• Increase efforts to identify sex and labor trafficking victims among vulnerable populations, including domestic workers and workers in the palm oil and disposable glove manufacturing sectors.
• Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking cases – as distinct from migrant smuggling – including those involving complicit officials and forced labor crimes.
• Provide trauma-informed and victim-centered services to all identified potential trafficking victims; identify and refer victims to services without requiring their participation in criminal proceedings.
• Train officials, including police, labor inspectors, and immigration officials, on SOPs for victim identification that include information on trafficking indicators; where possible, implement train-the-trainer programs, particularly for specialist roles.
• Increase law enforcement capacity to investigate and prosecute trafficking cases, including by improving interagency coordination and expediting status determinations for potential victims.
• Provide resources for and increasingly support the mechanism to provide interpretation services for victims.
• Institutionalize, resource, and increase staffing for the Victim Assistance Specialist program, including by appointing specialists in East Malaysian states.
• Improve case management and communication with trafficking victims, including through the consistent request and use of interpreters and the Victim Assistance Specialist program.
• Expand efforts to inform migrant workers of their rights under Malaysian labor laws – including their right to maintain access to their passports at any time – and their options for legal recourse to exploitation.
• Establish a Malaysian Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants (MAPO) Council presence in East Malaysia to enhance interagency coordination, strategic initiatives, and monitoring of anti-trafficking impacts and outcomes.
• Include language on protections for foreign workers in model contracts and bilateral MOUs with labor source countries.
• Make public the results of investigations involving corrupt officials to increase transparency and deterrence and hold officials criminally accountable.
• Expand cooperation with NGOs, including on victim rehabilitation services.
• Eliminate recruitment or placement fees charged to workers by recruiters and ensure any recruitment fees are paid by employers.
• Expedite and continue to provide trafficking victims approval for freedom of movement in shelters, including unchaperoned movement and permission to work.

The government maintained mixed law enforcement efforts.

The 2007 Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants (ATIPSOM) Act, as amended, criminalized labor trafficking and sex trafficking and prescribed punishments of three to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine, which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave offenses, such as rape. The Employment Act of 1955, as amended, criminalized forced labor offenses by employers using threats of intimidation, restriction of movement, or fraud to induce labor or services. The law prescribed penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment, a fine of 100,000 Malaysian ringgit (RM) ($22,381), or both; the penalties available under the Employment Act were significantly lower than those available under the ATIPSOM Act.

Law enforcement initiated 188 trafficking investigations (38 for sex trafficking, 122 for labor trafficking, and 18 for unspecified forms of exploitation); this compares with initiating 157 trafficking investigations in the previous reporting period. Officials also continued 88 previously initiated investigations (21 for sex trafficking, 65 for labor trafficking, and two for unspecified forms of trafficking). The Attorney General’s Chambers (AGC) initiated prosecutions of 72 alleged traffickers (eight for sex trafficking and 64 for labor trafficking), compared with 117 prosecutions initiated in the previous reporting period (22 for sex trafficking, 77 for labor trafficking, and 18 for unspecified forms of exploitation). The AGC prosecuted 50 of the alleged traffickers under the ATIPSOM Act (67 in the previous reporting period), and 22 alleged traffickers under non-trafficking laws (the Immigration Act, Penal Code, the Passport Act, the Child Act, and the Children and Young Persons [Employment] Act). Fifty prosecutions initiated in previous reporting periods charged under the ATIPSOM Act remained ongoing. Courts convicted 26 traffickers (10 for sex trafficking and 16 for forced labor) which included 11 convictions under the ATIPSOM Act for trafficking offenses. This was a decrease from 54 traffickers convicted in the previous reporting period (20 for sex trafficking and 34 for labor trafficking). Courts sentenced all convicted traffickers to penalties ranging from seven to 10 years’ imprisonment under the ATIPSOM Act and from nine to 12 years’ imprisonment under non-trafficking laws. Courts also convicted 16 individuals for withholding the passports of employees under the Passport Act of 1966, compared with 19 in the previous reporting period; the government did not report whether it investigated these individuals for trafficking crimes. Officials did not consistently understand the definition of trafficking and continued to conflate human trafficking and migrant smuggling, which impeded some anti-trafficking law enforcement and victim identification efforts. The government sometimes pursued cases of forced labor as disparate labor law violations instead of criminal cases of trafficking or failed to investigate them at all. The government did not adequately address or criminally pursue credible allegations of labor trafficking in the disposable glove manufacturing and palm oil production sectors; however, the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) reported initiating an investigation under the ATIPSOM Act in Sabah.

The government reported collaborating with foreign law enforcement in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Nigeria on trafficking investigations; this resulted in one trafficking prosecution in Malaysia. Authorities charged three individuals with trafficking crimes from investigations initiated in 2023 after foreign authorities discovered 43 Malaysians forced to commit fraud in Peru; further investigations remained ongoing and the case remained pending in court at the end of the reporting period. The prosecution of four Thai nationals extradited to Malaysia in the previous reporting period remained ongoing as part of a case initiated in 2015 after the discovery of a mass grave containing migrants and human trafficking victims on the Thailand-Malaysia border.

Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action. In September 2024, the Malaysia Anti-Corruption Commission conducted a law enforcement action resulting in the arrest of 49 immigration officials and one police official – including a senior immigration officer allegedly in charge – for accepting bribes to circumvent proper immigration checks for incoming foreign nationals at an international airport; two officials were charged under the Penal Code and the anti-corruption law, while 48 officials remained under investigation the end of the reporting period. The Immigration Department of Malaysia issued a public statement confirming the arrests of allegedly complicit government officials; all officials under investigation were reassigned to other posts. In October 2024, the media reported the Department of Labor (DOL) prosecuted a public schoolteacher for sex trafficking crimes under the trafficking law; the case remained ongoing at the end of the reporting period. In November 2024, courts convicted a police officer under the ATIPSOM and Immigration Acts for exploiting a foreign domestic worker in forced labor, and sentenced him to 12 years’ imprisonment, and ordered a fine of 80,000 RM ($17,905). The officer appealed the sentence and the case remained ongoing. Courts continued a prosecution initiated in the previous reporting period of two immigration officials allegedly facilitating migrant smuggling.

The RMP served as the lead enforcement agency and had a specialized anti-trafficking unit; the Ministry of Human Resources’ (MOHR) Labor Department also had a specialized trafficking enforcement team. Anti-trafficking law enforcement officials lacked sufficient resources to carry out their mandates. Malaysia’s criminal justice system continued to suffer resource constraints and uneven application of investigative and prosecutorial standards, which at times prevented judicial authorities from following through on trafficking cases. Although the government continued to operate an interagency anti-trafficking law enforcement task force under the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Council (MAPO Council), coordination among agencies remained inadequate and primarily only occurred in Peninsular Malaysia. The AGC had 65 trafficking-specialist prosecutors. Only one judge in the country specialized in the anti-trafficking law and the government continued to operate one specialized trafficking court in Selangor; it did not implement plans to expand specialized trafficking courts around the country, citing a lack of trafficking cases to justify specialized courts. Furthermore, the lack of sufficient resources and expertise among law enforcement outside urban areas contributed to inconsistent anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. The government increased the number of anti-trafficking trainings for law enforcement officers, public prosecutors, judges, and other government officials, including on forced labor. However, civil society reported the frequent rotation of police officers hampered the success of training efforts. Previously, an observer reported instances in which criminal syndicate members were present in court during criminal proceedings, likely to intimidate victims testifying. Prosecutors and law enforcement officers used an AGC guidebook with best practices and relevant laws for trafficking prosecutions; however, observers reported prosecutors lacked sensitivity towards the experiences of trafficking victims, potentially leading to the retraumatization of victims.

The government slightly increased protection efforts.

The government identified 160 confirmed trafficking victims (34 exploited in sex trafficking and 126 exploited in forced labor) among 635 potential victims identified, compared with 165 confirmed victims among 663 potential victims in the previous reporting period (29 exploited in sex trafficking and 136 exploited in forced labor). Of the 160 confirmed victims, traffickers exploited 25 women and nine girls in sex trafficking and 72 women, 37 men, five girls, and 12 boys in forced labor; this included five victims with disabilities. The government had victim identification SOPs for law enforcement to identify victims; however, implementation varied across the country especially in rural areas and in the eastern states of Sabah and Sarawak. Officials often relied on victims of labor trafficking to self-identify. The government did not adequately screen asylum-seekers and refugees for trafficking indicators. Due to officials’ inconsistent use of victim identification SOPs, authorities did not take effective measures to prevent the inappropriate penalization of some unidentified trafficking victims for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficking; inconsistent screening also prevented some foreign and domestic trafficking victims from receiving protection services. Officials utilized the National Guidelines on Human Trafficking Indicators (NGHTI 2.0), which included a general rapid-screening checklist for trafficking indicators; screening checklists specific to trafficking in a variety of sectors, including domestic work and maritime industries; and a guide on evidence collection. Trainings on these resources were implemented during the reporting period.

The ATIPSOM Act required the government to place victims who were granted a court-ordered 21-day interim protection order (for potential trafficking victims) or a subsequent 90-day protection order (for certified trafficking victims) at a “place of refuge,” designated by the Minister of Home Affairs. The government granted full protection orders to all certified victims in accordance with the law and provided them housing in government-operated or funded shelters. Potential victims with interim protection orders could also receive shelter resources. Authorities provided victims with food; medical care; social, religious, and income-generating activities; security; and a monthly stipend of 120 RM ($27) for incidental expenditures. The law required foreign victims to remain in government shelters for the duration of their protection orders, except for those with a work permit; domestic victims could stay with family members or a guardian. The government typically renewed protection orders for certified victims until the completion of the trial associated with their case; this resulted in some victims remaining in the shelters for more than six months. NGOs reported investigative authorities sometimes did not allow sufficient time to appropriately interview potential victims in shelters to certify them as victims and grant 90-day protection orders, which prevented some victims from obtaining protection services. Authorities provided protection orders less often for undocumented foreign victims.

The Ministry of Women, Family, and Community Development (MWFCD) operated eight trafficking-specific shelters – five for women, one for men, one for girls, and one for boys – and allocated 846,160 RM ($189,382) to fund two NGO-run shelters for women and children, compared with 845,000 RM ($189,123) allocated in 2023. However, the lack of shelters in several parts of the country, most prominently in East Malaysia, reportedly discouraged investigative officers from filing trafficking cases in those regions. Shortages of shelters for men and children across the country created additional challenges for law enforcement seeking placement for trafficking victims and decreased access to services for these populations. NGOs reported structural and procedural challenges and budget limitations inhibited reporting of trafficking cases. As previously reported, the government did not finalize plans to establish a permanent shelter in Sarawak; MWFCD continued to operate a “transit center” to temporarily provide shelter for victims in Sarawak but did not report placing any victims in the shelter. The government referred six victims between April and November 2024 to an NGO-operated “One Stop Centre,” where authorities could bring victims immediately upon identification and provide temporary shelter, health screenings, interpretation, and psycho-social counseling; the shelter closed in November 2024. Protection officers and shelter staff utilized an SOP on victim-centered and trauma-informed approaches when delivering services to victims, which officials reviewed and made updates to procedures relating to care and protection order extensions. Government-funded, NGO-operated shelters continued to suffer staffing shortages and struggled to maintain adequate resources to consistently provide services, including interpreters, medical staff, and mental health counselors. Although the government continued to place translated shelter rules and regulations in five languages in government shelters, language barriers continued to affect the government’s victim services in shelters, as it did not have an institutionalized way to ensure timely and accurate communication with potential trafficking victims who did not speak Bahasa Malaysia or English. The government reported the judiciary provided interpretation services for 165 languages during court hearings through its government-funded online portal, which assigned volunteer interpreters from foreign embassies, universities, and language institutes. Authorities did not permit foreign victims to leave shelters unless the MAPO Council granted them a freedom of movement pass, contingent upon medical, safety, and psychological assessments. Although the government reported freedom of movement passes allowed victims to leave the shelters unchaperoned, in practice, most victims preferred chaperoned trips due to safety concerns or lack of familiarity with the locality near their shelters. The government issued 154 freedom of movement passes from 221 applications to potential and identified victims in 2024, compared with 357 passes issued in 2023. An NGO noted safety concerns as the most common reason the government denied pass applications. The government granted all 41 victims who applied with continued permission to work, compared with eight in the previous reporting period. NGOs reported positive progress on government efforts regarding freedom of movement policies, but noted long delays in approval processes for work permits, potentially exacerbating economic vulnerabilities and prevented victims from remaining in Malaysia.

Victims’ access to services was contingent upon their cooperation with investigations and prosecutions, impacting overall victim support and protection efforts. A 2014 directive required prosecutors to meet with victims at least two weeks prior to the start of a trial to prepare victims to record their statements and to help them understand the judicial process. However, observers noted prosecutors, shelter staff, and law enforcement underutilized interpretive services in part due to long wait times when coordinating interpreters’ availability. Language barriers and insufficient resourcing for interpretation continued to create challenges in obtaining accurate testimony for criminal cases and needs assessments for victim care. The MAPO Council maintained a roster of 51 volunteer interpreters, who spoke a total of 21 languages and received anti-trafficking training from NGOs, to be available for victims who participated in investigations or prosecutions. Limited shelter capacity in parts of the country hindered the ability of prosecutors to meet with victims who were relocated to Kuala Lumpur for services. Some foreign victims reported a reluctance to stay in Malaysia to participate in prosecutions due to fears of extended shelter stays, unsatisfactory shelter conditions, and intimidation from traffickers or officials. The law granted magistrates the authority to extend protection orders for victims to record testimony, which could be used in lieu of in-person testimony, thereby allowing a foreign victim to return to their home country ahead of a trial; the government reported that two foreign victims used this option. However, observers reported a general reluctance among officials to permit victims to return home and use this option to testify. Prosecutors requested restitution in 13 cases involving labor trafficking victims who participated in court proceedings, securing 425,000 RM ($95,121) compared with 149,000 RM ($33,348) secured for 10 cases in 2023. Courts awarded restitution to five labor trafficking victims totaling 255,000 RM ($57,073) under the ATIPSOM Act. Courts awarded restitution to one sex trafficking victim totaling 50,000 RM ($11,190). Courts awarded compensation totaling 80,000 RM ($17,905) to a victim of forced labor; the government did not report whether the trafficker complied with the sentence. Labor trafficking victims could file civil suits against their employers to obtain compensation or recoup unpaid wages; however, lengthy court processes deterred victims from filing suits.

The government had nine Victim Assistance Specialists who drafted reports for investigating officers, advocated for victims’ needs, facilitated concerns to law enforcement, and delivered trauma-informed care to trafficking victims. However, the government did not institutionalize the use of these specialists for the majority of cases, and the government and NGO representatives who served as Victim Assistance Specialists did so on a voluntary basis on top of their standard duties; the number of specialists was insufficient to adequately support the number of victims, and most specialists were located in Kuala Lumpur and Selangor. NGOs reported a reluctance among law enforcement to allow specialists to participate during law enforcement actions, which contributed to a lack of trauma-informed practices and hampered law enforcement’s ability to appropriately screen for and identify victims. Specialists could only assist victims at the discretion of the investigating officers or deputy public prosecutors. The specialists worked with 143 foreign victims, which included victims identified in previous reporting periods, compared with assisting 101 victims in 2023. Many confirmed foreign victims preferred to return immediately to their home countries. The government did not provide legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims to countries where they faced hardship or retribution. The law required officials to refer foreign victims without legal residence in Malaysia to immigration authorities for repatriation upon the expiration of their protection order.

The government worked with foreign diplomatic missions to fund and provide repatriation assistance for victims to return to their home countries; however, NGOs reported the government often did not identify Malaysian victims as trafficking victims and did not provide services to Malaysian victims identified abroad in online scam operations. The government previously reported allocating 10 million RM ($2,238,138) to provide assistance to Malaysian nationals overseas, including those trapped overseas in online scam operations. The government reported using these funds to repatriate 64 Malaysian victims from Burma in February and March 2025, but did not report whether it identified any of these individuals as trafficking victims.

The government slightly increased efforts to prevent trafficking.

The MAPO Council – which included five enforcement bodies, other government entities, and three NGOs – met once and coordinated interagency anti-trafficking efforts to implement the government’s 2021-2025 anti-trafficking NAP. The government provided a 4 million RM ($895,255) budget for the operation of the MAPO Council secretariat – the same amount allocated in the prior year. The government increased the amount allocated to MWFCD for anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling activities to 5 million RM ($1.12 million) from 1.7 million RM ($380,483) allocated in 2024. NGOs highlighted the government’s budget remained insufficient for the operation of the MAPO Council. Additionally, NGOs noted the lack of similar interagency bodies coordinating trafficking efforts at local levels, particularly in Sarawak and Sabah, hampered overall efforts. The MAPO Council approved the establishment of a Human Trafficking Advisory Group (HTAG), comprising government agencies and NGOs, to provide a mechanism for anti-trafficking stakeholder partnerships. HTAG met twice and developed a proposal to create a survivor network to support trafficking survivor leadership and enhance victim protection efforts. In July 2024, the government launched an integrated data system – a collaborative effort initiated in 2023 with civil society – to centralize, track, and compile trafficking data nationwide and enhance coordination efforts; however, trainings for government officials and further implementation of the system did not occur.

The government maintained its efforts to raise public awareness of trafficking, including broadcasting announcements and conducting interviews on human trafficking on television and national radio networks. The government used billboards, websites, and brochures to raise awareness in multiple languages. Labor officials posted signage at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport in multiple languages to educate foreign workers about their rights in Malaysia. The MAPO Council continued to operate a national trafficking hotline, available at all times, and email address managed by officers from the MAPO Task Force; however, hotline operators lacked sufficient training in trafficking and observers reported some calls went unanswered. Hotline calls and emails resulted in the initiation of 27 investigations compared to three in the previous reporting period; as with the previous year, the government did not report identifying any victims from hotline calls or emails. Observers reported the government discontinued use of a smartphone application for migrant workers to report labor complaints, but initiated development of a new, replacement application during the reporting period to receive labor-related grievances, including forced labor. However, the application did not provide workers with an option to maintain anonymity when submitting grievances, potentially deterring some victims from submitting reports. Authorities deported workers, including potential victims, without legal documentation who filed grievances, deepening mistrust in the application. In response to the rise in online scams and fraudulent jobs, the government continued its partnership with the private sector to operate a campaign which raised awareness of online scam recruitment methods and promising practices for protections against online scams for participants in Malaysia.

The government continued to enforce its ban of Malaysia-based outsourcing companies, which often used practices that perpetuated debt-based coercion among migrant workers. The government’s Private Employment Agency Act (PEAA) required all private recruitment agencies to secure a license with the Ministry of Human Resources to recruit foreign workers, including domestic workers; however, observers reported this policy was not consistency enforced. The PEAA capped employee-paid “placement” or recruitment fees at 25 percent of the first month’s basic wages for Malaysian workers employed inside or outside Malaysia and one month’s basic wages for non-citizens. The law did not define what entailed a “placement fee,” and authorities did not adequately enforce this rule; most migrant workers in Malaysia paid much higher fees to recruitment agents, including in their home country, which contributed to the workers’ vulnerability to debt-based coercion. The government also mandated employers pay a levy for foreign workers, a one-time cost paid to the government for any non-Malaysian workers the company hired, instead of forcing workers to bear the cost. In practice, some employers took the levy out of worker wages, often without the worker’s knowledge. The government did not prosecute any employment agencies under PEAA during the reporting period. The government continued to use an online application system for employers to renew their workers’ temporary work permits without using a broker. Civil society observers previously noted the government did not adequately inform migrant workers of their rights and Malaysian labor regulations. Media reports stressed that unscrupulous recruiters and companies charged high recruitment fees for nonexistent jobs to migrant workers, often with valid visas, and in many cases took passports away from workers upon arrival. Migrant workers could not change employers except in extreme circumstances, such as the death of an employer, which heightened their risk of forced labor. To standardize labor laws across the country, the government passed two labor ordinances in Sabah and Sarawak that expanded worker protections to include domestic workers, provided minimum standards of housing for all employees, prohibited forced labor, and prohibited the employment of children in hazardous work.

The government reported it employed 113 labor inspectors who focused on labor trafficking for the entire country; the government assigned 72 of these inspectors to peninsular Malaysia, 22 to Sarawak, and 19 to Sabah, where a large number of Malaysia’s palm oil plantations were located. The lack of adequate resources, including for additional labor inspectors, hindered the government’s efforts to adequately identify labor trafficking and enforce the prohibition on employer-perpetrated passport retention, which remained widespread. Officials also cited limited infrastructure, inaccessible roads, the remote location of some worksites, and language barriers as challenges in their ability to effectively conduct labor inspections. Labor officials did not refer any cases to the AGC for labor trafficking during the reporting period. Labor courts resolved 21,583 labor disputes, ordered employers to provide workers back wages amounting to 52 million RM ($11.64 million), and levied fines against employers who violated labor laws in the amount of 2.3 million RM ($514,772); this compared with 19,370 labor disputes resolved, 86.2 million RM ($19.29 million) in back wages ordered to workers, and 5.3 million RM ($1.19 million) in fines levied against employers in 2024. The Ministry of Finance approved a MAPO initiative to add a compulsory pledge as part of the standard government procurement process and documentation, which included the implementation of anti-trafficking measures and penalties for contractors complicit in trafficking offenses. The Ministry of Plantation and Commodities required plantation companies to obtain the Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) Certification, ensuring ethical recruitment practices. The Malaysian Palm Oil Board could revoke the operating license of any company that failed to adhere to MSPO criteria but did not report doing so nor did it report identifying victims of forced labor. The Ministry of Plantation and Commodities also collaborated with international NGOs to combat forced labor in the plantation sector by hosting trainings for foreign workers and awareness campaigns.

Malaysian birth registration policies have left more than 500,000 individuals – including children – stateless and therefore unable to access some government services, including legal employment and public education, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.

Trafficking affects all communities. This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Malaysia, and traffickers exploit victims from Malaysia abroad. The majority of victims are among the migrant worker population, which include an estimated 1.5 million documented and an even greater number of illegal migrant workers in Malaysia. Foreign workers constitute approximately 20 percent of the Malaysian workforce and typically migrate voluntarily – often outside legal channels – from Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. More than one-third of all foreign workers are employed in the manufacturing sector, with others employed in construction, agriculture, and domestic work. A 2023 ILO report estimated 29 percent of domestic workers in Malaysia – primarily foreign domestic workers – experienced conditions consistent with forced labor. Employers, employment agents, and illegal sub-agents exploit migrants in labor trafficking primarily through debt-based coercion when workers are unable to pay fees for recruitment and associated travel. Some agents in labor-sending countries impose onerous fees on workers before they arrive in Malaysia, and Malaysian agents administer additional fees after arrival – in some cases leading to forced labor through debt-based coercion. Transnational crime organizations are responsible for some instances of trafficking. Employers utilize practices indicative of forced labor, such as restrictions on movement, violating contracts, wage fraud, assault, threats of deportation, the imposition of significant debts, and passport retention – which remained widespread – to exploit some migrant workers in labor trafficking on palm oil and agricultural plantations; at construction sites; in the electronics, garment, and rubber-product industries; and in homes as domestic workers. Malaysian law allows employers to hold workers’ passports with the workers’ permission, but some traffickers potentially coerce workers to obtain such permission; some employers retain the passports to prevent workers from changing jobs. According to the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia, approximately eight of every 1,000 palm oil plantation workers are in situations of forced labor, with the prevalence rate considerably higher in Sarawak than in Peninsular Malaysia and Sabah. Observers estimate 90 percent of the workforce in this industry are migrant workers. Previous reports also documented multiple indicators of forced labor associated with the production of palm oil in Malaysia, including coercive practices such as threats, violence, lack of clarity of employment terms and conditions, dependency on the employer, lack of protection by police, debt bondage, high recruitment fees, and involuntary overtime. The government owns 70 percent of public shares of one of the largest palm oil companies in the world. Chinese nationals working for Chinese government-affiliated construction projects in Malaysia are vulnerable to forced labor.

Traffickers recruit some young foreign women and girls – mainly from Southeast Asia, although also recently from China, Nigeria, Russia, Tanzania, and Uganda – ostensibly for legal work in Malaysian restaurants, hotels, and beauty salons, or for brokered marriages, but instead exploit them in sex trafficking. Traffickers use false or fraudulent offers of assistance to recruit Rohingya asylum-seekers from refugee camps in Bangladesh and Indonesia to exploit them in Malaysia, including women and girls coerced to engage in commercial sex. Traffickers also exploit some men and children, including Malaysians, in commercial sex. The Malaysian government has reported children are vulnerable to online sexual exploitation, including some instances of child sex trafficking. Traffickers exploit Malaysian orphans and children from refugee communities in forced begging and forced labor. Stateless children in Sabah are especially at risk of forced labor in palm oil production, service industries, and in forced begging. Media and NGOs report traffickers increasingly use online and app-based scams with promises of high-paying jobs to lure young adult Malaysians abroad, primarily to Cambodia, Laos, and Burma, but also the Philippines, Peru, and the United Arab Emirates, and exploit them in forced criminality and forced labor in online scam operations, or sell them to criminal gangs for further exploitation. Traffickers target Malaysian nationals in these schemes primarily for Chinese and English language abilities.

Ongoing corruption related to processes for foreign nationals to work in Malaysia increases the cost of migration and consequently increases migrant workers’ vulnerability to trafficking through debt-based coercion. Corrupt immigration officials facilitate trafficking by accepting bribes from brokers and smugglers at border crossings, including at airports. Some government officials profit from bribes and direct involvement in extortion from and exploitation of migrants.