimates put the total deaths from communist insurgency-related conflict at more than 130 in 2024.  2.58 According to the US National Counterterrorism Center, the CPP-NPA operates in the rural areas of central and southern Luzon, Palawan, the Visayan Islands and eastern and northwestern Mindanao. It also maintains cells in Manila and other cities. Pockets of conflict remain in some of the country’s poorest and most remote areas, particularly in Northern Mindanao and the western Visayas. The current number of combatants in the CPP-NPA is estimated at between 1,000 and 1,500. The movement continues to draw new members. Some recruits are ideologically motivated young people but most are drawn from poor areas where public services are insufficient.  2.59 The CPP-NPA’s operations go beyond armed clashes with state forces. According to ACLED, the CPP-NPA conducts attacks on individuals perceived to be state collaborators, government officials and off-duty soldiers or police officers. According to ACLED and in-country sources, attacks against civilians by the CPP-NPA were acts of ‘revolutionary justice’ against government officials, military or law enforcement officers or for perceived offences the movement such as providing information or assistance to government forces. 2.60 From June 2016 to June 2023, ACLED data shows over 270 events of CPP-NPA violence targeting civilians, consisting of attacks using explosives, sexual violence and forced disappearances. In August 2022, the CPP-NPA executed three people following trials in informal courts. The three men, one of whom was a barangay captain, were accused of providing information to government security forces. In-country sources said the CPP-NPA’s limited capacity meant the group was no longer able to target private enterprises. Extortion in the form of revolution taxes against civilians and private enterprises was uncommon.  2.61 Successive government policies and actions have effectively weakened the CPP-NPA. Philippine Strategic Associates reported most CPP-NPA-related violent incidents in 2024 were armed encounters resulting from military-initiated operations. In-country sources said government forces had actively sought out conflict with the CPP-NPA reducing its ability to conduct insurgencies. The National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC) conducts raids against the CPP-NPA and funds infrastructure and services in barangays cleared of CPP-NPA influence to address the root causes of the insurgency. In-country sources said the NTF-ELCAC was well-funded, reportedly receiving a 340 per cent budget increase in 2025. 2.62 The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) previously played a key role in operations against the CPP-NPA and Islamist groups. In-country sources said units of the AFP had their performance judged on suppressing communist organisations, leading to tenuous connections being drawn by military personnel between NGOs and alleged support for communism. The presence of pro-communist pamphlets was considered sufficient evidence to link an organisation to communism. For further information on the AFP, see Military. 11 2.63 During 2022 and 2023, Norway facilitated talks between the Philippine Government and the CPP-NPA. In November 2023, the parties agreed to engage in dialogue to establish a peace and transformation framework focused on addressing the socio-economic and political drivers of the armed conflict. A final peace agreement has not been reached but the Marcos Junior administration has committed to delivering one by 2028. Other Armed Groups 2.64 The following is a non-exhaustive list of Islamic armed groups in the southern Philippines. Many of these groups are prone to splits and factionalism and new groups may form quickly or split away. There may not be ideological consistency within existing groups.  2.65 The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was formed in 1972 and was a leading organisation for Moro separatists for the following twenty years. While the MNLF signed a Final Peace Agreement with the Philippine Government on 2 September 1996, elements of the MNLF remain opposed. In-country sources said the group had not committed to decommissioning its weapons. 2.66 The MILF formed as a breakaway from the MNLF in the late 1970s. After years of negotiation, the Philippine Government and the MILF signed a peace agreement on 27 March 2014 providing for the transitional process from the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to the BARMM (see below). The MILF forms part of the BTA and was involved in negotiations with the government regarding the Bangsamoro Organic Law. The MILF will contest the first parliamentary elections in the BARMM. 2.67 The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was founded in 1991 as a separatist militant Sunni Islamist movement operating in the southern Philippines. It operates in various subgroups, some of which have pledged allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Islamic State – East Asia (ISEA). ASG members and supporters comprising both Filipinos and foreign nationals are located throughout the Sulu archipelago, Southern Mindanao including the Zamboanga peninsula and in Sabah, Malaysia. ASG is responsible for numerous large-scale attacks in addition to high-profile kidnappings and beheadings, including of foreign nationals. The group is currently not engaged in any peace or mediation processes with the Philippine Government. 2.68 The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) formed in 2010 after splitting from the MILF and continues to conduct attacks in Mindanao, sometimes in cooperation with other armed groups including the MILF and ISIL-aligned elements, depending on the sub-groups’ allegiances. Since 2021, around 1,739 members of BIFF and Dawlah Islamiya have surrendered to authorities.  2.69 ISEA is a loose coalition of ISIL-affiliated groups across the Philippines commonly referred to as ISIL-Philippines. The Philippines designated ISEA as a terrorist group in December 2020. ISEA’s most recently identified leader, Abu Zacharia, was reportedly killed during a government raid in Mindanao in June 2023. The group is currently not engaged in any peace or mediation processes with the Philippine Government. Separatist violence and peace process in Mindanao 2.70 The 2014 Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) formalised a peace agreement between the MILF and the Philippine Government and ended decades of internal conflict. The CAB has two tracks. The first governs the political transition of the BARMM from an appointed to a democratically elected government (for further information, see BARMM). The second manages the ‘normalisation’ process to transform the MILF from an armed group into a political and social movement. 2.71 The normalisation track includes the phased decommissioning of 40,000 MILF combatants and the surrender of 7,000 MILF-owned weapons. It also involves confidence-building measures, socioeconomic interventions, transitional justice and reconciliation, disbandment of private armed groups, policing reform and the removal of government troops from the BARMM. The third phase of decommissioning was concluded in July 2023 bringing the total number of decommissioned combatants to 26,145, with 4,625 weapons surrendered. The Philippine Government and the MILF have failed to agree to commence the fourth and final decommissioning phase. Some 14,000 MILF combatants remain. 2.72 Peace has broadly held, though clan feuds and fighting between MILF commanders has continued. Islamic armed groups, while weakened following sustained counter-terrorism operations, continue to pose a threat to peace 12 and stability. The incomplete disarmament of MILF combatants and community frustration over promised peace dividends not being realised add instability. There were widespread reports of violence and intimidation during the 2025 mid-term elections. The MILF nevertheless secured strong results winning against traditional political clans. Red-Tagging 2.73 ‘Red-tagging’ is the branding of groups or individuals as supporters, sympathisers, recruiters or members of the CPP-NPA. Human rights defenders, humanitarian workers, lawyers, journalists, community media workers, students, artists, writers, trade unionists, teachers, youth activists, clergy, health workers and indigenous leaders have been red-tagged. Those holding politically progressive views, critics of government policies and advocates for human rights accountability and social justice have been targeted. Red-tagged individuals can become the subject of harassment, surveillance and can be at risk of extrajudicial killings.  2.74 According to in-country sources, many individuals and organisations charged with terrorism financing had previously been red-tagged. In a 2023 judgement based on a complaint filed by a former Bayan Muna lawmaker wrongfully accused of communist affiliations the Supreme Court ruled red-tagging, vilification and labelling could pose threats to life, liberty and security. The Court found evidence of state-inflicted harm and declared red-tagging was not protected speech when it incited violence or state repression. 2.75 According to civil society figures, at least 427 activists were killed after they were red-tagged under the Duterte administration. A 2022 report by the International Commission of Jurists found these killings were often by unidentified assailants. According to Human Rights Watch, red-tagging has continued under the Marcos Junior administration. The Ateneo Human Rights Center identified more than 450 red-tagging incidents in the first half of 2024. There is evidence the military, police, state security officials, senior government officials and some media outlets continue to engage in the practice. 2.76 According to a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the judicial process in cases involving red-tagging is ‘remarkably slow’. Pre-trial detention in red-tagging cases was sometimes equivalent to the detention period in the case of a conviction (see Judiciary).  Anti-Terror Laws 2.77 The Anti-Terrorism Act 2020 and the Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act 2012 grant expansive powers to the government’s Anti-Terrorism Council to designate organisations and individuals as terrorists and recommend the freezing of bank accounts. According to Philippines human rights group Karapatan, as of April 2025, at least 166 individuals had been charged or designated as terrorists via the Anti-Terrorism Act 2020 and Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act 2012. Seventeen NGOs, most of them engaged in development work, have had their bank accounts frozen under the ATA. 2.78 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) placed the Philippines on its ‘Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring’ or ‘grey list’ in 2021. Following this, the Philippine Government increased its filing of terrorism financing cases. The Philippines was subsequently removed from the grey list in 2025. The 2023-2027 National Anti-Money Laundering, Counter-Terrorism Financing, and Counter-Proliferation Financing Strategy prioritised increasing capacity to investigate and prosecute terrorism financing. Terror financing accusations are typically made by police but previous cases have also included charges filed by the Department of Justice.  2.79 The Philippines has successfully prosecuted some terrorism financing cases. In 2024, an individual linked to violent extremist groups in the southern Philippines was convicted. Other terrorism financing cases have involved individuals and organisations accused of having links to the CPP-NPA. There were new terrorism financing cases in 2025 against civil society groups and activities, including against six activists. According to Human Rights Watch, the Philippines increased the number of ‘baseless terrorism-financing claims against civil society groups and activists’ following their grey-listing by the FATF, a view shared by in-country sources. Those charged included workers and activists with civil society groups, clergy and journalists.  13 Criminal Gangs and Syndicates 2.80 Gangs and organised crime groups, ranging from domestic street gangs to transnational syndicates, exist in the Philippines. Gangs are typically regionally organised. The Kuratong Baleleng gang operates across the Philippines, with strongholds in Mindanao, Manila and Cebu. Various gangs operate within prisons as inmate gangs or pangkats. These include Batang Cebu, Batang City Jail, Batman Brotherhood and the Happy Go Lucky Gang. According to the former PNP Chief’s Tour of Duty Report, police arrested 368 members of criminal gangs, 109 members surrendered and six died during police operations from April 2024 to June 2025. 2.81 Chinese syndicates and gambling firms operate internet gaming and betting services in the Philippines, known as Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators (POGOs). POGOs typically cater to customers outside the Philippines. Some operations have been linked to human trafficking for forced criminality, sexual exploitation and transnational cybercrime operations involving online fraud, money laundering and identity theft. Those working in POGOs are often foreign nationals who are victims of human trafficking. 2.82 The Philippines banned POGOs under Executive Order No.74 in November 2024 and under Republic Act No. 12312 or the Anti-Pogo Act 2025. In-country sources said the government’s ban had pushed POGO operations underground and syndicates continued to engage in human trafficking and scam activities. The Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission has reportedly been increasingly active in targeting POGOs since the ban. PNP investigations have found POGOs posing as IT and business process outsourcing companies to continue their operations. Filipinos and foreign nationals employed or forced to work in these operations have been arrested for their involvement during police raids. According to the International Organization for Migration, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Migrant Workers and DSWD provide support, including repatriation, livelihood assistance and psychosocial counselling to identified victims. 14 3. REFUGEE CONVENTION CLAIMS RACE/NATIONALITY Indigenous People  3.1 Indigenous people (referred to locally as ‘IPs’) are ethnic or tribal groups that retain their distinct cultural practices and identities. There are over 14 million indigenous people in the Philippines, belonging to over 200 distinct ethnic groups. Indigenous communities are located across the entire country (in Mindanao, central and northern Luzon and the Visayas).  3.2 Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act 1997 grants indigenous people the right to practice and develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It also establishes the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples as the primary agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs related to indigenous people’s rights. The Commission assesses land claims and can issue certificates of ancestral domain title.  3.3 Indigenous people’s rights and safety are affected by land disputes. These disputes are typically due to overlapping and contested land claims or private sector interest in the land for mining or natural gas. In-country sources said authorities had pressured indigenous people to hand over ancestral land. According to Freedom House’s 2024 Freedom in the World report, indigenous people in Mindanao experienced harassment, torture, disappearances and killings by the military, which typically accused victims of links to the communist insurgency (see  Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s Army). In-country sources said the poor treatment of indigenous people was usually related to disputes over land rather than race or ethnicity. 3.4 Non-Moro indigenous people in the BARMM are highly marginalised due to competing land claims with Moro indigenous people and MILF factions. At least 90 non-Moro indigenous people were killed between 2014 and 2024 in conflicts over land and political power. Armed conflict between and among various groups and those asserting their rights to ancestral lands have led to the continued displacement of non-Moro indigenous people. More than 2,000 non-Moro indigenous families were displaced between 2021 and 2023. 3.5 According to the UN Office for Project Services, indigenous people lack access to social services, economic and political opportunities and experience high levels of illiteracy and unemployment. Accessing a birth certificate can be difficult, making indigenous children more vulnerable to poverty and exclusion as they are unable to access public education or government social welfare programs without one. In-country sources said barriers to education included conflict forcing the closure of schools and a lack of education in indigenous languages.  3.6 DFAT assesses indigenous people who live in remote areas on ancestral land possibly face harassment and violence from state and corporate interests due to overlapping land claims or perceived support for the communist insurgency. Non-Moro indigenous people in the BARMM are likely to experience violence, harassment and displacement due to overlapping land claims with other indigenous populations and MILF factions. Indigenous people in urban areas are unlikely to experience violence or discrimination. RELIGION  3.7 According to the PSA’s 2020 Census of Population and Housing, 78.8 per cent of Filipinos identify as Roman Catholic, 6.4 per cent as Muslim and 2.6 per cent as Iglesia ni Cristo (an independent Filipino Christian church). Over 90 per cent of the BARMM’s population identify as Muslim.  3.8 Article 3 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of religion. Article 2 of the Constitution provides for the separation of church and state. In January 2023, the House of Representatives passed the Magna Carta of Religious Freedom Bill which seeks to protect the right to propagate religious beliefs and disseminate religious publications, the right to religious worship and freedom against discrimination in employment. The proposed law criminalises compelling a person to choose or not to choose a specific religion, obstructing access to religious information and discriminating against a person because of his or her religious beliefs. According to the US Department of State, some humanist, atheist, Muslim and other religious minority groups expressed concern the legislation would favour 15 Christians and not offer equal protection to non-religious individuals. Humanist International said the bill could be ‘weaponized and used against minorities’. The Senate had not passed the law at the time of writing.  Christians  3.9 The Philippines is a majority Christian country. The Catholic Church plays an influential role in Filipino society. The church engages in programs geared to social action and human rights among the rural and urban poor. In many cases this activity has led to friction between the church and the Marcos Junior administration, resulting in the arrests of priests, nuns and lay people on charges of subversion.  3.10 In February 2023, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) reported the red-tagging of Bishop of San Carlos Gerardo Alminaza, an advocate for talks between the government and the CPP-NPA. Representatives of both the CBCP and the National Council of Churches of the Philippines have said instances of red-tagging against church leaders were politically motivated. In August 2022, five nuns were included in a group of 16 people accused of providing financial assistance to the CPP-NPA. Their organisation, the Rural Missionaries of the Philippines, had its accounts frozen in 2019 on similar accusations.  3.11 The Catholic Church does not officially endorse political candidates but exercises influence through advocacy. The Catholic Church campaigns on good governance, social justice and human dignity issues and against allowing divorce and abortion. Catholic clergy led anti-corruption protests in 2025. Other religious groups do endorse candidates. Iglesia ni Cristo usually releases a list of endorsed candidates in the days before the polls. In-country sources said endorsements were typically based on the prevailing political sentiment. The same sources said Iglesia ni Cristo’s strong influence over its members did not result in it receiving advantageous treatment. 3.12 Islamic extremists have targeted Christians in some instances. In December 2023, the Islamic State-affiliated Dawlah Islamiyah detonated a bomb during a Catholic Mass at Mindanao State University, killing four people and injuring more than 50 others. Islamic State claimed responsibility for the bombing. 3.13 DFAT assesses it is rare for Christians to face official or societal discrimination or violence on the basis of their faith. Priests, nuns and lay people advocating for greater support to poor communities are possibly red-tagged for their alleged provision of support to communist groups leading to them being harassed, surveilled, charged for terrorism financing or killed. Muslims  3.14 Most Muslims are members of ethnic minority groups and reside in Mindanao and nearby islands in the south. Although most are Sunni, a small minority of Shi’a Muslims live in the Philippines, mostly in the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Zamboanga del Sur in Mindanao. Muslims are increasingly migrating to the urban centres of Manila, Baguio, Dumaguete, Cagayan de Oro, Iligan, Cotabato and Davao. The Ahmadiyya sect of Islam established a permanent presence in the Philippines in the 1990s. In-country sources said both Shi’a and Ahmadiyya Muslims could practice their faith without discrimination or adverse attention. Despite this, isolated incidents of mob violence have been committed against Ahmadiyya Muslims, including by other Muslims. 3.15 The national government recognises sharia in all parts of the country through Presidential Decree No. 1083. Sharia courts are organised into five sharia districts, all in the south of the country. Muslims residing in other areas must travel to these districts to pursue an action in a sharia court. Sharia courts handle cases relating to family relations and property for Muslims. They do not have criminal jurisdiction.  3.16 The Department of Education supports an Arabic Language and Islamic Values Education program for Muslim students in private madrasahs and public elementary schools with a Muslim student population of 10 per cent or greater. In the 2022-23 school year, 4,122 public elementary schools administered the voluntary program for 153,605 students. The program’s stated aim is to integrate madrasahs into the public education system while preserving Islamic education for Muslims. By law, public schools must protect the religious rights of all students.  3.17 According to the US Department of State, in 2023 (prior to the 2025 mid-term elections) there were 11 Muslims in the 312-member House of Representatives and one Muslim in the 24-member Senate.  16 3.18 Social media comments regularly denigrate the beliefs and practices of Muslims, particularly following violence by Islamic extremists.  3.19 DFAT assesses it is almost certain Muslims in the Philippines can practice their faith freely, including Shi’a and Ahmadiyya Muslims. Incidents of anti-Muslim sentiment online possibly occur, particularly following violence by Islamic extremists. It is rare for Sunni Muslims in Muslim-majority regions to face official or societal discrimination.  Atheists  3.20 A handful of atheist and/or humanist groups operate freely in the Philippines, including Filipino Freethinkers, Humanist Alliance Philippines, International and the Philippine Atheist and Agnostics Society. Some Filipino atheists reportedly fear social rejection and mockery when converting to atheism, or when their non-belief becomes known to others. In-country sources said there were no restrictions on atheists and their rights were respected. 3.21 DFAT assesses it is rare for atheists to be subject to violence or official discrimination. Atheists are unlikely to face societal discrimination in the form of rejection or mockery. POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED) 3.22 High-profile criticism of President Marcos Junior is tolerated. Vice President Duterte and members of Congress, including the President’s sister Senator Imee Marcos, openly criticise President Marcos Junior, his administration and his family. DFAT is not aware of low-profile individuals experiencing adverse attention for criticising the president. Some civil society organisations (CSOs) and NGOs have experienced official discrimination (see Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organisations). 3.23 Violence, including shooting attacks and bombings, is common during election periods as rival candidates seek to control their districts and eliminate competitors. In-country sources said most election-related violence in 2025 occurred in the BARMM. Over a period of 13 years monitoring conflict in the Bangsamoro region, local NGO Climate Conflict Action (CCA) reported violence often spiked in election years. CCA monitoring showed election-related violence began to rise in 2018 and has not receded since. Across the 2022 and 2023 election years, a total of 68 deaths were recorded, more than double the 33 deaths during the 2013, 2016, 2018 and 2019 election years combined.  3.24 DFAT assesses it is rare for prominent political opposition figures and members of Congress critical of President Marcos Junior, his administration and his family to face official or societal discrimination. Low-profile politicians and individuals, particularly those in the BARMM, possibly experience violence during elections. Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organisations 3.25 Civil society in the Philippines is vibrant with a diverse range of active human rights, social welfare, environmental and other advocacy groups. Article 2, Section 23 of the Constitution obligates the State to ‘encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.’ The Philippines generally has an enabling legal, regulatory and policy environment for CSOs.  3.26 In 2024, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression found critical voices in Philippines civil society were subject to threats, vilification and harassment in the name of counter-terrorism efforts under the Marcos Junior administration. NGOs and individual activists regarded as threatening the interests of political and economic powerholders have experienced physical and legal harassment. Some have been assassinated. In 2023, Global Witness reported of the 443 killings of environmental and land-rights activists in Asia since 2012, 281 had been in the Philippines. In September 2023, two environmental activists who opposed land-reclamation projects in Manila Bay, in part due to their effects on fishing communities, were allegedly abducted and held for two weeks by the military.  3.27 Red-tagging and anti-terror laws are frequently used against CSOs, including those advocating for human rights and environmental issues. According to Amnesty International, two staff members of the Paghidaet sa Kauswagan Development Group (PDG) that advocates for sustainable agriculture, environmental protection and respect for the rights of farmers and fishers, were arrested on charges of terrorism financing. The charges were 17 based on the testimony of a sole witness who alleged the PDG served as the CPP’s political organiser, provided the CPP with money and weapons and tended to sick and wounded CPP members. PDG denied the allegations claiming it was the subject of relentless red-tagging. Amnesty International said the charges ‘appeared to fit into an increasingly alarming pattern of using the twin laws of anti-terror and terror financing against development and humanitarian organizations.’ In-country sources said the use of terrorism financing laws against CSOs resulted in them ceasing operations. 3.28 DFAT assesses CSOs advocating for human rights, or on environmental issues are likely to experience official discrimination in the form of red-tagging and the subsequent use of anti-terror laws. These groups possibly experience state-sanctioned harassment, threats, abductions and killings.  Media and Journalists  3.29 Article 3, Section 4 of the Constitution provides for freedoms of expression and the press. Traditionally, the Philippines had a vibrant media sector, however space for free expression narrowed under former President Duterte’s administration. The situation has improved under the Marcos Junior administration but the legal frameworks that enabled the suppression of media freedom remain in place. According to Reporters Without Borders, Philippine law does not protect media freedom in practice.  3.30 Journalists routinely face harassment, threats of violence and violence from politicians, government authorities and powerful people critical of their reporting. Surveys of Filipino journalists in the Worlds of Journalism Study Global Index on Journalists’ Safety found journalists outside Manila were particularly vulnerable to threats but those in Manila and working for larger news organisations also faced digital harassment, often instigated by politicians critical of their news coverage. In-country sources said the risks to journalists’ safety had decreased under the Marcos Junior administration. Journalists outside Manila were in greater danger than those in Manila.  3.31 According to data from the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility and the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP) from the beginning of the Marcos Junior administration in 2022 to April 2025, there were 184 attacks (defined as killings, intimidation and harassment) against media workers. This exceeded the 128 cases recorded across the six years of the Duterte administration, though more alleged killings took place under Duterte (23 compared with five recorded under Marcos Junior). Seventy eight attacks involved state actors, including 40 by Military/Police (including the NTF-ELCAC), 22 by local governments, 14 by the national government and one by a foreign government. Intimidation, including the use of red-tagging (48 cases) and surveillance (19 cases), were the most common form of attack. Harassment, including physical or online, accounted for 33 cases.  3.32 Libel and anti-terror laws are used against journalists reporting on politicians or business. Frenchie Mae Cumpio, a journalist who reported on abuses of power by the military during the Duterte administration had terror financing, illegal possession of firearms and two murder charges filed against her. Reporters Without Borders alleged the charges against Cumpio were based on fabricated evidence. The murder charges were dismissed in November 2025. In January 2026, the Tacloban Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Cumpio guilty of terrorism financing and sentenced her to 12 to 18 years in prison. The court acquitted Cumpio on the firearms charges. Cumpio served more than five years in pre-trial detention since her arrest in February 2020.  3.33 In September 2023, a court acquitted prominent independent journalist Maria Ressa and her news website Rappler on her fifth tax-evasion charge. In June 2025, the Pasig City RTC dismissed a case against Ressa and five other Rappler directors brought under Presidential Decree No. 715 or the Anti-Dummy Law that prohibits foreigners from intervening in any activity such as the operation of a media company. These cases against Ressa and Rappler were seen as reprisals for Rappler’s critical reporting on the Duterte administration. In 2020, the Manila RTC found Ressa and Rappler author Reynaldo Santos Jr guilty of cyber-libel for an article published on the Rappler website. Ressa and Santos were sentenced to up to six years in prison and fined PHP200,000 (AUD4,878.42). The Court of Appeal upheld the charges in 2022, added an additional 8 months and 20 days to the prison sentence and increased the fine to PHP400,000 (AUD9,756.83). 3.34 Journalists in the Philippines are not well paid. A 2021 survey by the NUJP found 44 per cent of respondents received a monthly salary of PHP15,000 (AUD365.88) or below. Fifteen per cent of respondents, mostly those based in the provinces, earned PHP5,000 (AUD121.96) or below. Half of respondents said they were not entitled to holiday 18 pay, hazard pay, overtime pay and insurance for dangerous or out-of-town assignments. In-country sources said as journalists were not well paid it was common for politicians to be able to buy favourable coverage at a local level.  3.35 DFAT assesses journalists in Manila reporting on issues critical of politicians or business interests possibly face politically motivated violence and harassment, including being accused of libel and other crimes. Journalists outside of Manila reporting on similar issues are also likely to face this treatment.  Street Demonstrations and Protestors 3.36 Article 3, Section 4 of the Constitution protects the right to peaceful assembly. Under the Public Assembly Act 1985, a protest application must be submitted to the office of the mayor of the city or municipality at least five days prior to the intended protest. An application is not required if the protest is planned for an established Freedom Park (a designated space for political gatherings and protests). In-country sources said permits were typically granted. Police presence was relaxed and non-violent protests, even when associated with sensitive issues like the communist movement, occurred without incident.  3.37 Police responses to anti-corruption protests in late 2025 have varied. In September 2025, anti-corruption protests in Manila which turned violent resulted in the arrest of 224 individuals and the deployment of tear gas to disperse individuals damaging property. Amnesty International alleged police engaged in unlawful use of force including beatings during arrest and detention and detained individuals for up to 10 days, beyond the maximum 36 hours allowed by law. Subsequent peaceful anti-corruption protests, including ones calling for President Marcos Junior’s resignation, have occurred without police interference. 3.38 DFAT assesses it is rare for peaceful protestors, including those critical of President Marcos Junior and the Philippine Government, to be interfered with or receive adverse attention for engaging in protest activities. Violent protestors are likely to be arrested and dealt with forcibly.  GROUPS OF INTEREST Women  3.39 The Constitution ‘recognizes the role of women in nation building and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men’. Gender-based discrimination is illegal under Republic Act No. 9710  or the Magna Carta of Women. Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act 2004, seeks to protect women and their children from violence by intimate partners. Rape, including spousal rape, is illegal, with penalties ranging from six to 40 years’ imprisonment. The Republic Act No. 11313 or the Safe Spaces Act seeks to protect against all forms of gender-based sexual harassment committed in public spaces, educational or training institutions, workplaces and online spaces. 3.40 Divorce is illegal for non-Muslim Filipinos. It is possible to seek an annulment or a declaration of nullity under certain conditions but the process is expensive and lengthy. It is legal and common for couples to separate and re-couple with others without divorcing however they are not permitted to re-marry. A bill to legalise divorce, opposed by the Catholic Church, was approved by the House of Representatives in May 2024 but is yet to receive Senate or presidential approval. Muslims in the BARMM can divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws (sharia). In-country sources said divorce came with stigma for Muslim women. Families expected Muslim women to endure mistreatment for the sake of preserving their marriage. 3.41 According to the 2022 National Demographic and Health Survey, 17.5 per cent of Filipino women aged between 15 and 49 have experienced physical, sexual or emotional violence from their intimate partners. According to the Philippine Commission on Women, lack of reporting of violence against women is a significant problem. In-country sources said women experiencing gender-based or family violence were often pressured by family members or law enforcement to reconcile with their abuser, including in cases of rape. In-country sources said gender-based violence in the BARMM was underreported due to stigma, pride or to prevent clan feuding. Victim-survivors sometimes married their abuser to save face and avoid conflict between families. 3.42 The Women and Children Protection Center, an investigative unit within the PNP, handles cases of gender-based violence, violence against children, children in conflict and human trafficking. It provides oversight for 19 Women and Children Protection Desks (WCPDs) within local police stations. The Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act 1998 directed the PNP to establish WCPDs within all police stations throughout the country. According to media reporting, most police stations contained a WCPD. DFAT was unable to verify this.  3.43 The Philippines has a protection order system to protect women from violence. There are three kinds of protection orders: a Barangay Protection Order (BPO), issued by a barangay captain and effective for 15 days, a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), issued by a court and effective for 30 days and a Permanent Protection Order (PPO), issued by a court and effective until revoked by the court upon application. Applications for protection orders may be filed with the appropriate Regional Trial Court/Family Court or Municipal Court where the petitioner resides. Applicants may apply for a BPO in the barangay where they reside.  3.44 The Magna Carta for Women mandates all LGUs establish a Violence Against Women (VAW) desk in every barangay. VAW desks serve as frontline service providers to victim-survivors experiencing physical, sexual, psychological, economic and other forms of abuse. Functions of a VAW desk include assisting victims in securing BPOs, facilitating and coordinating access to support services, onward case referral to WCPDs, reporting on case numbers handled by the barangay and community advocacy to eliminate violence against women. Desks are managed by a VAW Desk Officer and are usually located within a barangay hall. As of December 2024, there were over 39,619 barangays with VAW desks across the Philippines. In-country sources said desk officers and law enforcement lacked training to appropriately manage gender-based violence cases. VAW desks are not always staffed, which can lead to barangay captains or police mediating cases and promoting reconciliation between victim-survivors and abusers. 3.45 In cases of domestic and family violence, women struggle to access financial support and loans without interacting with their abuser. Child custody is usually awarded to the mother in cases involving violence.  3.46 DSWD operates temporary and long-term centres and residential care facilities across the Philippines. Not all DSWD facilities are dedicated women’s shelters and some may be used by other groups. Some LGUs operate shelters but this service is patchy and based on the attitudes of individual LGU leaders. In some cases, LGU women’s shelters are well-equipped and staffed on a 24/7 basis. In other cases, they are co-located with drug recovery and mental health shelters. Churches and religious groups also operate women’s shelters across the Philippines. 3.47 Women and girls have equal access to education. Girls typically stay at school longer than boys. Women do not face legal barriers to equal participation in the economy, politics and society but social attitudes and power imbalances undermine gender equality in practice.  3.48 Women have a workforce participation rate of around 50 per cent, with college educated women’s workforce participation closer to 80 per cent. Women are largely overrepresented in the informal sector. Informal sector employment is characterised by a lack of social protection, low remuneration and poor working conditions. Women employed in the informal sector are at risk of receiving little to no financial support to cover loss of income during natural disasters. Women with lower rates of education in rural areas are least likely to be in the workforce. Women are active in public sector employment, however, a women’s advocacy group in the BARMM described a ‘glass ceiling’ preventing women securing more senior positions. 3.49 Single women, including those who head a household, occasionally experience judgment and negative societal attitudes when attempting to access socio-economic and healthcare services like the 4Ps and childhood vaccinations. While Republic Act No. 11861 or the Expanded Solo Parents Welfare Act, provides a comprehensive framework of support, implementation varies. Women remain disproportionately affected due to entrenched societal norms and expectations surrounding motherhood and sexuality. These include an expectation for women to take on care responsibilities in the home and pressure to remarry in the case of separation. The CHR has found solo mothers (including those who are single, separated or widowed) frequently face stigma, workplace discrimination and limited access to essential services such as healthcare, housing and education. This is often compounded by poverty, scarce employment opportunities and unclear benefit guidelines. Women in conflict are mostly affected by lack of access to social services and the death of a male provider. 3.50 If a child is born out of wedlock, custody is typically awarded to the mother. Custody is shared where a child is not born out of wedlock if parents separate. Informal adoptions are common in the Philippines, for example, an aunty taking a niece or nephew to a third country. Formal inter-country adoptions of a child by relatives residing 20 overseas must satisfy the same requirements and qualifications as prospective adoptive parents seeking to adopt a non-relative child. 3.51 Abortion is criminalised on all grounds but still occurs. The most recent available estimates by the Guttmacher Institute put the total number abortions at 973,000 annually during 2015-2019, most of them unsafe. There is no national target to reduce unsafe abortion or to provide post-abortion care. Many Catholics and Muslims oppose abortion. In the BARMM the use of contraception is considered taboo.  3.52 Commercial surrogacy in the Philippines is not regulated and traditional surrogacy can raise issues related to parentage and custody.  3.53 DFAT assesses women experiencing gender-based, domestic or family violence are possibly unable to access adequate services or support, including from law enforcement and authorities. Single women, single women with children, widows and women experiencing violence are likely to experience societal and family stigma including workplace discrimination and pressure to remarry.  Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 3.54 The law does not prohibit consensual same-sex relations and issues facing Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex and/or Asexual (LGBTQIA+) communities are publicly discussed. The well-attended Metro Manila Pride Parade, held annually since 1994, is one of the longest running in Southeast Asia. In-country sources said the 2025 Metro Manila Pride Parade had extensive police protection and did not receive negative attention from law enforcement. 3.55 CSOs continue to flag concerns around a lack of national anti-discrimination legal protections for LGBTQIA+ people. Several cities, including Manila, have passed ordinances recognising LGBTQIA+ people’s rights and prohibiting acts of discrimination. Several versions of a Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics (SOGIESC) Equality Bill to provide legal anti-discrimination protections for the LGBTQIA+ community have been proposed since 2000. None have passed due to lack of support in the Senate and sustained opposition from conservative and religious groups. In 2023, the Supreme Court reiterated its previous ruling the Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act protects all women, including women in lesbian relationships. 3.56 The 2024 Philippines National Survey on the Mental Health of LGBTQ+ Young People, conducted by the Trevor Project and the Psychological Association of the Philippines, found nearly half of LGBTQIA+ young people had attempted suicide, more than one in three in the previous year. 3.57 Societal and familial treatment of LGBTQIA+ individuals varies, influenced by religious and cultural differences. There is typically stronger acceptance of gay and bisexual men, as opposed to lesbians and the transgender community. The capital region is more progressive and has more employment opportunities for LGBTQIA+ people who are open about their sexuality. Outside of this, and particularly in the southern Philippines, there are cases of violence and hate crimes committed against LGBTQIA+ groups.  3.58 One in-country source said it was unlikely members of the LGBTQIA+ community would be employed in the BARMM if open about their sexuality. In-country sources said LGBTQIA+ individuals were sometimes tolerated in the BARMM if they denounced Islam, owing to statements by Imams that being a member of the LGBTQIA+ community is for Christians, not Muslims. These sources said doing so did not necessarily provide protection from violence or discrimination as LGBTQIA+ people were still frequently targeted in the BARMM. 3.59 Lesbians are subjected to adverse societal and family attitudes and treatment, particularly in the BARMM. In Maguindanao Province in 2021, six women and girls between the ages of 16 and 20 had their heads forcibly shaved in public after being accused of being lesbians. The public shaming was attended by the community, recorded on video and shared on social media. The act was condemned by the Bangsamoro Parliament, the Commission for Human Rights and human rights groups.  3.60 More recently, in November 2025, local government officials in Pagalungan, Maguindanao del Sur, reportedly conducted ‘Operation Supak’ which targeted LGBTQIA+ couples living together. Individuals were allegedly taken from their homes and brought before officials in the barangay hall to be publicly shamed and interrogated. Some reports suggest the couples were separated to prevent further co-habitation. ‘Operation Supak’ was 21 condemned by local CSOs. In Maguindanao Province in 2021, an improvised explosive device was detonated at a volleyball game attended by members of the LGBTQIA+ community, killing one and injuring seven. The victims reported receiving threats related to their sexuality in the lead up to the attack. 3.61 Transgender people experience more violence and harassment than other members of the LGBTQIA+ community. Violence, including killings occurs, particularly against transgender women. Prosecutions for these murders are low and in-country sources said there was little to no recognition of the issue. In June 2025, a gunman in General Santos City in the southern Philippines carried out a targeted killing of transgender rights activist, Ali Jejhon Macalintal, who worked as a radio commentator. In 2022, a transgender student was murdered in Tawi-Tawi after being stabbed multiple times.  3.62 In-country sources reported conversion therapy for gay men was typically in the form of forced marriage to a woman. In-country sources said families would organise the rape of lesbian family members by a man as a form of conversion therapy. Religious groups and churches, including Catholics, Evangelicals and Muslims, do not conduct conversion therapy but do encourage families to conduct the practice against their LGBTQIA+ family members. 3.63 Gender-affirming hormone therapy is not subsidised resulting in out-of-pocket costs for transgender Filipinos typically between PHP710 (AUD17.32) and PHP1,065 (AUD25.98). In-country sources said it was difficult to access gender-affirming hormone therapy. According to the Philippine Professional Association for Transgender Health, most transgender Filipinos self-prescribe by purchasing cheaper hormones on the internet. In a submission to the UN Human Rights Council, local CSO, Pioneer Filipino Transgender Men Movement reported a lack of transgender-friendly healthcare providers led some transgender men to self-medicate. Transgender Filipinos reportedly have limited access to gender-affirming surgeries due to high costs and a limited number of providers. 3.64 In the absence of national legislation, transgender and gender non-conforming individuals must undergo a rigorous judicial process to change their gender on identification documents. According to in-country sources, cases had taken around five to six years and were costly.  3.65 The likelihood of facing official or societal discrimination, including familial violence, depends on geographic and religious factors. Despite the lack of anti-discrimination protections at the national level, DFAT assesses it is rare for LGBTQIA+ individuals to face official discrimination, except in the BARMM, when accessing services, seeking protection from law enforcement or seeking employment. Gay and bisexual men are unlikely to experience societal discrimination. Lesbians and trans women, particularly in the BARMM, possibly face violence from law enforcement and local authorities and from their families and communities if their sexuality or gender identity is known. Children 3.66 Article 15, Section 3 of the Constitution says ‘the State shall defend the right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development.’ The Philippines does not have a comprehensive law protecting the rights of children but protections are contained in other laws, including the Family Code, Labour Code, Child and Youth Welfare Code, Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act, Child Protection Act and the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act. A Magna Carta for Children Bill to provide a mandate for the promotion of children’s rights, especially those belonging to marginalised sectors was before Congress at the time of writing. 3.67 According to the United Nations Children’s Fund, children in conflict with the law (children alleged as, accused of or convicted of having committed a criminal offence) remains an issue in Mindanao, with 229 cases reported between 2022 and 2024 primarily in Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur and Cotabato City. Children in Mindanao are also at risk of recruitment into armed groups, trafficking, exploitation and election-related violence. The 7th UN Secretary General’s Report on Children and Armed Conflict in the Philippines, highlights 58 grave violations (including killing and maiming) committed against 43 children between January 2022 and December 2023, noting this was a significant decline in verified grave violations compared with the previous period. Incidents of sexual violence, abduction, attacks on schools and hospitals and denial of humanitarian access were also verified, though in low numbers. Further concerns were noted on the proximity of armed conflict incidents to schools, which resulted in class suspensions in eight Mindanao provinces.  22 3.68 Terrorist and anti-government organisations recruit child soldiers, primarily in insurgency-affected areas, especially in Mindanao. Between January to June 2024, the AFP’s Center for Law of Armed Conflict (AFP-CLOAC) rescued three children used as soldiers by communist insurgent groups, one from Lanao del Norte and two from Negros Occidental. The CPP-NPA and the MILF claim they do not recruit children as combatants but have admitted to training children for non-combat purposes, such as cooking or message delivery to combat areas.  3.69 In 2021, the Philippine Government prohibited the practice of child marriage and cohabitation of an adult with a child outside of a marriage under Republic Act No. 11596. The government raised the minimum age of sexual consent from 12 to 16 years old in 2022. Child marriage is practiced in Muslim and indigenous communities, occurring typically after a girl’s first menstruation. Non-Moro indigenous communities also practice child marriage. In-country sources said girls as young as 8 years old in the BARMM had been married for family or political reasons. Sources also said child marriage occurred amongst the political elite in the BARMM to secure allegiances. Girls are not allowed to continue education after marriage, resulting in more women working in the informal sector. According to UNICEF, across the Philippines, a lack of enforcement of Republic Act No. 11596 by local authorities, underreporting of cases and social norms are barriers to addressing child marriage.  3.70 Child pornography is illegal. Despite this, financially motivated Child Sexual Exploitation Material (CSEM) production is prevalent in the Philippines. According to the International Justice Mission (IJM) Scale of Harm, nearly half a million Filipino children were trafficked to produce CSEM in 2022. Local field units and barangay level police receive training and education on countering child exploitation. The government’s focus is on prosecution of family members who broadcast CSEM. In-country sources said there was support at the highest levels to address online sexual exploitation and abuse of children. The challenge was limited resources, not a lack of willingness.  3.71 Child labour (defined as children engaged in hazardous work, children below 15 years old who worked for more than 20 hours per week and children 15 to 17 years old who worked for more than 40 hours per week) occurs in the Philippines. The number of child labourers was around 513,000 in 2024, lower than 678,000 in 2023 and 828,000 in 2022. The agriculture sector accounts for the largest share of child labourers. 3.72 DFAT assesses it is rare for children to experience societal or official discrimination. Children in the BARMM, in poverty or in conflict-affected areas, possibly face violence and/or exploitation through recruitment into armed groups or by their family members. Victims of Loan Sharks 3.73 Loan sharks in the Philippines charge extremely high rates of interest, demand payment in short timeframes and use intimidation and harassment against borrowers. Loan sharks typically operate through online lending platforms. Detailed information on loan sharks and their operations is limited.  3.74 According to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission, loan sharks typically demand repayment within seven days. Failure to pay the debt typically results in large penalties and loan sharks contacting the family members and friends of borrowers. If no payment is made after two weeks, the loan shark may threaten the borrower with a complaint in a small claims court or barangay and a complaint to the borrower’s employer. Following this, loan sharks typically harass family members and threaten to post negative remarks about the borrower on social media or vandalise their residence. Some loan sharks resort to death threats. In-country sources said disputes over unpaid loans sometimes resulted in violence and killings however this was rare. 3.75 Some victims of loan sharks report demands to pay back a loan despite not receiving the money they requested. Victims are typically referred to debt collectors and, according to in-country sources, may receive death threats or bomb threats against their workplaces unless debts are paid. Other predatory lending practices include so-called ‘5-6’ loans, where the borrower must repay 6 pesos for every 5 they borrow (an interest rate of 20 per cent per month). These loans are unsecured, based on trust or personal relationships and often involve no written contracts. Collection methods can be aggressive and include social pressure or sometimes harassment. 3.76 Authorities target illegal and exploitative loan sharks. In February 2024, 16 Indian nationals in Iloilo and Antique provinces were arrested, accused of engaging in illegal lending practices. The Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission (PAOCC), a government body that investigates criminal syndicates, said as of July 2025, it was handling around 15,000 cases filed against online lending platforms. At the direction of President Marcos Junior, the 23 PAOCC was prioritising complaints against online lending applications to ensure victims achieved justice and legal remedy. It said many cases centred on allegations of harassment, threats and excessive interest rates.  3.77 In September 2025, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) shut down 19 illegal online lending firms following complaints of invasion of privacy and harassment. The SEC said the companies were not registered and lacked necessary permissions to operate as lending or financing companies. They faced penalties of a fine of up to PHP50,000 (AUD1,219.60) or imprisonment of six months to 10 years. 3.78 DFAT assesses state protection is available to people who owe money to loan sharks. DFAT assesses it is likely for people who owe money to loan sharks to be harassed. It is rare for people who owe money to loan sharks to face physical violence. 24 4. COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION CLAIMS ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF LIFE Extrajudicial Killings and the ‘War on Drugs’ 4.1 According to official statistics, more than 6,000 Filipinos were killed during former President Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs’. Local human rights groups estimate the actual number is closer to 30,000. President Marcos Junior has said his government’s campaign against drugs is focused instead on community-based treatment, rehabilitation, education and reintegration. In 2024, Marcos Junior said his government’s war on dangerous drugs would be ‘bloodless’ and killings were not part of the strategy. Marcos Junior also said anti-illegal drug operations should respect human rights.  4.2 Despite the change in rhetoric, extrajudicial killings related to drugs have continued under the Marcos Junior administration, albeit in smaller numbers. Monitoring by the University of the Philippines’ Dahas Project indicates from July 2022 (the time Marcos Junior took office) to February 2026, 1,173 people died in drug-related killings. Of the 364 killings recorded in 2024, 39 per cent were committed by unidentified assailants and 30 per cent were said to have been at the hands of state agents, mainly the police and to a lesser extent members of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.  4.3 Human Rights Watch reports law enforcement officers and their agents have continued to conduct raids using former President Duterte’s orders as justification. According to Human Rights Watch, extrajudicial killings continued throughout 2025, often perpetrated during police drug raids or by unidentified assailants on motorbikes.  4.4 Several bodies in the Philippines are responsible for monitoring and investigating killings by security forces. These include the PNP’s Internal Affairs Service, the AFP-CLOAC and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The Commission for Human Rights also investigates complaints of alleged extrajudicial killings. 4.5 Some police involved in extrajudicial killings have been prosecuted. In early 2024, a Navotas local court convicted five of six police officers involved in the August 2023 killing of Jemboy Baltazar in Navotas City. The officers failed to issue a warning before firing and had their body cameras turned off, both violations of regulations. One officer was convicted of homicide and sentenced to four-to-six years in prison. Four others were sentenced to four months in prison for the illegal discharge of firearms. One officer was acquitted.  4.6 The Marcos Junior administration has implemented reforms of the PNP, dismissing several officers, including for drug-related offences. Despite these high-profile cases, in-country sources said the general culture of impunity surrounding extrajudicial killings committed by police had not changed under the Marcos Junior administration.  4.7 Widows of the drug war face barriers including in accessing mental health and financial support and societal stigma. Socioeconomically disadvantaged families have frequently been unable to finance adequate burials of relatives killed in the drug war beyond a five-year lease of a grave, intensifying psychological stress when remains are exhumed and returned. Evidence has shown Filipinos who lost a family member through a drug-related killing were more likely to experience severe mental distress. Those who witnessed a killing were more likely to experience moderate mental distress and probable post-traumatic stress disorder. Strict drug enforcement policies and harsh rhetoric on drug use also retain support in some parts of the community, intensifying stigma and discrimination towards people who use drugs and their families.  4.8 The families of victims of extrajudicial killings are often stigmatised. Children whose parents have been killed are particularly affected. The loss of a parent who is the main financial provider can push poor families into greater poverty. Many children are forced to work. Some end up homeless, further exposing them to danger, violence and criminal activity. They may also experience difficulties accessing support services due to their perceived association with illicit drugs. 4.9 Harassment and extrajudicial killing of lawyers occurred more frequently under the Duterte administration than under the Marcos Junior administration. While figures vary, multiple organisations report around 60 lawyers were killed during the Duterte administration. According to the National Union of People’s Lawyers, most of those killed had represented either victims of the ‘War on Drugs’ or victims of human rights violations. Attacks and killings 25 of lawyers have continued under the Marcos Junior administration, though at a lesser rate. In-country sources reported six killings of lawyers under the Marcos Junior administration. In-country sources also said there had been few arrests related to the killings of lawyers. 4.10 DFAT assesses accused drug users and dealers are possibly killed by state forces or vigilantes. Family members of victims of drug-related extrajudicial killings likely experience societal discrimination in the form of stigma from the community and possibly experience official discrimination when attempting to access support services. Human rights lawyers and those representing drug war victims are unlikely to experience violence. Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances 4.11 The Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act 2012 criminalises enforced or involuntary disappearances. According to the CHR, the Act is underutilised and prosecutions are rare. In-country sources said it was difficult for victims’ families to get official confirmation their relatives were not held in government custody.  4.12 Karapatan, a local human rights CSO, reported 14 people were forcibly disappeared between 2022 and 2024. Victims of enforced disappearances are often activists, including those who campaign on indigenous, environmental and labour issues. Recent victims include activist James Jazmines and his friend Felix Salaveria Jr., reportedly abducted in Tabaco City in the central Philippines in August 2024.  4.13 Kidnappings were common and predominantly committed for criminal purposes, including ransom and forced labour in illicit criminal activities, including scam centres. Terrorist groups were implicated in many kidnappings in Mindanao. DEATH PENALTY 4.14 The Philippines abolished the death penalty in 2006. Calls to reinstate the death penalty occasionally occur in the wake of high profile, violent or deadly crimes. CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT Torture 4.15 Article 3, Section 12 of the Constitution prohibits torture. The Anti-Torture Law 2009 prohibits any form of physical or mental harm against individuals under investigation or in custody and establishes severe penalties for acts of torture. Evidence obtained through torture is legally inadmissible. The CHR and the Office of the Ombudsman have powers to investigate allegations of torture. 4.16 According to the US Department of State, members of the police and military are accused of routinely abusing and sometimes torturing suspects. Common forms of abuse during interrogation reportedly included electric shock, burning with cigarettes and suffocation. From January to July 2024, the CHR investigated 25 cases of alleged torture involving 33 victims. Seven involved members of the PNP, three local government officials, two corrections officers, one drug enforcement officer, one a member of the military and one a non-state actor. Amnesty International reported police physically abused ten individuals involved in anti-corruption protests in Manila on 21 September 2025.  4.17 In-country sources said people forced to work in scam centres were tortured and police reported evidence of physical abuse during raids on POGOs.  4.18 DFAT assesses systematic or widespread torture is rare. Where torture perpetrated by security forces or government officials occurs, DFAT assesses such practices generally reflect the actions of rogue officers rather than state policy, although a prevailing culture of impunity likely contributes. Arbitrary Arrest and Detention 4.19 Article 3 of the Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right to challenge the lawfulness of arrest or detention in court. Arbitrary detention reportedly occurs, particularly in areas of violent unrest. According to the US Department of State, the CHR investigated 31 alleged cases of unlawful arrest and illegal 26 detention from January to July 2024, of which 11 were perpetrated by police, three by members of the military, two by local government officials, one by a prison officer and one by a non-state actor. In September 2025, anti-corruption protests which turned violent resulted in the arrests of 224 individuals (see Street Demonstrations and Protestors). Amnesty International alleged police detained individuals for up to 10 days, beyond the maximum 36 hour period allowed by law. 4.20  In cases of arbitrary arrest and detention by police, disciplinary action is taken against offending officers. In March 2024, three police officers were subject to administrative charges for an illegal, warrantless arrest and 40-day detention of a group of individuals accused of burning a car. In another case, 10 police officers were dismissed for their alleged involvement in the arrest of four Chinese nationals involved in a scam centre in Paranaque City.  4.21 According to the World Prison Brief, 65.2 per cent of the prison population comprised people held in pre-trial detention or remand in 2022. According to in-country sources, lengthy periods of pre-trial detention were not typically punitive but the result of a slow, overburdened judicial system. Advocacy could sometimes reduce the time individuals spent in pre-trail detention although pre-trial periods often exceeded the maximum sentence for the alleged crime. In those cases, detainees were sometimes released before trial.  27 5. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS STATE PROTECTION Military 5.1 The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) reports to the Department of National Defense and consists of an army, navy and air force. Under the Marcos Junior administration, the AFP is undertaking a period of transition from internal security operations to external security operations concerning territorial defence and sovereignty. As part of this transition, the PNP will play a greater role in providing internal security functions. The AFP has historically prioritised internal security operations against the CPP-NPA and Islamic armed groups in Mindanao, including under previous administrations. 5.2 The AFP has a powerful, well-integrated Inspector General with responsibilities for discipline and performance. Violations of the law, including human rights abuses, are investigated and prosecuted under the AFP’s military justice system. Promotions may be withheld for individuals found to have committed human rights violations. 5.3 The AFP-CLOAC has responsibility for providing human rights training to AFP personnel and monitoring human rights practices of the AFP in cooperation with the CHR. According to the US Department of State, weak accountability mechanisms contributed to limited ongoing reports of human rights violations by the AFP, particularly by personnel acting outside the chain of command. The US Department of State also said the AFP-CLOAC was supportive of US Government efforts to investigate and vet AFP units accused of committing human rights violations.  Police 5.4 The PNP is a national police force with specialist units covering geographic areas and specific kinds of crime, including cybercrime, drug enforcement, protective security and counter-terrorism operations. Governors and mayors have veto powers over the PNP chief of their region, often resulting in a close relationship between regional police and politics.  5.5 Recruits receive an initial six-month Public Safety Basic Recruit Course. The course includes tactical and firearm handling training. This is followed by a six-month Public Safety Field Training Program which includes  on the job training. 5.6 Former PNP Chief, General Nicolas Torre III, committed the PNP to a 5-minute maximum response time policy in cities and, where realistic, remote areas.  5.7 The PNP is transparent about its operations. In-country sources said police invited media into live operations. Police continue to be accused of extrajudicial killings during drug raids (see Extrajudicial Killings and the War on Drugs).  5.8 The PNP Internal Affairs Service (IAS) was established in 1999 as an independent body to conduct inspections, investigate complaints and refer criminal cases against PNP members to the courts. According to the former PNP Chief’s Tour of Duty Report, from April 2024 to June 2025 the IAS handled 1,193 complaints against PNP officers. The PNP Human Rights Affairs Office has responsibility to promote human rights within the PNP and monitor IAS investigations. The NBI also investigates police conduct. In May 2023, the NBI in Central Visayas filed kidnapping, serious illegal detention, rape and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service charges against five Cebu City police officers and an informant, who illegally detained a woman in September 2022. The woman, detained on suspicion of drug trafficking, was allegedly held in a private apartment for three days where she was raped by the informant. 5.9 The PNP has systemic problems with corruption, including petty corruption. According to the US Department of State, human rights groups expressed concern regarding the contribution of corruption to abuses committed by the PNP. Witnesses to abuses were often unable to obtain protection. The Office of the Ombudsman reported witnesses often failed to come forward or to cooperate in police abuse or corruption cases. In-country sources reported the extent of corruption varied throughout the force but little had been done to prevent corrupt practices. For further information, see Corruption. 28 Tanod (Neighbourhood Safety Officers or Watchmen) 5.10 Neighbourhood safety officers known as a tanod operate under the control of barangay captains. Tanod perform basic front-line tasks to maintain peace and order in cooperation with police. They often carry weapons, from truncheons to guns. While they are volunteers, tanod are entitled to insurance coverage and other benefits.  Judiciary 5.11 The Supreme Court is the apex court and has administrative responsibility for the judiciary. It comprises a chief justice as its presiding officer and 14 associate justices, all appointed by the president from nominations submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council. President Marcos Junior has made one appointment to the Supreme Court and will appoint a new chief justice and associate justice in 2026 following retirements. Below the Supreme Court are the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, which handle appeals and cases on corruption and tax disputes. Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) serve as second-level courts with general jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. RTCs have jurisdiction over civil cases involving large amounts of money and serious criminal cases. Sharia District Courts are equivalent in rank to Regional Trial Courts. First-level courts include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The official names of first-level courts vary depending on location. First-level courts have jurisdiction over minor civil and criminal matters. Sharia Circuit Courts are equivalent in rank to first-level courts. 5.12 Courts, including criminal courts, have significant backlogs, in some cases amounting to many years. In-country sources said the judicial system was poorly governed, with judges responsible for managing administrative functions such as repairs, supplies, procurement, applications for personnel leave and disciplinary actions. In-country sources also said the system was overburdened due to too many penal laws.  5.13 In-country sources said corruption in the judiciary was systemic and judicial corruption, particularly in the form of bribery for favourable outcomes, was prevalent. In-country sources said paying judges for outcomes was less common in the BARMM.  Access to Justice 5.14 Costs associated with court processes can act as barriers to justice. Legal aid and public defender services are available to poor defendants, including those charged with drug offences. The Public Attorney’s Office, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (a professional association similar to Australian law societies), universities and NGOs provide legal aid services. The process for accessing legal aid through these organisations vary and typically requires an applicant to demonstrate their financial need. In November 2024, the Supreme Court approved The Rules on Unified Legal Aid Service (ULAS Rules) mandating lawyers provide 60 hours pro bono legal aid every three years. 5.15 According to the Pro Bono Institute, those able to access pro bono resources are often left to navigate courtroom intricacies, such as coordinating the submission of documents, witnesses and evidence, on their own. In-country sources said criminal justice was not accessible in the BARMM due to the high costs to file a case and to proceed through a trial. Those sources said legal aid and pro bono services were typically reserved for either significant cases or those that were easily resolved. Double Jeopardy 5.16 Article 3, Section 21 of the Constitution guarantees against double jeopardy. DFAT is not aware of a person convicted of a crime in another country being tried again for the same crime upon their return to the Philippines. Detention and Prison Conditions 5.17 Pre-trial detention is managed by the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), post-trial detention by the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor). The CHR is empowered under Article 13, Section 18 of the Constitution to inspect jails, prisons and detention facilities. 5.18 The corrections system is under significant strain from overcrowding. BJMP, which oversees 486 jail facilities and 115,065 prisoners, had an average congestion rate of 292 per cent in July 2025. BuCor, which manages seven prison facilities with 53,813 prisoners, had a congestion rate of 242 per cent in June 2025. In January 2025, the New 29 Bilibid Prison in Metro Manila, the largest prison in the Philippines, had one Corrections Officer for every 65 prisoners. Across the entire BuCor prison system, the ratio was one Corrections Officer for every 24 prisoners.  5.19 Attempts to reduce overcrowding have led to diversion programs, expanding capacity and broadening conditions for early release of inmates through provisions like Good Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA). The GCTA reduces prison terms for prisoners who demonstrate good behaviour or who undergo training and education. In April 2024, the Supreme Court expanded the GCTA to include prisoners convicted of crimes such as murder, kidnapping and drug trafficking. 5.20 Unhygienic conditions, overcrowding and poor access to health facilities and medications lead to poor health outcomes for prisoners. According to BuCor data, 5,159 prisoner deaths were recorded between 2020 and 2024 (a mortality rate around 2.5 times higher than the general population). Heart attacks are the leading listed cause of death amongst prisoners, followed by pneumonia and other respiratory illnesses. Tuberculosis is also a significant health concern for prisoners owing to overcrowding and poor ventilation.  5.21 Crime and corruption are prevalent within the prison system. In-country sources reported torture, mistreatment and extrajudicial killings occurred however extreme cases of mistreatment were addressed. In-country sources reported detainees could pay corrections officers for better treatment. Shortages of officers lead to correctional work being delegated to other prisoners, resulting in corporal punishment by the designated ‘prisoner-in-charge’.  5.22 Several high-profile killings have occurred within prisons. These have been arranged by gang leaders in prisons or in some cases, at the direction of prison officials. In November 2022, the former Director-General of BuCor, Gerald Bantag and another corrections officer were accused of arranging the assassination of journalist Percy Lapid in the New Bilibid Prison.  Personal Disputes 5.23 Personal disputes such as neighbourhood disputes (noise, pathways, property boundaries), simple monetary claims (unpaid personal loans, minor contract breaches) and some lesser criminal offences between individuals are locally managed. The Katarungang Pambarangay system, governed by sections 399 to 422 of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code 1991 requires almost all civil disputes and some criminal offences involving residents of the city or municipality to be brought before a panel of barangay officials for conciliation. For an individual to take a personal dispute with another person from the same city or municipality to a court, they must either receive a Certificate to File Action from their barangay, issued after the conciliation process, or their dispute must be exempt from the requirement for mandatory barangay conciliation. Section 408 of the Local Government Code 1991 sets out which disputes are exempt from mandatory barangay conciliation, for example, if the dispute is with the government or involves a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year. Barangays where most inhabitants are indigenous populations are entitled to use customary systems to settle disputes in place of barangay conciliation. A barangay blotter, used to record minor complaints or disputes between residents within the barangay’s territorial jurisdiction, is kept by the barangay secretary or barangay officials.  5.24 Feuding, known as ‘rido’, is common between Moro clans and families in the BARMM. Rido can also involve fighting between Moro and non-Moro clans. There have been some instances of non-Moro people injured in rido violence. Land disputes and political rivalry between clans are common causes for rido violence. Monitoring by ACLED has recorded over 150 rido events between 1 January 2018 and 25 April 2025.  5.25 Both the MILF and the Philippine Government have acknowledged rido has undermined progress towards peace in the BARMM. There have been efforts by the Bangsamoro Government’s Peace, Security and Reconciliation Office to resolve historic, long-running clan feuds through negotiated peace pacts. The Office has also introduced codified norms to influence the behaviour of feuding clans and reduce risks faced by communities from rido violence.  5.26 Criminal laws relating to violence and physical assault are set out in Articles 262-266 of the Revised Penal Code. Penalties vary depending on the severity of the harm caused to the victim. The arresto mayor penalty, applied where less serious physical injury occurs, carries a prison term varying from one month and one day to six months. The prision mayor penalty, applied where serious physical injury occurs, carries a prison term varying from six years and one day to 12 years. Threats typically attract a penalty one degree lower than the crime threatened. In-country 30 sources said despite government attempts, the ability to combat violence, particularly as a means of solving disputes in rural communities, was limited.  INTERNAL RELOCATION 5.27 There are no legal impediments to relocation and Filipinos do freely relocate internally. Barriers to internal relocation for many Filipinos, including for women escaping violence and LGBTQIA+ individuals, may be the absence of family connections in the area to which they would relocate or a lack of financial resources to fund the relocation.  5.28 Criminal gangs in the Philippines are locally organised and based and typically do not have the ability to operate regionally or nationally, though some have broader networks across the country (see Criminal Gangs and Syndicates). In-country sources said it was unlikely a gang would follow someone who relocated to another part of the Philippines. 5.29 Internal displacement caused by natural disasters and conflict is common. Climate-induced displacement is typically temporary but those affected sometimes face difficulties in accessing necessities such as shelter, food, electricity, water and sanitation and in rebuilding livelihoods. TREATMENT OF RETURNEES Exit and Entry Procedures 5.30 The Philippines has several international crossing points for air and sea passengers. There is a heavy police presence at airports to prevent out-bound human trafficking and to protect OFWs. Filipino authorities, including the NBI, have the capability to identify individuals on inbound flights subject to INTERPOL notices.  5.31 Maritime borders are porous. Many islands and surrounding waters are unable to be frequently or effectively patrolled. In-country sources said it was difficult for immigration officials to travel outside of Manila. There are also informal trading routes and maritime border crossings into Malaysia and Indonesia. Various armed groups in Mindanao run shadow economies through these waters.  5.32 According to the Global Organized Crime Index, corruption among customs and immigration officials plays a critical role enabling illegal departures and the creation of false documentation in the Philippines.  5.33 DFAT assesses it is rare a person of interest to authorities, such as a criminal, could depart without being detected.  Conditions for Returnees 5.34 Thousands of Filipinos enter and depart the Philippines every day, especially for work abroad. Returning OFWs have designated lanes at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport to facilitate their access to services. People who return to the Philippines after several years’ absence are unlikely to face adverse attention on account of their absence, except for those involved in international crime or terrorism. Victims of trafficking receive arrival and reintegration support from the Department of Migrant Workers.  5.35 Authorities do not pay special attention to Filipinos who overstayed work or tourist visas or otherwise breached visa conditions in other countries. It is unlikely the Philippine Government would be aware a returning person was a failed asylum seeker. According to in-country sources, where identified, failed asylum seekers would be provided support.  DOCUMENTATION Birth, Death and Marriage Certificates 5.36 The PSA issues birth, death and marriage certificates. Since 1988 marriages have been governed by Executive Order No. 209 or the Family Code of the Philippines. All marriages prior to 1988 are governed by the Civil Code. Except for Muslim marriages, which are governed by the Code of Muslim Personal Laws/Presidential Decree No 1083.  31 5.37 A child’s parents can apply in person or online for a birth certificate. The government promotes birth registration and authorities routinely register births in health facilities. Births outside facilities are less likely to be registered promptly, if at all. As a result, birth certificate data may not be reliable.  5.38 Death certificates can be provided by a hospital on payment of all bills or on application by the next of kin of the deceased from the Local Civil Registry Office. 5.39 The Family Code provides two options to legally terminate a marriage: annulment or a declaration of nullity of marriage. Courts sometimes issue a legal separation but parties are still considered married and are not free to re-marry, although they can re-partner and live with their new partner.  5.40 Terminating a marriage is lengthy and expensive. According to the Philippine Commission on Women, an annulment could cost anywhere from PHP300,000 to PHP1,000,000 (AUD7,317.62 to AUD24,392.08). A decision could take years and may not align with the couple’s wishes. If a Filipino and a foreign spouse secure a divorce in the foreign spouse’s country, the divorce is recognised if valid under the laws of the foreign spouse’s country of origin. The Filipino spouse is then permitted to re-marry. Muslims in the BARMM can divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws (sharia). National Identity (ID) Cards 5.41 The Philippine Identification System (PhilSys) was introduced in 2018 with the aim of establishing a single national identification system for all citizens and residents. As of 31 October 2025, around 80 per cent (over 90 million) of the population held a national identity (available in card, digital and paper form). Passports 5.42 The Department of Foreign Affairs is responsible for issuing passports. Biometric passports have been issued since 2009. Passports cost PHP950 (AUD23.17) if obtained in the Philippines or AUD108 if obtained through the Philippine Embassy or one of its consulates in Australia. Regular Philippine passports are valid for 10 years. Passports for Filipinos aged under 18 years are valid for five years.  Prevalence of Fraud 5.43 Documents issued by Philippine authorities are generally reliable, though in-country sources said birth certificates could be obtained through bribes to hospitals so lacked integrity. Inquirer.net reported the PSA rejected citizenship applications of 1,627 foreign nationals who submitted fraudulent Filipino birth certificates. Fraud is commonly found in secondary documents like financial statements and employment records. Some high-profile cases involving document fraud have occurred. For instance, in 2022, Chinese national Alice Guo, was elected as Mayor of Bamban town in Tarlac province using fraudulent identity documents, including a fraudulent birth certificate. 5.44 The PNP compile an official daily record of reported incidents known as a police blotter. It includes details of both criminal and non-criminal matters, from petty theft and civil disputes to major criminal allegations. Filing a blotter entry is typically the first step in informing law enforcement of a perceived wrongdoing. Certified copies of entries can be requested from the relevant police station for around PHP50-100 (AUD1.22-2.44) with proof of identity and proof of interest in the reported incident. DFAT was unable to verify the process of obtaining entries which contain false information.  32 

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