• Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, including complicit officials, which should involve significant prison terms.
• Strengthen law enforcement efforts, victim protection efforts, and government oversight of SEZs, including efforts to disrupt online scam operations, investigating and prosecuting associated traffickers, and identifying and protecting victims therein.
• Proactively screen for trafficking indicators among vulnerable groups, including: Lao and foreign nationals employed in SEZs and in online scam operations; Lao and foreign workers working on large infrastructure, mining, and agricultural projects, and projects affiliated with the Chinese government or state-owned enterprises, as well as Lao communities displaced by these projects; Lao labor migrants returning from work abroad through border crossings; and Lao and foreign women and girls discovered during law enforcement actions in nightclubs, karaoke bars, and other establishments that facilitate commercial sex.
• Increase efforts to proactively identify and provide protection services to victims of labor and sex trafficking.
• Train law enforcement officials at the national and local level to improve their ability to investigate and prosecute traffickers, including potentially complicit officials, those operating within SEZs, and perpetrators of extraterritorial commercial child sexual exploitation and abuse.
• Continue training officials on indicators of labor trafficking, particularly among men, boys, and vulnerable communities, and on national victim protection and referral guidelines.
• Allow all shelter residents freedom of movement.
• Increase transnational collaboration on trafficking investigations.
• Continue to publicize and adequately staff all available government anti-trafficking hotlines, and train staff on victim identification and referral guidelines, including for labor trafficking victims.
• Expand efforts to raise awareness on all forms of human trafficking, particularly among rural and border communities and vulnerable populations.
• Further reduce barriers to formal labor migration to reduce the vulnerability of migrant workers, including eliminating worker-paid recruitment fees.
• Continue to strengthen efforts at diplomatic missions overseas to identify and assist Lao victims of sex and labor trafficking.
• Screen any North Korean workers for signs of trafficking and refer them to appropriate services in a manner consistent with obligations under UNSC Resolution 2397.

The government slightly decreased law enforcement efforts.

Article 215 of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of five to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 10 million to 100 million Lao kip ($460 to $4,599); if the crime involved a child victim, the fine range increased to 100 million to 500 million Lao kip ($4,599 to $22,995). These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape.

In 2024, the government investigated 46 potential trafficking cases, involving 95 suspected perpetrators, compared with investigating 45 cases involving 98 perpetrators in 2023. Prosecutors considered charges against 39 individuals in 19 cases, but the government did not report how many prosecutions it initiated against alleged traffickers in 2024; in 2023, authorities prosecuted 12 alleged traffickers in 13 cases. Courts convicted 40 traffickers in 2024, compared with convicting 11 traffickers in 2023. Observers reported courts rarely sentenced convicted traffickers to prison and generally omitted sentencing details from official reports. The government did not disaggregate law enforcement data by type of trafficking or provide sentencing data for convicted traffickers. Authorities did not provide sufficient information to determine if the trafficking cases – investigated, prosecuted, or convicted – met the definition of trafficking according to international law; in previous years, authorities included non-trafficking crimes in reported prosecutions and convictions. The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action during the year. Observers reported some of the government’s institutions responsible for anticorruption efforts were largely ineffectual and ill-equipped to address the scale of corruption within Laos.

The government did not investigate or prosecute any cases related to trafficking that occurred within the country’s SEZs, amid widespread reporting of industrial-scale labor and sex trafficking in Laos’ SEZs, including in online scam operations. Despite government claims of complete sovereignty in SEZs, the government ceded some law enforcement authority to private security forces hired by businesses within the SEZs and did not conduct independent operations against transnational criminal organizations. The Ministry of Public Security (MOPS) reported maintaining approximately 170 central-level police officials inside the Golden Triangle SEZ; however, this police presence generated no noticeable impact on crime reduction or anti-trafficking efforts. Furthermore, the government reportedly eliminated the central-level MOPS unit in the Golden Triangle SEZ, leaving rotating provincial police and private security forces contracted by SEZ businesses solely in charge of security in the SEZ. Officials claimed they lacked jurisdiction to investigate trafficking cases involving foreign national victims or traffickers, particularly cases involving victims or traffickers from China. The government did not pursue investigations of Lao nationals recruiting for online scam operations or entertainment venues involved in sex trafficking within the Golden Triangle SEZ or other SEZs. Some officials reported fears of retaliation for investigating trafficking crimes. In March 2024, the Office of the Supreme People’s Prosecutor (OSPP) announced the planned opening of a new office in the Golden Triangle SEZ to address legal cases, including trafficking cases; however, by late 2024, officials announced the plan was terminated, citing unidentified “sensitivities.” In August 2024, the government cooperated with China and Vietnam in three joint law enforcement actions against online scam operations within the SEZs; however, Lao authorities played a minor role in these purportedly joint law enforcement operations. Authorities did not report any other law enforcement actions against online scam operations exploiting Lao or foreign nationals in SEZs or other parts of the country. In 2024, the government issued a notification prohibiting online scam operations and requested companies “switch” to legal activities; however, the government did not report any actions to enforce this notification. Senior MOPS officials reportedly received bribes to impede, hinder, and obstruct effective oversight and investigations of human trafficking claims in the Golden Triangle SEZ. In December 2024, the government awarded and honored the head of the transnational criminal organization which maintained de-facto control over the Golden Triangle SEZ, and many of the criminal enterprises therein, for his donation of 1.3 billion Lao kip ($59,787) to the provincial police force ostensibly responsible for overseeing the Golden Triangle SEZ.

The MOPS’s Anti-Trafficking Department (ATD) was the lead agency for trafficking investigations. The ATD jointly investigated trafficking cases with anti-trafficking units located in provincial and district police departments. However, provincial units often did not have dedicated personnel, and many units tasked with anti-trafficking work, whether investigatory or prosecutorial, were inadequately staffed and resourced. The government did not have prosecutors or courts specifically dedicated to trafficking cases and whether courts tried a case at the central, district, or provincial level depended on the potential severity of the sentence. Judges with experience adjudicating trafficking cases were more frequently assigned these cases. Officials reported they lacked the technical equipment and training to pursue senior members of trafficking syndicates, and security officials often only arrested low-level members of syndicates, as well as victims of forced criminality exploited by syndicates. Observers reported a fundamental lack of understanding of the indicators of forced labor among government officials, which hindered anti-trafficking efforts. In partnership with NGOs and international organizations, the government trained front-line responders and government officials on various trafficking topics. The government did not report systematic or regular training for law enforcement officials on identifying victims or investigating trafficking crimes. The government maintained bilateral agreements with Cambodia, China, Thailand, and Vietnam on information sharing, case investigation and prosecution, and victim repatriation. Although the government cooperated with a foreign government in addressing two cases of potential online child sexual exploitation or abuse that potentially involved trafficking, it did not report cooperating with foreign partners or international law enforcement organizations on any additional investigations of potential trafficking crimes. In some cases, the government extradited foreign national traffickers. In the previous reporting period, the OSPP completed a draft manual to guide victim-centered prosecutions; authorities began disseminating these materials and training some judges in late 2024.

The government decreased victim protection efforts.

The government identified 85 trafficking victims in 2024; the government did not provide data disaggregated by age, sex, or type of trafficking but did report identifying 40 girls as victims of unspecified forms of exploitation. This compared with identifying 168 trafficking victims in 2023, including 149 sex trafficking victims – four women and 145 girls – and 19 labor trafficking victims – 10 women, five men, and four girls. The government’s reported data may have included individuals exploited through means that did not amount to trafficking as defined by international law. The government reported identifying two foreign national victims of trafficking, one female from Cambodia and one female from Vietnam, compared with 36 foreign national trafficking victims identified in 2023.

The central ATD was the sole authority able to formally identify and refer trafficking victims to short- and long-term care; in practice, local authorities, the government-funded Lao Women’s Union (LWU), and NGOs could also screen and refer potential victims to the ATD for formal identification. Victim identification, referral, and care processes varied and at times depended on how a victim was screened, the victim’s nationality and employment, and the location at time of identification. The government reported using victim identification and referral SOPs but demonstrated inconsistent victim identification and referral practices in certain parts of the country and within specific sectors, particularly within SEZs and among individuals in commercial sex. High staff turnover, fear of retaliation, and lack of political will hindered government efforts to consistently and systematically screen for trafficking. The government handled some potential trafficking cases administratively, and, due to inadequate screening efforts, authorities did not take effective measures to prevent the inappropriate penalization of potential victims solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Officials and observers noted authorities were less likely to identify men as trafficking victims. Authorities did not proactively screen for or identify trafficking victims at foreign-owned rubber and banana plantations, in garment factories, or working on foreign-funded infrastructure projects, all of which presented some indicators of trafficking. Inadequate training and low literacy rates hindered screening efforts by officials in rural provinces. Border officials continued to demonstrate a low capacity to detect trafficking because of insufficient staffing at international checkpoints and border crossings and a lack of training on victim identification, including for the identification of labor trafficking victims exploited in online scam operations. However, observers reported some airport-based immigration officials screened for trafficking and prevented the onward travel of an unknown number of potential Lao victims; these officials reportedly referred the potential victims to NGOs for services. While some ATD officials had received victim sensitivity training and Lao-language victim sensitivity manuals, observers noted these officials sometimes did not consistently practice victim-sensitive techniques.

The government, in collaboration with NGOs, provided services to 119 victims or potential victims of unspecified forms of trafficking in 2024 (135 victims in 2023), including 11 men, seven women, six boys, and 95 girls; 40 were foreign nationals. The ATD did not report whether it counted or tracked victims who declined official assistance. The government provided victims with shelter, legal assistance, medical care, education, vocational training, basic mental healthcare counseling, and community integration services at one of its two government shelters. The LWU maintained two shelters for survivors of domestic violence and human trafficking; the shelters held separate spaces for men and women. The Vientiane shelter could accommodate approximately 30 women and 15 men; the shelter in Luang Namtha could accommodate approximately 30 women and 30 men. The LWU did not permit shelter residents freedom of movement, and observers reported survivors faced difficulties finding or keeping employment or returning to their homes due to bureaucratic hurdles and the geographic isolation of government shelters. The LWU lacked adequate counseling staff but provided basic counseling services. The government also referred victims to international organization- and NGO-funded shelters that provided care parallel to the LWU. Authorities and NGOs reported male trafficking victims sometimes declined to stay at formal shelters and requested shelter at local guest houses instead; in such cases, authorities coordinated with NGOs to provide some male and potential foreign national victims temporary shelter in such local guest houses, sometimes with security provided by ATD. The government did not require victims to participate in investigations to receive protection services. The law entitled all identified victims to the full range of victim support services, regardless of sex, nationality, or where the exploitation occurred. The significant increase in male victims seeking services compared with prior years overwhelmed the government’s capacity to respond, which required international organizations to assist with providing shelter for foreign male victims awaiting repatriation. NGOs assisted at least 353 victims and potential victims independent of government support in 2024; one NGO reported assessing an additional 679 individuals as potential trafficking victims.

Observers reported authorities did not proactively or adequately screen potential trafficking victims and vulnerable workers removed from the Golden Triangle SEZ, despite extensive reporting of widespread labor and sex trafficking in entertainment venues, restaurants, karaoke bars, construction sites, factories, and online scam operations in the SEZ. Authorities reported most vulnerable workers in the Golden Triangle SEZ did not qualify as trafficking victims, despite the workers’ appeals for assistance; rather, authorities characterized these cases as “labor disputes,” which prevented potential victims from accessing trafficking-related protection services. Some of the cases ultimately categorized as “labor disputes” were potential cases of labor trafficking. Observers reported authorities may have discouraged some foreign nationals from seeking official inquiry into their trafficking cases, or official identification, owing to the time and costs associated with investigation and service provision. The government did not screen any of the at least 323 Chinese and Vietnamese nationals arrested and deported in three joint law enforcement actions it conducted with officials from China and Vietnam on online scam operations within Laos’ SEZs; while some of these probably included traffickers or other criminals complicit in the scam operations, some were potential trafficking victims, and those potential trafficking victims deported to China may have faced prosecution for crimes they were forced to commit. In 2024, authorities released approximately 1,948 potential trafficking victims (2,614 in 2023) – the majority of whom were male – from the Golden Triangle SEZ, including 1,944 foreign nationals. Traffickers likely exploited the majority of these potential victims in forced labor in online scam operations, or in support sectors. The government did not specifically identify any of the approximately 1,948 potential trafficking victims it removed from the Golden Triangle SEZ as trafficking victims. Of the approximate 6,364 potential victims the government removed from the Golden Triangle SEZ between September 2022 and December 2024, the government identified only 25 victims of unspecified trafficking – 17 male and eight female.

The OSPP reported victims could testify behind a curtain to protect their privacy and ensure their safety; in practice, many court proceedings did not involve in-person testimony from either victims or defendants. Observers noted victims were not typically involved in law enforcement or legal proceedings beyond their initial testimony. The OSPP continued to collaborate with an international organization to provide judges and prosecutors with new victim-centered trial guidelines, which authorities finalized in late 2023 and began to disseminate in 2024. The government did not directly provide support for victims assisting trafficking investigations and prosecutions, but some authorities had the ability to work with village leaders or NGOs to provide financial assistance for costs associated with their participation in investigations. According to Laos’s anti-trafficking NAP, the government would appoint legal representation from the Lao Bar Association for trafficking victims whose cases went to trial; in practice, the government has never appointed a lawyer to represent trafficking victims. The government reported victims could request civil compensation, including in conjunction with a criminal trial; in practice, victims rarely received restitution unless provided informally at the village- or district-level. The government did not report if courts ordered restitution to victims for the last three consecutive years; in 2021, courts ordered nine defendants to pay 65.5 million Lao kip ($2,989) to 11 victims.

The government provided official documentation for the repatriation of 17 victims from Thailand (15 female and two male), five female victims from Malaysia, 13 female victims from China, and five from Burma (four female and one male). The LWU and the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (MOLSW) were responsible for providing reintegration services for trafficking victims but relied heavily on NGOs to offer such assistance and typically required NGOs or victims’ families to pay repatriation costs; the government coordinated with these stakeholders to organize repatriation. The government did not report providing legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims to countries where they may have faced hardship or retribution. Authorities reported waiving immigration fines and cooperated with civil society organizations to shelter potential foreign national trafficking victims until their departure.

The government decreased prevention efforts.

The ministerial-level National Steering Committee on Anti-Human Trafficking and the working-level National Secretariat on Anti-Human Trafficking each met two times to coordinate Laos’s trafficking prevention activities. The government provided an unspecified amount of funding for anti-trafficking activities on a case-by-case basis rather than allocating a set budget to each ministry. The multisector Human Trafficking Working Group coordinated with civil society organizations and convened twice to share best practices and maintain partnerships at national and subnational levels, including in anti-trafficking enforcement in the SEZs. The government did not make its annual progress report on implementation of the NAP publicly available; authorities also did not provide an update on their reported evaluation of the 2021-2025 NAP. The government reported beginning to draft an updated NAP, however, observers reported it was unlikely to be completed by the end of the year when the current plan expired. The government conducted awareness campaigns targeting government officials, teachers, students, jobseekers, some vulnerable communities, and the broader public. The government maintained multiple hotlines to report incidents of trafficking, domestic abuse, violence against women and girls, child protection, and various forms of labor exploitation. Insufficient staffing and low public awareness of the hotlines’ existence limited their accessibility and effectiveness. In response to these limitations, the LWU used social media and messaging applications to provide traditional hotline services like information and counseling resources; observers reported officials responded more rapidly via these alternative mechanisms. Authorities did not provide comprehensive information on trafficking victims identified or referred through these hotlines; however, the LWU provided legal counseling to 55 potential victims in 2024 as a result of reports through its hotline and other reporting mechanisms.

The formal migration process and regulatory framework remained insufficient to prevent exploitation in sex trafficking or forced labor for many Lao migrant workers. Observers noted some migrant workers reported the government and its foreign missions supported them in negotiations with foreign employers while working abroad. The MOLSW ran one public Employment Service Center and oversaw 35 recruitment agencies, 33 of which could recruit for jobs abroad in Thailand, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK). These recruitment agencies acted as gatekeepers to the formal migration process in Laos, and the law allowed them to charge workers recruitment fees, which continued to contribute to indebtedness that placed Lao workers at risk of trafficking abroad. Legal overseas employment programs typically cost more than 43.5 million Lao kip ($2,000), which drove many migrant workers to use illegal recruitment companies which put them at greater risk of trafficking. In partnership with foreign governments and an international organization, the government created a business association to oversee recruitment agencies, including those targeting Lao migrant workers. The government maintained bilateral labor agreements with several common destination countries, including Thailand, China, Cambodia, Japan, ROK, and Vietnam; observers noted most Lao migrant workers sought formal employment in Thailand, Japan, and the ROK. The bilateral anti-trafficking agreement with the Government of Thailand outlined a formal labor migration process that was costly to workers, overly complex, and time-consuming. The MOLSW continued to employ a labor attaché in Thailand who could register employment grievances of Lao workers in the country. The labor attaché received training from international organizations and the Government of Thailand before and during his assignment and assisted in the repatriation of Lao nationals identified as potential trafficking victims in Thailand.

The government did not adequately oversee or implement labor laws and protections in its SEZs, including the Golden Triangle SEZ. Several ministries, including members of the National Secretariat on Anti-Human Trafficking, had opened oversight or representative offices within the Golden Triangle SEZ throughout 2022 to 2024; however, by the end of the reporting period most of these offices were abolished or were not operational, further hindering the capacity of the government to conduct oversight in the SEZ. Furthermore, due to a lack of jurisdictional clarity in the Golden Triangle SEZ, the SEZ Management Committee and SEZ Administration Board prevented MOLSW from registering or monitoring workers in the SEZ, compounding the vulnerabilities workers faced in these zones. The quasi-governmental Lao Federation of Trade Unions (LFTU) maintained an MOU with the SEZ Promotion and Management Office, which ostensibly guaranteed LFTU access to conduct labor inspections of businesses and establishments within the SEZs. In reality, observers reported LFTU rarely conducted labor inspections, and business owners frequently refused government officials access to workplaces. In addition, the LFTU office within the Golden Triangle SEZ, shared with LWU and the Lao Youth Union, received funding from many of the same businesses within the SEZ it was meant to oversee. The government did not report conducting labor inspections in SEZs in 2024 or 2023, compared with 306 unannounced inspections in 2022, resulting in the identification of six trafficking victims. Officials and NGOs continued efforts to terminate work contracts for SEZ employees who filed formal and informal complaints of labor abuses throughout 2024, but the government did not proactively investigate labor issues in the Golden Triangle SEZ or screen for potential trafficking indicators.

The government’s labor laws required employers and employees to honor signed worker contracts; however, observers noted employers rarely faced legal repercussions for breaching contracts. Observers reported the government did not effectively enforce labor laws and freedom to change employers largely depended on the situation between the employee and the employer.

Government capacity to register births and issue civil documentation remained limited and contributed to general trafficking vulnerability, particularly in remote areas of the country. The government began to modernize civil registration systems in 2021; the government did not provide an update to this effort. The government did not report any efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.

Trafficking affects all communities. This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims within Laos, and traffickers exploit victims from Laos abroad; traffickers also use Lao territory to transport foreign victims to other countries in the region. Reports estimate 17,000 individuals in Laos are in commercial sex in established businesses and are potentially vulnerable to sex trafficking with as many as three times that figure operating independently throughout the country. Lao communities, such as those affected by drought and other natural disasters; foreign-invested mining and construction operations, including those affiliated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and other investments and other foreign government-backed projects; and foreign agricultural land concessions, are more vulnerable to trafficking. Informal sectors employ up to 74 percent of workers in Laos and operate with limited government oversight or regulation. Foreign nationals operate pornography and child sexual abuse material-production rings in Laos and subject adult and child victims to sex and labor trafficking. Farmers in Laos growing maize and cassava may go into debt to secure seed and capital inputs and are reportedly more vulnerable to forced labor to local community leaders due to this indebtedness. Foreign and local workers, with little oversight by local authorities at or near foreign-owned or foreign-operated agricultural operations, including banana and rubber plantations; infrastructure construction sites, including those affiliated with the government of China; and SEZs, are extremely vulnerable to forced labor and sex trafficking. Ongoing labor shortages in the agricultural industry have reportedly led to a decrease in the exploitation of Lao workers on plantations, owing to increased freedom for workers to avoid farms with undesirable working conditions. As regional authorities relaxed pandemic-related travel restrictions in 2022 and 2023, Laos began attracting more tourists, especially within the Golden Triangle SEZ. The resulting spike in demand for labor at entertainment and hospitality venues has drawn many young Lao workers to seek employment both in the Golden Triangle SEZ and in Vientiane. Similarly, rising inflation and poor employment prospects push many young Lao workers to seek work in the Golden Triangle SEZ or other SEZs. Traffickers exploit some of these individuals for work in restaurants, karaoke bars, agricultural plantations, and online scam operations. SEZ casinos have used social media to lure hundreds of Lao women to work as “chat girls” – online representatives selling casino stock to male customers – with false promises of high salaries, free meals, and accommodations. Many of these women do not meet the unattainably high sales quotas set by the casino managers and are forced to incur debt to pay the difference, as well as to pay for meals and accommodations. Casino managers leverage this debt to confine workers and subject them to forced labor and sex trafficking.

Endemic and high-level corruption and official complicity enabled human trafficking within SEZs, particularly the Golden Triangle SEZ. Illicit activity, often involving human trafficking, in the Golden Triangle SEZ and elsewhere generated significant revenue – as much as 70 percent of Laos’s GDP. Increasingly, traffickers use the internet and social media to fraudulently recruit men, women, and children from Laos and other countries in South and East Asia, Africa, Europe, North America, and South America for relatively well-paying technical jobs and, instead, force them to engage in online gambling, internet, cryptocurrency, and telephone or online scams, primarily in casinos and commercial compounds in Laos, concentrated in SEZs. In 2023, authorities reported 28,300 foreign nationals officially worked in the Golden Triangle SEZ, while observers estimate the true number is much higher. In Laos, traffickers often target young people from rural areas where education levels remain low and job opportunities are few. Traffickers often lure foreign victims to Thailand with false job offers and then transport them across the Lao border into the Golden Triangle SEZ, often by boat, though traffickers increasingly lure foreign victims to travel directly to Laos. Traffickers in online scam operations subject some workers to punishment for alleged poor performance and disobedience, including, but not limited to, physical abuse, wage docking, and debt-bondage; some scam operators may “resell” those who cannot meet sales quotas or repay recruitment debts to other criminal networks for forced labor in similar fraud schemes, domestic servitude, or sex trafficking. Traffickers regularly confiscate personal devices, monitor victims’ online activity while they are forced to conduct scams, and use surveillance cameras to maintain control over victims. Chinese national-operated crime syndicates, often with linkages to other online scam operations and criminal groups operating in Burma, Cambodia, and China, run many of these online scam operations. Observers note that, in some cases, victims are forced to recruit their own replacement via social media to obtain their freedom. Within online scam operations, traffickers frequently exploit adult and child victims in livestreamed or recorded rape, selling the sexual abuse or exploitation material online or threatening to release the video as a means of controlling victims.

Traffickers exploit Vietnamese, Chinese, and Lao women and children in sex trafficking in larger Lao cities, near national borders and casinos, and in SEZs, reportedly to meet the demand of international tourists and migrant workers. This trend has rapidly increased as economic hardships force young people in Laos into commercial sex and as Laos becomes a growing destination country for extraterritorial sexual exploitation and abuse. Chinese, Japanese, UK, Australian, and U.S. residents travel to Laos to engage in extraterritorial child sexual exploitation and abuse. Burmese, Chinese, Russian, Thai, and Vietnamese nationals are among those subjected to sex and labor trafficking in the Golden Triangle SEZ. Lao and foreign nationals, including Chinese national migrant workers, experience conditions indicative of forced labor at Chinese national-owned mining companies. North Koreans in Laos may be operating under exploitative working conditions and display multiple indicators of forced labor.

Reports indicate over 30 percent of Laos’s working age population has migrated for work due to decreasing economic opportunities. Some workers from Laos migrate through Thailand to third countries, such as Malaysia, where they may face greater risk of trafficking. Some victims migrate with the assistance of legal or illegal brokers, who often charge fees, placing them at increased risk of debt-based coercion; this often occurs under the direction of Lao intermediaries working with foreign traffickers. Others move independently through Laos’s 27 official border crossings using valid travel documents. Many of these border crossings are managed by provincial- or district-level immigration authorities with less formal training and limited hours of operation, making them easier transit points for traffickers to facilitate the movement of Lao victims into neighboring countries.

Traffickers in rural communities frequently and increasingly kidnap or recruit Lao women and girls with false promises of legitimate work opportunities or promises of marriage – typically through the use of marriage brokers – to nationals in neighboring countries, primarily China, and then subject them to sex trafficking, forced labor, and forced surrogacy. Economic hardship and decreasing job opportunities have markedly increased this trend in 2024 and 2025, with reports of forced surrogacy clinics re-opening in northern Laos and rising forced and/or fraudulent marriage cases. Brokered marriages between rural Lao women and Chinese men have increased across the country. Traffickers increasingly exploit individuals from communities in Luang Namtha and Oudomxay in forced and/or fraudulent marriage, which may have involved sex or labor trafficking. Traffickers exploit a large number of Lao women and girls in Thailand for commercial sex and forced labor in domestic service, factories, or agriculture. According to Thailand-based public health organizations, traffickers take advantage of the undocumented immigration status of some Lao men and boys to exploit them in sex trafficking. Lao men are also subjected to forced labor on fishing vessels operating in Thai and Indonesian territorial waters. Companies operating under the auspices of the Japanese government’s “Technical Intern Training Program” have exploited Lao nationals in forced labor, in agriculture, and several other sectors.