14. Jänner 2026

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Situation von Schuldner·innen mit Schulden bei Privatpersonen

Rechtslage

Sondersituationen

Folgen der Nichtvollstreckung schuldenbezogener Gerichtsurteile in China

Schwarze Liste für säumige („unehrliche“) Schuldner·innen

Selbsterhaltungsmöglichkeit

Soziale Auswirkungen (Langzeitfolgen)

Quellen

Anhang

Kurzbeschreibungen zu den in dieser Anfragebeantwortung verwendeten Quellen sowie Ausschnitte mit Informationen aus diesen Quellen finden Sie im Anhang.

Bitte beachten Sie, dass die in dieser Anfragebeantwortung enthaltenen Übersetzungen aus dem Chinesischen mangels Sprachkenntnis unter Verwendung von technischen Übersetzungshilfen erstellt wurden. Es besteht daher ein erhöhtes Risiko, dass diese Arbeitsübersetzungen Ungenauigkeiten enthalten. 

Situation von Schuldner·innen mit Schulden bei Privatpersonen

Xie beschreibt in seiner Dissertation über die Einführung eines Insolvenzrechts für natürliche Personen in China für die University of Kent (UK) vom Jahr 2021, dass Gläubiger·innen sich dafür entscheiden könnten, säumige Schuldner·innen nicht sofort zu verklagen. Sie könnten die Schulden entweder selbst oder durch Dritte außergerichtlich eintreiben (Xie, 2021, S. 154). Die meisten Inkassobeauftragten in China seien bei Inkassobüros angestellt, einige würden selbstständig arbeiten und manche seien Anwält·innen. In den meisten Fällen würde zunächst ein Mahnschreiben an den/die Schuldner·in geschickt. Erfolge die Zahlung nicht innerhalb einer festgelegten Frist, würden weitere Schritte eingeleitet. Inkassobeauftrage würden säumige Schuldner·innen telefonisch kontaktieren, um sie zur Zahlung zu bewegen. Sie würden Schuldner·innen zu jeder Tageszeit anrufen und deren Arbeitgeber·innen, Verwandte und Nachbar·innen über die Probleme informieren. In extremen Fällen würden Inkassobeauftragte körperliche Gewalt anwenden (Xie, 2021, S. 156). Nähere Informationen zu den Praktiken von Inkassobeauftragten und deren Auswirkungen auf die soziale und psychische Situation von säumigen Schuldner·innen finden Sie im Unterkapitel Soziale Auswirkungen.

Neben außergerichtlichen Inkassomaßnahmen könnten Gläubiger·innen ihre Forderung auch gerichtlich eintreiben. Üblicherweise würden sie das Verfahren bei einem Amtsgericht am Wohnsitz oder gewöhnlichen Aufenthaltsort des/der Beklagten einleiten. Sobald das Gericht die Klage annehme, werde höchstwahrscheinlich zunächst eine einvernehmliche Streitbeilegung angestrebt. Mediation gelte als bevorzugtes Verfahren (Xie, 2021, S. 157). Wenn eine außergerichtliche Mediation scheitere, werde der Fall vor Gericht verhandelt. Wenn Schuldner·innen ihren Verpflichtungen nicht nachkommen würden, könnten Gläubiger·innen beim Gericht, bei dem sie Klage erhoben haben, die Zwangsvollstreckung beantragen (Xie, 2021, S. 158-159).

Laut Xie sei in China im Falle von Verschuldung von Privatpersonen der/die Gläubiger·in in einer vorteilhafteren Position als der/die Schuldner·in, sowohl außergerichtlich als auch vor Gericht. Es herrsche eine Duldung unlauterer Inkassopraktiken (weitere Informationen hierzu finden Sie im Unterkapitel Soziale Auswirkungen) und gerichtliche Vollstreckungsverfahren seien laut Xie auf Gewinnmaximierung ausgerichtet (Xie, 2021, S. 165-166).

Rechtslage

In China gebe es kein nationales System für Privatinsolvenz (Zhenxiang, 9. August 2023; Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 417; Zhuang, 8. Juli 2024, S. 30; Wang, 10. Juli 2025). Folglich würden laut Zhang und Ou von der juristischen Fakultät der Hunan Normal University die meisten Schuldenstreitigkeiten durch traditionelle Zivilprozesse beigelegt. Klauseln im Zivilrecht, im Zivilprozessrecht und andere regionale Sonderregelungen würden eine zentrale Rolle bei der Regelung von Privatschulden spielen. Das chinesische Zivilprozessrecht untermauere die grundlegende Struktur der bestehenden Schuldenregulierungsbestimmungen (Zhang & Ou, 2021, S. 6; siehe auch: Zhuang, 8. Juli 2024, S. 30).

Weitere Details zu den rechtlichen Möglichkeiten eines Klageverfahrens gegen Schuldner·innen sowie zum Vorgang der Zwangsvollstreckung finden Sie in Kapiteln 17 (Artikel 225ff), 19 (Artikel 235ff) und 21 (Artikel 252ff) der abgeänderten chinesische Zivilprozessordnung von 2023:

·      Zivilprozessordnung der Volksrepublik China (Änderung 2023) [Chinesisch], veröffentlicht von Global Law, 1. September 2023
https://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/claw/clawContent.shtml?id=98636

Ding Chunyan, Professorin an der juristischen Fakultät der City University von Hong Kong, erklärt in einem im August 2023 in Brookly Journal of International Law erschienen Artikel, dass Schuldner·innen ihre Schulden lebenslang behalten würden, bis sie beglichen seien. Gläubiger·innen seien berechtigt, ein Urteil jederzeit zu vollstrecken, sobald der/die Schuldner·in über Vermögen verfüge oder seine/ihre Leistungsfähigkeit wiederhergestellt sei. Ein Vollstreckungsverfahren gegen Privatschuldner·innen sei somit erst mit vollständiger Tilgung aller Schulden abgeschlossen (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 417).

Auch Xie schreibt in seiner Dissertation von 2021, dass ein Gericht unter bestimmten Umständen zwar ein Vollstreckungsverfahren beenden könne, zum Beispiel, wenn der/die Schuldner·in nicht in der Lage sei, seiner/ihrer Verpflichtung nachzukommen, Gläubiger·innen jedoch auch nach Beendigung des Zwangsvollstreckungsverfahrens außergerichtliche Rechtsbehelfe in Anspruch nehmen könnten. Darüber hinaus könnten vorläufig eingestellte Verfahren gegebenenfalls wieder aufgenommen. Würden Gläubiger·innen Anhaltspunkte dafür finden, dass der/die Schuldner·in Vermögen erlangt habe, könnten sie die Wiederaufnahme der Zwangsvollstreckung beantragen. Auch Gerichte könnten das Vollstreckungsverfahren von Amts wegen wieder aufnehmen (Xie, 2021, S. 159–160). Im Rahmen des Vollstreckungsverfahrens könnten Gläubiger·innen und Schuldner·innen einen Vergleich schließen. Erfülle der/die Schuldner·in die Vereinbarung vollständig, werde das Vollstreckungsverfahren eingestellt. Andernfalls könnten Gläubiger·innen die Fortsetzung des ausgesetzten Vollstreckungsverfahrens beantragen oder beim Vollstreckungsgericht Klage auf Erfüllung des Vergleichs erheben (Xie, 2021, S. 162–163).

Würden mehrere Gläubiger·innen einen Antrag auf Zwangsvollstreckung stellen, könne das Gericht einen Vermögensverteilungsplan erstellen, dem die Gläubiger·innen zustimmen könnten. Nach Begleichung der Vollstreckungskosten und vorrangigen Forderungen würden die ungesicherten Forderungen entsprechend ihrem Anteil an den Gesamtschulden beglichen (Xie, 2021, S. 163).

Sondersituationen

Die Finanzkommentatorin Grace Wang erklärt in einem Artikel vom Juli 2025, dass einige wenige Städte, wie zum Beispiel Shenzhen (Provinz Guangdong), ein Gesetz, das Privatinsolvenz ermöglicht, erprobt hätten, doch selbst dort sei nur ein geringer Anteil von Anträgen bewilligt worden (Wang, 10. Juli 2025; siehe auch: The Economist, 7. Juli 2025; Zhenxiang, 9. August 2023).

Die Bestimmungen der Sonderwirtschaftszone Shenzhen zu Privatinsolvenz vom August 2021 auf Englisch finden Sie unter folgendem Link des Justizbüros der Stadt Shenzhen:

·      Justice Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality: Regulations of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on Personal Bankruptcy, 28. August 2021
https://sf.sz.gov.cn/ztzl/yhyshj/yhyshjzcwjywyb/content/post_9483678.html

Auch in den Städten Taizhou und Wenzhou (Provinz Zhejiang) kämen regionale Regelungen, die einer Privatinsolvenz nahe kämen, zum Zuge. Weitere Informationen zu den Systemen in Taizhou und Wenzhou finden Sie im Anhang, im Artikel von Zhang und Ou (Zhang & Ou, 2021, S. 6, 8-9). Laut dem Anwalt Zhenxiang gebe es auch in den Provinzen Jiangsu und Shandong Pilotstädte mit Regelungen für eine „Quasi-Privatinsolvenz“ (Zhenxiang, 9. August 2023).

Zhang und Ou merken an, dass diese regionalen Regelungen nur im jeweiligen Zuständigkeitsbereich und für ihre jeweiligen Einwohner·innen gelten würden. Die Urteile könnten von anderen nationalen Gerichten angefochten werden und seien kaum international anerkannt (Zhang & Ou, 2021, S. 9). Auch sei soziale Stigmatisierung ein enormes Hindernis für die große Mehrheit der chinesischen Bevölkerung Insolvenz als Ausweg zu erwägen (Zhang & Ou, 2021, S. 12–13). Weitere Informationen zu den sozialen Auswirkungen der Unfähigkeit zur Rückzahlung von Schulden finden Sie unter Soziale Auswirkungen.

Folgen der Nichtvollstreckung schuldenbezogener Gerichtsurteile in China

Your Solution China Lawyer erklärt in einem Beitrag auf ihrer Webseite vom September 2025, dass bei Nichtvollstreckung eines Urteils das Gericht befugt sei, Vollstreckungsmaßnahmen gegen den/die Schuldner·in einzuleiten. Diese Maßnahmen würden das Einfrieren und Pfänden von Bankguthaben, Versteigerung von Vermögenswerten, sowie gerichtliche Anordnungen (auch an Dritte, wie Grundbuchämter oder Handelsregisterämter) bzw. Unterlassungsanordnungen beinhalten. Weiters gebe es die Möglichkeit, mit einer täglichen Geldstrafe belegt zu werden oder in die „Liste unehrlicher Personen“ aufgenommen zu werden (weitere Informationen zu dieser Liste finden Sie unter Schwarze Liste für säumige („unehrliche“) Schuldner·innen). Gemäß Artikel 114 des chinesischen Zivilprozessgesetzes könnten Gerichte Personen, die die Vollstreckung eines Gerichtsurteils behindern, auch kurzfristig in Untersuchungshaft nehmen – in der Regel für bis zu 15 Tage. Bei wiederholter oder vorsätzlicher Nichtbefolgung eines Gerichtsurteils könne dies gemäß Artikel 313 des chinesischen Strafgesetzbuches strafrechtlich verfolgt werden, was bis zu sieben Jahre Gefängnis und/oder eine Geldstrafe zur Folge haben könnte (Your Solution China Lawyers, 9. September 2025; siehe auch: Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 419).

Schwarze Liste für säumige („unehrliche“) Schuldner·innen

Your Solution China Lawyer erklärt im oben genannten Beitrag, dass Personen, die einem Gerichtsurteil nicht nachkommen würden, in die schwarze Liste des chinesischen Sozialkreditsystems – bekannt als „Liste unehrlicher Personen“ („失信被执行人名单“) – eingetragen werden könnten. Dies ziehe schwerwiegende soziale und rechtliche Einschränkungen mit sich, so wie die Einschränkung von Konsumaktivitäten (z.B. Kauf von Flugtickets erster Klasse oder Schlafwagentickets, Aufenthalt in Luxushotels oder Resorts, Anmeldung von Kindern an teuren Privatschulen) und Reisebeschränkungen durch die Untersagung der Nutzung von Hochgeschwindigkeitszügen, Flügen oder anderen Premium-Transportmitteln (Your Solution China Lawyers, 9. September 2025).

Auch Chunyan widmet sich in ihrem Artikel vom August 2023 der schwarzen Liste für säumige Schuldner·innen. Diese Praxis sei einzigartig in China. Laut Chunyan diene das landesweite System dieser schwarzen Liste einerseits der Verbesserung der Urteilsvollstreckung und gebe andererseits einen Einblick in Chinas Sozialkreditsystem, mit Hilfe dessen Zugang zu öffentlichen Dienstleistungen und Ressource bestimmt werde. Eine Person werde nur dann auf die schwarze Liste gesetzt, wenn sie sich trotz Zahlungsfähigkeit weigere ihre Schulden zu begleichen oder die im Gerichtsurteil festgelegten Verpflichtungen zu erfüllen (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 390-391). Im Falle einer Geldzahlungsverpflichtung gelte ein/e Schuldner·in als diskreditiert, sobald das Gericht feststelle, dass er/sie die finanzielle Leistungsfähigkeit zur Erfüllung besitze. Im Falle einer immateriellen Verpflichtung (z. B. Räumung, Entschuldigung, Umgang mit einem Kind, Beseitigung oder Unterlassung einer Störung) genüge die Feststellung der Nichterfüllung an sich, um die Verweigerung der Erfüllung durch den/die Schuldner·in zu begründen und ihn/sie auf die schwarze Liste zu setzen (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 396-397). Xie erklärt in seiner oben genannten Dissertation, dass nicht die Zahlungsunfähigkeit allein zu einer Aufnahme in die Liste führen sollte. Das Gericht entscheide jedoch nach eigenem Ermessen über die Ehrlichkeit säumiger Schuldner·innen. Würden Schuldner·innen als unehrlich eingestuft, komme ihr Name auf die Liste. Der Begriff der Unehrlichkeit sei sehr weit gefasst. In der Praxis würden laut Xie auch Schuldner·innen, die ihren Zahlungsverpflichtungen nicht nachkommen könnten, als unehrlich angesehen. Die unten beschriebenen hohen Konsumbeschränkungen würden folglich in der Praxis gegen alle säumigen Schuldner·innen verhängt, unabhängig von den Gründen warum sie ihren Zahlungen nicht nachkommen (Xie, 2021, S. 161-162).

Laut Chunyan könnten die Gerichte die Listen von säumigen Schuldner·innen über Zeitungen, Radio, Fernsehen, Internet, Gerichtsaushänge und andere Mittel veröffentlichen. Darüber hinaus würden die Gerichte die Informationen an die zuständigen Regierungsstellen, Finanzaufsichtsbehörden, Finanzinstitute, öffentliche Einrichtungen und Branchenverbände mit Verwaltungsaufgaben weiterleiten. Die zuständigen Stellen würden gemäß den Gesetzen und Verordnungen Sanktionen gegen säumige Schuldner·innen in Bezug auf öffentliche Auftragsvergabe, Ausschreibungen, behördliche Prüfungen und Genehmigungen, staatliche Förderungen, Finanzierungen, Marktzugang, Qualifikationszertifizierungen usw. verhängen. Würden Beamt·innen oder Politiker·innen auf die schwarze Liste gesetzt, würden die Gerichte dies den Arbeitgeber·innen bekannt geben (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 401-402). Auf den Seiten 409 bis 413 des Artikels listet Chunyan in einer Tabelle alle Beschränkungen und Sanktionen diskreditierter Schuldner·innen auf der schwarzen Liste auf. Es gebe unterschiedliche Sanktionen für Einzelpersonen sowie Unternehmen auf der Liste. Für Einzelpersonen habe die Listung (neben den oben bereits genannten) unter anderem folgende Folgen: Veröffentlichung ihrer Informationen online (unter anderem auf bekannten Nachrichtenseiten), strengere Kontrollen (vor allem von Unternehmen mit Personen in Führungspositionen auf der schwarzen Liste), Einschränkung der Ausreise aus China, Einschränkung des Kaufs von Immobilien und Grundstücken sowie Entzug beruflicher Qualifikationen für Rechtsvertreter·innen und Führungskräfte in öffentlichen Institutionen (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 409-413). Alle Sanktionen (inklusive für Unternehmen) finden Sie im Anhang. Der Name des/r Schuldner·in bleibe für zwei Jahre auf der schwarzen Liste. Dies könne jedoch um ein bis zu drei Jahre verlängert werden, wenn der/die Schuldner·in die Vollstreckung des Urteils zum Beispiel durch Gewaltanwendung oder Drohung behindert habe (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 399). Beispiele der Art des Verhaltens, das zu einer (verlängerten) Listung führen könne, finden Sie im Anhang und auf Seite 419 des Artikels (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 419). Laut Xie könnten die Beschränkungen aufgehoben werden, sobald der/die Schuldner·in seinen/ihren Verpflichtungen nachkomme oder der/die Vollstreckungsantragsteller·in die Aufhebung befürworte (Xie, 2021, S. 161-162).

Chunyan argumentiert in ihrem Artikel, dass das System der schwarzen Liste für säumige Schuldner·innen parallel zum Rechtssystem bestehe, da bei Nichterfüllung eines rechtskräftigen Urteils (wie oben erläutert) bereits administrative und strafrechtliche Konsequenzen folgen würden und es daher zu einer „Doppelbestrafung“ komme, die auf einem moralischen Urteil basiere und somit dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip widerspreche (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 393; siehe auch: Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 422-423).

Selbsterhaltungsmöglichkeit

Xie erklärt in seiner Dissertation, dass gemäß den Bestimmungen des Obersten Volksgerichts zu Beschlagnahme, Pfändung und Einfrieren von Vermögenswerten durch die Volksgerichte im Rahmen der zivilrechtlichen Vollstreckung seien bestimmte Vermögenswerte, die für das Leben des/der Schuldner·in und seiner/ihrer unterhaltsberechtigten Familienangehörigen notwendig seien, von Vollstreckungsmaßnahmen ausgenommen. Geldschulden könnten jedoch nach geltendem chinesischem Recht nicht erlassen werden. Schuldner·innen würden daher – wie bereits oben erklärt – ein Leben lang zur Rückzahlung verpflichtet bleiben (Xie, 2021, S. 166-167).

Das Kinderhilfswerk der Vereinten Nationen (UNICEF) veröffentlicht im August 2024 einen Bericht über Sozialhilfe in China. Laut dem Bericht würden drei Systeme zur Unterstützung des grundlegenden Lebensunterhalts (Dibao, Tekun und vorübergehende Unterstützung) den Kern des chinesischen Sozialhilfesystems bilden (UNICEF, August 2024, S. 1). Zusätztlich zu den drei genannten Unterstützungssystemen zählt der Bericht fünf weitere Angebote auf, die zum Sozialhilfesystem dazuzählten: Katastrophenhilfe, medizinische Unterstützung, Bildungsförderung, Wohnbeihilfe und Arbeitnehmer·innenunterstützung (UNICEF, August 2024, S. 13; siehe auch: Xie, 2021, S. 176-177). Nähere Informationen zu den einzelnen Systemen finden Sie im Anhang und auf Seite 13 des genannten Berichts. Laut UNICEF stehe das chinesische Sozialhilfesystem vor verschiedenen Herausforderungen, darunter die begrenzte Abdeckung gefährdeter Bevölkerungsgruppen (z.B. migrantische Kinder), unzureichende Sozialhilfestandards, mangelnde serviceorientierte Unterstützung zur Deckung der vielfältigen Bedürfnisse von Familien und unzureichende Mechanismen zur finanziellen Aufteilung von Sozialhilfeprogrammen (UNICEF, August 2024, S. 3). Die Sozialhilfeprogramme würden hauptsächlich aus Geldtransfers bestehen, die den vielfältigen Bedürfnissen der Empfänger·innen, vor allem denen der älteren Menschen, Menschen mit Behinderungen und Kindern aus gefährdeten Familien, nicht gerecht würden. Einige Familien würden aus diesem Grund auch nach der Aufnahme ins Sozialsystem nicht den Mindestlebensstandard erreichen (UNICEF, August 2024, S. 4).

Yang Song und Zerui Cheng von der Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Renmin-Universität von China erklären im Oktober 2024, dass das Dibao-Programm nach Veränderungen sowohl Geldtransfers wie auch Sonderleistungen im Bildungs- und Gesundheitsbereich beinhalte. Dibao sei ein einkommensabhängiges Sozialprogramm und chinesische Bürger·innen, die diese Leistung erhalten wollten, müssten einen Antrag stellen und ihr Haushaltseinkommen der lokalen Regierung melden. Liege das Pro-Kopf-Haushaltseinkommen unter dem lokalen Sozialstandard, der sogenannten Dibao-Subventionsgrenze, sei der Haushalt unter der Bedingung, dass er gleichzeitig weitere Voraussetzungen der Einkommensprüfung erfülle, wie beispielsweise unzureichendes Vermögen, für die Dibao-Leistung berechtigt (Song & Cheng, Oktober 2024; siehe auch: Xie, 2021, S. 176-177).

Xie erklärt in seiner Dissertation von 2021, dass das chinesische Sozialsystem aus zwei Arten von Programmen bestehe: beitragsfinanzierten Sozialversicherungen, wie das Rentensystem, Krankenversicherung und Arbeitslosenversicherung, und aus nicht beitragsfinanzierten Sozialhilfeprogrammen, wie dem Mindestlebensstandardsicherungssystem (Dibao) (Xie, 2021, S. 168-169). Eine kurze Zusammenfassung der einzelnen Versicherungsmöglichkeiten finden Sie im Anhang und auf Seiten 168-174 der Dissertation. Xie erklärt zu den nicht beitragsfinanzierten Sozialhilfeprogrammen, dass sowohl ländliche als auch städtische Bewohner·innen von den Programmen erfasst würden. Das Dibao-System spiele die wichtigste Rolle, da andere Programme hauptsächlich Dibao-Empfänger·innen zur Verfügung stehen würden. Der Autor merkt an, dass die Höhe der Unterstützung durch Dibao landesweit variiere (Xie, 2021, S. 176-178). Außerdem sei die finanzielle Unterstützung durch Dibao unzureichend und könne keinen durchschnittlichen Lebensstandard sichern (Xie, 2021, S. 181–182). Bezüglich der Wirkung anderer ergänzender Sozialhilfeprogramme fehle die Literatur (Xie, 2021, S. 182–183).

Der folgende Link enthält ein von der Internationalen Organisation für Migration (International Organisation for Migration, IOM) – einer weltweiten völkerrechtlichen Internationalen Organisation, die Hilfsprogramme für Migrant·innen durchführt – im März 2025 veröffentlichtes Verzeichnis von Dienstleistungen für schutzbedürftige Personen, die nach China zurückkehren:

·      IOM – International Organization for Migration: Directory of Services for Vulnerable Individuals Returning to China, März 2025
https://unitedkingdom.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1381/files/inline-files/china-service-directory-english-a4_0.pdf

Soziale Auswirkungen (Langzeitfolgen)

Zhang und Ou erklären 2021, dass Zahlungsunfähigkeit von Schuldner·innen in den Jahren zuvor zu einer erhöhten Anzahl von Selbstmorden und Straftaten geführt habe. Schuldner·innen seien laut den Autor·innen mit Diskriminierung bei der Jobsuche, der Kreditvergabe und in anderen Lebensbereichen konfrontiert (Zhang & Ou, 2021, S. 7–8).

Guo und Marshall veröffentlichen im Dezember 2025 die Ergebnisse ihrer Untersuchung der Auswirkungen der zunehmenden Überschuldung privater Haushalte in China, wofür sie ein beliebtes Online-Schuldenforum linguistisch analysierten. Eine der bedeutendsten Folgen der Überschuldung für viele Forumsmitglieder seien die Beziehung und die Interaktionen mit der chinesischen Inkassobranche. Beispiele von Forumsbeiträgen zeigen, dass Schuldner·innen die Praktiken der Schuldeneintreiber·innen als „brutal/gewalttätig/extrem unter Druck setzend“ (violent pressurised) empfinden würden. Die Inkassobevollmächtigten würden im Forum als „hetzende/jagende Hunde“ (chasing dogs) beschrieben. Laut den Autor·innen werde die Bezeichnung „Hund“ in China verwendet, um moralische Verkommenheit zu implizieren. Ein Grund für diese starken negativen Gefühle sei laut den Autor·innen die Inkassopraxis des „Kontaktbombardement“ (contact bombing). Dies sei eines der am häufigsten diskutierten Themen im Forum und beziehe sich auf die Situation, in der Kreditnehmer·innen in China oft verpflichtet seien, Kreditgeber·innen Zugriff auf ihre Telefon- und WeChat-Kontakte (WeChat sei die beliebteste Social-Media-App des Landes) zu gewähren. Wenn sie dann in Zahlungsverzug geraten, würden diese Informationen an ein Inkassobüro weitergegeben, das nicht nur die Schuldner·innen wiederholt anrufe und Nachrichten schicke, sondern auch deren Kontakte, typischerweise mehrmals täglich, um sie unter Druck zu setzen, ihre Bekannten zur Rückzahlung zu bewegen. Laut Forumsmitgliedern würden die Schuldeneintreiber·innen auch Hausbesuche durchführen und jede Kontaktaufnahme sei durch Drohungen und Einschüchterungen gekennzeichnet (Guo & Marshall, Dezember 2025, S. 5). Viele Mitglieder seien der Meinung, dass die Androhung von Strafverfolgung eine Einschüchterungstaktik von Inkassounternehmen sei. Mit Hinblick auf die Beziehungen zu Familie, Freund·innen und Kolleg·innen seien viele Forumsmitglieder besorgt über die Auswirkungen von Überschuldung auf ihr sozialen Beziehungen. Viele hätten Angst vor dem „sozialen Tod“ (schesi) und dass der Schaden, der ihren sozialen Netzwerken (vor allem durch Kontaktbombardement) zugefügt werde, zu ihrer vollständen Isolation führen werde (Guo & Marshall, Dezember 2025, S. 6). Im Forum werde Mitgliedern dazu geraten sich über die Praktiken zu beschweren. Mitglieder, die dies getan hätten, würden es häufig als wirkungslos beschreiben (Guo & Marshall, Dezember 2025, S. 6-7). Die Autor·innen des Artikels kommen zu dem Schluss, dass das Vorgehen von Inkassounternehmen gegen Schuldner·innen als eine Form systematischer Gewalt wahrgenommen werde und das genannte Kontaktbombardement besonders besorgniserregend sei (Guo & Marshall, Dezember 2025, S. 7). The Economist berichtet von einem Fall, in dem das Kontaktbombardement bei einer Schuldnerin zu Depression und suizidalen Gedanken geführt habe. Die Inkassobeauftragen hätten ihre Freund·innen und Verwandte von unterschiedlichen Telefonen angerufen, um nicht geblockt werden zu können. Speziell die Belästigung ihrer Eltern sei für die Schuldnerin ärgerlich gewesen. Ihr Ehemann habe in weiterer Folge die Scheidung eingereicht. Von der Regierung sei sie auf die schwarze Liste für säumige Schuldner·innen gesetzt worden (The Economist, 7. Juli 2025).

Wang beschreibt im oben genannten Artikel vom Juli 2025, dass in der chinesischen Kultur finanzielles Scheitern stark stigmatisiert werde. Die Regierung könne nur begrenzt Unterstützung leisten. Regeln zur Schuldeneintreibung seien neu und würden oft nur unzureichend durchgesetzt. Die Regierung habe Inkassounternehmen verboten, Drohungen auszusprechen, beleidigende Sprache zu verwenden oder nachts anzurufen und Kreditgeber·innen an die Pflicht erinnert, personenbezogene Daten zu schützen. Die Durchsetzung dieser Maßnahmen sei jedoch mangelhaft. Es gebe Online-Selbsthilfegruppen für Verschuldete, wie die Plattform Douban (Schuldnerallianz), wo Mitglieder über ihre Erfahrungen unter anderem mit dem „sozialen Tod“ teilen würden (Wang, 10. Juli 2025; siehe auch: The Economist, 7. Juli 2025).

Xie schreibt 2021, dass einige Online-Kreditgeber·innen von Kreditnehmerinnen Selfies, auf denen ihre Ausweise zu sehen seien, verlangen würden. Kommen sie ihren Zahlungsverpflichtungen nicht nach, würden diese Fotos an Freund·innn, Verwandte und sogar Kolleg·innen weitergeleitet. Gelegentlich hätten die öffentlich-rechtlichen Medien über Selbstmorde von Schuldner·innen aufgrund von Zahlungsunfähigkeit berichtet (Xie, 2021, S. 135–136). Gravierende Folgen habe auch die Eintragung in die oben genannte schwarze Liste. Personen auf der Liste könnten Schwierigkeiten bei der Jobsuche haben. In einem Fall sei ein Angestellter entlassen worden, weil es ihm aufgrund der Liste nicht erlaubt gewesen sei, sich ein Flugticket für eine Geschäftsreise zu kaufen. Weiters könnten Kinder, deren Elternteile auf der Liste stehen, keine Privatschule besuchen. Berichten zufolge habe sich ein Student nicht an einer Universität einschreiben können, weil ein Elternteil auf der Liste geführt worden sei (Xie, 2021, S. 167–168).

Zhuang von der rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Qingdao University of Science and Technology in Qingdao argumentiert in einem Artikel vom Juli 2024, dass die zivilrechtliche Vollstreckung nicht zwischen den Gründen für Zahlungsunfähigkeit unterscheide und unschuldige Schuldner·innen (die über kein vollstreckbares Vermögen verfügen würden) aus diesem Grund stigmatisiert und in ihrer Würde verletzt würden (Zhuang, 8. Juli 2024, S. 30).

Liu und Zhang veröffentlichen 2024 im Journal Front Public Health die Ergebnisse ihrer Studie zu Verschuldung und psychischer Gesundheit in China, die auf einer Stichprobe von über 40.000 Erwachsenen basierte. Laut den Autor·innen habe Haushaltsverschuldung eine negative Auswirkung auf die psychische Gesundheit chinesischer Erwachsener. Gründe dafür seien unter anderem die den Schulden folgende eingeschränkte Kaufkraft hochwertiger Güter und Dienstleistungen, die der psychischen Gesundheit zuträglich seien, sowie die soziale Diskriminierung in Folge der starken Kritik von Verschuldung in der chinesischen Denkweise und dem daraus folgenden Schamgefühl der Schuldner·innen. Einkommen wirke dabei als Stresspuffer und Verschuldete aus Haushalten mit hohem Einkommen würden weniger häufig psychischer Erkrankungen aufweisen als Verschuldete aus Haushalten mit niedrigem oder mittlerem Einkommen. Weiters zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass monetäre Unterstützung durch Verwandte eine moderierende Rolle spiele. Im Gegensatz dazu habe emotionale Unterstützung keinen puffernden Effekt auf den Zusammenhang zwischen Verschuldung und psychischen Erkrankungen in China (Liu & Zhang, 2024, S. 8-9).

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 14. Jänner 2026)

·      Chunyan, Ding: “Moral Conviction” plus “Joint Sanctions”: The Judgment-defaulter Blacklist System in China, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 48/2, 30. August 2023
https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2005&context=bjil

·      Economist (The): Why so many Chinese are drowning in debt, 7. Juli 2025 (Login erforderlich)
https://www.economist.com/china/2025/07/07/why-so-many-chinese-are-drowning-in-debt

·      Guo, Jiaqi Feng & Marshall, John: Examining the impact of growing household over-indebtedness in China: A corpus linguistics analysis of a popular online debt support forum, Applied Corpus Linguistics, 5/3, Dezember 2025
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666799125000243#sec0007

·      IOM – International Organization for Migration: Directory of Services for Vulnerable Individuals Returning to China, März 2025
https://unitedkingdom.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1381/files/inline-files/china-service-directory-english-a4_0.pdf

·      Justice Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality: Regulations of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on Personal Bankruptcy, 28. August 2021
https://sf.sz.gov.cn/ztzl/yhyshj/yhyshjzcwjywyb/content/post_9483678.html

·      Liu, Jiankun & Zhang, Yueyun: Indebtedness and mental health in China: the moderating roles of income and social support, Front Public Health, 2024
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10794583/

·      Song, Yang & Cheng, Zerui: The impact of welfare design on consumption patterns of the poor: Evidence from the recent Dibao reform in rural China, China Economic Review, 87, Oktober 2024
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1043951X2400124X

·      UNICEF - UN Children's Fund: Social Assistance in China, Budget Brief, August 2024
https://www.unicef.org/china/en/media/28346/file/Budget%20Brief%20-%20Social%20Assistance.pdf

·      Wang, Grace: Why So Many Chinese Are Struggling With Debt, veröffentlicht von Medium, 10. Juli 2025
https://medium.com/@grace.wang_8955/why-so-many-chinese-are-struggling-with-debt-32ababe9d3c9

·      Xie, Pingyao: The Introduction of Personal Bankruptcy Law in China: A Comparative Analysis. Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) thesis, University of Kent, 2021
https://kar.kent.ac.uk/90060/1/3THE_INTRODUCTION_OF_PERSONAL_BANKRUPTCY_LAW_IN_CHINA_A_COMPARATIVE_ANALYSIS.pdf

·      Your Solution China Lawyers: Consequences of Failing to Execute A Court Judgment in China, 9. September 2025
https://yschinalawyers.com/execute-a-court-judgment-in-china/

·      Zhang, Xiaoxiao & Ou, Fuyong: Economic and legal necessity of personal bankruptcy legislation in China, Int Insolv Rev, 2021
https://insolvencylawacademy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Economic-and-legal-necessity-of-personal-bankruptcy-in-China.pdf

·      Zhenxiang, Wang: Current practices, complications of quasi-personal bankruptcy, China Business Law Journal, 9. August 2023
https://law.asia/quasi-personal-bankruptcy-current-practices/

·      Zhuang, Liu: China’s Path to the Constructions of Personal Bankruptcy System, International Law Research, 13/1, 8. Juli 2024
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/384242755_China's_Path_to_the_Construction_of_Personal_Bankruptcy_System/fulltext/66f05e7a750edb3bea6c0595/Chinas-Path-to-the-Construction-of-Personal-Bankruptcy-System.pdf?_tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InB1YmxpY2F0aW9uIiwicGFnZSI6InB1YmxpY2F0aW9u·in19

·      Zivilprozessordnung der Volksrepublik China (Änderung 2023) [Chinesisch], veröffentlicht von Global Law, Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China, 1. September 2023
https://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/claw/clawContent.shtml?id=98636

 

Anhang: Quellenbeschreibungen und Informationen aus ausgewählten Quellen

Ding Chunyan ist Professorin an der juristischen Fakultät der City University von Hong Kong.

·      Chunyan, Ding: “Moral Conviction” plus “Joint Sanctions”: The Judgment-defaulter Blacklist System in China, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 48/2, 30. August 2023
https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2005&context=bjil

„The practice of blacklisting judgment defaulters is unique to China. When a judgment debtor fails to satisfy an effective judgment or ruling of a court, that party will first be prohibited by the court from having high or non-necessary consumptions. If the court finds that the judgment debtor refuses to pay the judgment debt or perform the obligations determined in the judgment despite having the performance capability, that party will then be blacklisted as a ‘discredited judgment defaulter’ and be subject to a range of restrictions and sanctions as a consequence. The nationwide judgment-defaulter blacklist system not only represents a Chinese-characteristic solution to improving judgment enforcement but also serves as a window to China’s ‘social credit system’ which consists of three core parts: (1) a ‘financial creditworthiness’ system; (2) a data-driven social credit scoring system primarily applied to private parties to determine different treatments in terms of access to public services and public resources according to the parties’ social credit score (that is, ratings & differentiations); and (3) a general system of blacklisting ‘discredited parties’ followed by a range of liabilities (which is modeled on the judgment-defaulter blacklist system).“ (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 390-391)

„This article makes three major arguments. First, the nature and logic of the current judgment-defaulter blacklist system feature a strategic combination of ‘moral conviction’ and ‘joint sanctions’. This system runs parallel to the legal system that has provided administrative and criminal liabilities for refusing to satisfy an effective judgment. The legal system has unfortunately failed to reinforce court judgments and enhance judicial authority and credibility. Hence, the judgment-defaulter blacklist system is intended to pragmatically remedy the failure of the judiciary to perform its duty of judgment enforcement and the ineffectiveness of the existing legal approaches to enhancing judgment enforcement. Inevitably concerns have arisen about ‘double punishment’ and the diluted role of the legal system because of the judgment-defaulter blacklist system based on moral judgment by the state. Second, although the joint sanction mechanism has played a role in increasing judgment enforcement in terms of case numbers and amount of judgment debts, it has violated a number of fundamental legal principles, thus casting doubt on the legality, reasonableness, and due process of the joint sanctions imposed on discredited judgment defaulters. The underlying rationale for joint sanctions derives from ancient China’s Legalism theory of ‘A chaotic society calls for heavy penalties’ in the name of promoting moral virtue in individuals and organizations for the pragmatic purpose of improving law enforcement and governance. Nevertheless, this article suggests that the joint sanction mechanism against discredited judgment defaulters should be abolished as it contradicts the rule of law.“ (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 393)

„Regarding the first circumstance set out in Article 1 of the Provisions on Discredited Judgment Defaulters, a judgment defaulter is labeled ‘dishonest’ because the party has refused to perform the obligations determined in the judgment despite the performance capability, that is, refusing to satisfy a judgment ‘by intention.’ In this circumstance, before blacklisting a judgment defaulter, the court must determine whether the judgment debtor has performance capacity and whether the debtor has deliberately refused to perform the obligations concerned. The obligations determined in an effective judgment may involve pecuniary payment and/or a non-pecuniary obligation (such as vacating premises, apology, visitation of a child, eliminating orabating nuisance). In the case of the obligation of pecuniary payment, a judgment defaulter will be seen as discredited after the court ascertains that the party has the financial capacity to perform it. In the case of non-pecuniary obligation, the finding of a failure of performance per se is sufficient to establish the judgment debtor’s refusal to perform it.“ (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 396-397)

„In terms of the length of the blacklist term, according to Article 2 of the Provisions on Discredited Judgment Defaulters, the blacklist term for circumstances (2) to (6) (i.e., refusing to satisfy a judgment by constructive intent) lasts two years; however, when a judgment debtor obstructs or resists judgment enforcement by committing violence, issuing threats or through any other means, or has more than one discredited behavior, the blacklist term may be extended by one to three years.“ (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 399)

„The courts may, according to the actual circumstances of localities, issue lists of discredited judgment defaulters through ‘newspapers, radio, television, Internet, bulletin boards of courts, and other means.’ The courts may publicize on a regular basis to the public the information on the implementation of the system of blacklisting discredited judgment defaulters by the courts and other courts within their respective jurisdictions by press conference or any other means.

Moreover, the courts should circulate the information to the relevant government departments, financial regulatory authorities, financial institutions, public institutions, and industry associations undertaking administrative functions, among others; and relevant entities should, in accordance with laws, regulations and relevant provisions, impose credit-related punishments on discredited judgment defaulters regarding ‘government procurement, tendering and bidding, administrative examination and approval, government support, financing credit, market access, qualification accreditation, and so on.’ The court should also circulate a notice of the information about discredited judgment defaulters to credit investigation institutions; and credit investigation institutions should record the information in their credit investigation systems. When public officers, deputies to people’s congresses, or members of the Chinese people’s political consultative conference are blacklisted as discredited judgment defaulters, the courts should circulate a notice to the entities where they work or the relevant department.“ (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 401-402)

„ Table 1: Categories of Joint Sanctions Imposed on Discredited Judgment Defaulters under the Memorandum on the Cooperation in Taking Joint Sanctions against Discredited Judgment Defaulters

Defaulters	Category of sanctions	Specific measures
Individual/ corporate discredited judgment defaulters	Reputational sanction	Publish the information on discredited judgment defaulters to the public through the website ‘Credit China’ and the enterprise credit information publication system as well as major news websites
	Closer monitoring and supervision	Becoming the key supervision target and strengthening routine supervision and inspection of discredited judgment defaulters and those enterprises with blacklisted legal representatives, actual controllers, directors, supervisors, and senior executives
	Restrictions on their lawyers & law firms	Restricting the lawyers or firms from participating in the selection of the advanced lawyers or firms within a certain period of time
Individual discredited judgment defaulters	Personal restrictions	Restricting exit from China. Restricting high and non-necessary consumption. Restricting purchasing houses, lands, or other real estate*Restricting their children from attending high-tuition privacy schools*
	Deprivation of Occupational qualifications	Being civil servants or staff of public institutions. Being legal representatives of public institutions. Being legal representatives, directors, supervisors, or senior executives of state-owned enterprises. Being the main responsible persons, directors, supervisors, and senior executives of business entities. Being directors, supervisors, and senior executives of financing guarantee companies or financial institutions
Corporate discredited judgment defaulters	Business restrictions	Establishing financing guarantee companies and insurance companies. Issuing enterprise bonds and corporate bonds. Acquiring listed companies (for serious discredited judgment defaulters) Suspending the equity incentive plans of blacklisted domestic state-controlled listed companies or terminating the equity incentive participants’ qualification to exercise their rights. Using state-owned forest land, applying for key forestry construction projects, getting approval for the land occupation by state-owned grasslands, or applying for key grassland protection and construction projects. Engaging in the production, operation, and storage of hazardous chemicals, production and operation of fireworks and crackers, mine production, or safety assessment and other industries. Participating in government procurement activities as suppliers. Engaging in the transactions of the assets of state-owned enterprises, national assets, and other state-owned property rights
Corporate discredited judgment defaulters	Disqualifications for preferential treatments	Being enterprises certified by the Customs administration. Getting the support of subsidized funds and social security funds. Participating in the election of civilized entities and moral models (including those with blacklisted leaders)
	Applying stricter approval and supervision criteria	Strictly reviewing the issuance of bonds on the interbank market. Strictly supervising imported and exported goods. Strictly approving engagement in the pharmaceutical, food, and other industries. Implementing strict supervision and strengthening documents examination and inspection under surveillance by the Customs administration
Corporate discredited judgment defaulters	Restrictions on the legal representatives, main responsible persons, directly responsible persons affecting the repayment of debts, and actual controllers	Restricting their high and non-necessary consumption. Restricting them from paying high insurance premiums to purchase insurance products with monetary value*Restricting them from purchasing houses, land, or other real estate*Restricting their children from attending high-tuition private schools*

*Seen as one example of consumption restrictions.“ (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 409-413)

„Third, China does not have a personal bankruptcy law for natural persons. A natural person cannot apply to the court for liquidation when he fails to clear his or her debts as due and if his or her assets are insufficient to pay off all the debts or is incapable of paying off the debts. In other words, a judgment debtor owes his or her debts for a lifetime unless he or she clears them. The judgment creditor is entitled to enforce judgment at any time when the judgment debtor has assets or restores his performance ability. This explains why a case of judgment enforcement against an individual debtor cannot be closed before the debt is paid off.“ (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 417)

„Both the Civil Procedure Law and the Criminal Law have provided legal approaches to the judgment debtor’s refusal to satisfy an effective judgment or ruling. Article 114 of the Civil Procedure Law authorizes the court to impose a fine or detention on the litigation participant or any person, or the person in charge or directly liable persons of a legal entity according to the severity of the listed circumstances and, if suspected of a crime, subject them to criminal liability. Among the listed circumstances under Article 114, the following are related to those where a judgment debtor may be blacklisted as a ‘discredited judgment defaulter’ according to Article 1 of the Provisions on Discredited Judgment Defaulters. They include (1) concealing, transferring, selling, or destroying any seized or impounded property or any inventoried property under the custody of the litigation participant or person as ordered, or transferring any frozen property; (2) insulting, defaming, falsely incriminating, assaulting, or retaliating against any judicial personnel, litigant, witness, interpreter, expert for forensic authentication, surveyor or person assisting in enforcement; (3) obstructing judicial personnel from performing their duties by violence, threat, or any other means; and (4) refusing to satisfy any effective judgment or ruling of a court. Moreover, Article 313 of the Criminal Law sets out ‘the crime of refusing to satisfy a judgment or ruling’ for which the convicted may be sentenced to no more than three years of fixed-term imprisonment, criminal detention, or fined if the circumstances are serious.“ (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 419)

„In practice, instead of imposing administrative or criminal liabilities on judgment defaulters according to the law, the courts, through the enforcement division, exercise a moral judgment and then assign a ‘discredited judgment defaulter’ label to them when they have committed one of the discredited behaviors set out in Article 1 of the Provisions on Discredited Judgment Defaulters. Therefore, blacklisting judgment defaulters is, in nature, a ‘moral conviction’ by the court when they fail to satisfy a judgment by intention or by constructive intent. The equivalent daily-life expression in Chinese indicating negative moral judgment is ‘Laolai’, which refers to a dishonest person who refuses to pay his debt. The moral conviction of judgment defaulters will be announced and publicized by the courts to the public and various public agents and professional associations. Moreover, such a moral conviction leads to a ‘moral sentence,’ which is not necessarily limited to a moral reprimand. Once being determined as a discredited judgment defaulter with a moral stain, the judgment debtor must take the consequences—a wide range of joint sanctions tailor-made for discredited judgment defaulters, as shown in Table 1 above.“ (Chunyan, 30. August 2023, S. 422-423)

The Economist ist ein internationales, wöchentlich erscheinendes Magazin.

·      Economist (The): Why so many Chinese are drowning in debt, 7. Juli 2025 (Login erforderlich)
https://www.economist.com/china/2025/07/07/why-so-many-chinese-are-drowning-in-debt

„Dealing with personal debt remains shameful and unfamiliar in China. But the government is struggling to help. […]

Dealing with the banks was the easy bit, however. During the pandemic the government urged them to be gentle with debtors whose businesses had been affected by it; they agreed to waive tens of thousands of yuan in interest. The tough part was dealing with the pressure dogs hired by online lenders from whom she had borrowed money for personal use. They repeatedly called Ms Bai, her friends and her relatives, often from different phones so they could not be blocked. She is particularly angry about the harassment of her parents. ‘In China’, she says, ‘we generally don’t tell our parents about bad news, so they were very, very affected.’ Ms Bai became depressed and thought of suicide. Her husband divorced her.

Regulations relating to the debt-collecting industry are new and patchily enforced in China. Rather than helping Ms Bai, a court put her on a ‘social credit’ blacklist, which meant she could no longer fly, use high-speed trains or stay at luxury hotels. So where can debtors find relief? Support groups for them have been growing online. Jiaqi Guo of the University of Turku in Finland has been studying one of them, called the Debtors Alliance, on Douban, a social-networking site. Founded in 2019, it now has more than 60,000 members. Dr Guo says users often discuss shesi, meaning ‘social death’. It refers to the destruction of relationships caused by ‘contact bombing’, as the debt collectors’ phone calls are described.

The government has tried to show a modicum of sympathy. Last year it banned debt-collection agencies from threatening violence, using abusive language or calling people at anti-social times. It also reminded lenders to protect personal information (presumably meaning stopping misusing contact details). But data-privacy regulations are loosely enforced in China. Complaints on the debtors’ forum suggest little change in the collectors’ threatening and intrusive behaviour.

One reform that might help is a personal-bankruptcy law, of the kind found in rich countries, to protect debtors from claims that would leave them destitute. The lack of such legislation has fuelled the growth of online loan-sharks offering high-interest credit to desperate defaulters. In 2021 Shenzhen became the first city to introduce a bankruptcy law for individuals. But it has been used with caution. By the end of September 2024 more than 2,700 people had applied for bankruptcy protection under this law, but courts had accepted only about 10% of their cases. A few other places have been dabbling in similar schemes. But the government appears in no hurry: creditors are often big state firms. Officials worry that a national law might signal tolerance of reckless spending or speculative investment.“ (The Economist, 7. Juli 2025)

Feng Jiaqi Guo arbeitet für das chinesische Institut (Fakultät für Sprachen und Übersetzungswissenschaften) der Universität Turku (Finnland).

John Marshall ist ein unabhängiger Forscher.

·      Gua, Jiaqi Feng & Marshall, John: Examining the impact of growing household over-indebtedness in China: A corpus linguistics analysis of a popular online debt support forum, Applied Corpus Linguistics, 5/3, Dezember 2025
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666799125000243#sec0007

„Results

4.1 Debt collection […]

Its strongest collocate is 暴力 baolì ` ‘violent’ and this habitual combination, alongside their prominence in forum discussions, reveals that one of the most significant implications of over-indebtedness for many forum members is the relationship and interactions it has fostered with China’s debt collection industry. This is typified in the following concordance excerpts:

1: I’ve recently become overdue and I’ve been experiencing violent pressurised debt collection ever since. I’m on the edge of a complete meltdown.

2: I feel like I am being destroyed by this violent pressurised debt collection. I owe money not my life.

3: I have been suffering violent pressurised debt collection for several months now. There’s been several times where I thought I can’t go on.

Another keyword from this category, 催狗 cu¯ıgǒu, underscores how many forum members’ conceive the nature of this new relationship. Also a compound word, it comprises the verb 催 ‘to urge/chase’ with the noun 狗 ‘dog’, and is the terminology employed on the forum to describe debt collectors. Conceptualising them as ‘chasing dogs’ has a strongly negative resonance as derogatory terms featuring the modifier ‘dog’ have long been used in China to imply moral degeneracy. For example, in the Mao-era those accused of betraying China were labelled 走狗 zǒugǒu ‘running dogs’. Given this, it is unsurprising ‘chasing dogs’ has several collocates connected to unpleasant actions/emotions such as 骚 扰 saor ¯ ǎo ‘to harass’ (which is also a keyword) and 疯 f¯eng ‘insane’. The strength of feeling that exists among forum members is exemplified in the following concordances:

4: These chasing dogs all have black hearts. They are just thugs who drive people into their graves.

5: The chasing dogs are all shameless scum.

The reasons for these powerful feelings are also revealed by the keywords in this category. Specifically, 通讯录 tongxùnlù ¯ ‘contact list/ contacts’ and its strongest collocate 爆 bao ` ‘explode’ (also a keyword) describe a debt collection practice that we translate as ‘contact bombing’. This is one of the most commonly discussed topics on the forum and it refers to the situation whereby when borrowers take out loans in China, they are often required to provide lenders access to their phone and WeChat (the country’s most popular social media app) contacts. Then, if they become overdue, this information is provided to a collection agency who not only repeatedly calls and messages the debtor, but also their contacts, typically multiple times a day, to urge them to pressurise their acquaintance to repay. Forum members report that alongside phoning them (打给 dǎgˇei) and sending text messages (短 信 duǎnxìn), debt collectors also conduct doorstep visits (上门shangm ` ´en), with all these forms of contact characterised by threats and intimidation (威胁恐吓 w¯eixi´ekǒngh`e):

6: My contacts have been bombed. My father receives more than ten calls each day, and all of my friends are getting text messages.

7: I’ve had arrears of 65,000 for >4 months. I’ve been hounded with text messages and doorstep visits.

8: After being overdue for a week, I was called tens of times every day…the threatening text messages were endless. They also bombed my contacts, calling my friends and relatives tens of times a day. It’s all threats and intimidation.“ (Guo & Marshall, Dezember 2025, S. 5)

„4.2. Judicial system enforcement

Alongside debt collection by third-party companies, the category of keywords relating to the judicial system show that the prospect of being formally prosecuted is also frequently discussed. Keywords in this category include 传票 chaunpi ´ ao ` ‘court summons’, 律师函 lǜsh¯ıhan ´ ‘legal letter’ and 坐牢 zuol ` ao ´ ‘be put in prison’. However, it is relevant to note that 吓唬 xiahu ` (itself a keyword) collocates with many of these keywords. While 吓唬means ‘to scare’, colloquially it implies bluffing, i.e., an intimidating threat which will not be implemented. Indeed, our concordance analysis shows a frequent response to concerns about prosecution is to state that it is simply a scare tactic used by debt collectors:

10: A legal letter is just a load of crap. They also produce fake court summons just to scare people.

4.3. Relationships with family, friends and colleagues

Given the practice of contact bombing, it is unsurprising that many forum members express high levels of anxiety about the impact of over-indebtedness on their social ties. Specifically, the keywords 爸妈 bam` a ¯ ‘parents’ and 家里人 jial ¯ ǐr´en ‘family members’ reflect key spheres of concern. These words have numerous negative collocates such as 连累 lianl ´ ˇei ‘to implicate’ and 骚扰 saor ¯ ǎo ‘harass’. A particular worry is revealed by the strong collocation between ‘parents’ and 身体 sh¯entǐ which literally means ‘body’, but actually refers to ‘health’. Specifically, many forum members are afraid the distress caused by debt collection will irrevocably damage their parent’s mental and physical well-being:

11: My parents are nearly at breaking point, and I’m really worried about their health. The bank interest and penalties are terrifyingly high, and they can’t handle any more stress…They said they can’t sleep because of the constant collection calls. I feel so guilty.

Another noteworthy collocate of both ‘parents’ and ‘family members’ is 帮 bang ¯ ‘help’, with many forum members recommending that turning to one’s parents for assistance is an advisable means of escaping indebtedness. The keyword 坦白 tǎnbai ´ ‘to confess’ also collocates with both ‘parents’ and ‘family members’, with this act of openness and contrition often reported as necessary in securing such support:

12: I confessed today and my parents have said they will help me repay.

13: You should confess to your parents. Only they will help you unconditionally.

Alongside their families, forum members also discuss worries relating to their wider social networks. This is revealed by some of the words that collocate with ‘contact list’ including 单位 danw ¯ `ei ‘workplace’ and 好友 haoy ˘ ǒu ‘friends’:

14: My contact list contains all of the leaders at my workplace. I am so worried I can’t sleep.

15: The collection company has my contact list and warned me that if I don’t repay by 1pm tomorrow, they will message all my friends, sending them the video of when I took out the loan. They told me that if I don’t want to be known as a deadbeat defaulter, I need to pay off all my debt immediately.

In terms of the perceived cumulative effect of the collection practices, forum members frequently conceptualise this via the keyword 社死 sh`esǐ ‘social death’. This reflects deep anxiety that the damage which is being caused to their social networks will result in their complete isolation:

16: My family and some of my friends know about my debt, but I’m afraid it’ll spread to my colleagues as well. That’ll be true social death.

17: I’m numb from the crazy collection dogs constantly calling my family and colleagues. I’m dealing with absolute social death…I see no hope in life. With the New Year approaching, I’m supposed to see my parents and relatives, but I just can’t face it. Even thinking about it makes my chest feel tight. I’ve self-harmed many times and have severe depression. At my worst, I’ve thought about how to end my life.“ (Guo & Marshall, Dezember 2025, S. 6)

„4.5. Relationships with regulatory agencies

In terms of who members recommend complaining to, this is revealed by the collocates of ‘make a complaint’. In particular, 银监会 yínjianhuì ¯ ‘Banking Regulatory Commission’, 保监 bǎojian ¯ ‘Insurance Regulatory Commission’ and 信访 xìnfǎng ‘Petitions Bureau’ are three of the strongest collocates of ‘make a complaint’. All are also keywords. The first two are the main financial regulatory agencies, while the Petitions Bureau is the formal channel that exists in China for citizens to bring grievances to the attention of the government. These keywords highlight that another highly significant aspect of over-indebtedness concerns the interactions it fosters with such bodies. However, while it is common to recommend complaining, doing so is frequently reported as ineffective. Specifically, this is shown by the collocation between agencies such as the Petitions Bureau and the Banking Regulatory Commission and ‘没用’ m´eiyong ` ‘useless’ (itself a keyword). The frustration often expressed is captured in the following excerpts:

20: I’m so annoyed! I’ve already complained to the Banking Regulatory Commission twice, and I’ve filed two petitions, but its useless, nothing’s worked.

21: Last week, I experienced violent pressurised debt collection from Huabei. I filed a complaint through the national petition system… The very next day, someone from the petition bureau came to my village. They said they’d follow up, but nothing has come of it. Just a couple of days ago, the collector called again. So, even filing complaints with the national petition system is useless.“ (Guo & Marshall, Dezember 2025, S. 6-7)

„5. Discussion

We set out to examine what issues over-indebted individuals in China choose to discuss online and what their linguistic choices suggest about how they conceive the impact. As our results demonstrate, forum members are deeply troubled by the actions of debt collectors, which they frame as a form of systematic violence. Of particular concern is contact bombing. Through our analysis, we have uncovered how the distress caused by this practice infiltrates multiple dimensions of borrowers’ lives, spanning their relationships, time horizons, and decision-making processes. In contrast to debt collection in many other jurisdictions, contact bombing appears unusually intrusive, with collection agencies seemingly able to access and exploit a broader range of personal information than is typical. Given the extensive international literature on the harmful consequences of aggressive debt collection, our findings of numerous negative outcomes among Chinese borrowers are, unfortunately, unsurprising.“ (Guo & Marshall, Dezember 2025, S. 7)

Jiankun Liu ist an der Fakultät für Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin (Volksrepublik China) angestellt und Yueyun Zhang an der Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin (Volksrepublik China).

·      Liu, Jiankun & Zhang, Yueyun: Indebtedness and mental health in China: the moderating roles of income and social support, Front Public Health, 2024
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10794583/

„Based on a large sample of Chinese adults from CFPS [China Family Panel Studies] (n=41,274), we examined the relationship between indebtedness and mental disorders in the Chinese context and further explored the moderating roles of two types of coping resources (i.e., income and social support). […]

In line with the stress process paradigm, our results indicated that household debt had adverse effects on mental health among Chinese adults. This finding was convincing because we used other measures of core variables and reduced concerns that the results may be biased due to the endogeneity in baseline models and the sample selection bias. Thus, this study confirmed that indebtedness was a stressor of debtors’ mental disorders. The debt-mental disorders linkage can be attributed to the following social psychological mechanisms. On the one hand, indebted adults had to allocate current resources to repay debt or further borrow money to pay for necessities, which resulted in the deduction of disposable resources and limited their purchases of high-quality goods and services conducive to mental health. On the other hand, indebtedness has long been a sign of inability to restrain one’s own desire and thus was severely criticized in Chinese ideology. Therefore, individuals from indebted households may have feelings of shame by being socially discriminated against by others, which can serve as a source of mental disorders. […]

In line with the stress-buffering model, our results showed that income, as a critical personal resource, played a protective role against debtors’ mental disorders. Specifically, debtors who lived in high-income households had fewer mental disorders than those in low/ middle-income households. […]

As an external coping resource, social support was selected as another moderator in this study following the stress-buffering paradigm. Specifically, the moderating effects of monetary and emotional support were examined in this study. Our results revealed that monetary support could moderate the linkage of indebtedness with mental disorders, but only monetary support from relatives played a significant moderating role. […]

Moreover, we found little evidence that emotional support, mainly provided by respondents’ spouses and children, had a buffering effect on the link between indebtedness and mental disorders in China.“ (Liu & Zhang, 2024, S. 8-9)

Yang Song und Zerui Cheng arbeiten beide für die Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Renmin-Universität von China, Peking (Volksrepublik China).

·      Song, Yang & Cheng, Zerui: The impact of welfare design on consumption patterns of the poor: Evidence from the recent Dibao reform in rural China, China Economic Review, 87, Oktober 2024
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1043951X2400124X

„In the recent anti-poverty campaign, China's minimum livelihood guarantee program (called Dibao in Chinese) experienced significant changes in that it now includes both cash transfer and special assistances such as education and healthcare subsidies. Therefore, the current Dibao program in China is a composite cash transfer program containing the nature of both unconditional and conditional cash transfers. […]

Dibao is a means tested welfare program, and its purpose is to guarantee a minimum level of livelihood for the poor in China (Golan, Sicular, & Umapathi, 2017). Citizens of China who want to get this benefit will need to apply and report their household income to the local government. If the per-capita household income is below the local welfare standard which is known as the Dibao subsidy line, then the household will be qualified for the Dibao benefit conditional on meeting other means-test requirements at the same time such as lack of enough assets.“ (Song & Cheng, Oktober 2024)

UNICEF (Kinderhilfswerk der Vereinten Nationen) ist eine globale UN-Organisation, die humanitäre Hilfe und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit für Kinder weltweit leistet und sich dabei auf Gesundheit, Bildung, Ernährung, sauberes Wasser, Schutz und Nothilfe konzentriert.

·      UNICEF - UN Children's Fund: Social Assistance in China, Budget Brief, August 2024
https://www.unicef.org/china/en/media/28346/file/Budget%20Brief%20-%20Social%20Assistance.pdf

„Basic living assistance (including Dibao, Tekun, and temporary assistance) has been the core of China’s social assistance system.“ (UNICEF, August 2024, S. 1)

„1.4 Challenges in the social assistance system

The social assistance system faces various challenges, including limited coverage of vulnerable populations (e.g., migrant children), inadequate social assistance standards, lack of service-oriented support to meet the diverse needs of families, and inadequate fiscal sharing mechanisms for social assistance schemes.“ (UNICEF, August 2024, S. 3)

„In addition, the current criteria for receiving social assistance exclude certain groups from coverage, including marginalized groups that do not qualify for Dibao, families at high risk of falling back into poverty, and low-income families. […]

Currently, social assistance schemes in China are mainly cash transfers that are unable to meet the diverse needs of recipients. In particular, the current cash assistance policy has difficulty in meeting the special assistance needs of specific groups such as the elderly, people with disabilities, and children in vulnerable families, therefore some families do not meet the minimum standard of living after being included in the scope of social assistance. The current social assistance content lacks integration and unification with diversified service assistance such as psychological intervention and caring support, and there is a mismatch between supply and demand in the service assistance for the elderly with economic difficulties and people with disabilities. Moreover, the current Dibao programme provides assistance based on the family unit. It does not identify the degree of difficulty a family is facing, or set different assistance benefits according to family structure or type, even though families with disabilities, families with more than two children, families with members who have health conditions, and single-parent families need more assistance.“ (UNICEF, August 2024, S. 4)

„Table 3. Key policies of the eight social assistance schemes in China

Scheme	Name of policy	Description
Dibao	Regulations on Minimum Living Guarantees for Urban Residents (1999)	Minimum living guarantee or subsistence allowance provided to families with a per capita income lower than the minimum living guaranteed standard and meeting the criteria of family property.
	Notice on Establishing a National Rural Minimum Living Guarantee System (2007)
	Interim Measures for Social Assistance (2014)
Tekun	Interim Measures for Social Assistance (2014)	Support for the elderly, people with disabilities, and children under the age of 18 facing serious difficulties who are unable to work, lack a source of income, or are without a legal guardian.
	Measures for the Identification of Tekun Recipients (2021)
Temporary assistance	Interim Measures for Social Assistance (2014)	Support for families or individuals whose basic livelihood is threatened due to emergencies, accidental injuries, major diseases or other reasons, when other schemes cannot be applied
	Notice on Comprehensively Establishing a Temporary Assistance System (2014)
Disaster relief	Regulations on Natural Disaster Relief (2010)	Support to ensure the basic livelihood and safety of populations affected by natural disasters.
Medical assistance	Opinions on Implementing Rural Medical Assistance (2003)	Support to Dibao and Tekun recipients, marginalized families that don’t qualify for Dibao, rural populations at risk of poverty, patients with serious illness, and others burdened with medical expenses.
Education assistance	Interim Measures for Social Assistance (2014)	Support to school-age children of Dibao and Tekun recipients to access nine-year compulsory education, senior secondary education, and higher education. Support is also provided to children with disabilities who are unable to access compulsory education.
Housing assistance	Interim Measures for Social Assistance (2014)	Low-rent public housing, housing rental subsidies, and renovation of rural dilapidated homes provided for Dibao and Tekun recipients.
Employment assistance	Interim Measures for Social Assistance (2014)	Loan interest discounts, social insurance subsidies, employment subsidies, training subsidies, fee reduction, and public welfare job placement for unemployed persons in low-income families.”

(UNICEF, August 2024, S. 13)

Grace Wang ist Finanzkommentatorin mit Schwerpunkt auf globalen Wirtschaftsthemen und Finanzmärkten.

·      Wang, Grace: Why So Many Chinese Are Struggling With Debt, veröffentlicht von Medium, 10. Juli 2025
https://medium.com/@grace.wang_8955/why-so-many-chinese-are-struggling-with-debt-32ababe9d3c9

„Debt has become an emotional and financial burden. In a culture where financial failure is deeply stigmatized, many people do not know how to ask for help. Yet the government, already overwhelmed with local and corporate debt, is limited in how much support it can offer. […]

China’s rules on debt collection are new and often poorly enforced. Ms Bai was added to a government blacklist that blocked her from flying, taking high-speed trains, or staying in upscale hotels. She received little sympathy or support.

Some relief has come from grassroots efforts. Online support groups for people in debt have emerged. One group on the Douban platform, called the Debtors Alliance, has over 60,000 members. People there share experiences of ‘social death,’ a term that describes how constant calls from collectors damage relationships and reputations.

The government has taken a few steps to curb abuses. It banned collectors from using threats, foul language, or late-night calls. It also reminded lenders to safeguard personal data. But enforcement is weak. Many complaints show that harassment continues.

One potential solution is personal bankruptcy law. In most wealthy countries, these laws allow individuals a fresh start after financial failure. In China, only a few cities, like Shenzhen, have tested such legislation. Even then, only a small share of applicants are approved. […]

For now, millions of Chinese remain stuck. Caught between shrinking incomes, falling property prices, and little legal protection, they are struggling to stay afloat in a system not yet built to help them.“ (Wang, 10. Juli 2025)

Pingyao Xie war zum Zeitpunkt der Veröffentlichung Doktorand an der University of Kent (UK).

·      Xie, Pingyao: The Introduction of Personal Bankruptcy Law in China: A Comparative Analysis. Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) thesis, University of Kent, 2021
https://kar.kent.ac.uk/90060/1/3THE_INTRODUCTION_OF_PERSONAL_BANKRUPTCY_LAW_IN_CHINA_A_COMPARATIVE_ANALYSIS.pdf

„In recent years, public media has also reported more and more news about how debt default influences householders’ daily lives. For example, some online lenders ask female borrowers to take selfies in which their ID cards have to be shown. If they fail to meet their commitments, those photos will be sent to their friends, relatives and even colleagues. There is occasional news about a debtor’s suicide because of the inability to pay.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 135-136)

„When consumers cannot meet their commitments, creditors may not choose to directly sue those defaulting debtors. Instead, creditors can first try to collect debts either by themselves or through a third party, out-of-court.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 154)

„Most debt collectors are employed by debt-collection agencies, while some work independently and some are attorneys. Similar to the process of debt collection in commercial banks, in most cases debt collectors will first send a letter to debtors to demand payment. If they fail to make payments after a stipulated time, debt collectors will take further steps to collect the debts. Normally, they will contact delinquent debtors by phone to try to convince them to pay. However, because there is no nationally applicable fair debt collection legislation in China, debtor collectors may use some inexpedient methods. It is easy to understand the use of some improper methods because of the remuneration structure: the more debt collectors recover, the more they earn. As a result, debt collectors will call debtors at any time of the day, tell their employers, relatives and even neighbours about the problems. In some extreme instances, like Yu Huan’s case, collectors will exercise physical violence.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 156)

„In addition to extrajudicial means of debt collection, creditors may hope to recover the undisputed debt by invoking the power of the courts. Usually, creditors will initiate the proceedings in a basic-level court in the area where the defendant is domiciled or is their habitual residence. Once the court accepts the case, it is very likely that the court will first attempt to mediate the case between plaintiffs and defendants. Due to the pursuit of a harmonious resolution to the dispute, mediation is viewed as a preferred approach.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 157)

„If pre-trial mediation fails, the court will hear the case. Through the trial, the court will ascertain the facts and make a judgement. Pursuant to the judgment, the losing parties should take action to execute their obligations. However, the story between the creditors and individual debtors is far from over as not all debtors voluntarily carry out the requirements of the effective judgement. […]

When debtors fail to comply with their obligations for no matter what reasons, creditors can apply for compulsory enforcement in the court where they bring the lawsuit. Then the court will exercise its power to collect the debt for the creditors. An enforcement tribunal or enforcement bureau in a court is responsible for the enforcement of a judgment. The main measures can be summarised as: ‘1. inquiry, seizure, and freezing of the assets of the debtor; 2. transfer the deposit of the debtor, detaining and distilling the income of the debtor; 3. sealing, seizure, freezing, auction, and sale of the property of the debtor; 4. searching for the concealed property of the debtor in their living space or other possible places; 5. compulsory liquidation of real estate.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 158-159)

„Under some circumstances, the court may suspend or terminate an enforcement case. Cases suspended are those where non-substantial enforcement obstacles occur. By contrast, terminated cases are those circumstances where debtors have no ability to fulfil an obligation or the legal judgement is revoked. Regarding pecuniary defaulting cases, according to the civil procedure law, the compulsory enforcement against debtors who lack the ability to repay can be permanently terminated only in an extreme situation. In cases where there is no property available to be collected, the present solution is to temporarily terminate the enforcement process. However, the temporary termination of the enforcement does not amount to a discharge of debt. Creditors can still resort to extrajudicial remedies after the termination of the compulsory enforcement proceedings. Furthermore, temporarily terminated cases may possibly be resumed. If creditors find some clues indicating that judgment debtors have obtained any property, they can apply to resume compulsory enforcement. Additionally, courts can sometimes restart the enforcement process ex officio.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 159-160)

„For debtors who fail to fulfil their obligations, the courts may restrict their high consumption activities. The legislative objective of a high consumption restriction order is to protect the ‘lawful rights and interests of the enforcement applicants and persons subject to enforcement’. It is considered as a safeguarding mechanism deterring culpable debtors from escaping their financial obligations. However, it appears to be that this safeguarding mechanism is overusing in enforcement procedure. Generally speaking, before the imposition of the consumption restriction, the court will consider whether debtors have ever failed to comply with obligations, evaded the fulfilment of their obligation or refused to perform, and also assess their capability to observe their responsibilities. Therefore, theoretically, an honest debtor will not be subject to a high consumption restriction order just because of the inability to pay. In this sense, the court will exercise discretionary power to decide the honesty of defaulting individuals case by case. However, if debtors are included on the list of persons judged to be dishonest, the court must impose the high consumption limit orders on them. The definition of dishonesty is so broad. In practice, when debtors cannot comply with pecuniary obligations, they will be seen as dishonest individuals. As a result, they will be included on the list of persons judged to be dishonest and the high consumption restrictions will practically and compulsorily be imposed on all defaulting debtors, no matter whether they are culpable or not. Under the consumption restriction orders, debtors will be prohibited from high consumption or other consumption not necessary for life or work. Those consumption restrictions can be lifted once debtors fulfil their obligations. Additionally, during the restriction period, if the person subject to enforcement provides a reliable and valid guarantee or obtains the consent of the enforcement applicant, the court shall lift the limit order.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 161-162)

„During the enforcement process, creditors and debtors may reach a compromise. The compromise will suspend enforcement cases under some circumstances. Both parties can voluntarily negotiate the content of the compromise, which embodies the free will of both parties with the court playing a role in confirming the negotiated agreement. If debtors cannot fulfil the obligations included in the compromise, the creditor can apply for continuing the suspended enforcement procedure or bring a lawsuit to the enforcement court concerning the performance of the compromise. But if the debtor completes the settlement, the enforcement case will be terminated.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 162-163)

„In cases where more than one creditor applies for compulsory enforcement procedure, a participation-in-distribution mechanism may operate. The objective of such a mechanism is to deal with the distribution of debtors’ insufficient assets among multiple creditors. When a debtor has already been subject to an enforcement process, other creditors who have the enforcement grounds can apply for participating in the distribution of assets. Under this procedure, the court is responsible for proposing a property distribution plan and circulating it between creditors. If no creditors object to the plan, debtors’ assets will be distributed in accordance with the plan. After enforcement expenses and priority debts are paid off, unsecured debts will be paid according to their proportion of the total debts.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 163)

„Additionally, the current solution to individual over-indebtedness reflects that creditors are in the advantageous position in the creditor-debtor relationship in and out of court. Before taking cases to the court, due to the absence of fair debt collection regulations, debtors may be at risk of improper debt collection methods. Only in extreme cases where debt collectors commit a serious crime such as false imprisonment, will the authority become involved. To an extent, it appears to be acquiescence of improper collection practices. Such acquiescence, more or less reflects legislators’ tendency to neglect the probable harm resulting from improper collection practices and to prioritise creditors’ interests. Though the court is involved in enforcement procedure, it appears to play the role of maximising returns. On the one hand, the court will carry out various measures such as sealing up, garnishing wages and freezing properties, to collect debt for creditors but on the other hand, the lack of discharge signifies the enforcement proceedings may be suspended though not terminated unless debtors meet their commitments. Therefore, no matter whether in extrajudicial or in-court remedies, maximising creditor returns appears to be the most important concern.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 165-166)

„Compared to the pursuit of maximising creditor returns, debtor recovery is to some degree downplayed. Civil Procedure Law stipulates the general principle that the people’s court shall ensure that debtors can keep necessities of life for them and their dependent family members. According to Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court for the People’s Courts to Seal up, Distrain and Freeze Properties in Civil Enforcement, some specific properties which are necessary for the life of the debtor and his dependent family members are immune from enforcement measures. However, pecuniary debt cannot be discharged under the current Chinese legal framework. In other words, a debtor is still liable for his obligations. Despite legislation protecting some necessary properties during the compulsory enforcement procedure, no law prevents debtors from creditors’ out-of-court collection methods. Therefore, creditors may pursue the self-help remedy to recover their loss and debtors have to get used to creditors’ collection for the rest of their life. Furthermore, the establishment of the dishonest list system and the high consumption restriction order, has a negative impact on an individual debtor’s daily life.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 166-167)

„For individuals captured on the dishonest list, the consequences are serious. Those individuals may have difficulty in regard to their employment. In one instance, an employee was laid off because he was recorded on the dishonest list and could not purchase a plane ticket for a business trip. Additionally, restricting defaulting debtors may have spill-over effects on their families. For children, either of whose parents is subject to the dishonest list, it means they cannot attend a private school. What’s worse, it has been reported in the news that a student cannot register in university because one of his parents is included in the dishonest list.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 167-168)

„6.3 Chinese social welfare system

6.3.1 The structure of social welfare in China

In the past decades, China has made significant efforts to build its social protection network. The current social welfare system is composed of two types of social programmes. One is the contributory social insurance including pension schemes, medical care system or unemployment insurance. The other is a non-contributory social assistance programme such as the Minimum Living Standard Guarantee System (dibao). The following section will outline China’s social protection in detail and provide a brief assessment of how it performs in Chinese society.

a.      Old-age pension system

The current old-age pension system comprises two parts. The first part is the Employee Old Age Pension System (EOAPS), which applies to employees in enterprises, governmental organisations and public institutions, as well as migrant workers. The other is the Basic Pension Insurance for Urban and Rural Residents, which is a unification of the Urban Residents Pension Programme (URPP) and the New Rural Pension Programme (NRPP).“ (Xie, 2021, S. 168-169)

„b. Unemployment Insurance […]

Currently unemployment insurance is regulated by the State Council’s Regulation on Unemployment Insurance and the Social Insurance Law. At present, all employees excluding civil servants must participate in the unemployment insurance programme. Enterprises need to contribute 2% based on their total amount of salaries and employees are made to contribute 1% of their wages. To receive benefits from the unemployment insurance programme, workers should meet several requirements. In addition, the maximum period for receiving unemployment insurance benefits is 24 months if employees have contributed for over 10 years, 18 months if they have covered services for five to ten years and 12 months if they have paid the premiums for a cumulative period ranging from one year to five years.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 172-173)

„c. Medical Insurance System

The current medical insurance system for urban residents consists of two schemes: Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance and Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 174)

„d. Social Assistance […]

Currently, various schemes, including the Minimum Living Standard Guarantee System (dibao), medical assistance, education assistance, employment assistance, housing assistance and temporary assistance, have formed a comprehensive social assistance system. In addition, both rural and urban residents are covered in all those social aid schemes. Among these programmes, the dibao system is the major player since other schemes are mainly made available to dibao beneficiaries. In other words, dibao functions as the qualifying requirement for residents to be covered by other programmes.

The Minimum Living Standard Guarantee System (dibao) is an institutional means-tested programme and provides cash assistance to households whose average income is below the threshold set by local governments. It plays a role in helping poverty-stricken households to live at a subsistence level. Beneficiaries can receive an allowance up to the minimum living line. The assistance line is determined by the minimum costs of necessities such as food, electricity, water, etcetera. Furthermore, the local government will also consider its financial capacity when determining the assistance line. As a result, the minimum living line varies across the country. For instance, the urban average standard line in 2013 was 373 Yuan (about 41 GBP [Great British Pound]) per head per month, which is only 16.6% of the average disposable income. However, the urban standards differ from 277 Yuan (around 32 GBP) in Ningxia to 640 Yuan (around 74 GBP) in Shanghai.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 176-177)

„6.3.2 The performance of China’s social welfare […]

The performance of China’s social welfare has reflected several themes. Given the lack of a unified system across China, contemporary social protection policies are devised segmentally between rural and urban areas. […]

Comparatively, the benefits provided in a rural pension programme may be limited. For instance, the minimum monthly sum in NRPP [New Rural Pension Programme] may be RMB [Renminbi] 55, which is much less than the benefits of urban residents. The disparities not only exist in the pension schemes; they also occur in other social insurance programmes.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 177-178)

„In effect, to understand the low benefit levels of China’s social protection programmes, the performance of the non-contributory social assistance system may be a better example. As we have outlined above, China’s contemporary social assistance scheme consists of a major Minimum Living Standard Guarantee System (dibao) and other ancillary social aids such as education assistance, medical assistance and employment assistance. Researchers have already pointed out that the cash support from dibao is insufficient. The principle of dibao is to keep recipients’ living standard at the subsistence level. […] Indeed, the dibao allowance is increasing both in urban and rural areas. However, in practice, the fact is that it is too low to keep an average living standard.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 181-182)

„As for other ancillary social aid schemes, it seems that their effects are limited. A study based on Chengdu’s social assistance system indicates that those special assistance programmes cannot provide much help for those vulnerable residents. However, given the absence of systematic literature relating to other special programmes at a national level, we should draw a cautious conclusion about their real effects.“ (Xie, 2021, S. 182-183)

Your Solution China Lawyer ist die Shanghaier Niederlassung der Anwaltskanzlei Yingke und ist auf internationale Rechtsangelegenheiten spezialisiert.

·      Your Solution China Lawyers: Consequences of Failing to Execute A Court Judgment in China, 9. September 2025
https://yschinalawyers.com/execute-a-court-judgment-in-china/

„Enforcement Measures Against Property Under a Chinese Court Judgment

When a party refuses to execute a court judgment in China, the court has the authority to take direct enforcement actions against the debtor’s property. Key measures include:

(1) Freezing and Deducting Bank Deposits

If a debtor refuses to pay as mandated by a court judgment, the court can order the freezing and direct deduction of funds from the debtor’s bank accounts. This includes savings deposits, wealth management products, and other financial assets.

(2) Auctioning Assets

The court may seize and publicly auction valuable assets—such as real estate, vehicles, inventory, and equity interests—to recover debts specified in the court judgment. Proceeds from the auction are used to fulfill the obligations under the court

2. Compulsory Performance of Obligations Under a Court Judgment

When a debtor fails to comply with a court judgment, Chinese courts can enforce specific actions or restrict certain behaviors to ensure implementation. Key measures include:

(1) Mandatory Actions Ordered by Court Judgment

Courts can require debtors to perform specific actions in accordance with the court judgment, such as transferring property, restoring reputation, or issuing formal apologies. If the debtor refuses, the court may arrange for a third party to perform the act at the debtor’s expense.

In certain situations, the court can also compel government authorities to assist in enforcement. For example, it may issue a Notice of Assistance in Execution to real estate or company registration bureaus, mandating that they update registrations based on the court judgment.

(2) Restraining Orders Under a Court Judgment

A court judgment may prohibit an individual or entity from engaging in specific activities—such as disposing of assets without court approval or continuing infringing behavior. Violations of these court-ordered restrictions can lead to further legal consequences.

3. Penalties for Refusing to Comply with a Court Judgment

Individuals or legal entities that refuse to comply with a court judgment may face daily fines imposed by the court. These penalties continue to accumulate until the obligations under the court judgment are fully satisfied, significantly increasing the financial burden on the non-compliant party.

4. Inclusion in the Dishonest Persons List (“失信被执行人名单”)

Failure to comply with a court judgment can result in being included in China’s Social Credit System blacklist—known as the ‘Dishonest Persons List.’ This designation carries severe social and legal restrictions, including:

(1) Restrictions on High-Consumption Activities

Debtors and their legal representatives (for companies) are barred from engaging in high-consumption activities, such as:

– Purchasing first-class flight tickets or soft-sleeper train tickets;

– Staying at high-star hotels or luxury resorts;

– Enrolling children in expensive private schools.

These prohibitions are enforced under the authority of the court judgment.

(2) Travel Restrictions

Based on the court judgment, debtors and affected legal representatives may be prohibited from using high-speed trains, flights, or other premium means of transportation, severely limiting freedom of movement.

5. Judicial Detention for Refusing to Comply with a Court Judgment

Under Article 114 of China’s Civil Procedure Law, courts may impose short-term judicial detention—usually for up to 15 days—on individuals who obstruct the enforcement of a court judgment. This is an administrative measure, not a criminal penalty, designed to compel compliance.

Behaviors that can lead to detention include concealing assets, providing false information, refusing to perform mandatory actions, or violating restraining orders issued under the court judgment. […]

6. Criminal Liability for Repeated Refusal to Execute a Court Judgment

In cases of repeated or malicious non-compliance, refusing to perform a court judgment may lead to criminal charges under Article 313 of China’s Criminal Law. The crime of ‘refusal to execute a court judgment or order’ is punishable by:

– Imprisonment for up to seven years;

– Criminal detention;

– And/or criminal fines.“ (Your Solution China Lawyers, 9. September 2025)

Xiaoxiao Zhang ist mit der juristischen Fakultät der Hunan Normal University, sowie der Rechtsabteilung der Anwaltskanzlei Hunan Jinzhou; beide in Changsha, Hunan (Volksrepublik China) affiliiert.

Fuyong Ou ist ebenfalls mit der juristischen Fakultät der Hunan Normal University sowie mit der juristischen Fakultät der University of Essex (Colchester, UK) affiliiert.

·      Zhang, Xiaoxiao & Ou, Fuyong: Economic and legal necessity of personal bankruptcy legislation in China, Int Insolv Rev, 2021
https://insolvencylawacademy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Economic-and-legal-necessity-of-personal-bankruptcy-in-China.pdf

„Aside from policies announced on specific occasions, without a proper personal bankruptcy system, most debt disputes have been settled through traditional civil litigation. Clauses in Civil Law, Civil Procedure Law, and other special regional regulations play a pivotal role in personal debt adjustments. The Civil Procedure Law of China buttresses the basic structure of the existing debt adjustment provision. With its judicial interpretation and application, an alternative legal framework has been laid. Also, provision on creditors' participation coupled with restrictions on enforced persons' high consumption provides supplements to these execution processes. Meanwhile, some pilot projects have been carried out in Taizhou and Wenzhou cities in Zhejiang province. Taizhou issued Regulations on Transforming Execution Procedures to Personal Debt Adjustments (Interim) in 2019, while Wenzhou has trialed individual debt adjustment cases with a reference to corporate bankruptcy law in China. Shenzhen city has also legislated a regional personal bankruptcy regulation in 2020 with the law scheduled for implementation on March 1, 2021.“ (Zhang & Ou, 2021, S. 6)

„Social and national benefits

In the past few years, suicides and criminal activities linked with debt defaults have increased, thus creating social problems. Even though the alternative methods can discharge their debts and repair their credit rating, debtors may still face discrimination in recruitment, loans, and other aspects of life.“ (Zhang & Ou, 2021, S. 7-8)

„Evaluation of existing alternative regulations […]

Protection of debtors' benefits: Partially accomplished

With the use of new technology, a new series of collection techniques have been used by the creditors which may invade the privacy of the debtors, causing mental stress and social stigma. This rightly calls for the attention to physical and mental well-being of the debtors.

To sustain debtors' rights, more regional rules are applied. For example, debt adjustment rules in Taizhou and Wenzhou are similar to their counterparts in other countries' approaches such as liquidation and repayment plans. The Civil Procedure Law leaves a basic living allowance for debtors, which is also restressed in the Opinions on Further Strengthening the Concept of Civilized Implementation in the Execution (2019) by the Supreme Court. All of these regulations are paving the way for debtors' ‘fresh start’ and protecting their human rights and development possibilities.

However, under the existing framework, voluntary and free applications for personal bankruptcy cannot be realized for the debtors. The access requirement of personal bankruptcy is hard to replicate by non-bankruptcy laws. According to the rules in use, only when there is a judgment on assets being brought by the courts, especially with enforcement hardships, can the case proceed to debt adjustment procedures. That is to say, the decision to apply for consumer bankruptcy cannot be made alone by the debtors or the creditors, but a prerequisite ruling issued by the courts is required. Therefore, alternative methods are restricted to execution cases only.“ (Zhang & Ou, 2021, S. 8-9)

„Social and national benefits: Barely accomplished

As for the social perspective, some of the personal debt discharges may be able to avoid damages to the social and personal relationships in the community. However, it is difficult to attain national well-being with only alternative methods employed in specific cases in the pilot provinces. Current debt adjustments are regional rules which are only effective in their jurisdiction and to their inhabitants. The rulings may still be challenged by other domestic courts and are hardly recognized internationally.“ (Zhang & Ou, 2021, S. 9)

„Discrimination and stigma

The social opprobrium in bankruptcy is one of the most ‘intractable challenges’ in initiating the personal bankruptcy system. […]

‚面子‘(social reputation) is a huge obstacle for the vast majority of the Chinese population who are considering bankruptcy as an option because it is considered shameful and woeful by the society. […]

Once a debtor's bankruptcy became public, a series of consequences appear immediately. For instance, access to financing, employment, and even education is affected. Besides, ‘feelings of guilt, shame, and stigma’ of the debtor act as stimulants in shying away from bankruptcy applications.“ (Zhang & Ou, 2021, S. 12-13)

Wang Zhenxiang ist Partner bei der chinesischen Anwaltskanzlei Jingtian & Gongcheng.

·      Zhenxiang, Wang: Current practices, complications of quasi-personal bankruptcy, China Business Law Journal, 9. August 2023
https://law.asia/quasi-personal-bankruptcy-current-practices/

„China has yet to establish a national system for personal bankruptcy. Research on establishing a system was explicitly proposed in 2019, when 12 ministries and commissions – in conjunction with the Supreme People’s Court – jointly issued the Reform Plan for Accelerating the Improvement of the Exit System for Market Entities.

Since then, pilot cities in Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Guangdong and Shandong provinces have successively introduced supporting rules for ‘quasi-personal bankruptcy’ within their jurisdictions while, as a special economic zone, Shenzhen promulgated the Regulations on Personal Bankruptcy.“ (Zhenxiang, 9. August 2023)

Liu Zhuang arbeitet für die rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Qingdao University of Science and Technology in Qingdao (Volksrepublik China).

·      Zhuang, Liu: China’s Path to the Constructions of Personal Bankruptcy System, International Law Research, 13/1, 8. Juli 2024
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/384242755_China's_Path_to_the_Construction_of_Personal_Bankruptcy_System/fulltext/66f05e7a750edb3bea6c0595/Chinas-Path-to-the-Construction-of-Personal-Bankruptcy-System.pdf?_tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InB1YmxpY2F0aW9uIiwicGFnZSI6InB1YmxpY2F0aW9u·in19

„For a long time, due to the absence of personal bankruptcy law, the civil enforcement system in fact replaces the personal bankruptcy law to undertake the function of market clearance. In judicial practice, there are a large number of cases of natural persons ‘cannot be executed’, i.e., the executed person has no property for execution. Civil enforcement to replace personal bankruptcy, not only the cost is very high, and the effect is extremely limited, because of this, it is criticised. Tracing back to the roots, the existing civil enforcement system for the non-fulfilment of the obligation to pay the executor to set up a harsh right to limit, but did not distinguish between the reasons why the debtor cannot pay. Although these penalties objectively have a deterrent effect on debtors who intentionally conceal their property, the inability to determine whether the debtor is subjectively unwilling to pay the debt or objectively has no property available for execution has resulted in the innocent latter being labelled with the stigma of being a loser, thus undermining their dignity.“ (Zhuang, 8. Juli 2024, S. 30)