[Translation from French]

What’s new? In 2024, the Central African Republic’s army recruited a militia from the Zandé people to fight Fulani rebels in Haut-Mbomou, a south-eastern prefecture. The ill-planned initiative has exacerbated violence against civilians and caused clashes between the militiamen, on one side, and CAR soldiers and their Russian allies, on the other.

Why does it matter? The escalation of violence led the authorities to suspend integration of the Zandé militia into the army in May, deepening the hostility of the fighters toward government forces and raising fears of further deadly confrontations. The episode has also exposed the risks of the army’s use of self-defence groups.

What should be done? To calm the south east and promote social cohesion, Bangui should launch an intercommunal dialogue and undertake economic development projects. It should also negotiate with the militia over the fate of the cashiered fighters, while committing to funding a professional army whose ranks are as diverse as the country’s population.

Executive Summary

In 2024, the army of the Central African Republic (CAR) recruited a militia from among the Zandé people to help it fight the Fulani rebels of the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) in Haut-Mbomou, a prefecture in the country’s south east. This initiative has helped contain the rebellion, but in other ways it has destabilised the region. Believing the authorities to be complacent toward their UPC adversaries and angered by other problems with their incorporation into the army, the Zandé militiamen have engaged in deadly clashes with CAR soldiers and the Russian paramilitaries fighting alongside them. They have also staged several attacks on Fulani civilians. The government suspended the militia’s merger into the army in May, exacerbating its hostility toward state forces and fuelling fears of further violence. To reduce tensions in Haut-Mbomou, the authorities should promote intercommunal dialogue and invest in the prefecture’s economic development. They should also enter negotiations with the militia over the fate of its fighters, while refocusing on building a professional army whose ranks are representative of the country’s diversity.

The Zandé are the largest ethnic group in Haut-Mbomou, a prefecture 1,300km from CAR’s capital, Bangui. There are also Zandé communities in South Sudan to the east and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the south. Primarily subsistence farmers, the Zandé in CAR have been under pressure from ethnic Fulani herders encroaching upon their croplands since the 1980s and been harried repeatedly by armed groups. Their troubles got worse in late 2016, with the arrival of the UPC, a movement with origins in the Séléka, a rebel coalition whose coup in 2013 plunged CAR into more than a decade of turmoil. Claiming to be defending the Fulani, the UPC seized the prefecture’s major towns and attacked Zandé civilians. Feeling abandoned by the state, young Zandé formed a self-defence militia in March 2023, called Azandé Ani Kpi Gbé, which means “many Zandé are dead” in the local language. Comprising around 1,000 fighters, the militia quickly assailed the UPC to drive the rebels out of Haut-Mbomou, but it lacked the wherewithal to completely defeat them.

Thanks to its active political wing in Bangui, the militia attracted the attention of CAR’s government and its Russian allies from the Wagner Group, the Kremlin-linked security company, leading the latter to offer training to some of the Zandé fighters. The aim was to help the government in its own war with the UPC, but also to let Wagner gain a foothold in the south east. In May 2024, 200 Zandé fighters underwent a course of instruction with Russian paramilitaries and subsequently joined the national army, operating under Russian command. The following month, the newly incorporated militiamen took part in a large-scale offensive with government forces that considerably weakened the UPC’s position in the prefecture.

But despite this success, security in Haut-Mbomou continued to deteriorate. By relying on the Zandé militia, the CAR authorities exacerbated rather than relieved tensions in the prefecture. The militia was integrated into the army hastily. The Zandé fighters showed little respect for military discipline; they also complained about not receiving bonuses on schedule and about being used as cannon fodder. Distrustful of the authorities, whom they considered too conciliatory toward the UPC, the militiamen responded with acts of insubordination to their Russian superiors, who punished them harshly, and carried out deadly raids on government forces and Fulani civilians. The authorities subsequently stopped integrating Zandé into the army. They managed to disarm about a hundred of those who had been incorporated, but the remainder hung on to their weapons and joined the rest of the self-defence force in the bush. Meanwhile, since February, a number of militiamen have rallied behind their ethnic brethren in the south-western part of South Sudan, where the Zandé are engaged in a power struggle with the rival Balanda minority.

Bangui now faces a major decision. The violence that followed the creation of the militia in 2023, and its subsequent partial incorporation into the army, left nearly 200 people dead and thousands displaced in the Haut-Mbomou region, primarily from the Fulani. Disarming the Zandé fighters has fragmented the militia’s command, while heightening its animosity toward the state, raising fears of further violence, including against civilians. This episode has also highlighted the risks associated with Bangui’s use of self-defence groups to aid the national army in suppressing revolts. Since 2021, the army has resorted to this tactic on several occasions. But in doing so, it has overstretched the state’s financial capacities, leading to the difficulties with pay that infuriated the Zandé militiamen. The use of militias also flouts key principles of the national defence policy adopted in late 2024 to try ending the country’s cycle of crisis, particularly that the state should create an army whose ranks reflect the country’s communal diversity. Such an army would be better positioned to stay neutral in CAR’s internal disputes and thus better able to protect civilians.

In order to ease tensions and promote social cohesion in Haut-Mbomou, particularly ahead of the general elections in December, the CAR authorities should, with the help of partners such as the UN, sponsor intercommunal dialogue and take measures to develop the area economically, such as building roads. Meanwhile, Bangui should open negotiations with the Zandé militia over the fate of its fighters. The authorities could consider resuming their integration into the army, provided that they simply stay under the CAR military’s command and are no longer subject to Wagner’s. In accordance with the 2024 defence policy, the government should build a neutral, ethnically representative national army. Finally, Bangui should step up cooperation with Juba to prevent the alliance between the Zandé of CAR and South Sudan from fuelling violence in CAR’s south east.