Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Gang and Organized Crime Situation

A report by Infosegura [1], using data from the Guatemalan government, indicates that from January to March 2024, Guatemala experienced its lowest quarterly average homicide rates since January 2019 (2024-05-08). Based on official figures, Diálogos, a Guatemalan think tank that "promotes training, research, and innovation based on data and evidence among public authorities, members of civil society organizations, and journalists" (ACLED n.d.), reports that there were 16.1 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2024 and 16.7 in 2023 (Diálogos 2025-01-21). Sources note that the homicide rate has been trending down (Infosegura 2024-05-08; Diálogos 2025-01-21) since 2009 (Diálogos 2025-01-21). Diálogos indicates, however, that extortion increased by 39% from 2023 to 2024, from 18,096 cases to 25,151 (2025-01-21).

The US Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) travel notice for Guatemala notes that although Guatemala's homicide rate is declining, it remains "high," due in part to narcotrafficking and gang-related violence (US 2024-03-12, 2). The Government of Canada's travel advisory for Guatemala similarly indicates that violent crime is "common" and happens "throughout the country," with "[m]ost incidents" being linked to drugs and gangs (Canada 2024-03-04). According to OSAC, the "bulk" of drug-related crimes occur along the Guatemala-Mexico border (US 2024-03-12, 3). Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) 2024, which "assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of governance in 137 countries," notes that drug trafficking is a "key driver" of violence in "several more remote areas" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2024, 2, 31).

Sources report that since March 2022, as a result of the Salvadoran government's crackdown on gangs, thousands of gang members have fled to nearby countries, including Guatemala (S-RM 2023-07-17; BBC 2025-05-22).

1.1 Actors

InSight Crime, a think tank and media organization focused on organized crime in the Americas (InSight Crime n.d.), indicates that there are "a multitude" of criminal groups operating in Guatemala, ranging from "very sophisticated to rudimentary," including Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organizations (2024-01-18). Stanford University's Migration and Asylum Lab, which provides "impartial analysis" of country conditions, lists Los Huistas, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), and Barrio 18 [18th Street Gang] as "[m]ajor" criminal actors in Guatemala, alongside the Mexican crime organizations Jalisco New Generation Cartel (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación, CJNG), Los Zetas, and Sinaloa Cartel (Migration and Asylum Lab 2023-11, ii, 5).

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), "an independent civil-society organization, headquartered in Geneva" (GI-TOC n.d.), writes in its 2023 crime index for Guatemala that Mexican cartels control "much" of the drug trafficking in Guatemala and work with local criminal groups (2023, 5). BTI 2022 notes that local criminal groups interact with transnational drug trafficking organizations "without using violence" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 6).

Sources report that Guatemalan criminal organizations include former military [and intelligence (InSight Crime 2024-01-18)] personnel as well as police officers, public officials, and drug traffickers (GI-TOC 2023, 5; InSight Crime 2024-01-18). The same sources indicate that Guatemalan criminal organizations "work closely" with certain sectors of the government (InSight Crime 2024-01-18) or "create alliances with state actors at all levels" (GI-TOC 2023, 4). BTI 2022 indicates that, rather than using violence, "non-state armed groups" are increasingly protecting their illicit business interests through "corruption and strong political-criminal nexuses" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 6).

1.2 Activities

Sources report that criminal groups in Guatemala are involved in the following criminal activities:

• marijuana, opium poppy, and coca cultivation;
• human, drug, and weapons trafficking;
• kidnapping;
• money laundering; and
• extortion (GI-TOC 2023, 5; InSight Crime 2024-01-18).
  
  

An article by the Guatemalan daily newspaper Prensa Libre, citing Guatemala's National Civil Police (Policía Nacional Civil, PNC) statistics across a 2-year period, indicates that the crimes most often reported to the government's Crime Stoppers hotline and online platform include drug trafficking and other drug-related crimes, followed by human trafficking (Prensa Libre 2024-01-03).

BTI 2024 indicates that criminal gangs in urban areas have shifted their operations to focus "more on drug-peddling and small-scale extortion" and less on fighting other gangs for territory (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2024, 32). Prensa Libre cites the PNC's Director as stating that since July 2024 Barrio 18 and MS-13 have been attempting to take control of the drug dealing market in the country (2025-08-01).

Sources indicate that the country's "major" (US 2024-04-22, 6) or "most important" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2024, 14) prisons are controlled by criminal groups (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2024, 14; US 2024-04-22, 6). Sources report that prisoners engaged in illegal activities "both inside and outside of prisons" (US 2024-04-22, 6) or that gang leaders "coordinat[ed]" their activities from inside prisons (GI-TOC 2023, 6). InSight Crime states that "[p]risoners are known to run extortion rackets, black market networks, and drug sales from within jails" (2024-01-18). According to Agence France-Presse (AFP), Guatemala's president described one prison, since reclaimed by security forces, as a [translation] "'headquarters'" for criminal activities, including extortion, drug trafficking, and contract killing (2024-11-06). News sources report, citing [translation] "authorities," that the "majority" of extortion calls come from within prisons (ChapinTV 2025-02-25; AFP 2024-11-06).

1.3 Areas of Operation

OSAC's travel notice indicates that the "bulk" of crime related to drug trafficking occurs near the border with Mexico; criminal groups are "prevalen[t]" in the departments of San Marcos and Huehuetenango and law enforcement in those regions is "limited" (US 2024-03-12, 3). An article by Prensa Libre, citing PNC statistics on reports to its crime hotline and online platform, states that drug trafficking is the most reported crime in the departments of Quetzaltenango, San Marcos, Chiquimula, Zacapa, and Petén, while in Suchitepéquez drug trafficking and murder for hire are equally the most reported (2024-01-03).

The information in the following paragraph was provided by a representative of Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), a US-based non-profit organization that gathers data on violent conflict and protest around the world (ACLED n.d.), in correspondence with the Research Directorate:

Gang violence is "hyper-concentrated" in Guatemala Department, including Guatemala City and "surrounding municipalities" such as Mixco, Villa Nueva, San Pedro Ayampuc, Santa Catarina Pinula, Villa Canales, and San Juan Sacatepéquez. Gangs such as MS-13 and Barrio 18 have a "significant presence and territorial control" in that region. Other cities, such as Chimaltenango, Puerto Barrios, Quetzaltenango, Jalapa, and Escuintla, are also "increasingly affected by gang presence" (ACLED 2025-07-11).

A study of gangs in Guatemala conducted by José Miguel Cruz, et al. [2] and funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) similarly indicates that "[m]ost" gang members are located in Guatemala City and "suburban municipalities," with "some" in Quetzaltenango and Escuintla (Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 1). The Prensa Libre article, again citing the PNC, indicates that gang-related crime and drug sales are the most common offences reported in Guatemala Department (2024-01-03). Citing interviews with anonymous "security experts," R. Evan Ellis, a senior fellow at the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy [3], indicates in an article on the institute's website that gangs in Guatemala have been "limited to the marginal outer suburbs of Guatemala City, particularly" Villa Nueva and Mixto (Ellis 2024-07-23). The same source adds that gangs have also been present "to an extent" in Escuintla (Ellis 2024-07-23).

The ACLED representative noted that in rural departments that have "significant Indigenous populations," including Zacapa, Petén, Huehuetenango, and Santa Rosa, drug trafficking organization are the "main criminal actors" (2025-07-11). Cruz, et al. state, citing former gang members interviewed, that in northwestern Guatemala the population is "mostly" Indigenous, and drug cartels are present in eastern and southern Guatemala; both groups are very unwelcoming to gangs (2020-12, 20). A former gang member further explained that Indigenous communities will "lync[h] or kil[l]" gang members, and gang members caught by drug traffickers will be killed (Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 20). Ellis similarly indicates that areas outside of Guatemala City are "dominat[ed]" by "narcotraffickers and conservative elites," thus preventing the incursion of MS-13 and Barrio 18 into those territories (2024-07-23).

An article by Voice of America (VOA), a US-based international broadcaster that is funded by the US Congress (VOA n.d.), reports that according to Guatemalan police, criminal groups [translation] "control" areas 5, 6, 14, 16, and 18 of Guatemala City (2024-06-07). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

2. Gangs (Maras)

Sources state that both MS-13 and Barrio 18 are made up of clicas [cliques], neighbourhood-based cells (Paarlberg 2021-08-26; Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 15). The same sources note that clicas can vary in size (Paarlberg 2021-08-26; Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 15) from 30 to 500 members (Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 15) or "from less than a dozen to several hundred members" (Paarlberg 2021-08-26). Sources report that MS-13 and Barrio 18 each have a leadership council in Guatemala, called a rueda [circle] (Tol Gutiérrez 2024, 34; Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 15), made up of "[i]mprisoned senior members" (Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 2).

According to sources, clicas operate ["largely" (Paarlberg 2021-08-26)] "independently" (Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 15; Paarlberg 2021-08-26). Cruz et al. adds that although clicas are "controlled by senior members" and these leaders will sometimes cooperate with other clica leaders, one leader will not control multiple clicas (2020-12, 15). According to an article by Manuel Antonio Tol Gutiérrez [4], appearing in Diálogo Forense, a peer-reviewed journal published by Guatemala's National Institute of Forensic Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Forenses, INACIF) (INACIF n.d.), each clica has a leader (ranflero) who controls its activities and ensures that the orders from more senior leaders are carried out (Tol Gutiérrez 2024, 35).

Cruz, et al. state, citing "authorities" and survey participants, that MS-13 is "better organized, more professional, and wealthier" than Barrio 18, though the latter has more members and "covers a larger territory" (2020-12, 15).

2.1 Barrio 18

Barrio 18 is a "well-established international criminal organization and violent street gang" (US 2024-12-09) or "one of the largest youth gangs in the Western Hemisphere" with "cells operating from Central America to Canada" (InSight Crime 2023-11-14). It emerged in Los Angeles in the 1980s (InSight Crime 2023-11-14; US 2018-01-18, 1). Sources indicate that the group has a "strong" (InSight Crime 2024-01-18) or "notable" (AQ 2021, 39) presence in Guatemala (InSight Crime 2024-01-18; AQ 2021, 39). The US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), in a 2018 address to a US House of Representatives subcommittee, stated that transnational gangs, "especially" Barrio 18, are "increasingly extending operations" in Guatemala as efforts to fight these groups have "intensif[ied]" in El Salvador and Honduras (US 2018-01-18, 1).

An article from Prensa Libre indicates that according to the Ministry of Interior (Ministerio de Gobernación, Mingob), Barrio 18 is made up of [translation] "more than" 20 clicas nationwide, each with their own leadership and area of operation (2024-05-29). Sources indicate that in Guatemala the Barrio 18 leadership council, the Rueda, "coordinates" (InSight Crime 2023-11-14) or [translation] "oversees" (Tol Gutiérrez 2024, 34) the group's activities (InSight Crime 2023-11-14; Tol Gutiérrez 2024, 34).

Citing a professor at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, Americas Quarterly (AQ) [5] indicates that Barrio 18 has a "reputation for irrational violence and extreme cruelty" (AQ 2021, 39). InSight Crime similarly states in its 2018 profile of the group that Barrio 18 contributes to violence against local communities "to a greater extent" than MS-13 (2018-02-13).

According to sources, Barrio 18's criminal activities include the following:

• murder for hire (AQ 2021, 39; InSight Crime 2018-02-13; Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 15),
• drug sales (InSight Crime 2018-02-13) or "petty drug trafficking" (AQ 2021, 39; Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 15),
• extortion (AQ 2021, 39; VOA 2024-06-07; Acuña Jerónimo 2023-09-01, 40),
• human trafficking (AQ 2021, 39; La Hora 2025-03-28),
• prostitution (InSight Crime 2018-02-13),
• theft (InSight Crime 2018-02-13), and
• kidnapping (InSight Crime 2018-02-13; Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 15).
  
  

Sources identify extortion as the primary source of revenue for the gang (Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 15; InSight Crime 2024-01-18; Acuña Jerónimo 2023-09-01, 40). According to the head of the PNC's anti-gang task force (División Nacional Contra el Desarrollo Criminal de las Pandillas, DIPANDA), in an interview with Lizandro Alberto Acuña Jerónimo published in the Revista Análisis de la Realidad Nacional [6], Barrio 18 are not selective about who they extort and will target [translation] "anyone" (Acuña Jerónimo 2023-09-01, 41). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

2.2 MS-13

Like Barrio 18, MS-13 is a criminal organization created in Los Angeles in the 1980s (Ruiz 2022-01, 3; AQ 2021, 38). Sources indicate that the group has a "strong" (InSight Crime 2024-01-18) or "significant" (Canada 2025-02-20) presence in Guatemala (InSight Crime 2024-01-18; Canada 2025-02-20). InSight Crime states that MS-13 is a "significant threat to citizen security" in urban areas of Guatemala (2025-04-03).

According to sources, MS-13's criminal activities include the following:

• extortion (Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 15; InSight Crime 2025-04-03; AQ 2021, 38),
• "petty" drug trafficking (Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 15; InSight Crime 2025-04-03; AQ 2021, 38),
• kidnapping (Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 15),
• money laundering (AQ 2021, 38),
• murder for hire (Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 15; AQ 2021, 38),
• international human and drug trafficking in a "support[ing]" role (InSight Crime 2025-04-03).
  
  

Sources identify extortion as the primary source of revenue for the gang (Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 15; InSight Crime 2024-01-18; Acuña Jerónimo 2023-09-01, 40). The head of DIPANDA stated in the interview with Acuña Jerónimo that MS-13 is [translation] "more selective" in its extortion activities than Barrio 18, and targets businesses (Acuña Jerónimo 2023-09-01, 41). Sources indicate that the group particularly extorts transportation companies (InSight Crime 2025-04-03; ACLED 2025-07-11).

3. Family Clans and Organized Crime Groups

According to InSight Crime, drug trafficking groups in Guatemala include the Mendoza, Lorenzana, Ortiz López, and León family clans (2024-01-18). The same source notes that these groups previously "controlled strategic areas near the borders and maintained strong contacts in the security forces and political circles" but were "largely dismantled" by law enforcement in the 2010s (InSight Crime 2024-01-18). This made room for "smaller, lesser-known groups" that "often" forge "alliances" with local security forces and authorities (InSight Crime 2024-01-18). ACLED mentioned, however, that the Lorenzana family continues to have a presence in Zacapa and Petén (2025-07-11). InSight Crime notes that the drug trafficking group Los Huistas in western Huehuetenango was not successfully dismantled in the 2010s and that the group has built "strategic ties with high-level politicians" (2024-01-18). ACLED similarly indicated that as of 2025 Los Huistas are present in Huehuetenango (2025-07-11).

GI-TOC indicates that Guatemalan drug traffickers "are believed to have influenced local mayoral elections"; they also use their power to influence "[c]orrupt state-embedded actors" into supporting and protecting their illegal operations (2023, 5).

According to InSight Crime, drug traffickers "seek municipal power," since mayors have "political immunity" and influence over local law enforcement, as well as access to state contracts allowing for money laundering (2023-06-20).

A May 2024 InSight Crime article notes that Guatemalan mayors' control of security forces enables them to "divert attention" away from drug shipments, while the immunity they receive [while in office (InSight Crime 2021-01-29)] grants them "additional protection" (2024-05-21). In a 2023 article, Ojoconmipisto [7] identifies 5 mayors from San Marcos Department with pending or completed US extradition orders against them for drug trafficking (2023-03-28). Similarly, an August 2025 US Department of Justice (DOJ) press release reports on Romeo Ramos Cruz's extradition to the US; according to the release, court documents indicate that from 2022–2024, while mayor of Santa Lucia in Escuintla Department, Ramos Cruz "exploited his official position" to act as a "key member" of a Guatemala-based criminal organization trafficking in cocaine destined for US markets (US 2025-08-06).

3.1 Los Huistas

The information in the following paragraph was provided in a 2022 press release from the US Department of the Treasury on sanctions against members of Los Huistas:

Los Huistas is the "dominant" drug trafficking group in the Guatemalan department of Huehuetenango. Its leaders are Eugenio Darío Molina López and Aler Baldomero Samayoa Recinos. Los Huistas has engaged in

• smuggling cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin from northern Guatemala to the US in collaboration with Mexican organizations such as the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG;
• producing heroin and methamphetamine destined for the US;
• cultivating poppies in Huehuetenango and San Marcos departments;
• manufacturing methamphetamine; and
• money laundering (US 2022-03-18).
  
  

A US DOJ press release describes Los Huistas as follows:

[Los Huistas] acted as a critical link in the illicit supply chain of cocaine from South America to Mexican cartels, and ultimately into the United States. [Its leaders] allegedly controlled and operated a sophisticated transportation network within Guatemala—including warehouses, trucking routes, and properties on the Guatemala-Mexico border—to transport cocaine from Guatemala to the Sinaloa Cartel. (US 2025-05-15)

The US Treasury states that both Los Huistas' leaders have been indicted by US courts on drug trafficking charges, as have 2 of their family members (US 2022-03-18). The US DOJ announced in May 2025 that Samayoa Recinos and his son-in-law, Freddy Arnoldo Salazar Flores, had both appeared before a US federal court (US 2025-05-15). Sources report that Salazar Flores represented Guatemala in the Central American Parliament (Parlamento Centroamericano, Parlacen) (Infobae 2022-03-18; US 2022-03-18) for the 2020–2024 term (Infobae 2022-03-18). Sources indicate that Salazar Flores' wife, Samayoa Recinos' daughter, was also elected to Parlacen in 2019 (Soy502 2022-03-18; La Hora 2025-05-15).

Media sources report that Sofia Hernández Herrera, a member of Guatemala's Congress, has family ties to Los Huistas (eP Investiga 2025-03-12; Prensa Libre 2022-03-18; Plaza Pública 2024-03-04):

• Her nephew was extradited to the US on drug trafficking charges (Plaza Pública 2024-03-04; InSight Crime 2023-06-20; US 2023-12-12) in 2022 and pled guilty to smuggling cocaine (Plaza Pública 2024-03-04; US 2023-12-12).
• One of her brothers was arrested for his part in a plan to obstruct justice on behalf of a member of Los Huistas (Prensa Libre 2022-03-18; eP Investiga 2025-03-12). He pled guilty and was convicted (Plaza Pública 2024-03-04; Prensa Libre 2022-03-18).
• Another brother was found by prosecutors to have links to a "network of companies" owned by Los Huistas members (InSight Crime 2023-06-20).
  
  

Sources report that Hernández Herrera represents Huehuetenango Department in Congress (Prensa Libre 2022-03-18; Plaza Pública 2024-03-04). According to eP Investiga, a news publication covering Guatemala (eP Investiga n.d.), she is not the only family member to hold political office; other relatives also occupy [translation] "key positions" in Huehuetenango (eP Investiga 2025-03-12).

3.2 Los Pochos

The information in the following paragraph was provided in a US Department of the Treasury press release announcing renewed sanctions for Los Pochos in 2024:

Los Pochos is a Guatemala-based organization that "primarily" smuggles cocaine to the US has links with the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel. Los Pochos' members are involved in local politics. The group was headed by the Mayor of the town of Ayutla [on the Mexican border], Erik [Erick] Salvador Súñiga Rodriguez, until he was extradited to the US in 2019. His son-in-law, Juan Jose Morales Cifuentes, became a leader of Los Pochos at that point. Morales Cifuentes has a reputation for resorting to violence, including executions, to "resolve conflicts" and was arrested in 2023. As of February 2024, he was awaiting extradition to the US. His wife—Súñiga Rodriguez's daughter—Isel Aneli Súñiga Morfin, became Mayor of Ayutla in 2023 and "reportedly uses her political connections" to assist Los Pochos. Los Pochos "relies on corrupt public officials, including police and military officers, prosecutors, and other Guatemalan authorities, to facilitate" its criminal activities (US 2024-02-28).

The Assistant Director of the anti-narcotics unit within Guatemala's Public Prosecutor's Office [also translated as Public Ministry, Attorney General's Office or Office of the Prosecutor General] (Ministerio Público), interviewed by InSight Crime, stated that Los Pochos received help from municipal police, including access to police cameras to monitor the population (InSight Crime 2021-08-03). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The May 2024 InSight Crime article indicates that Morales Cifuentes has been extradited to the US, though Súñiga Morfin has not been charged despite US sanctions, due to "political immunity afforded to all Guatemalan mayors" (2024-05-21). The article notes that the "[s]ustained US pressure" on Los Pochos is "unlikely to have dealt a fatal blow" to the organization given its connections with politicians, law enforcement, and, "purported[ly]," the Sinaloa Cartel (2024-05-21). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

3.3 Familia Preciado Navarijo

Sources report that since 2004 the Preciado Navarijo family has had a [translation] "strong political influence" (Prensa Libre 2024-09-09) or "political control" (InSight Crime 2021-03-12) over the municipality of Ocós, San Marcos Department (Prensa Libre 2024-09-09; InSight Crime 2021-03-12). eP Investiga states, citing a former government official, that [translation] "small cartel groups," including the Preciado Navarijo family, have divided up control of the San Marcos region since Juan Chamalé, the region's "top boss," was arrested in 2011 (2024-11-12). The same source adds that the Preciado Navarijo family controls the [neighbouring] municipalities of La Blanca and Ocós (eP Investiga 2024-11-12). InSight Crime indicates that Ocós is "strategic" for drug trafficking given its location near the Mexican border and Pacific coast; the "majority" of drugs from South America pass through the area (2021-03-12).

The information in the following paragraph was provided in an article from eP Investiga, citing a former high-ranking government official:

The Preciado Navarijo [translation] "organized crime structure" began by transporting migrants across the Guatemalan border with Mexico. From there, Carlos Preciado Navarijo was recruited by a high-level drug trafficker, Mauro Salomón Ramírez Barrios, who was interested in the family's experience with migrant smuggling routes and its access to the ocean via Ocós. Ramírez Barrios was eventually extradited to the US, but Preciado Navarijo continued accepting [drug] shipments and smuggling them over the border into Mexico (eP Investiga 2024-11-12).

According to sources, prominent Preciado Navarijo family members include the following:

• Edilma Navarijo de Léon, the family matriarch, who served as mayor of Ocós from 2004 to 2016 (Ojoconmipisto 2023-03-28; Prensa Libre 2024-09-09). In 2019 she became mayor of La Blanca, a municipality that split off from Ocós in 2014 (eP Investiga 2024-11-12; InSight Crime 2021-03-12). She was re-elected to that role for the 2024–2028 term (Prensa Libre 2024-09-09).
• Vivian Preciado Navarijo, her daughter, who was elected to represent San Marcos in Congress in 2015 (Prensa Libre 2024-09-09; InSight Crime 2021-03-12; eP Investiga 2024-11-12) and re-elected in 2019 (InSight Crime 2021-03-12; eP Investiga 2024-11-12). According to InSight Crime, she was detained and released in 2010 over "accus[ations]" of "manufacturing a coverup" for a former police officer convicted of extrajudicial killings (2021-03-12).
• Carlos Preciado Navarijo, Navarijo de Léon's son, who was elected mayor of Ocós in 2019 (eP Investiga 2024-11-12; InSight Crime 2021-03-12). He was arrested in January 2021 on drug charges and extradited to the US (InSight Crime 2021-03-12; Prensa Libre 2024-09-09; Soy502 2024-09-09). He pled guilty to trafficking cocaine and was sentenced to 10 years in prison in 2024 (Prensa Libre 2024-09-09; eP Investiga 2024-11-12; Soy502 2024-09-09).
• Alma Lucrecia Hernandez Preciado, [aunt to the Preciado Navarijo siblings (InSight Crime 2021-03-12; Ojoconmipisto 2023-03-28)], who received a 30-year sentence from a US court in 2011 on drug charges (InSight Crime 2021-03-12; eP Investiga 2024-11-12). She was linked to the Chamalé drug group (InSight Crime 2021-03-12; Ojoconmipisto 2023-03-28).
  
  

4. Ability and Motivation of Organized Crime Groups and Gangs to Track Individuals

Information on the ability and motivation of organized crime groups and gangs to track individuals in Guatemala was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The information in this section was provided by the ACLED representative in correspondence with the Research Directorate:

If a person moves from one of the municipalities with a strong gang presence to another, there is a high chance that they will be tracked down by either the same gang they were fleeing from, or a rival gang, depending on the dominant actor in the neighborhood they relocate to, and hence fall victim [to] retaliation.

If a person flees from a drug trafficking group's threat in a rural department, they are likely to move to a more urban setting. If this happens, they may escape the retaliation of the drug trafficking group but are likely to end up in suburban sectors of a city with a strong gang presence, hence replacing one threat with another.

It is highly unlikely that a person fleeing from a gang in urban settings tries to resettle in more rural areas, due to the lack of economic opportunities and, in many cases, the cultural and linguistic barriers that moving to an area with an Indigenous majority would represent.

"[N]ormally," when an individual moves to a neighbourhood controlled by an urban gang, such as Barrio 18 or MS-13, gang members will "directly" ask the new arrival where they came from. The gang then contacts its clicas in other cities to check if the individual is telling the truth and if they come from a rival gang's territory. If the person came from a neighbourhood controlled by the same gang, members will check if the person "owes anything to the gang."

Urban gangs and drug trafficking groups are distinct entities. Urban gangs, such as Barrio 18 and MS-13, "most common[ly]" track and target civilians in order to

• enforc[e] extortion threats, to instill sufficient fear among other extortion victims and thus ensure they pay up;
• sanctio[n] disrespect of gang rules, such as
  
  • denouncing to the police;
  • refusing to become a sentimental partner of gang members (in the case of women), to be recruited, or simply to carry out favors (i.e., moving an object from point A to point B, or hiding a weapon in someone's house); or
• punis[h] those who are suspected to be a rival gang's collaborators, particularly in a context where a [territory] is disputed.
  
  

Drug trafficking organizations, such as Los Huistas and the Lorenzana family, are likely to target individuals who "hinder their activities," including forest rangers, local politicians, prosecutors, and police officers. However, individuals "can be targeted" for "an offence or a perceived lack of respect" (ACLED 2025-07-11).

4.1 Profile of Targeted Individuals

Information on the profile of individuals targeted by organized crime groups and gangs was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The information in this section was provided by the ACLED representative in correspondence with the Research Directorate:

The transport sector is "by far" the "most targeted" by organized crime groups, "particular[ly]" gangs. In Guatemala, "almost" 1 in 5 incidents of violence against civilians since 2018 targeted transport sector workers. Bus and taxi drivers are "often" targeted to punish transport company owners for delaying or failing to pay extortion. "[A]round" 70% of violence against transportation workers occurred in the Guatemala Department, where MS-13 and Barrio 18 "have the strongest presence."

Other groups similarly at risk of violence include

• shop owners
• "delivery services" workers (including those who deliver food, water, gas and electrical services)
• garbage collectors
• restaurant workers.
  
  

Women are also "frequent target[s]," because they "often own or work in food-related businesses," such as market stands or restaurants (ACLED 2025-07-11).

4.1.1 Profiles of Individuals Targeted for Recruitment

Information on the profiles of individuals targeted for recruitment was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to the Director General of the PNC, cited by Prensa Libre, although youth have been recruited into gangs since the 1990s, the practice has become more common in the last decade as gang leaders seek to increase profits (2024-09-26). The same article indicates that according to DIPANDA, Barrio 18 recruits minors to transport marijuana and illegal arms, collect extortion money, and perform contract killings, while MS-13 recruits minors to distribute cocaine and to run small businesses used for money laundering and contract killing (Prensa Libre 2024-09-26). The Guatemalan daily newspaper La Hora reported that in May 2025 authorities arrested 20 members of Barrio 18 for a child recruitment scheme in which minors were lured in through social media, taken captive under threat of violence, [translation] "sexually abused," and "forced" to commit crimes (2024-03-28).

5. State Response to Organized Crime

The BTI 2024 report indicates that the country's homicide rate has declined from 45 per 100,000 in 2009 to "around" 17 per 100,000 from 2020 to 2022 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2024, 32). The report notes that the Guatemalan government attributes the decline to "improved policing, including better intelligence, more police officers and soldiers, cross-border operations against drug trafficking and community outreach programs," but observes that COVID-19 lockdowns were also a contributing factor (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2024, 32).

BTI 2022 indicates that criminal networks in Guatemala are "deeply embedded in public institutions" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 6). The same source adds that the country has

a political elite that controls key institutions such as the Public Ministry, the Supreme Court and the police, which protect major criminal activities. Currently, corrupt networks are mainly embedded in the legislative, neutralizing the work of security institutions to fight organized crime, especially at the local level through mayors and deputies. (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 6)

GI-TOC's 2023 report indicates that the abolishment of the UN-backed anti-corruption body [International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala, CICIG)] "has left investigative and judicial authorities vulnerable to criminal organizations entrenched in state institutions and deprived them of international support" (2023, 6). The same source adds that since its shutdown, there has been a rise in attacks against judiciary personnel for "investigating corruption and organized crime" (GI-TOC 2023, 6).

GI-TOC also lists several factors that undermine the work of the law enforcement units that combat organized crime, namely:

• "understaffing, lack of equipment, corruption and poor coordination with investigators";
• a "lack of public confidence" in the PNC;
• an intelligence system that is "inefficient due to poor coordination between police, military, civil and strategic intelligence units"; and
• "corrupt and under-equipped" border control agents (2023, 6).
  
  

Sources indicate that in February 2024, the administration of President Arévalo [who took office in January 2024] created a new anti-extortion taskforce, consisting of approximately 400 officers on motorcycles (AGN 2024-02-08; Soy502 2024-02-08). The Guatemalan state news agency Agencia Guatemalteca de Noticias (AGN) reports that 2,533 people were arrested on charges of extortion from January to the beginning of December 2024 (2024-12-03).

6. State Protection for Victims and Witnesses

The Guatemalan media outlet Soy502 indicates that individuals can report crimes anonymously online or by telephone, but that PNC detectives [translation] "recommend" that victims of extortion make a report in person at either the DIPANDA office or the Public Prosecutor's main office, both located in Zone 1 in Guatemala City (2024-10-24).

The head of DIPANDA stated in the interview with Acuña Jerónimo that DIPANDA is the police unit in charge of investigating extortion-related crimes, while also coordinating with other law enforcement units to provide protection services to victims (Acuña Jerónimo 2023-09-01, 41, 42). According to the same source, once a report has been made to DIPANDA, the victim will be assigned a security and investigative team; the victim's local police station is responsible for providing them with [translation] "perimeter security" (Acuña Jerónimo 2023-09-01, 42).

ACLED's representative noted, however, that due to ties between gangs and "corrupt police and judicial authorities in many areas," victims risk that gang members will learn of formal complaints they file (2025-07-11). Prensa Libre reports that the government's Crime Stoppers hotline and online platform allow for anonymous reporting and notes that over a two-year period [translation] "more than" 3,200 investigations were opened in response to citizen reports to Crime Stoppers (2024-01-03). ACLED's representative stated that although in "recent years" the Public Prosecutor's Office has established offices across the country, making it more accessible to file a complaint, this has not been accompanied by "greater investigative capacity" for the police, nor by a greater "ability to protect victims of gang violence" (2025-07-11).

GI-TOC's 2023 report indicates that while the Public Prosecutor's Office has a witness protection program and a dedicated unit to support victims, they "lack transparency and the country's weak institutional framework creates a climate of impunity that diminishes the effectiveness of victim support initiatives" (2023). According to ACLED's representative, state protection mechanisms in Guatemala are "virtually non-existent," with "very limited" witness protection programs for "high-impact" cases, and "very limited and underfunded" programs for relocating victims (2025-07-11). The source added that "mos[t]" relocation programs for witnesses and survivors of organized crime violence are operated by NGOs, "which may have further scaled down their operations" as a result of "recent" cuts to funding from the US government (ACLED 2025-07-11).

The information in the following paragraph was provided in Guatemala's [most recent (CIEN 2025-09-25)] National Survey on the Perception of Public Safety and Victimization in Guatemala (Encuesta nacional de percepción de seguridad pública y victimización en Guatemala, ENPEVI) [8]:

Of victims of a crime surveyed, 77.1% had not reported it to the authorities. The percentage of such [translation] "hidden crime" varied depending on the type of crime. Car and motorcycle theft were most often reported (84.9% and 80.9% of the time, respectively). In contrast, 64.9% of extortions went unreported. Asked about the effectiveness of state institutions, 48.3% of respondents stated that the PNC's work had "little or no effec[t]." For judges and the court system, this figure was 40.1% (Guatemala 2019-11, 62, 76, 80, 156).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] InfoSegura is a regional partnership between the UNDP and the USAID that works with Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic to "improve their citizen security indicators" and support the implementation of public policies that combat violence and insecurity (Infosegura n.d.). ^[back]

[2] The study on gangs in Guatemala was conducted by a team of researchers assembled by Florida International University (FIU), the American Institutes for Research (AIR), and Democracy International (DI), with funding from USAID (Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 1, 5). AIR is a non-profit organization that carries out behavioural and social science research (AIR n.d.). DI is a US-based organization that harnesses behavioural science to improve development aid (DI 2023-07-10). Respondents included 57 former gang members and 48 "experts," ranging from community stakeholders to government officials, and data was collected from October 2019 to June 2020 (Cruz, et al. 2020-12, 1). ^[back]

[3] The Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy is an institute at the FIU that provides research and education on public policy and national security topics (FIU n.d.). ^[back]

[4] Manuel Antonio Tol Gutiérrez is affiliated with the Department of Criminal Analysis (Dirección de Análisis Criminal) at Guatemala's Public Prosecutor's Office (Tol Gutiérrez 2024, 31). ^[back]

[5] Americas Quarterly (AQ) is a US-based magazine covering business, culture and politics, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean (AQ n.d.). ^[back]

[6] The Revista Análisis de la Realidad Nacional is a peer-reviewed journal published by the Institute for Analysis and Research on National Problems (Instituto de Análisis e Investigación de los Problemas Nacionales) of the Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala (USAC) (USAC n.d.). Lizandro Alberto Acuña Jerónimo is a researcher at the Institute (Acuña Jerónimo 2023-09-01, 38). ^[back]

[7] Ojoconmipisto is a Guatemala-based digital media outlet run by the "journalist organization" Laboratorio de Medios (IPI 2021-12-08). Ojoconmipisto focuses its reporting on "the management of public resources in Guatemala's municipalities" (IPI 2021-12-08). ^[back]

[8] The ENPEVI survey was carried out by Mingob and Guatemala's National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE) between December 2017 and February 2018, with a sample size of 17,784 households (Guatemala 2019-11, 3, 196). ^[back]

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Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: associate professor at a university in the US whose research focuses on gangs, police, and criminal violence in Central America; postdoctoral fellow at a university in the US who research includes gangs in Central America and Guatemala; Washington Office on Latin America.

Internet sites, including: Agencia EFE; Análisis e Investigación de los Problemas Nacionales; Austrian Red Cross – ecoi.net; CNN; Diario Las Americas; El Faro; El Financiero; El Imparcial; El País; Freedom House; Guatemala – Crime Stoppers Guatemala, Instituto de Policía Nacional Civil; Human Rights Watch; Inter-American Court of Human Rights; Los Angeles Times; The New York Times; Organization of American States; Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project; Peru – Centro de Estudios Estratégicos del Ejército del Perú; Prensa Latina; Revista Summa; SWI swissinfo.ch; The Washington Post; Washington Office on Latin America.