26. November 2025          

Diese Anfragebeantwortung wurde für die Veröffentlichung auf ecoi.net abgeändert.

Kurzbeschreibungen zu den in dieser Anfragebeantwortung verwendeten Quellen sowie Ausschnitte mit Informationen aus diesen Quellen finden Sie im Anhang.

Bitte beachten Sie, dass in dieser Anfragebeantwortung ausschließlich die Rekrutierung durch die sudanesische Armee (Sudanese Armed Forces, SAF) behandelt wird und nicht Rekrutierung durch die konkurrierenden Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Das sudanesische Nationaldienstgesetz (National Service Act) von 1992 besagt, dass jede·r sudanesische Staatsbürger·in im Alter von 18 bis 33 Jahren zum nationalen Dienst verpflichtet ist (National Service Act 1992, Article 7). Der Dienst kann bei den Streitkräften, der Polizei, in Regierungs- oder öffentlichen Einrichtungen sowie in öffentlichen Projekten im Bereich Entwicklung, Wirtschaft oder Soziales geleistet werden (National Service Act 1992, Article 8.1). Die Dienstzeit beträgt 24 Monate, wobei es verkürzte Dienstzeiten je nach akademischer Qualifikation gibt (National Service Act 1992, Article 9).

ACAPS berichtet im Februar 2024, unter Bezugnahme auf Quellen und Medienberichte aus dem Jahr 2023 und Anfang 2024, dass sowohl die SAF als auch die RSF Zivilist·innen rekrutieren würden und unklar sei, inwieweit diese Rekrutierungen vollständig freiwillig erfolgen oder Elemente von Zwang beinhalten würden (ACAPS, 29. Februar 2024, S. 3).

Das Außenministerium der Niederlande veröffentlicht im Mai 2024 einen Länderinformationsbericht zum Sudan, dessen Kapitel über Wehrpflicht und Zwangsrekrutierung hauptsächlich auf Informationen von vertraulichen Informant·innen basiert. Laut dem Bericht gelte das oben genannte Nationaldienstgesetz formal, jedoch werde es nicht aktiv angewendet und durchgesetzt. Während des Berichtszeitraums (August 2022 bis Ende Mai 2024) habe es eine Mobilisierungskampagne der SAF und verbündeter Akteure (dem Bewaffneten Volkswiderstand; arabisch: Al Moqawwma Al Sha’abyya Al Mosallaha) gegeben. Diese Kampagne habe an Dynamik gewonnen, nachdem die RSF im Dezember 2023 Wad Madani eingenommen habe. Tausende Männer seien in den von der SAF kontrollierten Gebieten dem Aufruf gefolgt, um sich gegen die RSF zu verteidigen. Zwei Quellen zufolge habe die Mobilisierungskampagne für Beamt·innen eine unfreiwillige Dimension angenommen. Beispielsweise hätten Beamt·innen in Kassala und Sennar sich als Rekrut·innen melden müssen, andernfalls hätten sie ihre Arbeitsplätze und zusätzlichen Leistungen verloren. Eine andere Quelle habe gegenüber dem niederländischen Außenministerium angegeben, nichts von solchen Praktiken zu wissen (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mai 2024, S. 63). Der Bericht schreibt weiters, dass es wenige öffentliche Informationen über Zwangsrekrutierung gebe und zitiert einen Artikel der Washington Post vom November 2023, laut dem sowohl SAF wie auch RSF Zivilist·innen gegen ihren Willen rekrutiert hätten. Mehrere Quellen hätten in Interviews mit dem niederländischen Außenministerium darauf hingewiesen, dass SAF und RSF die Umstände der Rekrutierenden missbrauchen würden. Beide Seiten würden sich vorwiegend an arme, leicht beeinflussbare junge Männer wenden, und ihnen den Sold als Soldat in Aussicht stellen. Viele junge Männer würden sich gezwungen sehen darauf einzugehen, da sie keine andere Möglichkeit sehen würden ihren Lebensunterhalt zu verdienen. Laut den Aussagen mehrerer Informant·innen erfolge Rekrutierung unter Zwang. Eine Quelle habe von der Zwangsrekrutierung von über vierzig Bergleuten in den Bundesstaaten „die Nördliche“ („Northern“) und „Nilfluss“ („River Nile“) berichtet. Diese beiden nördlichen Bundesstaaten seien unter der Kontrolle der SAF gestanden. Die betreffenden Bergleute hätten aus Darfur gestammt und seien von ihrem Umfeld der Kollaboration mit den RSF verdächtigt worden. Sie hätten sich rekrutieren lassen, um ihre Loyalität gegenüber den SAF zu beweisen (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mai 2024, S. 64).

Die Asylagentur der Europäischen Union (European Union Agency for Asylum, EUAA) veröffentlicht im Februar 2025 einen Länderfokusbericht zu Sudan und stützt sich im Kapitel über „Wehrpflichtige, Wehrdienstverweigerer, Zwangsrekrutierung für bewaffnete Gruppen“ größtenteils auf Informationen des oben genannten Berichts des niederländischen Außenministeriums. EUAA zitiert außerdem das sudanesische Mediennetzwerk Ayin Network, das im Dezember 2024 über seit Oktober 2024 andauernde Mobilisierungskampagnen von mit den SAF verbündeten Milizen in den an den Tschad grenzenden Gebieten Ambaro, Karnoi, Abu Gamra und Al-Tina als Reaktion auf eine Mobilisierungskampagne der RSF berichtet habe. Es seien Tausende von Kämpfer·innen mobilisiert worden, die durch die Notwendigkeit, ihre Dörfer vor bewaffneten Angriffen der RSF und deren verbündeten Milizen zu schützen, motiviert worden seien (EUAA, Februar 2025, S. 40). Informationen über Zwangsrekrutierung durch die RSF sind auf Seiten 41 - 42 des EUAA-Berichts zu finden.

Laut einem Artikel des sudanesischen Mediennetzwerks Atar Network vom Oktober 2025 würden sich die SAF auf Stammesscheichs stützen, um Kämpfer·innen zu rekrutieren und auszubilden (Atar Network, 6. Oktober 2025).

The Guardian berichtet ebenfalls im Oktober 2025 von der Flucht eines Mannes aus Darfur in den Südsudan. Er und seine Mitreisenden hätten sich einmal auf einem Lastwagen mit Ziegen versteckt, um nicht von Regierungstruppen entdeckt zu werden. Laut dem Mann würde man bei verweigerter Rekrutierung beschuldigt werden, den RSF anzugehören und es sei schwierig, sich gegen eine solche Anschuldigung zu verteidigen (The Guardian, 2. Oktober 2025).

The National veröffentlicht im November 2025 einen Artikel über eine verstärkte Rekrutierungskampagne der SAF. Laut dem Artikel wende sich die Rekrutierungskampagne an Freiwillige. Die Kampagne sei islamistisch geprägt, würde die Armen ausbeuten und durch Hassreden und Verratsvorwürfe gegen diejenigen vorgehen, die sich weigern würden für die Armee zu kämpfen, so The National. Eine Rekrutierungskommission habe Zweigstellen in den von den SAF kontrollierten Gebieten eröffnet und Vertreter·innen der Kommission würden durch die Gebiete reisen, um Männer für den Kampf gegen die RSF zu gewinnen. Laut Saleh Mahgoub, einem pensionierten Brigadegeneral und Militäranalysten, sei die Rekrutierung in vielen Fällen eine Ausbeutung der Armen (The National, 14. November 2025).

France24 schreibt im Mai 2023, dass die sudanesische Armee Reservist·innen und pensionierte Soldat·innen zur Wiedereinberufung aufgerufen habe. Laut einem Armeesprecher sei die Wiedereinberufung freiwillig. France24 gibt an, dass das geltende sudanesische Militärgesetz jedoch vorsehe, dass pensionierte Soldat·innen als Reservist·innen gelten würden und zur erneuten Einberufung verpflichtet werden könnten. Dies gelte nicht für diejenigen, die lediglich den zweijährigen obligatorischen Militärdienst im Sudan abgeleistet hätten (France24, 27. Mai 2023).

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 26. November 2025)

·      ACAPS: ACAPS Thematic report: Sudan - Protection concerns: ten months into the war, 29 February 2024, 29. Februar 2024
https://reliefweb.int/attachments/e32770f3-cdda-42a4-a8fb-4b74e3c53bb3/20240229_ACAPS_Sudan_analysis_hub_protection_concerns_10_months_into_the_war.pdf

·      Atar Network: Militarising tribes: Inside Sudan’s system of war mobilisation, 6. Oktober 2025
https://atarnetwork.com/?p=16121

·      EUAA - European Union Agency for Asylum: Sudan - Country Focus, Februar 2025
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2121411/2025_02_EUAA_COI_Report_Sudan_Country_Focus.pdf

·      France24: Sudan army urges former soldiers to re-enlist as fighting persists, 27. Mai 2023
https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230527-sudan-army-urges-former-soldiers-to-re-enlist-as-fighting-persists

·      Guardian (The): Deaths, disappearances and forced recruitment: refugees recount horrors of relentless war in Sudan, 2. Oktober 2025
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/02/refugees-recall-horrors-of-sudan-civil-war

·      National (The): Sudan army steps up recruitment drive but more battlefield setbacks may be in store, 14. November 2025
https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2025/11/14/sudan-army-steps-up-forced-recruitment-drive-but-more-battlefield-setbacks-may-be-in-store/

·      National Service Act 1992, veröffentlicht vom Internationalen Komitee vom Roten Kreuz, ohne Datum
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/national-practice/national-service-act-1992

·      Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs: General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, Mai 2024
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2113861/General_COI_Report_on_Sudan_May_2024.pdf

Anhang: Quellenbeschreibungen und Informationen aus ausgewählten Quellen

 ACAPS ist eine Organisation, die sich auf Analysen im humanitären Bereich fokussiert.

·      ACAPS: ACAPS Thematic report: Sudan - Protection concerns: ten months into the war, 29 February 2024, 29. Februar 2024
https://reliefweb.int/attachments/e32770f3-cdda-42a4-a8fb-4b74e3c53bb3/20240229_ACAPS_Sudan_analysis_hub_protection_concerns_10_months_into_the_war.pdf

„Forced conscription and recruitment Both the SAF [Sudanese Armed Forces] and the RSF [Rapid Support Forces] are reported to have undertaken civilian recruitment into their ranks to bolster their strength and capacities (OHCHR 22/02/2024 and 23/02/2024). Some forced recruitment victims solely do so to shield their families and loved ones from being violated (TWP 30/11/2023). Targets include men choosing to return to their places of origin given the unbearable conditions in refugee camps, resulting in secondary displacement as people flee recruitment (MSF 09/06/2023; TWP 30/11/2023). Both sides have openly called for civilians to enlist in their military fold, but it is unclear if the process is completely voluntary or has elements of coercion (CEIP 15/02/2024; VOA 26/05/2023; DW 03/07/2023).“ (ACAPS, 29. Februar 2024, S. 3)

Atar Network bezeichnet ein sudanesisches Online-Nachrichtenangebot, das sich auf die Analyse, Einordnung und kuratierte Aufbereitung aktueller Ereignisse spezialisiert. Der Schwerpunkt liegt darauf, laufende Entwicklungen im Sudan für ein allgemeines Publikum verständlich zu machen.

·      Atar Network: Militarising tribes: Inside Sudan’s system of war mobilisation, 6. Oktober 2025
https://atarnetwork.com/?p=16121

„The Rapid Support Forces inherited and expanded that legacy. Hemedti long relied on tribal loyalties before the current fighting, recruiting leaders with a mixture of enticement and coercion. The SAF [Sudanese Armed Forces], for its part, has used the same methods, leaning on sheikhs to produce fighters, turning tribes into a shared human reservoir for both sides and eroding their traditional social role.“ (Atar Network, 6. Oktober 2025)

Die Asylagentur der Europäischen Union (European Union Agency for Asylum, EUAA) ist eine EU-Agentur, deren Aufgabe es ist, die Mitgliedstaaten bei der Umsetzung des als Gemeinsames Europäisches Asylsystem bekannten EU-Gesetzespakets zu Asyl, internationalem Schutz und Aufnahmebedingungen zu unterstützen.

·      EUAA - European Union Agency for Asylum: Sudan - Country Focus, Februar 2025
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2121411/2025_02_EUAA_COI_Report_Sudan_Country_Focus.pdf

„Conscripts, draft evaders, forced recruitment to armed groups

Military service is both voluntary or compulsory, it is open for both men and women between the ages of 18 and 33, and lasts between 12 and 24 months. The Dutch COI [Country of Origin Information] report indicated nevertheless that, based on confidential sources it consulted, '[i]n formal terms, the Sudan National Service Act 1992 still applies', but it is not actively applied or enforced either by the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) or the SAF [Sudanese Armed Forces] 'as the forced recruitment of conscripts would further damage the standing of the SAF'.“ (EUAA, Februar 2025, S. 39)

„Both the SAF [Sudanese Armed Forces] and the RSF [Rapid Support Forces], however, are accused of engaging in forced recruitment of men and boys. […] In SAF-controlled areas, recruitment is carried out through mobilisation campaigns as part of an 'armed popular resistance to halt the RSF advance'. These campaigns appeal to the notion of 'dignity' and are also backed with allusions to RSF abuses committed in places they had taken over, which prompt prospective recruits to want to join the SAF and defend themselves, their property, and communities. Recruits come from all walks of life and are referred to as mustanfareen, or 'the mobilised'. According to a report by Africa Defense Forum (ADF), the SAF uses social media to recruit volunteer fighters by directing them to the nearest SAF command or military unit to sign up. The Dutch COI [Country of Origin Information] report indicated that some government officials face pressure to enlist in these mobilisation campaigns under the threat of losing their jobs or social benefits. Ayin Network, a Sudanese media network, reported that, as a response to a mobilisation drive carried out by the RSF since October 2024, SAF-allied militias led parallel campaigns in the Chad-bordering areas of Ambaro, Karnoi, Abu Gamra, and Al-Tina, where they mobilised 'thousands' of fighters into their ranks motivated by the need to protect their villages from armed attacks launched by the RSF and its allied militias. Without providing an exact date, the Dutch COI report provided the example of more than 40 Darfurian mineworkers in Northern and River Nile states who had to join the SAF and prove their loyalty because they were being seen as collaborators of the RSF.“ (EUAA, Februar 2025, S. 40)

France24, das französische Auslandsfernsehen, ist ein internationaler Nachrichtensender mit besonderem Fokus auf Berichterstattung zu Ländern mit Frankreich-Bezug in Afrika und Nahost.

·      France24: Sudan army urges former soldiers to re-enlist as fighting persists, 27. Mai 2023
https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230527-sudan-army-urges-former-soldiers-to-re-enlist-as-fighting-persists

„Sudan's army called on Friday for reservists and retired soldiers to re-enlist amid a deadly conflict with a rival paramilitary and asked the United Nations to change its envoy to the country. […]

The call to former soldiers to present themselves at their nearest military base looked aimed at strengthening the army in its battle with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary, but may add fuel to the conflict days into a truce. […]

An army spokesperson said enlistment would be voluntary. Sudan’s existing armed forces law says, however, that retired soldiers remain as reservists, eligible for compulsory re-enlistment. That does not include those who only did Sudan’s mandatory two-year military service.“ (France24, 27. Mai 2023)

The Guardian ist eine britische Tageszeitung.

·      Guardian (The): Deaths, disappearances and forced recruitment: refugees recount horrors of relentless war in Sudan, 2. Oktober 2025
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/02/refugees-recall-horrors-of-sudan-civil-war

„Omar, who lost his brother and six other relatives when an army aircraft bombed a market in Ed Daein, left behind his pregnant wife and their four children. He hopes they can join him in South Sudan, then go together to Uganda, the country that hosts the largest number of refugees in Africa.

The fear of being targeted by both of the war’s protagonists hung over his head throughout the journey. At one stage, he and fellow travellers hitched a ride on in a lorry carrying goats and hid among the animals to avoid being spotted by government forces.

‘If you decline recruitment, they accuse you of belonging to RSF [Rapid Support Forces], and it becomes difficult to defend yourself against that accusation,’ the 35-year-old said. ‘If I met RSF, they would accuse me of being a member of the Sudanese army, and if I met the Sudanese army, they would accuse me of belonging to RSF’.“ (The Guardian, 2. Oktober 2025)

The National ist eine englischsprachige Nachrichtenorganisation mit Hauptsitz in Abu Dhabi und einem Fokus auf den Nahen Osten.

·      National (The): Sudan army steps up recruitment drive but more battlefield setbacks may be in store, 14. November 2025
https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2025/11/14/sudan-army-steps-up-forced-recruitment-drive-but-more-battlefield-setbacks-may-be-in-store/

„Hurt by the loss of its last stronghold in Darfur, Sudan's armed forces have stepped up a drive to recruit volunteers to join the fight against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, but analysts say the army could face further battlefield setbacks.

They highlighted a campaign driven by Islamist influence that preys on the poor, fuelled by hate speech and accusations of treason against any man who refuses to join the army’s fight. […]

Part of the army's reaction to the loss of El Fasher was to increase and broaden the scale of the recruitment of fighters, an undertaking now channelled through a commission led by a retired army general. The commission has recently opened branches in army-held regions and its representatives tour those areas looking for men willing to join the fight against the RSF [Rapid Support Forces]. […]

Saleh Mahgoub, a retired army brigadier who is now a military analyst, said the recruitment of civilians to fight was in many cases a thinly veiled exploitation of the poor. He also questioned whether the enlistment of volunteers could meaningfully change the course of the war.“ (The National, 14. November 2025)

National Service Act 1992 ist das sudanesische Nationaldienstgesetz.

·      National Service Act 1992, veröffentlicht vom Internationalen Komitee vom Roten Kreuz, ohne Datum
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/national-practice/national-service-act-1992

„Every Sudanese citizen aged from eighteen years to thirty three years of age is subject to national service.“ (National Service Act 1992, Article 7)

„The recruit shall do the service in any of the following places:

- The armed forces

- The police or other regular forces

- Government or public sector units

- Public projects in development, economic or social service“ (National Service Act 1992, Article 8.1)

„9.1 The duration of the service is 24 months.

9.2 The duration of the service for university graduates, high institutes or equivalent shall be reduced to twelve months. It shall also be reduced to eighteen months for those who have completed secondary high school level or equivalent.

9.3 The director shall specify, with the consent of the Minister, the service period for those recruits in the previous 1989 compulsory service law or other similar service, provided that it does not exceed twenty four months.

9.4 The service reduction period for the recruit shall be considered on the basis of the academic qualification at the start of the service.

9.5 It is possible to reduce the service period by deducting any previous military service for the recruit in accordance with the law regulating and evaluating that previous service.“ (National Service Act 1992, Article 9)

Das Außenministerium der Niederlande (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, BZ) ist die Regierungsbehörde der Niederlande, die für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten des Landes zuständig ist.

·      Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs: General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, Mai 2024
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2113861/General_COI_Report_on_Sudan_May_2024.pdf

„Compulsory military service and forced recruitment

5.1 Compulsory military service

In formal terms, the Sudan National Service Act 1992 still applies. During the reporting period, however, this law was not actively applied and enforced by the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) under Burhan. One source pointed out that the aforementioned actors did not actively apply and enforce the compulsory national service, as the forced recruitment of conscripts would further damage the standing of the SAF.

During the transition period under Prime Minister Hamdok, the aforementioned law was relaxed. Before the fall of President Bashir, men of fighting age had to be able to prove that they had completed the compulsory military service before they could have a college degree authenticated, get a job in the public or private sector or travel abroad. This condition lapsed during the transition period.

5.2 Mobilisation campaign in SAF areas

During the reporting period, the SAF and associated actors began a mobilisation campaign known as the Armed Popular Resistance (in Arabic, Al Moqawwma Al Sha’abyya Al Mosallaha). This campaign gained momentum after the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) took Wad Madani in December 2023 (see 2.2.6). Thousands of men in the SAF-controlled states answered the call to halt the RSF advance as part of ‘armed popular resistance’. They were referred to as mustanfareen (‘the mobilised’). The abuses committed by the RSF in Wad Madani prompted them to want to defend themselves, their property and communities. Commentators feared the proliferation of weapons amongst civilians would lead to further escalation of violence in Sudan.

According to two sources, the aforementioned mobilisation campaign took on an involuntary dimension for officials. For example, officials in Kassala and Sennar had to sign up as recruits; otherwise, they would lose their jobs and additional social benefits. Another source claimed to be unaware of such practices.“ (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mai 2024, S. 63)

„5.3 Forced recruitment of soldiers (including child soldiers)

As far as could be ascertained, little public information existed on forced recruitment by the conflict parties.

In late November 2023, The Washington Post reported that both the SAF [Sudanese Armed Forces] and RSF [Rapid Support Forces] had conscripted civilians against their will. For example, this US newspaper reported the story of a father in Khartoum. RSF militants had threatened to rape his daughter. In response, he offered to join the RSF so that his daughter would be left alone. The Washington Post further reported that the RSF had detained six young men at a checkpoint on the outskirts of Khartoum. They were handcuffed and given nothing to eat for a week. This broke their resistance, after which they joined the RSF.

On 21 March 2024, the Cable News Network (CNN) reported that, in the preceding three months, the RSF had forcibly recruited nearly 700 men and 65 children in the state of El Gezira. The coercion applied had taken various forms, including intimidation, torture and denial of food and medical assistance. CNN based this report on interviews with more than 36 eyewitnesses.

Multiple sources pointed out that both the SAF and the RSF had abused circumstances in recruitment. For example, both sides primarily approached poor young men who could be easily influenced. They presented these young men with the prospect of a soldier’s pay. Many young men were forced to respond to this, as there seemed to be no other options for earning a living. In recruitment, the SAF appealed to the notion of ‘dignity’ (see 2.1.2), while the RSF contended that they were fighting for ‘democracy’ (see 2.1.3).

Statements from multiple sources indicate that recruitment took place under physical duress. For example, one source noted that the RSF had approached veterans from the SAF. These SAF veterans were required to join the RSF; otherwise, they would be arrested. Another source was aware of the forced recruitment of more than forty mineworkers in the states of Northern and River Nile. These two northern states were under the control of the SAF. The mineworkers in question came from Darfur and were suspected by those around them of collaborating with the RSF. According to the source, they had responded to the mobilisation call described in Section 5.2 in order to prove their loyalty to the SAF.“ (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mai 2024, S. 64)