DFAT Country Information Report Egypt

CONTENTS ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................................................... 2 GLOSSARY ..................................................................................................................................................................... 3 1.  PURPOSE AND SCOPE .............................................................................................................................................. 4 2.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION................................................................................................................................ 5 COUNTRY OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................................... 5 DEMOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................................................................. 5 ECONOMIC OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................................. 5 POLITICAL SYSTEM ........................................................................................................................................................ 9 HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................................................... 11 SECURITY SITUATION .................................................................................................................................................. 11 3.  REFUGEE CONVENTION CLAIMS ........................................................................................................................... 13 RACE/NATIONALITY .................................................................................................................................................... 13 RELIGION ..................................................................................................................................................................... 16 POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED) .............................................................................................................. 22 GROUPS OF INTEREST ................................................................................................................................................. 28 4.  COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION CLAIMS ............................................................................................................. 32 ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF LIFE .............................................................................................................................. 32 DEATH PENALTY .......................................................................................................................................................... 32 CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT .......................................................................... 33 5.  OTHER CONSIDERATIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 35 STATE PROTECTION .................................................................................................................................................... 35 INTERNAL RELOCATION .............................................................................................................................................. 38 TREATMENT OF RETURNEES ....................................................................................................................................... 38 DOCUMENTATION ...................................................................................................................................................... 39    ACRONYMS AUD  CCRO  CSF  CSO  EGP  ENP  ERC  FGM/C  GSMHAT   IOM  IMF  INGO  LGBTQIA+   NCHR  NGO  NSA  SSCHR   SSEC  UNICEF  UN OHCHR  UPR   WHO   Australian Dollar Central Civil Registration Office Central Security Forces Civil Society Organisation Egyptian Pound (currency) Egyptian National Police Egyptian Red Crescent  Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting General Secretariat of Mental Health International Organization for Migration International Monetary Fund International Non-Government Organisation Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex or Asexual National Council for Human Rights Non-Government Organisation National Security Agency Supreme Standing Committee for Human Rights State Security Emergency Courts United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights  Universal Periodic Review World Health Organization 2 GLOSSARY Baksheesh  Sharia  Shura Wasta Gratuity payment expected in return for the provision of services  Islamic law Principle of Islamic governance in which leaders consult with a council or the community before making an important decision Personal connections and favouritism Terms used in this report Almost certain   Likely    Possibly   Unlikely   Rare    Official discrimination This treatment is expected to occur in nearly all circumstances. This treatment is expected to occur in most circumstances. This treatment may occur in some circumstances. This treatment is not expected to occur in most circumstances. This treatment is only expected to occur in exceptional circumstances. 1. legal or regulatory measures applying to a particular group that impede access to state protection or services that are available to other sections of the population (examples might include but are not limited to difficulties in obtaining personal registrations or identity papers, difficulties in having papers recognised, arbitrary arrest and detention) 2. behaviour by state employees towards a particular group that impedes access to state protection or services otherwise available, including by failure to implement legislative or administrative measures Societal discrimination  1. behaviour by members of society (including family members, employers or service providers) that impedes access by a particular group to goods or services normally available to other sections of society (examples could include but are not limited to refusal to let property, refusal to sell goods or services, or employment discrimination) 2. ostracism or exclusion by members of society (including family, acquaintances, employers, colleagues or service providers). 3 1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1.1 This report was prepared for protection status decision makers by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). It provides a factual overview distinct from Australian Government policy and does not contain policy guidance for decision makers. 1.2 1.3 According to Ministerial Direction 84 of 24 June 2019, issued under the Migration Act 1958: Where the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has prepared [a] country information assessment expressly for protection status determination processes, and that assessment is available to the decision maker, the decision maker must take into account that assessment, where relevant, in making their decision. The decision maker is not precluded from considering other relevant information about the country. The report was prepared with regard to the current protection visa caseload without reference to individual applications. It provides DFAT’s best assessment at the time of writing.  1.4 The report draws on in-country knowledge and discussions. It takes into account reporting from a range of credible sources including: other governments, United Nations agencies, human rights and civil society organisations, local and international media and academia. Source details may be omitted to protect sources. 1.5 This Country Information Report replaces the previous DFAT report on Egypt published on 17 June 2019. 4 2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION COUNTRY OVERVIEW 2.1 Egypt became a republic following a military coup in 1952. The country underwent significant political, economic and social changes between 1954 and 1970 under the rule of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. His successor, President Anwar Sadat, was assassinated in 1981 by an Islamist militant opposed to peace initiatives with Israel. President Hosni Mubarak’s almost thirty-year rule ended in 2011 during the ‘25 January Revolution’, when large protests spread across Egypt against growing economic hardships, heavy-handed security practices, lack of political representation and endemic corruption within the ruling elite.  2.2 Egypt's first freely-elected president, Mohammed Morsi, assumed power on 30 June 2012. Morsi represented the Freedom and Justice Party, the political wing of the formerly outlawed Muslim Brotherhood (‘the Brotherhood’). As President, Morsi drew criticism for his perceived inability to improve Egypt’s economic situation and his authoritarian tendencies. Following nationwide anti-government protests, Egypt’s military removed Morsi during the ‘June 2013 Revolution’ and installed an interim military regime.  2.3 Egypt adopted a new Constitution in February 2014. The former head of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, was elected president in May 2014. Parliamentary elections were held in late 2015 and President El-Sisi transferred legislative powers to the parliament in February 2016. El-Sisi was re-elected president in 2018 and 2023. Egypt’s Emergency Law (No. 162) 1958 was lifted on 25 October 2021, having been in place almost consistently since 1981.  DEMOGRAPHY 2.4 Egypt’s population is estimated at 107,680,000 according to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics. Around 95 per cent of Egyptians live in the fertile zone along the Nile Valley that comprises 5 per cent of the country’s area. About half of the population lives in urban areas, particularly the capital, Cairo (estimated population 22.2 million) and Alexandria (estimated population 5.6 million). Almost all Egyptians (99.7 per cent) identify as ethnically Arab, although smaller populations of Beja, Nubians, Dom and Siwis (Amazigh or Berbers) exist. The national language is Arabic. For religious demography, see Religion.  ECONOMIC OVERVIEW 2.5 Egypt is the second-largest economy in Africa and has relatively large agricultural, manufacturing and services sectors. According to the World Bank, Egypt is a lower middle income country that earns substantial revenue from the Suez Canal, sale of hydrocarbons, tourism and remittances from overseas workers. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth was 4.8 per cent in 2025 and GDP per capita was approximately EGP157,835 (AUD4,935). Economists forecast GDP growth of 4.6 per cent in 2026, despite continuing high rates of inflation and tight credit conditions.  2.6 In March 2025, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved disbursement of AUD1.87 billion to Egypt following completion of the fourth review of the country's AUD12.4 billion economic reform program. The IMF Mission Chief for Egypt said the country had made substantial progress toward macroeconomic stability since 2024. The IMF's July 2025 Egypt Country Report stated the Egyptian authorities had preserved macroeconomic stability amid a difficult regional environment but progress on the structural reform agenda was 'mixed'. 2.7 Military-owned companies, often run by retired generals, have long played an oversized role in Egypt’s economy. The military has significantly broadened its economic profile under the administration of President El-Sisi, supervising massive infrastructure projects, running food distribution networks and investing heavily in real estate and factory projects. In 2019, the military began to routinely partner with Egypt’s largest private businesses and diversified into new economic sectors and activities. At the time of writing, military-owned companies were leading the implementation of President El-Sisi’s state-led investment strategy and were heavily integrated into the strategic management of the economy.  5 2.8 Egypt implemented a state ownership policy in 2022 to increase private sector participation by having the government withdraw from certain sectors and reduce its stake in others, while continuing to invest in areas deemed strategic. In response to the IMF’s recommendations to reduce state involvement in the economy, the government announced plans in 2025 to list four companies affiliated with the military on the stock market. In-country sources said the military had substantial businesses interests, accounting for close to 40 per cent of the overall economy. The military’s reach in the economy is much larger when including the companies it influences or unofficially runs. 2.9 Cost of living pressures for many Egyptians have worsened since 2021 according to in-country sources. This is primarily the result of the devaluation of the Egyptian pound (40 per cent during January 2023), high rate of inflation (11.7 per cent in October 2025), and reduction in government subsidies on bread and other food items. The Egyptian Government stopped publishing detailed poverty statistics in 2020 but in-country sources estimated 40 per cent of Egyptians were living under the poverty line in 2025. Some households had reduced their protein intake and swapped buying vegetables for cheaper, less healthy foods. As the price of bread, eggs and milk increased faster than inflation, food insecurity had become an issue for some poorer families.  2.10 In-country sources said despite many households reducing spending due to cost of living pressures, the average Egyptian was still able to access government services including healthcare and education and afford food, water, medication, electricity and fuel. DFAT assesses cost of living pressures are a major push factor for both legal and illegal migration from across Egypt (see also Employment). Employment 2.11 According to the World Bank, in 2024 Egypt's unemployment rate was 7.2 per cent and the youth unemployment rate (for those aged 15 to 24 years) 18.7 per cent. The overall unemployment rate dropped to 6.3 per cent in the first quarter of 2025, the lowest rate since records began in 1993. Egypt’s large informal sector and significant under-employment mean the actual unemployment rate is likely higher. 2.12 The Labour Law (No. 14) 2025, effective from 1 September 2025, aims to combat arbitrary dismissal and align national labour standards with international conventions. The new law introduces protections against unjust terminations, strengthens job security, promotes gender equality and inclusion of persons with disabilities. The law mandates three months of paid maternity leave, two years of unpaid childcare leave and severance payment of two months’ salary for every year of service. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have historically documented instances of employers failing to pay wages regularly and on time, especially in manufacturing industries and for those in informal employment. 2.13 To mitigate the ongoing high rate of inflation, President El-Sisi declared a rise in the minimum wage from EGP1,200 (AUD38) to EGP 6,000 (AUD187) in 2024. The Ministry of Manpower also announced an increase in the minimum monthly wage for private sector workers to EGP6,000 (AUD187), up from EGP3,500 (AUD109). Local media reported employers sometimes failed to pay the minimum wage and labour organising was heavily restricted. 2.14 DFAT assesses low rates of pay and weak economic opportunities often act as a push factor for emigration from Egypt, particularly for young Egyptians. Welfare 2.15 Article 79 of the 2014 Constitution states Egyptians have the right to healthy and sufficient food and clean water, with the state to ensure food resources for all citizens. Article 83 of the Constitution guarantees the health, economic, social, cultural and entertainment rights of elderly people and stipulates an entitlement to adequate state pensions. The Egyptian Government’s 2025-26 budget allocated EGP732.6 billion (AUD22.8 billion) towards ‘subsidies, grants and social benefits’, a 15.2 per cent increase over the previous year. This included EGP160 billion (AUD5 billion) to support food subsidy programs and EGP54 billion (AUD1.7 billion) for the Takaful (‘Solidarity’) and Karama (‘Dignity’) initiatives (see below). 2.16 Around 70 million Egyptians are eligible for government subsidised essential commodities (bread, sugar and cooking oil) designed to alleviate financial burdens on the vulnerable. In 2024, the Egyptian Government sought to limit subsidised foods to those who were eligible in return for the IMF extending Egypt's loan program, under which 6 Egypt committed to gradually abolish subsidies on basic commodities. In-country sources confirmed the government had begun reducing subsidies on food items in favour of direct cash transfers to the most vulnerable. 2.17 The Egyptian Government's Takaful and Karama initiatives provide direct cash transfers. Takaful provides cash transfers to low-income families with children conditional upon school attendance and regular health check-ups. Karama is an unconditional cash transfer to low-income orphans, older people and people with disabilities. These safety nets aim to provide short-term relief and economic stability during times of hardship. The number of beneficiaries of direct cash support programs increased from 1.79 million families in 2014-15 to 5.2 million families in 2023-24 (a 200 per cent increase). In-country sources said most direct cash transfer programs were for a maximum of EGP600 (AUD19) a month per individual (well below minimum wage) and entailed significant paperwork. Health 2.18 Average life expectancy in Egypt was 72 years in 2023 according to the World Bank (most recent data available) and was slightly higher in urban areas. Mortality rates are highest for non-communicable diseases such as heart disease, stroke, cirrhosis of the liver, kidney disease and diabetes according to the World Health Organization (WHO). 2.19 Article 18 of the Constitution states every citizen is entitled to comprehensive health care. It commits the Egyptian Government to establishing a comprehensive health care system, maintaining public health facilities and allocating no less than 3 per cent of GDP to health care. The government spent 4.7 per cent of GDP on health expenditure in 2022 according to World Bank data (most recent available). In-country sources said spending had dropped below constitutionally-imposed limits by 2024 due to population growth. The 2025-26 budget allocated EGP496 billion (AUD15.5 billion) towards health, an increase of 24.9 per cent from 2024-25. 2.20 Responsibility for health care is divided between the Ministry of Health, which funds primary care clinics, and the Ministry of Higher Education, which funds university hospitals. Health services are also provided by various other ministries, including defence, transport, aviation, electricity and interior. The Public Utilities’ Obligation to Establish, Manage, Operate, and Develop Health Facilities Act (No. 87) ratified on 23 June 2024, allows the private sector to operate and manage public health facilities on a for-profit basis. At the time of writing, Law No. 87 was yet to be implemented. 2.21 In 2022, Egypt had approximately 1,810 hospitals and 5,426 healthcare facilities.  Egypt had 1.3 hospital beds per 1,000 people according to World Bank data, on par with Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. The number of practising doctors in Egypt was 97,400 in 2022, meaning there were 8.6 doctors per 10,000 people. The Ministry of Health announced in November 2024 it was upgrading hospitals in 11 governorates to expand the number of new hospital beds by 2,648 and would construct 10 new hospitals by 2027. 2.22 The public health system is heavily subsidised. Out of pocket costs are relatively low unless specialist treatment for a chronic condition is required. Specific groups, including people with disabilities and those entitled to social assistance, are eligible for fully subsidised medical care. Many medicines are heavily subsidised through a combination of government funding, subsidised loans to pharmaceutical companies and insurance programs. Incountry sources said while the quality of public hospitals was poor, services and medicines were generally accessible and affordable for all Egyptians, including ethnic and religious minorities. The number of doctors, pharmacies and health care centres is generally higher in urban areas. 2.23 More than 66 per cent of Egyptians were covered by public health insurance programs in 2023 according to the Ministry of Health and Population. Those covered included most school students, public and private sector workers, widows and pensioners. There are no official figures on Egyptians who hold private health insurance. At the time of writing the Egyptian Government was rolling out a universal health insurance scheme to expand basic healthcare coverage. Fees are based on income, with the government covering costs for the poorest.  2.24 The Hayah Karima (‘Decent Life’) sustainable rural communities initiative commenced in 2019 and was expanded to mitigate the negative impacts of COVID-19. Under the initiative an additional EGP31 million (AUD958,000) was spent on health services in villages with the highest poverty rates. In-country sources said the initiative had improved health and education infrastructure in rural areas. 7 2.25 The private sector supplements Egypt’s public health facilities. Private hospitals and clinics in large cities such as Cairo, Alexandria and Sharm El Sheikh offer much higher standards of health care. These facilities sometimes employ internationally-trained doctors and specialists.  2.26 Aged care services for older Egyptians exist, both in terms of home-based care and residential care. The spectrum ranges from lower-priced moderate quality services run by CSOs to more expensive high-quality care options in privately-run facilities. In-country sources said most families looked after older relatives themselves and some found the need to place relatives into residential care a source of shame. 2.27 DFAT assesses Egyptians can access healthcare services without discrimination and generally with minimal out-of-pocket costs but quality and availability of services varies widely. Mental Health 2.28 The Mental Health Act 2009 establishes a framework for safeguarding the human rights of patients in psychiatric facilities and those engaging with mental health services. The Act aims to protect patient rights, combat stigma and raise public awareness of issues related to mental health. The Ministry of Health oversees hospitals and centres offering mental health services. Twenty-one public psychiatric hospitals operate countrywide offering inpatient and outpatient facilities, including two general hospitals with mental health wards. Egypt has less than one psychiatrist, one psychologist and 4 mental health nurses per 100,000 population according to the WHO.  2.29 While mental health services are generally covered under public health insurance programs, services are limited and facilities often overcrowded. Most public mental health resources are allocated to a small number of centralised psychiatric hospitals in larger cities. The number of beds available for psychiatric patients requiring acute inpatient care is often insufficient to meet demand. However, according to medical professionals in Egypt, significant progress had been made in integrating mental health promotion, prevention and treatment into primary care.  2.30 In-country sources said private therapy services were available but were expensive, with professionals charging between EGP1,000 (AUD31) to EGP10,000 (AUD310) a session. Private therapists are in high demand and fees must often be paid out of pocket. 2.31 A 2023 Economist study found the prevalence of those living with mental health conditions in Egypt was 14.6 per cent, slightly lower than the global average. Rural governorates reported higher rates of mental health conditions than their urban counterparts. In Egypt, some people avoid seeking professional help for mental health issues due to stigma of being perceived as ‘weak’ and a lack of awareness about available services. Historically, discussing mental health could be perceived as a sign of weakness in faith, prompting individuals to seek solace through spiritual practices like prayer and Qur’an readings instead of accessing mental health services. 2.32 The General Secretariat of Mental Health (GSMHAT) has led several campaigns since 2014 to raise awareness surrounding mental health and tackle misconceptions. These campaigns have targeted schools, workplaces, mosques, churches and community organisations with the goal of altering basic societal understanding. In-country sources said strong social media campaigns since 2020 had significantly lessened the stigma of discussing issues related to mental health. 2.33 DFAT assesses Egyptians can access public mental health care services without discrimination but quality and availability varies widely and can be inadequate. The poor and most vulnerable, those least able to afford private mental health care services, often reside in areas where public mental health care services are less available. People with Disability 2.34 Egypt is home to 12 million people with disabilities, representing approximately 9 per cent of the total population according to UNDP estimates. Egypt ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities in 2008. Egypt’s disability determination system broadly aligns with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ social model definition of disability and the WHO classification system. 2.35 Article 81 of the Constitution guarantees the health, economic, social, cultural, entertainment, sporting and educational rights of people with disabilities. It also commits the government to provide people with disabilities job opportunities (including through quotas) and ensure public facilities are accessible. Additional constitutional articles and the 2021-26 National Human Rights Strategy address the rights of people with disabilities.  8 2.36 The Law on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (No. 10) 2018 provides a wide range of legal rights and protections, including rights to non-discrimination in employment, health, political activity, rehabilitation and training. Law No. 10 includes provisions for the rights of people with disabilities in education at all levels. It prohibits educational institutions rejecting applications from students on grounds of disability, punishing violations with fines of up to EGP2,000 (AUD62). As a result of Law No. 10, the Egyptian Government established the National Council for Persons with Disabilities and the Differently Abled Fund to empower people with disabilities and ensure their rights are upheld. The Ministry of Social Solidarity also launched smart cards to facilitate access to services for people with disabilities, enabling discounts for transport and on other governmental transactions. 2.37 Discrimination in employing people with disabilities in Egypt limits their opportunities and access to resources. Prejudices, including the belief disabilities are divine punishments or caused by malevolent spirits, also persist. Another major challenge for people with disabilities is the lack of accessibility to public spaces and buildings, limiting their ability to access essential services and participate in public life. Many schools and universities do not have the resources to support students with disabilities. Many employers are unwilling to hire people with disabilities. The 2018 Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey reported among the poorest 20 per cent of the population, 18.1 per cent lived with disabilities. Education 2.38 Article 19 of the Constitution guarantees the right to education which is free within government schools. Enrolment is compulsory until the end of secondary school (or its equivalent). Article 19 also commits the government to allocate no less than 4 per cent of GDP to education. Human Rights Watch reported education spending declined from 2.3 per cent of GDP in 2020 to 1.7 per cent of GDP in the 2024-25 budget. 2.39 There are more than 25 million students across the Egyptian education system, which is divided into primary, middle, secondary and vocational/tertiary education. Children start kindergarten at age four, move to primary school at age six and start high school when they are 15 years old. High schools provide choice between academic, vocational and technical streams. Access to basic education, including for girls, has improved in recent years. The primary school enrolment rate for girls was 91 per cent in 2023 according to World Bank data. 2.40 The quality of public education in Egypt is poor and overcrowding is common. The Education and Technical Education Ministry said in 2024 public school classroom sizes ranged on average from 43 to 55 students. The ministry intended to cap classroom size at 50 students in 90 percent of schools in 2024-25 by moving some students to different schools and providing evening school shifts. In-country sources said class sizes sometimes exceeded 60 students in 2025. There was also a shortage of approximately 469,000 teachers in 2024, according to the ministry. 2.41 The private sector tends to have better facilities, better trained teachers and an overall higher quality of education. Most private schools follow the national curriculum. Some private schools are based on a religion, such as Catholicism, or a particular educational philosophy, such as Montessori. International schools also exist. 2.42 DFAT assesses Egyptians can access education without discrimination on ethnic or religious grounds. POLITICAL SYSTEM 2.43 Egypt is a presidential republic. The president is Head of State and leads the executive branch of government. The Constitution gives considerable power to the president, including the authority to appoint the prime minister and other ministers, civil and military personnel and diplomatic representatives. The president is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (see Military). The president has the power to declare a state of emergency, issue a pardon or mitigate a sentence, issue a decree with the force of law (if Parliament is not in session) and call a referendum. The Constitution was amended in 2019 to extend presidential terms from four to six years. This amendment also allowed President El-Sisi to stand for a third term to which he was re-elected in December 2023. According to Freedom House, President El-Sisi's victory came after ‘a campaign marked by the arrest of opponents, intimidation and stringent eligibility requirements for candidates, which collectively obstructed any meaningful competition’ (see also Political opinion). The next presidential election is due in 2029. 9 2.44 Amendments to the Constitution in 2019 re-established a bicameral parliament in which members serve five-year terms. The upper house, the Senate, is made up of 300 seats. Two-thirds of members are elected and one-third appointed by the president. State-aligned political parties won the majority of seats in Senate elections held in August 2025. Independent media reported low turnout and cash vouchers of EGP200-300 (AUD6-10) distributed by the government-aligned Mostaqbal Watan Party in order to increase voter turnout. The next Senate elections are due in 2030. 2.45 The House of Representatives is made up of 568 members, half elected through closed party lists and half to individual seats. The president has the right to appoint 28 additional members to the House. The current House of Representatives was elected in late 2020. Freedom House reported those elections were ‘marred by the widespread detention and intimidation of individuals who criticised the process, low turnout, claims of fraud, vote buying and severe interference by security apparatuses’. Women make up 28 per cent of the members of the House of Representatives. The next House of Representatives elections are due in November 2025.  2.46 Egypt is divided into 27 governorates, each further subdivided into regions. Each governorate has a capital city and a governor appointed by the president. Administratively, there are 186 centres/municipalities, 225 cities, 85 districts and 4,737 villages. Most of those holding posts in local governments are drawn from the military, police or security agencies. The police and other aspects of state protection are administered centrally. Corruption 2.47 Egypt is a State Party to the UN Convention Against Corruption and Article 218 of the Constitution commits the state to fight corruption. The Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 criminalises active and passive bribery, attempted corruption, providing gifts with the intention to influence, abuse of office and the use of public resources for private gain. Several government agencies work to combat corruption, including the Central Agency for Auditing and Accounting, the Administrative Control Authority, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, the Public Prosecution Office, and the Egyptian Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Combating Unit.  2.48 President El-Sisi has made the fight against corruption a priority. The US Department of State's 2023 Egypt Country Report on Human Rights Practices stated courts convicted several high-level officials, civil servants and former judges in 2023 for misuse of public office, bribery and other related charges. These included retired Major General Mohamed Youssef, former Chairman of the Board of the Maritime and Land Transport Holding Company, and Medhat Amin, Managing Director of the Egyptian Gulf Investment Group, for misuse of public office and conspiracy to commit fraud with public funds. Prosecutors also indicted Gamal Ibrahim al-Labban, former Director of the General Administration of Supplies at the State Council, and five businessmen in the criminal court in 2023 on charges of defrauding the government for goods and services never delivered. 2.49 Despite a strong official framework and some high-level convictions, corruption occurs throughout Egypt. Transparency International ranked Egypt 130 out of 180 countries in its 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, detailing public perception the government shrouded ‘corrupt practices in secrecy, opening opportunities for corruption across public life, from access to basic goods and services, to lack of transparency in procurement’. Egypt was ranked 135 out of 142 countries in the World Justice Project’s 2024 Rule of Law Index, with data showing the majority of Egyptians were concerned officials in the executive and legislative branches used public office for private gain. The US Department of State's 2024 Investment Climate Statement for Egypt states corruption in the public sector is common in the form of requests for bribes and embezzlement.  2.50 Anti-corruption entities in Egypt have been criticised for lacking independence from the government and military. According to Freedom House, official mechanisms for investigating and punishing corrupt activity are weak and ineffective. The Anti-Corruption Resource Centre and Transparency International report the absence of an independent judiciary and robust anti-corruption agencies consistently undermines efforts to curb corruption in Egypt. High-profile corruption cases rarely result in substantial penalties, creating a perception of impunity.  2.51 There is no domestic legal protection for whistleblowers. However, financial incentives for whistleblowing were established through Law No. 30 2023 to combat tax evasion. Under the law, a portion of late payment or additional tax, not exceeding 10 per cent, can be distributed among informants involved in detecting or reporting tax evasion, excluding authority employees. 10 2.52 The payment of baksheesh, or tips, in order to receive basic services is often requested and may sometimes result in preferential treatment or the granting of favours. In-country sources said requests for baksheesh in return for everyday government services were becoming rarer as senior public servants clamped down on the practice. Corruption and trading in influence in Egypt is also facilitated through the use of wasta, a form of personal connection and favouritism. Using or invoking wasta means asking someone to intervene or mediate to obtain some kind of advantage from a third party.  2.53 According to the Anti-Corruption Resource Centre and Transparency International, military-owned businesses have thrived due to close links to the government, which has exempted them from paying value-added tax and allowed them the legal right to use military-designated land as equity in commercial joint ventures, conscript labour, government subsidies, favourable foreign exchange rates and the ability to win contracts on a non-competitive basis. Most of the formal military economic sector falls outside the remit of Egypt’s audit and anti-corruption agencies. HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 2.54 Egypt’s Constitution states it is consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and holds all Egyptians equal in rights and duties without discrimination of any kind. It guarantees several ‘public rights, freedoms and duties’ under articles 52 to 93, including human dignity, equality before the law, freedom of movement, freedom of belief, freedom of the press and the right to organise. In-country sources said there is a gap between protections specified in the Constitution and how they are applied.    2.55 Egypt is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and its Optional Protocols on the involvement of children in armed conflict (CRC-OP-AC) and on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (CRC-OP-SC), and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), although not its Optional Protocol. Egypt has acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Article 93 of the Constitution commits the state to the agreements, covenants and international conventions it has ratified. 2.56 Egypt’s National Human Rights Strategy 2021-26 aims to enhance respect for and protection of all civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. In-country sources said although the strategy was well intentioned, it lacked verifiable mechanisms to address human rights concerns. Some CSOs reported the strategy represented ‘an attempt by the Egyptian Government to whitewash its public image following an upsurge in international criticism of its abysmal human rights record’. Amnesty International said the strategy presented ‘a deeply misleading and at times outright false picture of the human rights situation in Egypt’ and offered ‘modest and largely technical solutions to overcome human rights challenges’. To address civil society’s concerns with the National Human Rights Strategy 2021-26, the Egyptian Government said it was preparing a new 5-year national human rights strategy to be released in late 2026, which would include tangible measures to implement reforms on realistic timelines. SECURITY SITUATION 2.57 Egypt has low rates of serious and violent crime, including in major cities like Cairo and Alexandria. Several crisis on Egypt’s borders continued in 2025. In-country sources said Egypt’s internal security presence increased significantly in 2024 when the civil war in Sudan and the uprising in Syria intensified. Despite regional instability, threats to national security in Egypt are low. 2.58 On 25 October 2021, President El-Sisi lifted Egypt’s state of emergency for the first time in more than four years. The state of emergency granted the executive and security services expanded powers under the Emergency Law (No. 162) 1958 under limited judicial oversight. Powers included the authority to suspend free expression, assembly and movement. The state of emergency also put in place security courts to facilitate speedy prosecutions without a right to appeal (see Legal system).  11 2.59 Human Rights Watch called the decision to lift the state of emergency ‘positive but far from sufficient to begin to quell the country’s prolonged human rights crisis’. The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights stated it was a ‘step in the right direction, although… deficient alone in dismantling the arsenal of repressive legislation issued in recent years’. Following the lifting of the state of emergency, Parliament passed amendments incorporating many emergency-law-like provisions in other laws. President El-Sisi ratified this legislation, allowing him to take ‘appropriate measures’ for not exceeding six months to maintain public order and security (including curfews and forced evacuations) in the event of a natural disaster or terrorism event and authorising the military to assist local authorities in protecting critical infrastructure. 2.60 Sectarian and militant attacks have been rare since 2020 but isolated incidents have occurred. For example, the Ministry of Interior announced on 20 July 2025 it had killed two alleged militants in an anti-terrorism raid in the Boulaq al-Dakrour neighbourhood of Giza, near Cairo. In addition to the suspects, a civilian was killed and an officer injured during the exchange of gunfire. 2.61 Militant attacks in North Sinai, especially around the cities of Arish, Rafah and Sheikh Zuweid, decreased significantly after the launch of the military’s ‘Comprehensive Operation Sinai’ in 2018. Militant groups like Islamic State Sinai Province (IS-Sinai, designated a terrorist organisation by Australia and the United Nations), had previously conducted regular small arms, light weapon and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in North Sinai. Most of these attacks targeted Egyptian security forces, anti-IS tribal militias and local infrastructure. The last confrontation between the military and militant groups in North Sinai occurred in August 2022, when the army killed IS-Sinai leader, Hamza Al-Zamli (Abul Kazim al Maqdisi).  2.62 On 25 January 2023, President El-Sisi announced the ‘end of terrorism’ in Sinai. The security situation in areas outside of North Sinai had already improved by 2021, with many residents uprooted by the violence allowed to return home. In 2025, North Sinai was tightly controlled by the enhanced military presence in place since the beginning of the Hamas-Israel conflict. At the time of writing, IS-Sinai did not pose a threat to the population of the Sinai.  2.63 In the governorates of Upper Egypt, including Assiut and Minya, disagreements over land or business deals sometimes escalate into blood feuds. In-country sources said these feuds were swiftly contained by the large security presence in the region. Local media reported in 2025 security forces were active in rooting out ‘criminal elements’ in Upper Egypt and had killed several criminals and militants in confrontations.  12 3. REFUGEE CONVENTION CLAIMS RACE/NATIONALITY 3.1 The Egyptian population is almost entirely Arab (including Bedouin). Several small ethnic minority communities exist, such as Nubians. The Constitution considers all citizens equal in terms of rights, freedoms and duties without discrimination based on origin, race, colour or language. In-country sources estimated Egypt hosts approximately one million registered refugees and upwards of 9.5 million unregistered asylum seekers, mainly Palestinians, Sudanese and Syrians. Bedouin 3.2 Bedouin (Beduin or Beduare) are Arab tribes of nomadic pastoralists numbering around 1 million in Egypt. Most Bedouin are Sunni Muslims. Bedouin society is patriarchal and typically composed of extended families. The head of the family, as well as of each successively larger social unit making up the tribal structure, is called sheikh. Bedouin mostly reside in the Sinai Peninsula but also in the governorates of Matruh, Red Sea, Suez and Ismailia, as well as in Cairo.  Bedouin generally have higher rates of unemployment and poverty than the Egyptian population overall.  3.3 Bedouin residing in Sinai have historically been viewed with suspicion by the Egyptian Government. In-country sources said Bedouin were often detained at checkpoints and after security incidents occurred because they were viewed as potential terrorists. Between 2014 and 2023, approximately 150,000 Bedouin were displaced after the military demolished thousands of their homes and bulldozed tens of thousands of acres of agricultural land in North Sinai. Bedouin were resettled in residential complexes away from North Sinai and promised the right to return when the state of emergency was lifted. Despite its lifting in October 2021, in-country sources said Bedouin had not officially been allowed to return to North Sinai, with government officials justifying this policy based on factors including the existence of unexploded ordinance. 3.4 In 2023, some Bedouin attempted to return to their traditional lands in North Sinai without permission but were refused entry by the military. In-country sources said Bedouin attempting to move back to North Sinai faced arbitrary arrests and detention. For example, 54 Bedouin protesting their displacement were detained in October 2023, with some facing charges of terrorism. In another example, prominent Bedouin sheikhs who advocated for return to North Sinai were arrested in December 2024 for ‘attacking the military’. Most Bedouin involved in these incidents later received presidential pardons, according to in-country sources.  3.5 In-country sources said official discrimination against Bedouin occurred. International media reported Bedouin often faced discrimination when accessing employment, including being excluded from work on government-sponsored projects in the Sinai. Local media reported there are restrictions on Bedouin joining the military and police, as well as holding significant posts in government.  The US Department of State’s 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Egypt stated Sinai Bedouin communities also faced marginalisation due to negative stereotyping in the media and popular culture. 3.6 Egyptian law imposes tight restrictions on property ownership in the Sinai and Bedouin there sometimes have difficulty proving they own their homes. For example, North Sinai has around 40,000 pieces of land inherited through the wad al-yad practice, meaning houses, farmlands and businesses have been passed through generations without official documents to prove ownership. Under the wad al-yad practice, Sinai Bedouin are deemed ‘occupants’ of the land through customary proprietorship but not always regarded as owners by the Egyptian Government. Only Egyptians born to Egyptian parents can own land. Proving family lineage for some Bedouins can be challenging because they sometimes do not have birth certificates or ID cards (see Documentation).  3.7 DFAT assesses Bedouin are likely to face official discrimination in the form of harassment by police, as well as detention when security incidents occur. DFAT assesses Bedouin possibly face societal discrimination when accessing employment. DFAT assesses it is rare for Bedouin to face violence from the security forces or Islamic militant groups. 13 Nubians 3.8 Nubians are a non-Arab Nilo-Saharan speaking ethnic group indigenous to southern Egypt. There are no official statistics on the number of Nubians living in Egypt but estimates range from 300,000 to 5 million. Most Nubians are Sunni Muslims. Nubians generally have higher rates of unemployment and poverty than the Egyptian population overall. 3.9 In the 1960s, many Nubian villages were destroyed by the construction of the Aswan High Dam that flooded the region upstream from Aswan and created the 500 km-long Lake Nasser. Between 50,000 and 130,000 Nubians were forcibly relocated to Cairo, Alexandria and purpose-built accommodation in Kom Ombo. Nubian rights activists participated in the ‘25 January Revolution’ of 2011 and were later represented in negotiations leading to the 2014 Constitution. Nubians obtained the right of return to unflooded lands around Lake Nasser and consultation on any decisions concerning the economic development of the region. Article 236 of the Constitution specifically mentions Nubians’ right to return within a period of ten years.  3.10 Since 2014, presidential decrees have allocated parts of Nubian lands for business projects and military purposes, impeding Nubians’ constitutional right to return. For example, 17 of the 44 villages identified as suitable for Nubians have been cut off due to military control of surrounding lands. In-country sources said compensation had been granted as an alternative to the right to return. Nubians have alleged the process lacked fairness and was not based on their free, prior and informed consent. Academics estimated approximately 5,220 Nubians were not provided compensation for the loss of lands during this process. 3.11 Nubians protesting their inability to return to lands identified under Article 236 of the Constitution have been detained and arrested. For example, after Presidential Decree 355 was issued in 2016 to allocate state-owned land to investors, Nubian youth staged a sit-in and dozens were arrested. In 2017, Nubians organised a march in Aswan and 24 people were arrested, including Gamal Sorour who later died in prison. As a result of these arrests, local and international media reported most Nubians attempted to remain apolitical and avoid collective mobilisation or publicly highlighting their distinct language and history. In-country sources said Nubian elders remained fearful of arrest if they raised human rights concerns and advised Nubian youth against organising or protesting. Attempts at collective mobilisation by groups in Egypt are often suppressed by security forces, especially if considered a threat to national unity. 3.12 In-country sources said official discrimination against Nubians occurred. Nubians often face discrimination when accessing employment, with many confined to lower-status employment. Stereotypes propagated by the media often portray Nubians as doormen, servants and drivers.  3.13 Nubians face societal discrimination due to their darker skin colour and because some Egyptians believe they are part of an immigrant or refugee community. Although many Nubians self-identify as Egyptians or Egyptian Nubians, they say they often need to deny harbouring separatist intentions. 3.14 DFAT assesses Nubians are likely to face official discrimination in the form of harassment by police based on their race. DFAT assesses Nubians are likely to face societal discrimination when accessing employment based on their race. DFAT assesses it is rare for Nubians to face violence from security forces based on their race. Palestinians  3.15 Palestinians are an Arab group in the Levant that share close religious, linguistic and cultural ties with Egyptians. There are no official statistics on the number of Palestinians currently in Egypt but estimates range from 70,000 to 140,000. Most Palestinians are in the country on temporary visas because the 1954 Memorandum of Understanding between the UNHCR and the Egyptian Government limits their ability to be registered as refugees. The Egyptian Government actively discourages Palestinians from organising or joining protests in relation to the Hamas-Israel conflict.  3.16 The Egyptian Government issues temporary visas to some Palestinians on humanitarian grounds, including for medical transfers valid for one month. At the time of writing, these visas were not being extended, meaning most Palestinians in Egypt lacked official status. Palestinians arriving in Egypt on free medical transfers are often confined to hospital unless returning to Gaza. Although Palestinians with expired visas are in breach of the Regulation on 14 Migration Law (No. 111) 1983, in-country sources said the Egyptian Government had not and would not deport Palestinians back to the State of Palestine under any circumstances.  3.17 Egypt’s response to the humanitarian situation in Gaza following the Hamas-Israel conflict in October 2023 was to designate the Egyptian Red Crescent (ERC) as its humanitarian lead, working closely with the Ministry of Social Solidarity. All international cooperation and coordination between Egypt, the UN and the broader humanitarian community is channelled through the ERC. In-country sources said without the ability to obtain refugee status or residency, most Palestinians had limited access to medical care, education and legal employment options. Palestinians in Egypt lack access to government services but are still able to receive assistance from INGOs and CSOs. Palestinians do not face societal discrimination in Egypt based on their race or nationality according to in-country sources. 3.18 DFAT assesses it is rare for Palestinians to face official or societal discrimination based on their nationality. DFAT assesses it is rare for Palestinians to face societal violence in Egypt based on their nationality. Sudanese 3.19 Sudanese are a non-homogenic Arabic-speaking group, mostly Muslims of Cushitic ancestry, descended from Arab and African tribes. There are no official statistics on the number of Sudanese currently in Egypt but in-country sources estimated there were around 5 million in 2025. Following the outbreak of armed conflict in Sudan in April 2023, upwards of 1.5 million Sudanese fled to Egypt. In response, UNHCR expanded its work with Egypt’s government and partners to register and assist the forcibly displaced people arriving in the country. In-country sources said around 70 per cent of the 900,000 refugees registered by UNHCR in Egypt are from Sudan. 3.20 Prior to the start of the conflict in Sudan, Egypt had an open-door policy for Sudanese under the Four Freedoms Agreement 2004, which allowed for freedom of movement. On 10 June 2023, Egypt began implementing regulations requiring all Sudanese to obtain visas from the Egyptian consular offices in Wadi Halfa or Port Sudan prior to crossing the Egyptian border. As the civil war intensified and larger numbers of Sudanese entered the country, Egypt stopped issuing visas in Sudan. In-country sources said it was still possible in some instances to obtain an Egyptian visa in Sudan but this required paying a substantial bribe too expensive for most Sudanese.  3.21 Since 2023, most Sudanese have paid smugglers to facilitate their entry into Egypt. In-country sources said smugglers often exploited irregular migrants and subjected them to violence. The crossing from Sudan to Egypt was dangerous and in the most extreme cases those unable to pay smugglers had been shot. Others died of heat stroke while crossing the Nubian Desert. Sudanese arriving in Egypt over the southern border still need to travel to Cairo (a distance of approximately 950km) in order to register with UNHCR to obtain refugee status and residency. 3.22 Sudanese with expired visas and/or without residency are in breach of the Regulation on Migration Law (No. 111) 1983 and liable for fines and deportation to Sudan. In-country sources said approximately 20,000 Sudanese had been deported from Egypt in 2024, some as part of group deportations. The number of deportations of Sudanese asylum seekers for violations to residence permit regulations had increased in 2025. During the deportation process, returnees were charged a fee of EGP500 (AUD15) in addition to fines calculated by the number of days spent in the country without status. Detainees at times reported authorities subjected them to oral abuse and poor detention conditions. In-country sources said many Sudanese instead choose to bribe border guards or army units approximately EGP900 (AUD27) to be deported without paying additional overstay fees. As of August 2025, Egypt was offering free trains from Cairo to Aswan and then onward transport into Sudan, to facilitate voluntary returns. 3.23 Sudanese recognised as refugees by the UNHCR or with residency status have access to medical care, education and legal employment options. Sudanese often send their children to ‘learning centres’ instead of government schools because they better align with the Sudanese curriculum. There is a fee involved to attend these learning centres, while government-run public schools are free. Around 60 per cent of Sudanese children in Egypt were not attending school in 2025. In-country sources said some learning centres had been closed by authorities in 2025 because they lacked permits. Some Sudanese without residency permits had been detained near learning centres pending deportation.  3.24 Sudanese face societal discrimination in Egypt based on their nationality, which often impacts their ability to secure employment and accommodation. Sudanese are easily identifiable based on their darker skin tone and 15 in-country sources said they often faced racism due to their appearance, including from authorities. For example, hundreds of Sudanese protested in Cairo in March 2022 to draw attention to their ongoing harassment and racist treatment. The protests were broken up with some involved arrested by police and others pressed into forced labour despite not being convicted of a crime. In February 2024, members of security forces subjected Sudanese gathered in front of the UNHCR building in the Giza governorate to violence and racist insults like ‘slaves’ and ‘filth’. In July 2024, Director of the African Vision School for Sudanese Education, Othman Hussein Yaqoub, was forcibly disappeared for a week, during which he stated he was tortured and forced to signing a ‘voluntary return’ document in order to deport him to Sudan. 3.25 DFAT assesses Sudanese are likely to face official discrimination in the form of harassment by police and detention, based on their nationality. DFAT assesses Sudanese are likely to face societal discrimination when accessing employment, education and housing, based on their nationality. DFAT assesses Sudanese are unlikely to face societal violence based on their nationality. Syrians 3.26 Syrians are an Arab group in the Levant that share close religious, linguistic and cultural ties with Egyptians. There are no official statistics on the number of Syrians currently in Egypt but estimates by the International Organization for Migration are upwards of 1.5 million. In-country sources said large number of Syrians began returning home voluntarily in the wake of the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024. The UNHCR reported the number of Syrians in its caseload reduced from 160,000 in 2024 to 140,000 in 2025. 3.27 Most Syrians arrived in Egypt on tourist visas, with many later obtaining residency and setting up businesses. Syrians recognised as refugees by the UNHCR or with residency status have access to medical care, education and legal employment options. As of June 2024, Syrians could no longer renew tourist visas within Egypt and were required to return to Syria to reapply. In-country sources said Egyptian embassies stopped issuing tourist visas to Syrians in December 2024, except for those married to Egyptian citizens. Syrians with expired visas and/or without residency are in breach of the Regulation on Migration Law (No. 111) 1983 and liable for fines and deportation to Syria. 3.28 Following the overthrow of Syria’s Assad regime on 8 December 2024, local media reported many Syrians took to the streets in Egypt in spontaneous celebrations. These impromptu gatherings were quickly dispersed by security services and 30 Syrians were detained according to a local CSO. Strict entry restrictions were also imposed on Syrian migrants from this time, including requirements for them to undergo background checks by Egyptian embassies before entering the country to screen for links to the Muslim Brotherhood. Syrians already holding Egyptian residence permits are exempt from background screening procedures. 3.29 Syrians did not face societal discrimination in Egypt based on their race or nationality according to in-country sources. Despite rising anti-migrant sentiment in Egypt, Syrians were generally welcome because they were perceived as law abiding contributors to the economy. Due to religious, linguistic and cultural similarities, Syrians have been able to settle in well and blend into the local population. However, some Syrians in Egypt were accused in 2025 of being supporters of Islamist groups such as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. 3.30 DFAT assesses it is rare for Syrians to face official or societal discrimination based on their nationality. DFAT assesses it is rare for Syrians to face societal violence in Egypt based on their nationality. 

RELIGION  3.31 There is no official breakdown of Egypt’s religious demographics. Most experts estimate Sunni Muslims comprise approximately 90 per cent of the population, with Coptic Christians and a small numbers of other religious minority groups making up the remaining 10 per cent. The Egyptian Government only recognises the Abrahamic faiths of Islam, Christianity and Judaism.  The Constitution states Islam is the state religion and the principles of sharia are the primary source of Egypt’s legislation. Article 64 states ‘freedom of belief is absolute’.  3.32 Religious institutions are responsible for personal status issues such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. Muslim personal status laws, derived from sharia, are reflected in legislation applicable to all Muslims. For Christians, 16 religious authorities such as the Coptic Orthodox Church adopt personal status rules based on relevant religious doctrine. These rules are considered equivalent to administrative decisions and are subject to review in courts. At the time of writing, Egypt’s personal status laws were undergoing review. 3.33 Civil marriage is not permitted in Egypt. However, in-country sources said civil marriages of Egyptians abroad were recognised and could be registered by authorities if they complied with Egypt’s personal status laws. However, a marriage not in accordance with Egypt’s personal status laws would not be recognised, for example where a Muslim married a Christian in Australia. Egypt does not recognise same-sex marriage. Egyptian children born from civil marriages or out of wedlock are officially recognised. 3.34 The Egyptian Government recognises conversion to Islam but not generally conversions from Islam to any other religion. The sole exception is the case of individuals who were not born Muslim but later converted to Islam and then wished to revert to their original religion. Egyptians attempting to convert from Islam are generally unable to have the conversion officially recognised, including on their national identity cards. Converts from Islam to other religions are not subject to officially sanctioned violence or detention but face significant societal discrimination in the form of rejection, ostracism and sometimes violence from their families and communities (see also Christians). Blasphemy/Defamation of Religion  3.35 Article 98(f) of the Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 provides for prison sentences of up to five years and/or fines of at least EGP500 (AUD15) for ‘exploiting and using religion in advocating and propagating extremist thoughts with the aim of instigating sedition and division or disdaining and contemplating any of the heavenly religions or prejudicing national unity or social peace’. Articles 160 and 161 proscribe various acts connected with religion, including disturbing religious ceremonies, violating the sanctity of religious buildings or cemeteries, printing adulterated versions of holy books or imitating religious ceremonies for the purpose of ridicule. In-country sources said Article 98(f) was being used considerably less since 2019 as legal justification for arresting blasphemy suspects. 3.36 Article 19 of the Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Law (No. 175) 2018 has been used increasingly since 2019 to arrest those posting on social media on topics seen as going against ‘family values’. The cybercrime law penalises ‘violating the family principles of Egyptian Society’ with a minimum imprisonment of six months and a fine of EGP50,000 to 100,000 (AUD1,536 to 3,072). The Public Prosecution Office has a unit for monitoring social media (especially TikTok) but also relies on social media users to report others. What constitutes ‘family principles’ is vague and authorities sometimes invoke this provision to punish perceived blasphemy. 3.37 Misdemeanour Courts hear most blasphemy and defamation of religion cases. Criminal Courts have jurisdiction if the charge involves a potential prison term. It is common for these cases to last over a year and for proceedings to be postponed repeatedly. The Public Prosecution Office initiates charges when a private citizen or the state files a complaint of blasphemy  3.38 Christians publicly discussing Islam were sometimes arrested under Article 98(f) of the Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 or Article 19 of the Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Law (No. 175) 2018. Most were later released without convictions after a period of pre-trial detention. In-country sources said penalties imposed for convictions for ‘violating the family principles of Egyptian Society’ were inconsistent and depended on a judge’s opinion of what family principles and values had been offended. Gender and socio-economic status were also unofficially considered during sentencing (see also Legal system). 3.39 Recent convictions on grounds of blasphemy include Yusuf Sa‘d Hanin, a Coptic Christian conscript, who was sentenced by a military court to three years in prison in July 2024 for blasphemy after he exchanged ‘statements offensive to Islam’ in a private text message conversation. Composer Ahmed Hegazy was sentenced to six months in prison in January 2024 for ‘contempt of religion’ after he appeared in a video reciting verses of the Qur’an to a tune deemed inappropriate by authorities. A TikTok content creator using the account name 'al-Prince al-Masry' (Egyptian Prince) was sentenced to three years in prison in February 2023 for insulting Christianity via several videos in which he burned the Bible, smashed a cross and insulted Jesus.  17 Atheists 3.40 There is no law preventing atheism in Egypt, however in-country sources said the centrality of religion was rarely questioned. There are no official statistics on the number of atheists in Egypt but estimates range from hundreds to millions. Local media sources quoted a former Minister of Culture in 2020 as estimating the number of atheists as several million, while a scholar at al-Azhar University said there were four million. Boston University’s 2020 World Religions Database reported there are approximately 700,000 atheists and agnostics in Egypt. 3.41 The Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 does not criminalise atheism however Article 98(f) on blasphemy has been used selectively against those making public declarations of atheism.  For example, Egyptian blogger and activist, Anas Hassan, was convicted in February 2020 of ‘insulting religion and misusing social media’ for creating a Facebook page called ‘Egyptian Atheists’, which contained content promoting atheism that was viewed as proselytisation. He was later sentenced to three years in prison. In-country sources said only those publicly promoting atheism would potentially be targeted with legal action for blasphemy. At the time of writing, DFAT was not aware of recent instances of Article 98(f) on blasphemy being used against atheists. 3.42 Article 19 of the Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Law (No. 175) 2018 has been used selectively to arrest those posting on social media on topics seen as going against ‘family values’, including atheism. Although the Public Prosecutors Office has a unit for monitoring social media, it often relies on social media users to report others. In-country sources said the Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Law (No. 175) 2018 had been used against atheists but could not detail any recent cases. In-country sources said only atheists promoting the practice on social media would potentially be arrested. At the time of writing, DFAT was not aware of recent instances of the Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Law (No. 175) 2018 used against atheists. 3.43 It is difficult to live in Egypt completely free of religious tradition. National identity cards and corresponding records reflect a person’s religious identity at birth (see Documentation). Official guidance from the Ministry of Justice stipulates marriage to an atheist is prohibited because only religious marriages are recognised. This means atheists wanting to marry first need to register a religious identity in conflict with their beliefs. 3.44 Atheism is not well understood in Egypt but most atheists are tolerated unless they advocate publicly for the practice. In-country sources said most Egyptians held the view atheists could think and believe whatever they wanted provided they kept it to themselves. Some government officials and religious figures have come out against atheism, including negatively stereotyping the practice and suggesting it was a sickness. In-country sources said instances of vigilantism against atheists were rare, especially against those not publicly advocating for the practice or posting about it on social media. At the time of writing, DFAT was not aware of recent instances of societal violence targeting atheists. 3.45 DFAT assesses it is rare for atheists to face official discrimination based on their lack of religion unless they publicly advocate for and promote the practice. Proselytising is highly restricted in Egypt due to blasphemy and apostasy laws, with those engaging in the practice likely to face arrest. DFAT assesses it is rare for atheists to face societal discrimination based on their lack of religion unless they publicly advocate for and promote the practice. DFAT assesses it is rare for atheists to face societal violence. Baha’i 3.46 The Baha’i faith proclaims the essential unity of all religions and humanity. It is concerned with social ethics and has no priesthood or sacraments. As a result of its 19 initial disciples, it considers the number 19 sacred. Adherents are expected to pray daily, fast 19 days a year and obey a strict ethical code. There are no official statistics on the number of Baha’i in Egypt but estimates range from 1,000 to over 7,000. 3.47 The Egyptian Government does not recognise the Baha’i faith because its legal status was annulled by the 1960 decree (No. 263). Baha’i institutions and community activities are officially banned although the Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 does not stipulate penalties for banned religious groups or members who engage in banned religious practices. Baha’i organisations do not have the legal right to own houses of worship or other property, hold bank accounts or import religious literature. Bassatine Cemetery in Cairo is the only cemetery in Egypt that permits Baha’i 18 burials. In-country sources said Baha’is were permitted to worship privately in small numbers but were unable to hold larger public gatherings or proselytise.  3.48 Personal status issues in Egypt are informed by religious rather than civil law but this does not extend to the Baha’i faith. This means that many aspects of the lives of Baha’i adherents, such as marriage, divorce and family relationships, are not officially recognised.  Baha’i secured the legal right to obtain identification cards with a dash listed in the space for religious affiliation in 2009. Baha’i marriages are not acknowledged by authorities and married Baha’i who refused to be issued documentation listing them as ‘single’ sometimes face difficulties setting up a bank accounts. Baha’i reported occasional success when filing individual legal petitions to recognise marriages performed outside Egypt but these cases were usually appealed by the Egyptian Government. 3.49 Baha'i in Egypt state they are harassed, intimidated and interrogated by authorities. The US Commission on International Religious Freedom reported state surveillance of Baha’i and their activities occurred in 2024, including the monitoring of social media, email accounts and mobile phones. Baha’i state their friends are sometimes discouraged by other Egyptians from maintaining relationships with them. Some Muslims regard the Baha'i faith as an apostasy from Islam. At the time of writing, DFAT was not aware of recent instances of societal violence targeting Baha’i.  3.50 DFAT assesses Baha’i are likely to face official discrimination based on their religion in the form of harassment by police and difficulties obtaining official government documentation. Proselytising is highly restricted in Egypt due to blasphemy and apostasy laws, with those engaging in the practice likely to face arrest. DFAT assesses Baha’i are unlikely to face societal discrimination unless they publicly advocate and promote their religion. DFAT assesses it is rare for Baha’i to face sectarian violence. Christians 3.51 There are twelve officially recognised Christian denominations in Egypt (four Orthodox, seven Catholic and one Protestant). The vast majority of Christians in Egypt are members of the Coptic Orthodox Church. Christians reside throughout the country but are concentrated in Upper Egypt and in major cities such as Cairo and Alexandria. Christians are diverse in terms of socio-economic status and political views. They range from the very poor to the very rich, have attained a range of education levels and hold varied professions. At the time of writing, Christians were prominent and influential in Egyptian politics and business. Christians generally dress similarly to Muslim Egyptians, except in some urban areas where Christian women are more likely than Muslim women to leave their hair uncovered. Christians tend to have identifiable names. Some tattoo small crosses on the inside of their wrists or between their thumb and forefinger as a mark of identity. Not all Christians have these tattoos and it is not a mandatory religious practice. All those belonging to recognised Christian denominations are identified as Christian on their national identity cards. 3.52 Coptic Christians adhere to core Christian beliefs, including the Holy Trinity, the divinity of Jesus and the authority of the Bible. They also practice sacraments such as baptism, communion and confession, and observe fasting periods. The number of Coptic Christians in Egypt is contested. The Egyptian Government estimates there are approximately 5 million Copts in Egypt, while the Coptic Orthodox Church states it has between 15 and 18 million adherents.  3.53 The Egyptian Government recognises the right of Christians to practice their religion publicly. In-country sources said Coptic Christians were able to practice their religion freely and without government interference. President El-Sisi is supportive of Egypt’s Coptic Christian community and has attended religious celebrations at Easter and Christmas since 2015. He also regularly makes public statements referencing the Coptic Christian community as part of Egypt’s ‘values of unity and coexistence that define the nation’s identity’.  3.54 Under the Constitution, Christians are legally allowed to build churches. Egypt's Church Construction Law (No. 80) 2016 created a formal process for Christian denominations to submit a request for the ‘building, expanding, enhancement, reinforcement, destruction, or external detailing of a church, church annex, services building, or retreat house’. A legal representative of the church must submit a request with the appropriate permits and documentation to the relevant provincial governor. Law 80 also created a ministerial committee to review applications for churches built without permission before the law was ratified in 2016. Prior to the passage of Law 19 80, the construction of churches had been governed by the Hamayouni Law 1856, which required the president (and previously the Egyptian King and Ottoman Sultan) to approve the construction of every new church. As of October 2024, the government stated it had approved the legalisation of 3,453 churches out of the 5,540 requests submitted since Law 80 was enacted. In-country sources said Law 80 was being upheld by authorities, with Coptic Christian churches receiving permission to be built and renovated, even if decisions could be slow. 3.55 Newly built cities and suburbs must include a Coptic Christian church to receive planning approval. President El-Sisi stated in 2022, ‘where there is a mosque, there must also be a church’. He clarified ‘even if they will be attended by only 100 people, it [churches] must be built anyway… so no one will have to meet in an apartment and present that private house as a church’. In-country sources said the government was allocating land in all new cities and suburbs for the construction of Christian churches. Christian churches in Egypt are well protected, including by armed guards, concrete barriers and security gates. 3.56 The Constitution states Christian canonical law forms the basis of legislation governing Christians personal status, religious affairs and selection of spiritual leaders. The Coptic Orthodox Church has the sole legal right to marry Coptic Christians and is responsible for granting approval to complete the sacrament of marriage and documenting the contract in the Ministry of Justice. The Coptic Orthodox Church rarely permits divorce, which may only occur under very limited circumstances such as proven adultery or in cases of a change of faith (apostasy). In-country sources said as a result of the difficulties in obtaining a divorce, Coptic Christian women often converted to Islam when they wanted to annul a marriage. If one spouse converts to Islam, Egypt’s court system applies Islamic law and a ruling can be obtained invalidating the marriage performed by the Coptic Orthodox Church on the basis of a change in religion. Converting to Islam also permits the option to re-marry which is restricted by the Coptic Orthodox Church in cases of divorce. 3.57 A new Personal Status Law for Christians was being debated in Parliament at the time of writing. The Coptic Orthodox Church, along with representatives from other Christian churches (including Catholic, Evangelical and Anglican), contributed to drafting laws related to Christian marriage, divorce, child custody and inheritance. Under the draft law, the courts would make decisions on divorce with the Coptic Orthodox Church's role limited to granting permission for a second marriage. Grounds for marriage annulment would expand to include ‘deception regarding a chronic illness’ (including infertility) and ‘separation lasting three years or more’. The practice of changing religion solely to obtain a divorce would be restricted. The new Personal Status Law for Christians would also introduce gender equality into official inheritance procedures.  3.58 In-country sources said forced conversions and marriages of Coptic Christian women had all but ceased since 2014. Coptic Christians chose to voluntarily convert to Islam for a number of reasons, including to obtain a legal divorce, in cases of interfaith marriages and occasionally for economic reasons. Coptic Christian families of converts often portrayed these voluntary conversions and marriages as forced, due to stigma, disapproval from the community and fear their relative would face eternal punishment. Coptic Christian organisations primarily located outside Egypt reported forced conversions and marriages sometimes occurred but the means of converting Coptic Christian women and girls had shifted from ‘abduction to deception, luring or grooming’. At the time of writing there were no official statistics or details on the numbers of Coptic Christians who had converted to Islam, voluntarily or otherwise. 3.59 There is no prohibition on converting from Christianity to Islam. Authorities often require a certificate of conversion provided by a mosque, as well as identity documents and fingerprints. Criminal history checks are made as conversion often requires a change in name. Conversion to Islam is generally recognised and national identity cards changed without difficulty or delay. A 2011 court ruling allowed Christians who converted to Islam and then back to Christianity (generally to more easily access divorce) to amend their identity cards to reflect the return to their original faith. At the time of writing only a small number of such individuals had been permitted to do so. 3.60 Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 Article 98(f) on blasphemy has been used selectively against Coptic Christians for insulting religion but in-country sources said its use was rare in recent years. For example, Marco Gerges was found guilty of contempt of Islamic religion and violating family values in February 2022 for having images on his mobile telephone considered offensive to Islam. At the time of writing, DFAT was not aware of recent instances of Article 98(f) on blasphemy used against Coptic Christians. 20 3.61 Sectarian violence against Coptic Christians has been rare since 2018, including in the Upper Egyptian governorates of Assiut and Minya. In-country sources said police and security forces were effective in protecting Coptic Christians from violence and swiftly made arrests when incidents occurred. For example, after some Coptic Christians were assaulted in the village of Al-Kom Al-Ahmar in Minya governorate in April 2024, security forces made arrests to bring the situation under control. In another instance, Christians in the village of Al-Fawakher in Minya governorate were assaulted and several houses set on fire by extremists following rumours a church was to be built in the area. Security forces arrived, arrested the perpetrators and reportedly restored calm to the area (see Security situation). 3.62 In-country Coptic Christian sources said most conflict involving Coptic Christians and Muslims was due to land or business disputes, not religious issues. However, these localised disputes over non-religious matters were sometimes reported as ‘sectarian disputes’ by Coptic Christian advocacy groups based overseas. For example, local media reported in May 2025 some Coptic Christians were assaulted in the village of Manshyiat El-Hawaslya in Minya governorate, with Bishop Macarius of Minya stating the incident was not sectarian but instead stemmed from a disagreement over the installation of a mobile phone tower on a Coptic-owned house. The incident damaged some equipment but no one was harmed after police successfully contained the situation.  3.63 In-country sources said most Coptic Christians were well integrated into local communities and generally did not suffer discrimination. The majority of Egyptian Muslims accepted Coptic Christians as members of the wider community according to in-country sources. Whether or not individual Coptic Christians reported feeling discrimination in Egypt often depended on their socio-economic status, with those from a lower socio-economic status stating it occurred more frequently than others. Discrimination, when it occurred, often related to reduced employment opportunities within the private sector. Some Coptic Christians complained anti-discriminatory laws and legal protections were not enforced fairly, reporting instances of police siding with Muslims in legal disputes. At the time of writing, Coptic Christians were restricted from joining certain national security and intelligence institutions but could become police officers. In-country sources reported some discrimination within the public service but said this was related to individual prejudices rather than official policy. Coptic Christians have served in senior government roles, including as governors, ambassadors, ministers and currently as President of the Supreme Constitutional Court. DFAT understands the percentage of Christians in the Egyptian public service is broadly representative of the religious breakdown of the population. 3.64 There are approximately 1000 to 1,500 Jehovah’s Witnesses living in Egypt. Jehovah’s Witnesses are not officially recognised by the Egyptian Government but are allowed by authorities to meet privately and worship in gatherings of fewer than 30 people. Jehovah’s Witnesses are banned from importing religious literature such as Watchtower publications, a key part of religious instruction and practice. Courts have ruled Jehovah’s Witnesses have the legal right to obtain identification cards with a dash listed in the space for religious affiliation. 3.65 DFAT assesses Christians are unlikely to face official discrimination based on their religion, in the form of inability to access government employment in certain national security and intelligence institutions. DFAT assesses Christians are unlikely to face societal discrimination based on their religion, which is more common in rural than urban areas. DFAT assesses it is rare for Christians to face sectarian violence. Shi’a 3.66 Shi’a Islam places importance on the Ten Obligatory Acts and mourns the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. The size of the Shi’a population in Egypt is unclear because official statistics do not distinguish Muslims by sects but estimates range from 800,000 to two million. Shi’a in Egypt are mainly from the Twelver sect, with smaller numbers of Ismaili, including Dawoodi Bohra and followers of the Aga Khan. 3.67 There is no legal prohibition on Shi’a Islam in Egypt but authorities have on occasion prevented its practice. In-country sources said Shi’a were permitted to worship privately in small numbers but unable to hold larger public gatherings like those celebrating Ashura. Shi’a have not received official permission to establish husseiniyas (congregational halls) and other places of worship including mosques. Some Shi’a state they were excluded from service in the armed forces and from employment in the security and intelligence services. In-country sources said authorities were suspicious at times of Twelver Shi’a due to concerns over foreign influence if they followed an Iranian ayatollah or fear husseiniyas would become centres for Iranian political activity. DFAT is aware some Twelver 21 Shi’a have been dismissed from private sector employment after their employers discovered their religious identity but not of cases where Shi’a have been dismissed from public sector employment because of their faith. In-country sources said Ismaili Shi’a were generally well-integrated into Egyptian society and had comparatively higher socio-economic backgrounds than Twelver Shi’a. 3.68 The Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 does not criminalise Shi’a Islam. However, Article 98(f) on blasphemy has been used selectively against members of the Shi’a community for publicly voicing their religious opinions and promoting Shi’a thought.  For example, Mustafa Al-Ramli and Mahmoud Youssef were found guilty on 27 June 2020 of ‘illegally establishing a group to proselytise the Shi’a faith’ and sentenced to one year in prison. At the time of writing, DFAT was not aware of recent instances of Article 98(f) on blasphemy being used against Shi’a. However, some Shi'a who have travelled to Iran and Iraq have been detained for questioning by authorities upon return.  3.69 Most Shi’a do not promote their religious identity. Shi’a do not have any defining characteristics such as appearance or dress that would distinguish them from other Egyptians. They do not live in identifiable communities and often worship in private. Although most Shi’a have given names such as ‘Ali’ or ‘Hussein’ that would identify them as Shi’a in other parts of the Middle East, many Egyptian Sunnis also use these names. National identity cards identify the holder as ‘Muslim’ without any additional information about sect. Marriages between Shi’a are recognised as Muslim marriages. 3.70 According to in-country sources, those publicly identifying as Twelver Shi’a sometimes faced societal discrimination, which varied based on geographic location and socio-economic status. Shi’a had been targets of defamation and hate speech by Salafi Islamist groups that do not accept Shi’a as Muslims. A 2023 report from the Andalus Center for Tolerance and Anti-violence noted hate speech targeting Shi’a was highest on Facebook, where anti-Shi’a posts made up over 79 percent of hate speech posts analysed in Egypt. At the time of writing, DFAT was not aware of recent instances of societal violence targeting any Shi’a sect. 3.71 DFAT assesses Shi’a are likely to face official discrimination based on their religion in the form of harassment by police and charges of blasphemy. Proselytising is highly restricted in Egypt due to blasphemy and apostasy laws, with those engaging in the practice likely to face arrest. DFAT assesses Shi’a are likely to face societal discrimination based on their religion. DFAT assesses it is rare for Shi’a to face sectarian violence. POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED) 3.72 Article 65 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and the right of every person to express their opinion. However, a number of topics are considered sensitive, with those raising them liable to receive punishment. Sensitive issues include but are not limited to: President El-Sisi and his family, the General Intelligence Service and its associated businesses, the armed forces and its associated businesses, and conditions in prisons. Article 179 of the Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 amended in 2021 criminalises insulting the president and imposes a penalty of detention and/or a fine of between EGP10,000 to 30,000 (AUD316 to 948). Article 184 of the Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 criminalises ‘insulting the People’s Assembly, the Shura Council or any State Authority, or the Army or the Courts’, imposing a penalty of detention and/or a fine of between EGP5,000 to 10,000 (AUD 158 to 316). In-country sources said official tolerance for freedom of expression and opinion, including public criticism of the government, had shrunk in recent years. 3.73 According to Freedom House, Egyptians who express personal views contrary to preferred state narratives are subject to reprisals. Criticism of the president online or in public can result in imprisonment. Human Rights Watch reported in 2024 the Egyptian Government systematically detained and punished peaceful critics and activists, effectively criminalising peaceful dissent. The US Department of State's 2023 Egypt Country Report on Human Rights Practices stated the Egyptian Government regularly investigated, detained and prosecuted individuals for expressing political views or criticism, using charges such as: spreading false news, supporting a banned group, incitement of violence, insults to religion, insults to public figures and institutions (such as the judiciary and the military) or abuse of public morals. 3.74 Authorities actively discourage negative portrayals of President El-Sisi, the General Intelligence Service and the armed forces. Those responsible for negative public portrayals are often arrested. For example, the Interior Ministry stated in July 2024 a man had been arrested for displaying criticism of President El-Sisi on an advertising 22 screen (billboard) in Giza which had gone viral on social media. In another highly publicised example, Ashraf Omar was arrested in July 2024 after publishing cartoons criticising the country’s economic crisis and energy shortages in a way that negatively portrayed President El-Sisi and the armed forces. He was charged with being involved in a ‘terrorist group, disseminating false news, and misusing social media tools’. Omar remained in pretrial detention at the time of writing. Ashraf Omar's wife, Nada Mougheeth, was arrested in January 2025 after bringing public attention to her husband's arrest and ongoing detention, as well as alleging money and personal items had been seized by authorities from their home. The Ministry of Interior said legal action had been undertaken against Mougheeth for spreading false allegations. In another instance, Yehia Hussein Abdelhady was arrested in July 2024 for being involved in a terrorist group and disseminating false news after he published a Facebook post criticising President El-Sisi and the armed forces. 3.75 Article 87 of the Constitution states every citizen has the right to ‘run for elections’ with the caveats ‘law shall regulate the exercise of these rights’ and ‘there may be exemption from the performance of this duty in certain cases’. Article 74 of the Constitution gives citizens the right to form regulated political parties. Political parties cannot be based on religion, sex, origin, sect or geographic location. Activities hostile to democracy, secretive or military in nature are prohibited. Parliamentary elections for the House of Representatives and Senate were last held in 2020 and presidential elections were last held in 2023. Egypt has not held elections for local councils since 2008. The last elected local councils were dissolved in 2011. 3.76 Freedom House states significant challengers were barred from participating in the 2023 presidential election and the parliamentary 2020 elections were marred by the widespread detention and intimidation of individuals critical of the process. While electoral laws provide a basis for credible elections, electoral authorities fail to ensure an open and competitive campaign environment. Restrictions imposed by the Egyptian Government have made it nearly impossible for the opposition to gain power through elections. Human Rights Watch reported the 2023 presidential election followed a campaign of arrests, intimidation and onerous requirements for candidates that effectively prevented meaningful competition. The US Department of State's 2023 Egypt Country Report on Human Rights Practices stated the 2023 presidential election was widely reported to not be fair or free of abuses and irregularities, including actions inhibiting declared candidates from qualifying for the ballot. 3.77 Ahmed Tantawi, the key challenger to El-Sisi in the 2023 presidential election, was forced to suspend his campaign after failing to secure the required signatures. His efforts had been impeded by the climate of fear created by the arrest of over 100 of his supporters charged with terrorism-related offenses, illegal assembly, spreading false news and misusing social media. Human Rights Watch stated in December 2023 it had documented security instructions to hotels prohibiting them from hosting opposition conferences. It also alleges physical harassment by security officials in civilian clothes or members of pro-Sisi parties against people attempting to register endorsements for other candidates and other bureaucratic obstructions. In February of 2024, Tantawi and 22 of his supporters were sentenced to prison sentences for the unauthorised circulation and production of election documents. According to Human Rights Watch, Egypt detained dozens of politicians and activists, including Ziad al-Elaimy and Hossam Mo’nis, for planning a new coalition to contest the 2020 parliamentary elections. Observers of Egypt's 2020 parliamentary elections noted restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly, political association and expression significantly inhibited the political climate surrounding the elections. 3.78 The Egyptian Government initiated a ‘National Dialogue’ in 2023, which involved opposition parties, union leaders, religious figures, journalists and civil society representatives. The National Dialogue continued into 2024 and discussed economic issues, pretrial detention and national security among other issues. The National Dialogue’s pretrial detention recommendations resulted in changes to the Code of Criminal Procedure 1950, approved by Parliament in December 2024. However, legal experts and independent commentators said changes to the Code of Criminal Procedure 1950 did not take into account National Dialogue recommendations and contradicted the Constitution and Egypt’s international obligations. In-country sources said the National Dialogue was seen as an important outlet for society, considering Parliament was made up almost exclusively of loyalists of President El-Sisi. However, it was designed to placate those who otherwise felt they did not have a voice and had not instituted significant reform. 3.79 Article 73 of the Constitution guarantees citizens the right to organise public meetings, marches, demonstrations and unarmed peaceful protest by serving a notification as required by law. The Constitution further 23 prohibits security forces from attending, monitoring or eavesdropping on such meetings. The passing of the Protest Law (No. 107) 2013 restricted the ability of Egyptians to protest peacefully. Law 107 requires organisers of any kind of public event or meeting involving more than ten people to provide police with three days’ notice and prohibits houses of worship (or their vicinities) being used for political gatherings or as meeting points for marches. Law 107 also limits activities that could be seen as violating general security, public order, production or which could impact on public services or the flow of traffic among other things. Failure to comply with the provisions of Law 107 are punishable with fine of up to EGP300,000 (AUD9,175) or up to seven years’ imprisonment. The Court of Cassation ruled on 30 May 2023 defendants convicted for participating in illegal demonstrations could be dismissed from their jobs. According to local human rights organisations, security forces set up checkpoints around the anniversaries of street protests and conduct searches (including of mobile devices) and sometimes make arrests without warrants. 3.80 According to Freedom House, protests in Egypt are rare because of fears they will be dispersed forcefully and protesters will be arrested. In 2023, security forces arrested more than 2,000 people for peaceful expression or assembly according to the independent human rights campaign, Until the Last Prisoner. Amnesty International reported authorities often carried out mass arrests to prevent planned anti-government protests and forcibly dispersed the few small peaceful protests that took place. In-country sources said authorities were increasingly disrupting any kind of protest, fearing they could morph into anti-government protests. For example, authorities arbitrarily arrested dozens of Egyptians in July 2024 in connection with online calls for protests and for the ousting of President El-Sisi’s government due to price increases. Security forces forcibly dispersed a small demonstration in Alexandria in March 2024 and arbitrarily arrested protesters with signs blaming President El-Sisi for ‘starving’ the poor. Between 20 and 29 October 2023, authorities arbitrarily arrested dozens of people, including children, in connection to Palestine solidarity protests in the governorates of Cairo, Giza, Alexandria and Dakahlia. In-country sources said Palestine solidarity protests in Egypt had continued in 2025, resulting in further arrests. Many protesters arrested in these protests remained in pre-trial detention at the time of writing. 3.81 DFAT assesses human rights activists who publicly criticise President El-Sisi and/or the military are almost certain to face official discrimination in the form of harassment by security forces, travel bans, arrest, imprisonment and enforced disappearances. DFAT assesses it is rare for human rights activists to face societal discrimination or violence. DFAT assesses people who participate in protests are likely to face official discrimination in the form of harassment, arrest and imprisonment. DFAT assesses it is rare for protesters to face societal discrimination or violence.  Civil Society  3.82 Article 75 of the Constitution states citizens have the right to form NGOs. The same article further states administrative entities may not interfere in the affairs of NGOs, dissolve them or their boards without a judicial ruling. President El-Sisi declared 2022 the ‘Year of Civil Society’ and directed state bodies to create a dialogue platform among local and international NGOs. In line with President El-Sisi's directive, the National Alliance for Civil Development Action was established to gather ‘voluntary and civil efforts under one umbrella to maximise impact’. At Egypt's Universal Periodic Review in 2025, the government reported the National Coalition for Civil and Developmental Work incorporated 36 major CSOs and 3,000 grass-roots associations, collectively serving 5 million beneficiaries. 3.83 The Law Governing the Pursuit of Civil Work (No. 194) 2019, commonly known as the ‘NGO Law’, governs the process for legal recognition of CSOs and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and outlines provisions on their activities, monitoring, funding and sanctions for violations. Under the NGO Law, domestic and foreign NGOs are prohibited from pursuing activities in breach of vaguely worded terms such as ‘national security’, ‘public order’ and ‘public morals’. Other provisions in the law prohibit NGOs from conducting political activities, entering into agreements with foreign entities, conducting opinion polls and surveys, engaging foreigners as employees or volunteers or participating in workshops abroad without prior approval. The NGO Law also created a Central Unit for Associations and Civil Work within the Ministry of Social Solidarity responsible for monitoring and oversight of NGOs. The Ministry of Social Solidary stated NGOs not registered under the NGO Law by 12 April 2023 risked dissolution.  24 3.84 The space for civic engagement and human rights activism in Egypt has shrunk due to restrictions on CSOs and INGOs. In 2025, Freedom House stated ‘in recent years, NGOs have faced mass closures, as well as harassment in the form of office raids, arrests of members, lengthy legal cases and restrictions on travel’. The US Department of State's 2023 Egypt Country Report on Human Rights Practices stated independent domestic human rights NGOs faced difficulties operating due to reprisals and pressure from the government and security forces. Authorities sometimes allowed CSOs not registered as NGOs to operate but such organisations reported harassment and surveillance, along with threats of government interference, investigation, asset freezes or closure. In-country sources said many CSOs, especially those focused on human rights issues, had been unable to register under the NGO Law. Others, such as the Arab Network for Human Rights Information, decided to cease operations rather than comply with the restrictions the NGO Law imposed. In-country sources said CSOs were increasingly being approached by police and national security agencies and pressured to provide information about their staff, activities and sources of funding. 3.85 The ability of individuals, CSOs and INGOs to monitor and investigate human rights issues within Egypt is limited. In-country sources said human rights defenders were targeted by authorities with raids, hostile phone calls, confiscation of assets and/or prosecution. Authorities sometimes used the provisions under the Counter-Terrorism Law (No. 74) 2015 against human rights defenders. Human rights defenders had been charged for ‘publishing false information for the purposes of harming national security’ or ‘membership in a terrorist (or banned) group’. For example, human rights lawyer Houda Abdel Moneim had terrorism-related charges brought against her in October 2024, despite previously serving jail time for the same offences due to her work with the CSO Egyptian Coordination for Rights and Freedoms. The founder of the human rights group Egyptian Coordination for Rights and Freedoms, Ezzat Ghoniem and 29 others were convicted in March 2023 on a variety of charges related to their human rights work and sentenced to prison terms ranging from five years to life. In other cases, prosecutors have appealed judicial release orders and insisted on the long-term pre-trial detention of detainees, sometime upwards of two years. For example, prominent women’s rights activist, Marwa Arafa had been in pre-trial detention for over five years at the time of writing for ‘spreading false news’ and ‘misusing social media’.  3.86 Egypt’s laws impose penalties on individuals designated by a court as ‘terrorists’ even without criminal convictions, including travel bans, asset freezes and passport cancellation. For example, human rights defenders Hoda Abdelwahab and Gasser Abdelrazek were banned from traveling abroad at the time of writing. Travel bans are not always formally announced but information is available at Passports Authority offices. Those seeking information regarding who issued a travel ban and when must generally inquire in-person. Travel bans are reviewed and can be lifted. For example, Human Rights Watch reported in 2024 the Egyptian Government allowed several leading human rights defenders, including Gamal Eid and Hossam Bahgat, to travel outside the country for the first time since 2016.  3.87 DFAT assesses high-profile civil society actors who work on topics deemed sensitive by the government or military are likely to face official discrimination in the form of harassment by security forces, travel bans, arrest and imprisonment. The hidden nature of low-profile CSO members, especially those working for service-delivery organisation, makes it difficult to assess the likelihood of discrimination they may face. DFAT assesses it is rare for CSO members to face societal discrimination or violence. Media and Journalists  3.88 Article 65 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and opinion, including the right of every person to ‘express his/her opinion verbally, in writing, through imagery, or by any other means of expression and publication’. Article 71 of the Constitution allows for ‘limited censorship in times of war or public mobilisation’. The Law on the Organization of Press, Media, and the Supreme Council of Media (No. 180) 2018 regulates media conduct, giving the Supreme Council of Media the authority to file criminal complaints against digital media platforms and individuals on the basis of vaguely worded offences such as ‘inciting people to violate laws’ and ‘defamation against individuals and state institutions’. Amendments made in 2021 to the Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 increased punishments for journalists covering criminal trial sessions without prior approval and allowed for prison terms of up to five years for those disclosing classified information. 3.89 Egypt has a wide variety of traditional and electronic media. Government-owned and aligned companies make up the majority of TV, radio, print and online media outlets. In-country sources said United Media Services, created and overseen by the General Intelligence Service, owned more than 80 media companies in Egypt. At the 25 time of writing, independent media was made up primarily of online newspapers such as Mada Masr and Al Manassa, neither of which was licenced to operate by the Supreme Council for Media Regulation.  3.90 The ability of journalists to exercise freedom of expression in Egypt is constrained. Self-censorship is common. Egypt ranked 170 out of 180 countries in Reporters Without Borders’ 2025 World Press Freedom Index, with the media situation labelled ‘very serious’. A local CSO recorded 367 violations against journalists and media workers between 1 May 2023 and 1 May 2024. During this time, authorities actively prevented the media from covering 26 incidents, restricting the press's ability to report freely. In-country sources said journalists and editors were often called in for questioning by the Supreme Council for Media Regulation after covering politically sensitive topics. The Supreme Council for Media Regulation also asked media organisations to self-censor to avoid defamation action. Approximately 51 media organisations have been shut down by authorities since 2013.  3.91 Journalists have been arrested when covering politically sensitive topics, tried and in some instances received prison sentences. Reporters Without Borders reported 20 journalists were detained in Egypt in July 2025. A local CSO documented 36 journalists subject to detention, 14 to oral threats and 13 to physical abuse between 1 May 2023 and 1 May 2024. In-country sources said journalists reporting on politically sensitive issues sometimes had their communications intercepted and were threatened by authorities with arrest.  For example, journalist Sayed Saber was arrested in November 2024 following his posts on social media criticising military rule in Egypt. Security forces raided the home of journalist Khaled Mamdouh in July 2024 and charged him with belonging to an unnamed terrorist group and ‘spreading false news’. Journalist Abdelrahman Mahmoud Abdou (Abdelrahman Ayyash) was charged along with four others in July 2024 with ‘leadership of a terrorist group’. 3.92 The Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Law (No. 175) 2018 provides police and investigative authorities power to monitor and block websites for material deemed to incite crime or damage national security. The Law on the Organization of Press, Media, and the Supreme Council of Media (No. 180) 2018 subjects social media accounts with more than 5,000 followers to the same level of criminal responsibility as formalised media outlets for acts such as ‘publishing false information’ or ‘inciting the public to disobey laws’. Freedom House ranked Egypt as ‘Not Free’ in its Freedom on the Net 2024 report stating internet freedom and the rights of internet users were severely constrained. According to the report, website blocking, removal of content, criminal penalties, harassment and surveillance contributed to high levels of self-censorship among internet users. For example, Tiktok influencer Mariam Ayman was arrested on 2 August 2025 and charged with distributing indecent content after the Interior Ministry received complaints her posts contained objectionable content. Ayman’s case was ongoing at the time of publication. (see also Blasphemy, Women). 3.93 DFAT assesses journalists covering topics deemed sensitive by the government or military are likely to face official discrimination in the form of harassment by security forces, arrest and imprisonment. DFAT assesses it is rare for journalists to face societal discrimination or violence. The majority of social media users in Egypt are able to use platforms without incident although they do so with the acknowledgement they may be monitored and need to self-censor. Military Objectors  3.94 Article 86 of the Constitution states military service is compulsory. Military service is regulated by the Law on the Military and National Service (No. 127) 1980 and mandatory for all males aged between 18 and 30. Length of required military service varies based on education level, ranging from one to three years. Conscripts may be placed in a branch of the military, police force or prison service. Women are not subject to conscription but may serve voluntarily in limited roles such as nurses, specialised officers in administrative positions and assistant civil servants.  3.95 The military conscription process is highly structured, involving registration, background checks and medical examinations. In-country sources said background checks regularly involved investigations into whether potential conscripts were politically active (or came from politically active families), were ‘overly religious’ or had criminal convictions. Military intelligence often ruled out those with strong political opinions or religious beliefs for fear of these views ‘infecting’ the military. Medical checks were sometimes carried out to identify and screen out conscripts based on their same-sex orientation.  26 3.96 Temporary and permanent exemptions from military service are reportedly common. Exemptions can be granted for several reasons, including family circumstances (for example, when an individual is an only son), health conditions and disabilities, to complete education and in cases of dual nationality. Exemptions are usually granted temporarily with final exemptions being granted at 30 years of age. Those granted an exemption are issued with an exemption certificate.  3.97 Egyptians who fail to report to register for military service can be punished with one year of additional service. Those who evade military service and reach the age of 30 can be fined between EGP3,000-10,000 (AUD94-312) and/or be imprisoned for up to one year. In-country sources said a fine was the most common method used against those evading military service. Egyptians who have not completed military service and not obtained an exemption may not be able to travel and may find it difficult to obtain employment. 3.98 Conscientious objection to military service is not common according to in-country sources. Most people who chose to avoid military service did so due to personal preference rather than reasons of conscience. Human Rights Watch reports Egyptians evading military service, who are not politically active, are not targeted by authorities as critics or activists. Societal discrimination is rare against evaders of military service according to Human Rights Watch. 3.99 DFAT assesses military objectors possibly face official discrimination in the form of fines and in rare instances imprisonment. DFAT assesses it is rare for military objectors to face societal discrimination or violence. Muslim Brotherhood 3.100 The Muslim Brotherhood (‘the Brotherhood’) is an Islamist religious, political and social movement founded in 1928. The Brotherhood has traditionally been the primary political opposition to Egypt’s military rulers, despite being largely prevented from participating in formal politics and being subjected to intermittent (and often violent) crackdowns. Although the Brotherhood did not play a significant role in the ‘25 January Revolution’ of 2011, it took a more assertive role afterwards. The election of Mohamed Morsi as president in June 2012 led to the Brotherhood’s emergence as the most significant political Islamic group in the region.  3.101 Since the July 2013 military intervention removed Morsi from office, the Egyptian Government has outlawed the Brotherhood and taken strong steps to arrest and prosecute its members. The Brotherhood was declared a ‘terrorist organisation’ under Article 86 of the Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 in December 2013. Under Article 86, membership of a designated terrorist group can incur penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment. Article 86 also criminalises the distribution of materials, in writing or in speech, pertaining to a proscribed organisation or in service of its objectives. International academics have documented the imprisonment of tens of thousands of Brotherhood members. In-country sources estimated upwards of 80,000 Brotherhood members had been imprisoned since 2013. The Brotherhood’s charities have been closed and their assets confiscated. Morsi, who had been on trial since 2013, died in prison in June 2019. Egypt’s security apparatus and courts have imposed significant restrictions on the Brotherhood’s members and activities using the Terrorist Entities Law (No. 8) 2015. As of late 2024, the list of terrorist entities in Egypt included over 4,400 individuals. 3.102 At the time of writing, most of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood members were imprisoned or living in exile. In-country sources said despite the Hamas-Israel conflict and the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, a resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood was unlikely in Egypt. The sustained crackdown on its operations meant the Brotherhood’s party structure had not been rebuilt domestically. New leaders had been prevented from emerging in Egypt and the Brotherhood’s chain of command no longer existed within the country. However, Egyptians still identified with the Brotherhood who were no longer active faced arrest or other forms of harassment, including losing their jobs. 3.103 DFAT assesses Muslim Brotherhood members, regardless of level of seniority, are almost certain to face official discrimination in the form of harassment by security forces, arrest, imprisonment, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. DFAT assesses Muslim Brotherhood members possibly face societal discrimination. DFAT assesses Muslim Brotherhood members are likely to face violence from security forces. 

GROUPS OF INTEREST Women  3.104 Article 11 of the Constitution commits the state to achieve equality between women and men and to ensure appropriate representation of women in national bodies. There are considerable legal protections for women in Egypt, including on personal safety, participation in the workforce and mandatory schooling for girls. The government’s National Strategy for the Empowerment of Egyptian Women (2017 – 2030) sets a number of concrete targets for political, economic and social empowerment by 2030. The strategy aims to increase the percentage of women in public posts from 5 per cent to 17 per cent, reduce the unemployment rate for women from 24 per cent to 16 per cent and to halve the maternal mortality rate. The strategy also aims to eliminate sexual harassment and domestic violence and improve Egypt’s ranking on the UN’s Gender Inequality Index.  3.105 The 2025 World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report ranked Egypt 139th out of 148 economies for women’s economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment (Sudan ranked the lowest, countries like Afghanistan and Yemen were not included). The report stated women attained parity with men in life expectancy but this was due in large part to declines in life expectancy for men. The report also noted recent positive progress in women’s workforce participation with women attaining parity in professional and technical roles, as well as in literacy rates (86 per cent). However, lack of affordable childcare options and reductions in agricultural and public service jobs have impacted women's employment opportunities. The labour force participation rate of women was around 18 per cent in 2025 according to World Bank estimates.  3.106 Women participate in all areas of Egyptian society, including government, business and civil society. There have been considerable improvements in women’s representation in Parliament in recent years, assisted by Law 46 2014 that introduced quotas. For example, women made up 162 seats of both houses of Parliament in 2020, an increase from 89 women in 2015 and 11 in 2012. The cabinet reshuffle in July 2024 resulted in women heading four out of 30 ministries. Five out of 23 deputy ministers are women. Three women judges were appointed to the Technical Office of the Council President for the first time in 2024. In another first, a woman, Major General Manal Atef, was appointed Assistant Minister of Interior for the Human Rights Sector in 2024. 3.107 Discriminatory laws and regulations based on gender exist. These include the Personal Status Law 1920/1929 governing marriage, guardianship, custody, alimony and inheritance. For example, while Muslim men can unilaterally divorce their wives without providing justification, Muslim women must either forfeit their financial rights by accepting a ‘no-fault’ divorce (khula) or fight long and costly court battles to prove their husband committed ‘harm’. If a divorced woman with children decides to remarry, she loses custody of her children to the children’s father or his closest female kin, leading most divorced women to elect not to remarry. Laws related to adultery are far more severe for women than men. For example, under Article 237 of the Penal Code (No. 58) 1937, a husband who kills his wife who has committed acts of adultery can be charged with a misdemeanour instead of murder. Under the Personal Status Law 1920/1929, Muslim women are entitled to inherit only half as much as their male relatives. 3.108 Gender-based violence (GBV) against women and girls takes many forms. It can be physical, emotional, psychological or sexual in nature and may encompass threats of violence and coercion. GBV is common in Egypt according to the UNFPA. In-country sources said the Egyptian Government was attempting to address GBV, including through its 2015 National Strategy to Combat Violence against Women. Some progress had been made but according to in-country sources upwards of 30 per cent of women in Egypt experienced GBV at least once in their lives. According to UN Women approximately 12 per cent of ever-partnered women and girls aged 15 years and older were subject to physical, sexual or psychological violence by a current or former intimate partner in the previous 12 months.  3.109 Article 267 of the Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 criminalises sexual intercourse with a female without her consent, prescribing penalties of upwards of 25 years’ imprisonment, or life imprisonment for cases of rape involving armed abduction. ‘Corrective rape’ perpetrated against someone on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity to force them to conform to heterosexuality or normative gender identity is considered criminalised under the Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 but there are no known instances of prosecution. Rape within marriage is not a crime. 28 Articles 268 and 269 of the Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 criminalise indecent assault. Egypt does not have a law on domestic violence and there are no specific civil protection orders available for survivors. Some domestic violence offences are punishable under 1998 amendments to the Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 but only if they exceed ‘accepted limits of discipline’ as determined by a judge and injuries are apparent when a complaint is filed with police. There are no reliable statistics available regarding the incidence of killings and assaults motivated by ‘honour’. These are not specifically addressed in Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 but are treated as crimes. Police reports are generally not provided to victims of crimes, with reference numbers being given instead to follow up on court cases.  3.110 State protection is available for women reporting GBV. In-country sources said reports of GBV are generally taken seriously by police, who file cases and undertake investigations. The US Department of State's 2023 Egypt Country Report on Human Rights Practices stated there were instances where police treated domestic violence as a matter for private family resolution, which in-country sources said was due to individual prejudices of police officers rather than official policy. However, in-country sources said police often took GBV claims of wives and mothers more seriously than daughters’ allegations against their fathers, which were met with more scepticism. Women and girls who brought advocates (family members, CSOs, faith-based groups or legal professionals) to their initial meetings with police often had their cases handled more quickly.  3.111 Prosecutors require medical reports from a public hospital in addition to police reports to file charges against offenders for GBV offences. In-country sources said average sentences imposed on those found guilty of minor physical assaults against women and girls ranged from one to four weeks in jail. Those found to have committed rape or assaults causing permanent injury are often sentenced to months or years in prison.  3.112 The Ministry of Social Solidarity runs a network of approximately nine shelters nationwide to accommodate survivors of GBV. During intake these shelters often ask women for identification and if criminal charges have been filed against offenders. Shelters are generally accessible and house upwards of several hundred people nationwide. Children can be accommodated but boys are only permitted until the age of seven. Shelters provide social, family and psychological counselling, along with referrals to other relevant government and CSO service providers. DFAT was not aware at the time of writing of targeted government programs or financial assistance for GBV survivors. Faith-based organisations run informal shelters that may be easier for some to access. Locations and details of these informal shelters are kept confidential to protect the safety of survivors of GBV.  3.113 Female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) refers to all procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for cultural or other non-medical reasons. FGM/C has been illegal in Egypt since 2008 under Article 242 of the Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 although there are no punishments explicitly set out for aiding, abetting or failing to report the practice. The US Department of State's 2023 Egypt Country Report on Human Rights Practices stated the government enforced the FGM/C law, including maintaining hotlines to inform authorities of doctors who performed FGM/C, as well as public awareness campaigns.  3.114 Egypt’s political leaders and highest Muslim religious authorities have declared FGM/C unacceptable and without basis in Islam. Still, some Muslim and Christian communities continue to practice FGM/C. According to the 2021 Egyptian Family Health Survey, 86 per cent of married Egyptian women between the ages of 15 and 49 had undergone FGM/C, of which 74 per cent was performed by a doctor. Community attitudes appear to be shifting. The same survey found 13 per cent of mothers intended to subject their daughters to FMG/C, a reduction from 35 per cent recorded in 2014.    3.115 Sexual harassment is experienced by women across the socio-economic spectrum. Sexual harassment was criminalised in 2014 and was upgraded to a felony in 2021, with penalties of upwards of four years in prison and/or a fine of upwards of EGP200,000 (AUD6,334) for anyone who ‘subjects others, in a public or private place, to sexual or lewd matters, suggestions, or hints, whether by sign, words, deeds, or any means, including wired, wireless, or electronic communication’. In December 2023 the penalty for sexual harassment in ‘aggravating circumstances’ was increased to imprisonment of a minimum of 10 years. However, an April 2023 report by the UN Human Rights Committee stated heightened sentences for sexual harassment had not yet reduced its prevalence. In-country sources said prosecutions and sentences for committing sexual harassment were rare.  3.116 Historically it was socially taboo for women to live alone without a male relative or guardian. In-country sources said women were now able to live alone but were sometimes viewed with disapproval or shame. There are 29 no official barriers for single, divorced and widowed women accessing education and employment. The Labor Law (No. 12) 2003 prohibits employment and wage discrimination on the basis of gender. It also imposes a fine on employers or their representatives who breach these obligations. Anti-discrimination measures are enforced according to in-country sources. A 2025 study in the Journal of Development Economics found when applying for employment, Egyptian women were slightly less likely to receive callbacks than Egyptian men, with only a small difference between single and married women. Women’s significantly lower rate of participation in the labour force has been attributed to barriers including them assuming a disproportionate share of childcare and household responsibilities. 3.117 DFAT assesses women possibly face official discrimination based on gender in the form of discriminatory laws and regulations including the Personal Status Law 1920/1929. DFAT assesses women possibly face societal discrimination in the form of sexual harassment and discrimination in employment. DFAT assesses women possibly face violence in the form of FGM/C and GBV. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 3.118 Homosexuality is not criminalised in Egypt, but there have been instances where LGBTQIA+ people have been charged with ‘habitual debauchery’ under the Law on Combating Prostitution (No. 10) 1961. Medical checks are sometimes carried out to determine if penetrative sex occurred, as well as part of sexually transmitted infection screening processes. Forced anal examinations - held to be a form of cruel, degrading, and inhuman treatment rarely occurred in 2025 according to in-country sources. People found guilty of ‘habitual debauchery’ receive sentences of between three months to three years, although most are acquitted upon appeal. Egypt’s media does not generally publish the details of ‘habitual debauchery’ cases to protect the privacy of the accused. DFAT is not aware of instances of lesbians being arrested, charged or convicted under the Law on Combating Prostitution (No. 10) 1961. 3.119 In-country sources said police officers operating on their own initiative sometimes used social media and applications like Grindr to monitor LGBTQIA+ people. In-country sources said some individual police officers viewed LGBTQIA+ people as ‘amoral’ or suffering from a form of ‘sexual perversion’ that was ‘haram’ (forbidden or proscribed by Islamic law). In some instances, these officers arrested LGBTQIA+ people after luring them to prearranged meetings or dates. As these cases were initiated and investigated based on officers’ individual prejudices instead of official policy, judges generally acquitted the accused because the charges lacked a legal basis or were based on entrapment. The US Department of State's 2023 Egypt Country Report on Human Rights Practices reported police had sometimes harassed LGBTQIA+ people and used physical assault, had forcibly solicited bribes to avoid arrest and forced them to provide information concerning other LGBTQIA+ individuals. In-country sources said between 30 to 50 LGBTQIA+ people were arrested annually in Egypt, the majority were later acquitted. In-country sources said police often targeted LGBTQIA+ people based on class, with those arrested primarily having lower socioeconomic status and lacking wasta. International media reported that incarcerated LGBTQIA+ people often face worse treatment than other inmates, including verbal and physical abuse. 3.120 Homosexuality is socially taboo in Egypt across socio-economic backgrounds and geographic locations. Societal discrimination against LGBTQIA+ people is common, especially in terms of accessing accommodation and employment. In-country sources said LGBTQIA+ people generally did not share their sexual orientation or gender identity openly with others, although some did on social media and dating applications. In-country sources said many LGBTQIA+ people feared being ‘outed’ and the perceived shame it might bring their family. LGBTQIA+ people sometimes faced threats and extortion when people found out about their sexual orientation or gender identity. In-country sources said LGBTQIA+ had difficulties accessing state protection because they often avoided contact with the police for fear of being questioned, detained or extorted. Although societal violence against LGBTQIA+ people was rarely reported, family violence sometimes occurred, especially against gay men as a result of Egypt’s patriarchal culture. LGBTQIA+ people also reportedly had a higher suicide rate than the overall population.  3.121 Both gay men and lesbians come under considerable social pressure to enter heterosexual marriages and produce children. Religious leaders from both the Muslim and Coptic Christians communities sometimes advocated for forced ‘corrective’ heterosexual marriages and conversion therapy. In-country sources said few people accessed conversion therapy, which was very expensive and only accessible to rich, upper-class families.   30 3.122 Egypt lacks detailed legislation or processes regulating sex reassignment surgery. Physicians are prohibited from carrying out ‘gender change’ operations but are permitted to perform ‘gender correction’ operations with approval from the review committee within the Medical Syndicate. In-country sources said the committee met irregularly and had a backlog of cases. In 2020, the head of the committee said between 2014 and 2017, 87 cases of ‘gender correction’ had been approved for intersex people but none for transgender people. In the absence of government-sponsored gender-affirming healthcare, an underground sex reassignment surgery industry has emerged. Those who do not gain relevant approvals before undergoing sex reassignment surgery often face problems changing their gender on official documents. In-country sources said they were aware of instances of gender being modified on government-issued identification of trans women but only after bribes were paid. 3.123 Trans women often experience societal discrimination and find it difficult to secure formal employment. Some trans women reportedly turn to prostitution, leaving them vulnerable to sexual abuse, harassment or arrest under the Law on Combating Prostitution (No. 10) 1961. If arrested, trans women are generally treated by authorities as men. 3.124 A small number of CSOs advocate for LGBTQIA+ rights. Most CSO efforts are focused on providing legal support to those arrested, psycho-social support and safe spaces for the community and discreet advocacy with international organisations. Most CSOs advocating for LGBTQIA+ rights in Egypt keep a low profile and operate discretely to avoid the attention of authorities.  3.125 DFAT assesses LGBTQIA+ people are likely to face official discrimination based on their sexual orientation and gender identity in the form of harassment and arrest due to individual prejudices of police officers rather than official policy, as well as apprehension about accessing state protection. DFAT assesses LGBTQIA+ people are likely to face societal discrimination. DFAT assesses it is rare for LGBTQIA+ people to experience societal violence but they possibly experience family violence. DFAT assesses trans women are almost certain to face official discrimination in the form of gaining permission for sex reassignment surgery and changing their gender on official documents. Children 3.126 Article 80 of the Constitution defines anyone under the age of 18 years as a child. The Constitution commits the state to ensuring children have free healthcare, vaccinations, basic nutrition, safe shelter and education. The Egyptian Government is responsible for providing children with protection from ‘all forms of violence, abuse, mistreatment and commercial and sexual exploitation’. The Child Law (No. 12) 1996 amended in 2008, Labour Law (No.12) 2003 and Law No. 64 2010 on combating human trafficking provide specific protections for children. The Sustainable Development Strategy: Egypt Vision 2030 outlines commitments towards combatting violence against children, ending preventable deaths of newborns and young children and ensuring universal health coverage for all children. 3.127 Corporal punishment in Egypt is common and parents often adopt violent disciplinary practices according to UNICEF. Boys are more likely than girls to suffer from violent discipline. Children living in poorer households are more likely to be exposed to violent disciplinary methods than children from wealthier families.  3.128 Child marriage sometimes occurs, more frequently in rural areas rather than urban areas. Approximately 2 per cent of women aged 20-24 years were married by age 15 and 16 per cent were married by age 18 according to UNICEF data. In-country sources said child marriages often resulted in unregistered births. 3.129 Approximately 1.3 million children aged between five and 17 were engaged in child labour activities in Egypt in 2021. Child labour is twice as common in rural areas than in urban areas. It is also more common among poorer households and among those whose mother is deceased. According to UNICEF, child labour affects school attendance with 10 per cent of children who are not attending school engaged in child labour compared with 4 per cent among those attending school. The Egyptian Government does not release data on the number of children exposed to the worst forms of child labour, such as drug trafficking, forced begging and commercial sexual exploitation. 3.130 DFAT assesses it is rare for children to face official or societal discrimination based on their juvenile status alone. DFAT assesses children are likely to face societal violence in the form of corporal punishment. Children who are poor, geographically isolated, female, living with disabilities or orphaned may face elevated risks. 31 4. COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION CLAIMS ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF LIFE Extrajudicial Killings 4.1 Article 59 of the Constitution guarantees Egyptians the right to a ‘safe life’, with the government responsible for providing security for its citizens. The Supreme State Security Prosecution is often responsible for investigating extrajudicial killings but outcomes are rarely made public. The US Department of State's 2023 Egypt Country Report on Human Rights Practices stated the Public Prosecutor’s Office had charged, prosecuted and convicted a small number of perpetrators but lack of accountability was a serious problem. Human rights organisations reported perpetrators of extrajudicial killings often acted with impunity under the pretext the killings occurred as part of counter-terrorism operations. In-country sources said provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Law 2015 protected officers who used force in the course of their duties as long it was found to have been necessary. 4.2 When they occur, extrajudicial killings usually happen during arrests or while suspects are in police custody. For example, Youssef Sarhani and Farag al-Farazi were reportedly killed in police custody in Matrouh Governorate while being questioned about the deaths of three security force members. Public prosecutors in Matrouh initiated an investigation into the deaths of Sarhani and al-Farazi, which was ongoing at the time of publication. Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances 4.3 Article 54 of the Constitution prohibits the arrest, detention or restriction of freedom of anyone in any way unless under judicial order. The US Department of State's 2023 Egypt Country Report on Human Rights Practices reported authorities sometimes detained individuals without producing warrants. Many detainees were held incommunicado and denied requests to contact family members or lawyers for periods ranging from a few days to several years. Local human rights organisation stated enforced disappearances were systemic and widespread. 4.4 In-country sources said during enforced disappearances suspects were blindfolded by security services and shackled to walls for between six weeks to two months before ultimately being charged with belonging to a terrorist group. The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance reported in July 2024 it had a total of 279 unresolved cases. The Working Group expressed concern at the reported patterns of use of the Anti-Terrorism Law 2015 and national security legislation to perpetrate enforced disappearances. Cases of enforced disappearance spiked in 2017 at 198 instances before decreasing to eight instances in 2021, three in 2022 and five in 2023. Amnesty International reported dozens of individuals were subjected to enforced disappearance in 2024. Deaths in Custody 4.5 Egypt does not publish statistics on deaths in custody. In-country sources said deaths in detention facilities occurred primarily due to lack of access to medical care and treatment (see Detention and Prison). Authorities often conclude deaths in custody occurred from natural causes and do not undertake forensic examinations. 4.6 In-country sources said there had been approximately 132 deaths in custody between April 2022 and November 2024. Amnesty International stated authorities failed to adequately investigate the causes and circumstances of at least 43 deaths in custody in 2024. For example, no investigations were opened into the death of Ibrahim al-Ajeery in January 2024 at the Badr 3 Prison following claims he had been denied access to healthcare for a chronic condition. DEATH PENALTY 4.7 Egyptian law permits the death penalty for 104 crimes under the Penal Code (No. 58) 1937, Military Judiciary Law (No. 25) 1966, Weapons and Ammunition Law (No. 394) 1954 and Anti-Narcotics Law (No. 182) 1960. Executions are carried out by hanging, although military personnel can be executed by firing squad. All death sentences are referred to the Grand Mufti who issues non-binding legal opinions based on sharia. Appeals against death sentences are referred to the Court of Cassation, except in the case of military trials that are not appealable. Prior to execution, 32 files are sent to the president to consider clemency. If no response is received within 14 days of the president receiving the condemned person’s file, the execution can legally be carried out. 4.8 Egyptian courts issue death sentences across a variety of cases, including those that are politically motivated. Courts issued at least 380 death sentences in 2024, compared with 348 in 2023 and 538 in 2022. Authorities executed at least 13 people in 2024, compared with at least 8 people in 2023 and 30 people in 2022. The Egyptian Front for Human Rights (EFHR) stated all executions in 2023 and 2024 related to criminal cases, with none against individuals convicted in cased EFHR considered politically motivated. EFHR reported in 2022 seven people were executed following convictions in cases of political violence. 4.9 In-country sources said the number of executions in Egypt had declined significantly since 2020 because the government was keen to highlight progress addressing human rights concerns, including as part of the National Dialogue. In addition, many of those found guilty of terrorism offences were executed prior to 2022.  CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT Torture 4.10 Egypt is a State Party to the Convention Against Torture but not its Optional Protocol. Article 52 of the Constitution states all forms of torture are crimes with no statute of limitations. Article 126 of The Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 provides punishments of between three and ten years’ imprisonment for ordering or conducting torture to extract a confession. The Office of the Public Prosecutor has responsibility for investigating complaints of torture and for referring them to the criminal courts.  4.11 Authorities, including President El-Sisi, have denied systemic torture occurs in Egypt. Despite legal protections, in-country sources said police and security authorities sometimes resorted to torture as a means of obtaining confessions. Torture often includes beatings, sleep deprivation and threats to family. Human Rights Watch further documented incidents of police and National Security Agency (NSA) officers using electric shocks, stress positions and sometimes sexual assault against terrorist and criminal suspects. For example, political cartoonist Ashraf Omar’s family said NSA officers tortured him and threatened to subject him to electric shocks while in detention. International human rights organisations report a culture of impunity for torture exists and State Prosecutors rarely investigate torture allegations. Arbitrary Arrest and Detention 4.12 Article 54 of the Constitution states, except when caught in the act, citizens may only be apprehended, searched, arrested, or have their freedoms restricted after a judicial warrant is issued. Those detained must be immediately informed of the reason, allowed to contact family and a lawyer and be brought before the investigating authority within 24 hours. Questioning may only occur in the presence of a lawyer. 4.13 International and local human rights organisations state arrests without warrants are common. This is due in large part to the Anti-Terrorism Law 2015 and national security legislation that gives prosecutors greater power to detain suspects without judicial review and significantly expands the definition of activities for which individuals and groups may be designated terrorists. For example, Hani Soliman was detained in April 2023 following comments on social media regarding the lack of transparency of President El-Sisi’s finances and suggesting he would not accept defeat in elections. Soliman was charged with ‘joining a banned group’, ‘spreading false news’ and ‘misuse of social media’. In another instance, authorities arbitrarily detained dozens of people In July 2024 amid online calls for protests in response to price hikes and power cuts.  4.14 Egypt’s Code of Criminal Procedure 1950 allows a suspect to be held in detention for a maximum of two years throughout the preliminary investigation stage and criminal trial, but international and local human rights organisations state prosecutors and judges sometimes circumvent this requirement through the practice of tadweer (‘rotation’ or ‘recycling’). When certain detainees are close to reaching their maximum period of pretrial detention, they are re-arrested in connection with a new case with near-identical factual allegations to the original case brought against them. This re-arrest then restarts the two-year clock on pretrial detention. For example, a local research institute recorded 941 cases of rotation impacting 774 defendants between January 2018 and March 2021. From 33 among those defendants, 660 were subject to rotation once, 77 were subject to it twice and 38 were subject to it three or more times. On 26 August 2025, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk called on Egyptian authorities to immediately end the abusive practice of 'rotation' and release all those arbitrarily detained under it. Changes to the Criminal Procedure Code 1950 were being considered by parliament at the time of writing, including reducing the amount of time it was permissible to spend in pre-trail detention. Corporal Punishment 4.15 Article 55 of the Constitution states detainees may not be physically or mentally harmed. Corporal punishment has been illegal as a disciplinary measure in prisons since 2002 and is unlawful as a sentence for crime. Despite the prohibition on its use, in-country sources said corporal punishment was sometimes used on prisoners in detention facilities.  4.16 Corporal punishment is lawful in Egyptian homes, alternative care settings and day care centres. Act No. 126 2008 amended the Children’s Act 1996 to strengthen legal protection for children’s rights, including protection from harm but confirmed parents’ and carers’ ‘right to discipline through legitimate means’. Provisions against violence and abuse in the Children’s Act 1996 and the Penal Code (No. 58) 1937 have not been legally interpreted as prohibiting corporal punishment of children (see also Children). 34 5. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS STATE PROTECTION Military 5.1 Egypt’s military comprises the Army, Navy, Air Force and Air Defence Force. It had 440,000 active personnel, 480,000 reserve personnel and a 300,000-person strong paramilitary in 2025. The military’s primary mission is to safeguard Egypt’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. This includes defending the country’s land borders and coastline on the Mediterranean and Red Seas. The Law on Guarding and Protecting the State’s Public and Vital Facilities and Buildings (No. 3) 2024 expanded the armed forces’ responsibilities, tasking the military with assisting police guarding and protecting vital facilities including power stations, electricity lines and towers, oil fields, railway tracks, roads, bridges and other comparable facilities. The law provides military personnel involved in such operations with the same judicial powers of arrest and seizure as police. 5.2 Article 152 of the Constitution states the President is Supreme Commander of the Egyptian Armed Forces. The President cannot declare war or send the military into overseas combat without consultation with the National Defence Council (consisting of senior political and military leaders) and the approval of the House of Representatives with a two-thirds majority. Article 201 states the Minister of Defence is the Commander in Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces (although answerable to the Supreme Commander) and must be appointed from among its officers. 5.3 The Law Concerning the Treatment of Some Senior Officers of the Armed Forces (No. 161) 2018 allows the president to grant legal immunity to senior military officers for any crimes committed between 3 July 2013 (when the Constitution was suspended) and 10 January 2016, when parliament reconvened. Legal action against these officers would first require permission from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. President El-Sisi issued a decree in 2022 granting immunity to all members of the armed forces. This immunity means the actions of the military cannot be questioned. According to the decree, no authority in Egypt has the right to search the properties of officers or to grant a search warrant for anybody to search their property or vehicles. In-country sources confirmed the decree included complete immunity for the military and intelligence services, including the inability for them to be summoned, questioned or prosecuted. Police 5.4 Articles 206 and 207 of the Constitution set out the roles and responsibilities of the police force, namely ensuring safety and security of citizens and preserving public order and morality. Police are divided into two main forces: the Egyptian National Police (ENP) and the Central Security Forces (CSF). The ENP is a regular police force that had approximately 350,000 personnel in 2017 (most recent data available). It is responsible for law enforcement and maintaining public order nation-wide. It has a number of specialist agencies, including the General Directorate of Criminal Investigation and the General Administration of Criminal Evidence Verification. The paramilitary CSF, which includes conscripts and whose estimated numbers vary considerably, is responsible for security at key infrastructure sites, diplomatic missions and public events. Professionalism varies across the police and effectiveness is limited by understaffing, shortages of equipment, insufficient training and low pay.  5.5 Human rights education has been integrated into police training programs, covering topics such as the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) and combating violence against women. Complaints against police can be submitted through governmental platforms, the Office of the Public Prosecutor and human rights entities. Police officers have been charged and convicted after committing criminal offences, including the use of torture. For example, two police officers were sentenced to six years in prison in 2022 after they were found guilty of torturing Mahmoud Khamis Gaber to death while he was in police custody. However, international human rights organisations report convictions are rare and prosecutors often dismiss or ignore complaints filed against police. 35 Legal System 5.6 Article 184 of the Constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary and prohibits political interference in judicial affairs. Article 186 guarantees the independence and permanent status of judges, while Article 198 prohibits the arrest or detention of lawyers engaged in defence work. Senior judges are generally professional and independent but the quality and impartiality of judges at more junior levels varies. Women can serve as prosecutors and judges at all levels. 5.7 Egypt has three supreme courts. The Supreme Constitutional Court is the highest judicial authority and has exclusive jurisdiction to decide issues regarding the constitutionality of laws. The Court of Cassation is the supreme court of the common court system and deals with civil and criminal matters. The Supreme Administrative Court is the highest court of the administrative court system, known as the State Council, and adjudicates disputes involving government actions or those involving government employees. 5.8 The common court system hears the majority of criminal and civil cases. Courts of first instance are the first level of litigation in civil cases and in criminal cases involving misdemeanours (crimes punishable by up to three years’ detention) and petty offences. Misdemeanour courts consist of a single judge attached to the court of first instance for that district. Appeals are to a misdemeanour court of appeals, consisting of a panel of three judges. Felonies are tried before panels of three judges in criminal courts, which are a circuit of the courts of appeal. Egypt has eight courts of appeal located throughout the country. Family courts deal with family-related disputes. 5.9 Misdemeanour and criminal court judges have the authority to conduct their own supplemental investigation if they are not satisfied with evidence presented by the public prosecution and defence or if new factual issues arise in the course of the trial. At the other extreme, trial judges can accept the evidence as presented by the parties in the court file without any requirement to hear live testimony from witnesses if not requested to do so by a party. A large number of misdemeanour and even some felony cases are routinely tried in a single day. Other trials generally take longer. 5.10 The Public Prosecution Office is an independent arm of the judiciary charged with conducting neutral, unbiased investigations. It is headed by a Prosecutor-General, a senior judge selected by the Supreme Judicial Council. Public Prosecutors act as both investigators and courtroom prosecutors. Criminal investigations are generally initiated based on complaints filed by citizens or government officials but may also be initiated by the Public Prosecution Office. 5.11 The only avenue for appeal for cases before criminal courts is the Court of Cassation. Appeals are limited to issues of law rather than fact. However, judgements in criminal courts unsupported by sufficient evidence are sometimes reversed as erroneous as a matter of law. For example, in-country sources provided examples of convictions of LGBTQIA+ people overturned by the Court of Cassation due to errors of law. Military Courts and State Security Emergency Courts 5.12 Egypt’s military courts operate under the authority of the Defence Ministry. Military courts typically deny defendants’ rights accorded by civilian courts, including the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against them, to access a lawyer and to be brought promptly before a judge following arrest. Although Article 204 of the Constitution prohibits military trials of civilians, it has a broad exemption for crimes representing direct assaults against military authority. For example, a military court sentenced 62 residents of North Sinai governorate in December 2024 to prison terms ranging from three to 10 years on charges of damaging military vehicles and using force against public officials. 5.13 Amendments made in January 2025 to the Military Code of Justice (No. 25) 1966 added to the military courts’ jurisdiction crimes committed against ‘public and vital facilities and public properties, and other comparable things, that are protected by the armed forces’. Law No. 25 was invoked in January 2025 to arrest five fishermen at Lake Bardawil for being in a ‘military area’ without permission. Reconciliation Committees  5.14 Reconciliation committees are a form of traditional justice authorities use to resolve communal incidents between Muslims and Christians, including in land and business disputes. The process typically involves victims 36 accepting a negotiated apology and compensation for abandoning any claim to legal remedy. Reconciliation committees are more common in rural and poorer areas, where people historically had greater difficulty accessing the justice system. In-country sources said reconciliation committees were being used less frequently due to improvements within the common court system, which had resulted in fewer adjournments, speedier trials and reduced backlogs of cases. DFAT was not aware at the time of writing of recent instances of reconciliation committees forcing Christians to withdraw charges against Muslims or apologise to them unjustly in order to resolve issues at the local level. Double Jeopardy 5.15 Egypt's legal system generally recognises the principle of double jeopardy. However, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders reported instances where people were charged with similar, and sometimes identical, terrorism-related accusations in a practice known as 'rotation' or 'recycling'. For example, upon completing a five-year sentence on 1 November 2023 for ‘joining an unnamed terrorist organisation’, human rights lawyer Hoda Abdel Moneim was detained again for an identical charge to that for which she had completed her previous sentence. In another instance, human rights defender Aisha al-Shater was charged with an identical crime to that for which she was serving a 10-year prison sentence. There have been other cases where people charged and acquitted by one jurisdiction of Egypt were charged for the same offence in another jurisdiction.  DFAT was not aware at the time of writing of recent instances of individuals convicted or acquitted of crimes overseas being charged for the same crimes upon their return to Egypt. National Human Rights Institution 5.16 The National Council for Human Rights (NCHR) was established in 2003 with a mission to protect, promote and develop human rights in Egypt under the provisions of the Constitution. Article 99 of the Constitution grants the NCHR the power to file complaints with the Public Prosecution Office in the event of violations of legally established civil rights. Article 214 of the Constitution guarantees the NCHR’s independence but Law 94 2003 – the NCHR’s enabling law - does not specifically establish its independence from the executive and legislative branches of government. In-country sources said resource and mandate constraints limited the NCHR’s effectiveness. They said the NCHR lacked the power to subpoena officials or make binding demands on the government. 5.17 The NCHR’s periodic reports on the human rights situation in Egypt declined in both frequency and substance in recent years, according to human rights organisations. The NCHR has also limited its engagement with politically sensitive human rights issues like enforced disappearances and is instead focusing on socio-economic rights. The Sub-Committee on Accreditation of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions recommended downgrading the NCHR to ‘B status’ in November 2024 over concerns about its lack of independence, transparency and effectiveness. 5.18 The Supreme Standing Committee for Human Rights (SSCHR) was established in 2018 by Prime Ministerial Decree No. 2396 with the aim of further enhancing human rights protection in Egypt. It includes all ministries and government bodies involved with human rights in Egypt and is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The committee is responsible for monitoring implementation of international obligations under the relevant international conventions. SSCHR also reviews domestic human rights legislation and policies and monitors implementation of national human rights strategies. Detention and Prison 5.19 Article 56 of the Constitution states prisons are houses for reform and rehabilitation subject to judicial oversight. Apart from a few military prisons under the Defence Ministry, all official prisons in Egypt are administered by the Interior Ministry, under its Prison Authority or security directorates. There were 78 prison facilities operating in 2021 and an unclear number of police detention facilities. The Interior Ministry restructured its prisons and rehabilitation centres since 2021 to improve standards. This included closing down 15 ‘traditional prisons’ and constructing new facilities, including the Wadi Al-Natroun Rehabilitation Centre in the Beheira Governorate. 5.20 Egypt does not publish official statistics on its prison population. However, according to the World Prison Brief/Institute for Criminal Policy Research’s World Prison Population List, Egypt had an estimated total prison 37 population of 120,000 (including pre-trial detainees and remand prisoners) in 2022. The official prison capacity is 55,000 people. According to a former chairperson of Parliament’s Human Rights Committee, half of the prisoners in Egypt were in pretrial detention in 2025 and yet to be sentenced. 5.21 In-country sources said older style traditional prisons were often overcrowded and lacked proper sanitation and ventilation but newly built facilities did not have these issues. Newly built rehabilitation facilities have lights on for 24 hours a day and cameras installed in every cell, while traditional prisons do not. All facilities reportedly lacked nutritious food and provided only limited access to fresh air and exercise. Medical facilities varied in terms of quality and access to specialist services. Inmates are generally permitted family visits once a month for between 15 or 20 minutes. The government reports there are employment and education programs available for inmates but DFAT was unable to verify if these programs functioned. Inmates are permitted to worship and there are mosques and small churches within every rehabilitation centre/prison that hold weekly prayer sessions. 5.22 Article 56 of the Constitution states conduct violating the dignity of prisoners or endangering their health is forbidden. The US Department of State's 2023 Egypt Country Report on Human Rights Practices reported families of some deceased prisoners alleged prison authorities denied prisoners access to potentially life-saving medical care and in some cases denied requests to transfer the prisoners to hospital, leading to deaths in prison. A report by a local monitoring organisation stated 35 prisoners and detainees died as a result of abuse or medical neglect during 2023. In-country sources said punishment for offences committed in prisons usually involved restrictions on food, solitary confinement or transfer to other prisons. Corporal punishment occurs in prisons, with inmates sometimes subjected to threats, sleep deprivation and beatings, often when on hunger strikes. INTERNAL RELOCATION 5.23 Article 62 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of movement, residence and emigration. There are no legal impediments to internal movement within Egypt. Egyptians can and do relocate for a variety of reasons. Major cities, such as Cairo and Alexandria, offer Egyptians greater opportunities for employment. Some Egyptians from the poorer parts of Upper Egypt have moved to the north coast of the country in search of better jobs and living conditions. In-country sources said worsening economic conditions within Egypt were a major push factor for both legal and illegal migration abroad, which was favoured by most over internal relocation. For women escaping situations of violence, those from the middle and upper classes are likely to have a greater ability to find work and shelter in new locations.  5.24 DFAT assesses migrating to large urban areas like Cairo and Alexandria may mitigate against potential risks posed by GBV. However, vulnerable groups such as single and divorced women from poorer and more rural areas leaving family violence situations may face additional barriers to relocation, including accessing employment and housing (see also Women). TREATMENT OF RETURNEES Exit and Entry Procedures 5.25 The Passport Control Department of the Interior Ministry is responsible for conducting checks at ports of entry and exit, which are strictly enforced. When leaving Egypt, Egyptians must present a valid passport and visa for their destination country, if required. Egyptian males are also required to show evidence of their military service status when departing the country. Such proof includes exemption certificates, an expired passport noting exemption from military service, or a permission to travel issued by the Conscription Department. 5.26 Egypt records entries and exits from the country, with authorities able to determine whether someone is in Egypt or abroad. Egyptian law prevents those with criminal charges against them leaving the country. These names are recorded on a ‘warning list’, amended by judges and the Prosecutor-General, against which all travellers are checked prior to departure. Not all people with charges against them (or trials or appeals pending) are automatically put on the warning list. It is possible for names to be taken off the list, even if trials are pending. Should a person’s lawyer request a name be taken off the list, it is the responsibility of the Prosecutor-General to show why the name 38 should remain on it. There have been numerous cases where a person facing trial has had their name removed from the list and subsequently travelled abroad without incident. 5.27 Human rights organisations have reported the Interior Ministry and General Intelligence Service are able to amend the warning list to include persons of interest, including for political reasons. For example, Patrick Zaki was arrested in 2020 after publishing an article with personal reflections on religious discrimination against Coptic Christians in Egypt. Authorities released him pending trial after 22 months of detention but for the next 1.5 years placed him under a travel ban. In July 2023, Zaki was sentenced and then, two days later, pardoned by President El-Sisi and removed from the warning list. 5.28 Children travelling with only their mothers must present proof of their father’s approval to leave the country. This can take the form of: in-person approval by the father, written approval from the father presented by a paternal uncle or grandfather, written approval from the father signed and stamped by the Notary Office, or written approval from the father stamped by an embassy or consulate. Conditions for Returnees 5.29 Returnees, both voluntary and involuntary, are processed at Egypt’s ports of entry like other returning citizens. In-country sources said some failed asylum seekers had been questioned by border officials upon their return to identify if they were members of banned Islamic militant groups. Suspected militants returning from conflict zones such as Libya are likely to be detained for further questioning.  5.30 Airport authorities do not report failed asylum seekers to the Ministry of the Interior or other security services beyond normal security screening processes. Egyptian embassies take note of political activities conducted by Egyptians abroad but in-country sources said only particularly high-profile cases gaining media attention in Egypt are likely to be questioned upon return. 5.31 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) runs a program in Egypt to assist voluntary returnees in cooperation with the country from which they are returning. Egyptian authorities cooperate with the IOM in these arrangements. Egypt’s diplomatic missions issue passports to citizens overseas, including those who have previously sought asylum abroad. 5.32 DFAT assesses people who return to Egypt, even after several years’ absence, do not face adverse attention by authorities on their return due to their absence. DFAT assesses failed asylum seekers do not face adverse attention from authorities because of their failed application for asylum when they return to Egypt.  DOCUMENTATION Birth, Death and Marriage Certificates 5.33 The Central Civil Registration Office (CCRO) holds information in relation to births, deaths and marriages. To register a birth, the informant must produce identification and bring an additional witness. Births are required to be registered within 15 days. Births may be registered by a hospital or local health unit.   5.34 Christians, Jews and Muslims can register marriages with documentation provided by a cleric. Marriage registration requires both parties and witnesses to present identification and to pay relevant fees. When granted, divorces may be registered by the courts. Both marriages and divorces must be registered within 15 days. Adherents of non-officially recognised religions often have difficulty having their marriages recognised and recorded, including adherents of Baha’i and Jehovah’s witnesses. In-country sources said Egyptians married overseas in civil ceremonies found it relatively easy to register them if they accorded with the Personal Status Law 1920/1929. Children born overseas from civil unions could also be registered. Some Egyptian Christians had obtained divorces in Lebanon through civil means, which were accepted and successfully registered in Egypt. 5.35 To register a death, the informant must show identification and the medical certificate. Deaths must be notified to authorities within 24 hours and registered within 15 days. Foetal and neonatal deaths are required to be registered within 24 hours of occurrence. Health authorities are able to register deaths. 39 National Identity Cards 5.36 Egyptians are eligible for national identity cards from 16 years of age. To issue the card, authorities require an original birth certificate and a declaration (in person) from either parent that the applicant is their child. The applicant must submit evidence of study, usually a recent certificate issued and endorsed by a school or university confirming enrolment and the applicant’s photo and identity. A digital photo of the applicant is taken at the time of application. An electronic record of the identity card and associated documentation is kept at the CCRO. This is verified against, and linked to, the applicant’s and parents’ birth records. 5.37 The address on the national identity card should be the holder’s residence. It is a requirement the address is updated when a person relocates but this requires the holder to actively make the change. There is no penalty for not updating one’s address. The applicant’s religion (Christianity, Judaism, Islam or a ‘dash’) is generally included on national identity cards because courts in Egypt apply religious laws in personal status matters and require the individual's religious affiliation to determine which jurisdiction applies. While the ‘dash’ on national identification cards allows members of non-recognised faiths to avoid falsely claiming membership in a different religion, some religious minorities state it imposes restrictions on their freedom of religion or belief (see Baha’i, Jehovah’s witnesses).  5.38 National identity cards are mandatory for adults in Egypt. Many key transactions are almost impossible to conclude without them, including renting or buying property or vehicles, applying for passports, opening bank accounts and entering employment. Failure to obtain a national identity card does not usually result in prosecution. Lost cards must be reported to the police. Replacement is straightforward.   Passports 5.39 To obtain a passport, Egyptians older than 15 years of age must provide a valid national identification card. Men must show proof of their ‘military status’. Women must submit a computerised Egyptian document issued by the Civil Status Sector of the Ministry of Interior to prove their marital status in the event of marriage or divorce. Unmarried women must submit a declaration of non-marriage. Those under 15 years old must also provide their original computerised birth certificate and original certificates of enrolment if they are students.   Prevalence of Fraud 5.40 Identity fraud in Egypt is uncommon and penalties are severe. Forgery of official documents constitutes ‘aggression against the State’s authority, a loss of trust in State issued documents, damage to the interests of individuals and an overall breach of security and stability in society’. Fraudulently obtained genuine documents are also uncommon due to cross checking by ministries. Cases of identity fraud referred to or discovered by authorities are investigated and prosecuted. 5.41 Instances reported of fraudulent passports being used by Egyptians overseas are rare. For example, an Egyptian man was detained in Malaysia in July 2025 after presenting a falsified Egyptian passport to renew his visa. 

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