• Significantly increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, including Omani nationals, recruitment agencies, and allegedly complicit officials, for labor trafficking crimes, specifically of migrant workers, including domestic servitude, by thoroughly investigating reports of abuse and trafficking indicators, such as debt-based coercion through illegal “release fees.”
• Increase efforts to proactively identify potential trafficking victims – rather than relying on victims to self-identify – to ensure victims are not inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked.
• Expand implementation of the NRM to other relevant ministries to ensure care is not delayed for victims who request it.
• Ensure officials do not pressure or require victims to participate in law enforcement proceedings as a condition to receive care and ensure victims consent to referral to the government shelter.
• Prohibit officials from facilitating or negotiating “release fee” payments per employers’ demands and proactively raise awareness among migrant workers that such fees are illegal and not official requirements.
• Penalize employers and recruitment agencies for demanding illegal “release fees” from workers who seek to leave a job prior to contract expiration regardless of working conditions.
• Implement victim-centered and trauma-informed care in shelter practices, including providing adequate legal support, and do not restrict victims’ ability to leave the shelter to return home or work, regardless of the status of legal proceedings.
• Train law enforcement on victim-centered, trauma-informed investigative practices, including during victim interviews and evidence collection.
• Implement Ministerial Decision 189/2004 to allow domestic workers – in cases of abuse – to terminate a contract without notice and do not solicit illegal payments from workers as a condition for termination.
• Expand and enforce legal protections for domestic workers and increase efforts to hold noncompliant employers criminally accountable with deterrent penalties.
• Continue to expand trainings for officials involved in criminal investigations and for hotline operators to ensure accurate identification of trafficking crimes and ensure hotlines and other grievance mechanisms are accessible and responsive to workers submitting complaints.
• Hold non-compliant recruitment offices criminally accountable for potential trafficking crimes, including domestic worker mistreatment or violations of the labor law, by increasing inspections and enforcing adequate penalties.
• Fully implement the 2024-2026 NAP and conduct country-wide public awareness campaigns on all forms of trafficking, specifically targeted to vulnerable populations, including migrant workers, employers, and recruitment agencies.

The government maintained inadequate anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts, particularly in addressing labor trafficking of migrant workers.

Oman’s 2008 anti-trafficking law criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed punishments of three to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine between 5,000 and 100,000 Omani rial (OMR) ($12,990-$259,740) for offenses involving adult victims and seven to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 10,000 OMR ($25,974) for offenses involving child victims. These punishments were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. The government previously reported drafting new anti-trafficking legislation in consultation with an international organization focused on increasing penalties for traffickers and greater protections for victims; the legislation remained pending for the third consecutive reporting period.

During the reporting period, the government investigated 27 trafficking cases involving 67 alleged traffickers; this included 55 individuals for sex trafficking, nine individuals in five cases of labor trafficking, and three individuals for “unspecified exploitation.” This compared with 18 investigations involving 56 alleged traffickers (53 for sex trafficking and three for labor trafficking – all of which were for alleged forced begging) in the previous reporting period. Notably, officials investigated five cases of labor trafficking involving migrant workers for the first time since 2023. While officials referred all five cases to prosecution, prosecutors closed and did not bring charges in four of the cases due to lack of evidence; one case remained under investigation. Authorities prosecuted 29 individuals under the anti-trafficking law for sex trafficking, a decrease compared with the prosecution of 38 alleged sex traffickers in the previous reporting period. Courts convicted 12 sex traffickers under the anti-trafficking law, compared with 10 sex traffickers convicted in the previous reporting period. The government did not provide sentencing data for all convicted traffickers; however, judges sentenced some traffickers to between one and 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 5,000 OMR ($12,300) to 10,000 OMR ($27,890). Despite reports indicating it remains the most prevalent form of trafficking in Oman, the government did not prosecute any suspects for alleged labor trafficking involving migrant workers, including domestic servitude, and has not done so since 2023. For the seventh consecutive reporting period, the government did not convict any perpetrators for labor trafficking of migrant workers or domestic servitude, and it did not convict any Omani nationals for trafficking during the reporting period. The government arrested and extradited one alleged trafficker.

As in previous reporting periods, media, NGOs, and labor-source governments continued to report labor recruiters deceived workers – mostly from Africa and Asia – either by forcing them to pay illegal recruitment and visa fees and work in a job different than agreed upon or to work as a domestic worker, where workers experienced conditions different from those agreed upon. Once in Oman, workers experienced non-payment of wages; restriction of movement; physical, verbal, and sexual abuse; contract switching; excessive work hours; denial of medical care, food, and rest days; passport confiscation; threats of use of force, arrest, and detention by police; and debt-based coercion through illegal “release fees” – all trafficking indicators – at the hands of their employers. The government reported it considered “release fees” to be illegal as it considered such fees to be similar to recruitment fees, which were illegal under Omani law. Officials often considered such cases as worker-employer disputes or contract disputes. NGOs, labor-source governments, and observers reported that when workers sought assistance, officials supported employers’ demands for “release fees” to reimburse the employer or sponsor for recruitment fees previously paid to hire the worker, despite these being illegal and not required by the government or recruitment agencies. Despite Omani law stating workers were not responsible for any fees required to facilitate the termination of a contract – including recruitment fees – to return to their home country or change employers, employers often demanded such fees when workers sought to leave Oman or transfer employers prior to the conclusion of the employment contract. Officials suggested payment of such fees was the quickest resolution to enable workers to return home or change employers and did not acknowledge allegations of abuse and exploitation, including trafficking indicators, reported by workers. Officials frequently returned workers to their employers’ homes until such fees could be paid, potentially facilitating re-trafficking; in other cases, authorities sent workers to the government shelter without their consent. Labor-source country governments and workers’ families paid Omani employers up to $3,900 per worker to enable their return home or change employers; other diplomats reported negotiating such fees directly with sponsors or employers to enable their citizens to return home. As many workers already paid illegal recruitment fees to agents and experienced wage theft from their employers, observers noted requiring payments further exploited workers in debt bondage. Observers continued to report instances where both employers and recruitment agencies – in cases where a victim of domestic servitude left an employer and returned to the agency – also demanded “release fees” to enable the worker to leave Oman without government intervention, illustrating the demand for such fees was a widespread exploitative cultural practice, despite having no legal basis.

The Royal Oman Police (ROP) and Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) maintained specialized anti-trafficking units in their respective organizations. During the reporting period, the government established a court within the Court of Appeals to exclusively handle trafficking cases, presided by specialized anti-trafficking judges. Observers reported that deficiencies in officials’ understanding of trafficking, an unwillingness to thoroughly investigate potential crimes involving the exploitation of foreign workers, and a preference to handle such crimes through arbitration contributed to weak investigatory and prosecutorial capacity to address labor trafficking, particularly domestic servitude. While the government reported it interviewed alleged victims and employers in separate rooms, observers noted – based on interviews and interactions with domestic workers in Oman – police severely lacked a victim-centered, trauma-informed approach and often spoke to both employers and workers alleging abuse in the same room. Observers reported instances during the reporting period where law enforcement questioned alleged victims, including in front of their employer/alleged perpetrator, and actively worked to discredit allegations of abuse; law enforcement officials often blamed victims for their situations and overlooked their vulnerability. In situations where authorities investigated an employer’s home following a complaint of abuse, observers continued to report Omani police and other authorities solely spoke to the employer. Observers reported law enforcement and prosecutors did not consider labor trafficking cases, including domestic servitude, as criminal matters. As a result, some officials did not generally consider trafficking indicators, such as physical or sexual abuse, deceptive recruitment, worker-paid recruitment fees, excessive working hours, contract switching, or receiving wages less than promised, when investigating or bringing charges against alleged perpetrators.

Concerns of official complicity in trafficking crimes remained during the year – including officials facilitating “release fees.” During the reporting period, observers reported a case of an employer exploiting a domestic worker, including in conditions indicative of labor trafficking such as excessive working hours; denial of food, rest days, and medical assistance; passport confiscation; psychological abuse; threats of arrest; and debt-based coercion through demands for “release fees.” The employer allegedly had law enforcement connections, including a family member — who was a police officer – residing at the employer’s home; the police officer also allegedly sexually abused the domestic worker during her employment at the home. The government did not report any criminal investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government officials allegedly complicit in human trafficking crimes and did not report investigating this case or holding the employer or police officer accountable.

The government conducted and participated in over 20 anti-trafficking trainings for relevant officials on victim identification and reporting methods, identification of potential labor trafficking cases via labor inspections, and victim care and investigative methods during criminal cases. However, despite these trainings, officials did not consistently implement trauma-informed and victim-centered investigative practices – demonstrated by reports of denial of access to justice for victims, victim-blaming, and re-traumatization – which limited accountability for traffickers, particularly for domestic servitude.

The government made mixed victim protection efforts. Efforts to identify and protect victims of domestic servitude remained negligible compared to the scale of the problem.

The government identified 50 victims (41 female sex trafficking victims, three child sex trafficking victims, five female labor trafficking victims, and one male labor trafficking victim; all were foreign nationals), compared with 36 victims (34 female sex trafficking victims and two boys exploited in forced begging) identified in the previous reporting period. Of the 50 victims, the government provided care to 18 victims at the Ministry of Social Development (MOSD) shelter; shelter staff separately identified three female labor trafficking victims and one male labor trafficking victim upon their entry into the shelter. The government did not report how such victims reached the shelter or if the remaining 28 identified victims were referred to care. Government efforts to identify victims of labor trafficking, including domestic servitude were insufficient to address the scale of reported allegations during the reporting period.

The government reported officials – particularly law enforcement, labor inspectors, and healthcare workers – continued to utilize proactive victim identification guidelines to identify potential trafficking victims. The government reportedly implemented an NRM – particularly by law enforcement or the PPO – to refer identified victims to the MOSD shelter. Officials generally referred victims identified as part of ongoing police investigations to MOSD for shelter placement and medical and psychological services; the government reported MOSD and the Ministry of Labor (MOL) were not included in the NRM, which limited its use. Observers continued to report officials largely relied on victims to self-identify by reporting abuses to authorities; in some cases, observers reported officials did not immediately refer self-identified victims to care, instead delaying or ignoring victims’ requests for support or sending victims to shelter without their consent. Referrals to the MOSD shelter required a court order or approval by the shelter manager in emergency cases; however, potential victims could also self-refer. Officials reported in situations where a potential victim approached the shelter, staff admitted the victim and immediately notified ROP and PPO for an official court order. Shelter staff reported the ability to accept self-referred victims on an emergency basis enabled immediate care, as court orders were sometimes delayed. Officials did not report if the four labor trafficking victims identified by shelter staff self-referred or if shelter staff referred the victims to law enforcement upon entry to pursue criminal charges or receive court approval to remain in care. Experts reported notification to law enforcement for a court order upon admission suggested the government expected victims at the shelter to participate in criminal justice proceedings, which was not a trauma-informed or victim-centered practice.

The shelter accepted all potential victims who self-referred, except for those facing criminal charges, such as theft. The shelter accepted potential victims with “absconding” charges if the individual had previously submitted a complaint against their employer with authorities; if no competing complaint was submitted, shelter staff did not admit the potential victims and instead referred them to MOL. In cases where employers filed “absconding” charges against workers to counter their complaints, this policy may have limited access to shelter for some potential victims who had not been able to file a competing complaint against their employer. Observers continued to report challenges in assisting potential trafficking victims to self-refer to the shelter due to lack of available information on shelter procedures online or via phone with MOSD.

The government allocated 30,045 OMR ($77,922) for shelter operations, compared with 43,100 OMR ($111,978) in the previous reporting period. The government shelter provided room and board, counseling, legal support, monetary stipends, recreational opportunities, and medical care to victims and could accommodate up to 50 female, 30 male, and 20 child victims of trafficking or other types of abuse. The government reported opening temporary spaces to provide victims shelter in rural areas but did not report how many victims received services in such spaces. The MOSD shelter continued to cooperate with a quasi-governmental local charity through an MOU to assist vulnerable individuals residing at the government shelter, including trafficking victims by providing airline tickets home for victims when court proceedings ended and facilitating training workshops for victims to learn new skills. During the reporting period, the government dedicated a shelter specifically for men; however, the shelter remained closed due to underutilization.

The shelter did not allow victims to freely leave and re-enter following admission; shelter policy dictated victims could depart the premises only with a chaperone, including to participate in law enforcement proceedings. Victims were able to work during their stay at the shelter, with the employer acting as a chaperone during working hours after vetting, training, and signing an agreement of expectations; six labor trafficking victims were provided employment opportunities during their stay at the shelter. However, observers reported instances where victims were detained in the shelter from months to over a year and denied the opportunity to work or return home until the completion of their legal cases. The government reportedly offered repatriation services to victims who did not want to remain in the country or could facilitate new sponsorship if they chose to stay in Oman to work after departing the shelter. However, observers reported some victims were advised to fund their own repatriation after the conclusion of their legal cases; in other cases, victim’s families or their embassy paid for return flights. Some source-country embassies also offered victim services for their nationals and reported some potential trafficking victims chose to go to their embassies for shelter during the year for linguistic or cultural reasons or lack of awareness of government services.

The government provided foreign victims with legal alternatives to removal to countries in which they may face retribution or hardship, to include alternate employment under another sponsor; however, during the reporting period, the government did not report whether it assisted any victims in obtaining new jobs in Oman. Officials reported they permitted and encouraged victims to stay in Oman for the duration of court proceedings or allowed ROP officers to take victims’ statements to pursue criminal charges in their absence if the victim chose to be repatriated; however, observers reported several instances where victims were not permitted to return home until their legal case was completed. Shelter administrators reportedly interfaced with judicial officials to keep victims informed of the status of their legal cases; however, observers reported some victims residing in the shelter during the reporting period were not provided updates on their case, rarely asked to engage with officials during legal proceedings, and only advised when their case had been completed. The government reported provision of services was not dependent on a victim’s cooperation in criminal justice proceedings; however, as notification to law enforcement and a court order was required for admission into shelter, observers reported in some cases, officials pressured victims to participate in investigations and court proceedings. The government continued to stipulate a victim had to have an active trafficking investigation to remain at the shelter long-term; this policy may have limited care for victims who chose not to participate in law enforcement proceedings. The government did not report how many victims willingly participated in law enforcement proceedings during the reporting period.

Some officials reportedly encouraged other victims, including unidentified and potential victims, to reach extrajudicial settlements for the sake of expediency, which undercut broader efforts and weakened deterrence among perpetrators. Observers reported some cases ended with aggrieved workers unable to switch employers, reaching administrative settlements with their former employers, and subsequently returning to their home countries. The National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking (NCCHT) upheld the tenets of its MOU with a local association to provide pro bono legal assistance to trafficking victims involved in court proceedings, to include seeking damages on behalf of victims and pursuing labor claims via MOL mediation. Officials permitted victims to obtain restitution directly from the government and/or compensation by filing civil suits against traffickers; in 2023, courts awarded at least one victim compensation. Observers also reported instances where victims were promised compensation by officials but did not receive it prior to returning home.

Due to inadequate screening among vulnerable populations, specifically domestic workers reporting abuse and those who fled their employer’s home after experiencing mistreatment, including indicators of labor trafficking, the government did not take effective measures to prevent the inappropriate penalization of potential victims solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Observers continued to report in cases where domestic workers experienced abuse or conditions indicative of labor trafficking and sought government assistance, officials did not thoroughly investigate the workers’ claims and instead returned them to abusive employers, arrested them because their employer filed “absconding” charges, or sent them to the government shelter without consent – where some victims allegedly were detained for prolonged periods and denied the opportunity to work or return home. In some cases, this practice rendered potential victims of labor trafficking without victim-centered and trauma-informed care or at risk of re-trafficking in their employer’s home. In other cases, officials reportedly facilitated requests to pay employers or negotiated settlements for repayment of illegal “release fees” from workers who sought to terminate their contracts early to change employers or return home, exploiting the worker in debt bondage. Authorities arrested and detained some unidentified victims, such as workers who fled abusive employers and were arrested for “absconding” or other immigration violations. In other cases, authorities facilitated re-trafficking by returning unidentified victims of domestic servitude to their employer’s home and re-traumatizing victims by detaining them at the government shelter for prolonged periods and denying freedom of movement.

The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking.

The NCCHT – composed of members from relevant government ministries and a quasi-government organization focused on human rights – led the government’s anti-trafficking efforts and met twice as a full committee. The NCCHT continued to implement its 2024-2026 NAP and allocated 144,180 OMR ($374,500) to implement the NAP and other prevention activities, an increase compared with 100,000 OMR ($259,740) in the previous reporting period. The government conducted awareness campaigns in multiple languages via social media and the NCCHT website, primarily targeting migrant workers, on reporting mechanisms and trafficking indicators; the government also held an annual meeting with labor-source embassy representatives to discuss conditions for workers and trafficking vulnerabilities. MOL and the Oman Human Rights Commission (OHRC) developed a manual on workers’ rights and distributed it to newly arrived workers at the airport.

The ROP maintained the government’s central trafficking hotline, and the NCCHT was able to receive complaints through its website, which was available in 14 languages. MOL operated a labor violation hotline, which it promoted in its video on workers’ rights and responsibilities, and the MOSD operated a hotline to assist potential victims in accessing the government shelter. OHRC could also receive complaints via email. All hotlines reportedly remained active year-round, 24 hours per day, and staffed with Arabic and English interpreters; Urdu, Hindi, and Bengali-speakers were available as needed. The government reported it received 9,072 calls across all hotlines and identified 43 potential trafficking cases; the government did not report details of such cases or where they were referred. Observers continued to report concerns with available hotlines and grievance mechanisms for workers, including unresponsiveness to calls, language barriers, and unclear guidance on submitting complaints online. Observers also reported instances of officials repeatedly ignoring requests for assistance sought through grievance mechanisms.

The government continued to implement the 2023 labor law to provide protections for private sector workers. It remained unclear whether the labor law applied to domestic workers, who remained highly vulnerable to trafficking. Observers noted a provision in the labor law limited its application to work that was not already regulated by special laws or regulations; therefore, domestic workers’ employment remained solely regulated by the Ministerial Regulation No. 189 of 2004 that did not provide effective rights protections or adequate complaint mechanisms for this population. While the 2004 decision established broad regulations related to monthly wages; adequate room, board, and medical care; and return airfare when the employer terminates the contract, it did not provide standards on working hours, weekly rest days, annual vacation, or overtime compensation. The government’s 2011 standard employment contract for domestic workers included provisions from the 2004 decision and required one weekly rest day, 30 days of leave, and return flights every two years, but it had no limit on working hours, no provisions for overtime pay, and did not explicitly prohibit passport confiscation. An international organization reported the regulation did not include penalties for employer breaches or noncompliance, asserting it served as guidance rather than offering enforceable protections under the law for this population. While some protections under the 2004 law existed, the government did not adequately implement or enforce this regulation, and domestic workers experienced wage theft; excessive work hours; passport confiscation; restriction of movement; denial of food, medical care and legally mandated rest days; debt-based coercion; and physical and sexual abuse – all indicators of trafficking – during the reporting period. The government reported new domestic worker regulations – aimed to provide clarity on working hours, working conditions, wages, and rest periods and require medical insurance remained pending approval by MOL at the close of the reporting period.

MOL remained responsible for issuing licenses, regulating and monitoring recruitment agencies through inspections, and handling workers’ complaints through arbitration. During the reporting period, MOL referred three recruitment agencies to civil prosecution for violations of recruitment regulations and closed four agencies for violating the labor law via inspections; the government did not report referring any agencies to law enforcement for criminal investigation for potential trafficking crimes. MOL continued to employ its dedicated anti-trafficking unit and reportedly screened labor complaints for trafficking indicators. While MOL did not report the total number of complaints it received from workers against recruitment agencies or employers, it referred nine complaints to ROP for further investigation as potential trafficking cases. MOL reportedly provided interpretation services to workers filing complaints against employers or agents, and OHRC officials reported providing legal support in 257 labor cases submitted by workers. The General Federation of Oman Workers also provided support to 28 workers, including four domestic workers, in cases that involved trafficking indicators but were determined to be labor law violations.

Article 31 of the labor law prohibited worker-paid recruitment fees. However, many workers – particularly domestic workers – continued to pay recruitment fees to agents in their home countries who also operated agencies in Oman, were informal sub-agents of agencies in Oman, or connected the worker with the Omani recruitment agency. Workers – in attempts to terminate a contract or transfer employers – were also commonly subjected to “release fees” to reimburse an employer or agency for recruitment fees previously paid to hire the worker. While MOL reported efforts to arbitrate such cases – particularly when workers sought to change employers before the end of their contract term – such efforts involved officials negotiating settlements for repayment, despite fees being illegal. MOL reported workers could file a complaint even after paying a fee; however, observers reported seeking remedy through MOL was unpredictable and often prolonged, and officials commonly sided with employers in disputes, including on demands for “release fees.” Observers reported the government did not adequately address illegal worker-paid recruitment fees or consistently hold non-compliant recruitment agencies or employers accountable for mistreatment of workers, violations of the labor law, or demanding “release fee” payments that further exploited workers.

The government continued to implement a 2021 reform that allowed migrant workers to change employers upon completion or termination of their employment contract without employer approval, although MOL still had to approve the transfer. If a worker desired to terminate their contract prior to its expiration, the worker could do so after providing a 30-day notice to their employer, per article 38 of the labor law. The government still required workers who fled allegedly abusive employers to obtain employer approval if their contract had not expired or been terminated, and some workers reported employers demanded “release fees” when a worker requested to change jobs before the contract period concluded in exchange for employer approval. Observers reported the labor law lacked clarity regarding job transfers; in cases where a worker could terminate a contract following two consecutive months of non-payment of wages, the law did not explicitly describe the parameters for changing jobs, including a grace period to enable to the worker to search for alternative employment.

Separately, per the 2004 regulation, domestic workers could terminate a contract with a 30-day notice period at the end of the contract period without employer approval; otherwise, domestic workers could terminate a contract anytime with employer approval. Per article 8 of the 2004 decision regulating domestic workers, in the case of abuse by the employer or a member of the employer’s family, domestic workers allegedly could terminate their contract without notice; the decision did not specify any fees the abused worker would be responsible for in such circumstances. However, because the government did not consistently acknowledge cases of domestic worker exploitation or abuse, including domestic servitude, it did not implement this decision; rather, it allowed employers to demand illegal “release fees” from domestic workers to pay employers or agents as reimbursement for recruitment fees, regardless of working conditions.

The government reported all workers could depart the country without permission at any time, but a worker’s ability to do so was contingent on physically possessing a passport, having sufficient travel funds to return home, and not facing a so-called “immigration block.” Blocks could include charges of “absconding”, overstay fines, or if a worker had not been removed from their employer’s sponsorship; observers reported that employers demanding “release fees” from workers did not remove their sponsorship until such fees were paid, effectively restricting a worker’s movement and ability to leave Oman. While three complaints involving passport confiscation were part of MOL’s referrals to ROP as potential trafficking cases, observers reported the practice remained pervasive, particularly as another method for employers to control workers and restrict their movement. Many workers reported as soon as they were picked up at the airport, either the employer or recruitment agency representative confiscated their passport. Although the labor law prohibited passport confiscation, it allowed employers to hold worker’s passports with written consent of the worker and did not specify penalties or enforcement mechanisms. The 2004 domestic worker regulation did not explicitly prohibit passport confiscation.

The government continued to prevent wage theft through its Wage Protection System (WPS). The WPS aimed to monitor the disbursement of wages to employees and penalize employers if payment was more than a week late. MOL’s Inspection Department established a Wage Protection Section responsible for monitoring payments and implementing penalties, including issuing warnings, suspending the ability for employers to obtain work permits, and fines. During the reporting period, observers reported registration and compliance of employers remained low; only 25 percent of private sector businesses successfully processed wages through the WPS. The government did not report if it penalized non-compliant employers during the reporting period. Observers expressed significant concern the WPS did not include domestic workers, despite this population’s vulnerability to wage theft.

The government continued to prohibit the conversion of tourist visas to work visas for all nationals to reduce migrant workers’ vulnerability to deceptive recruitment practices and legal penalties from overstaying a tourist visa. Prior to this decision, foreign nationals could enter Oman on a tourist visa with the goal of finding employment and converting to a work visa. In some cases, recruiters made false promises and abandoned prospective workers once their tourist visas expired. In other cases, prospective workers failed to find a work visa sponsor and sought unregulated work, heightening their vulnerability to exploitation and trafficking without legal protections under the labor law. Labor-source country embassy representatives reported the decision continued to reduce the number of workers exploited through such methods who sought embassy assistance in Oman; however, observers continued to report cases of workers who arrived to Oman on tourist visas after being deceived by unscrupulous recruiters. The government reported having bilateral labor agreements (BLAs) regarding migrant workers with Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran, Morocco, Pakistan, the Palestinian Authority, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Vietnam; some BLAs reportedly included articles prohibiting unlawful labor recruitment and trafficking. The government signed an MOU with the Government of Bahrain to cooperate on anti-trafficking efforts, and officials continued to negotiate with labor-sending country governments on trafficking related agreements. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.

Trafficking affects all communities. This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit foreign victims in Oman. Oman’s migrant worker community comes primarily from Southeast and South Asia and African countries, including Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Foreign workers typically migrate to Oman willingly and legally. Men generally seek employment in construction, agricultural, and service sectors, while women often seek domestic worker jobs. Male migrant workers are typically from South Asia and are vulnerable to labor trafficking. Traffickers exploit female victims, predominantly from South, Southeast, and East Asia and Africa, in labor trafficking, particularly domestic servitude, and sex trafficking.

In 2024, media, NGOs, international organizations, and labor-source governments continued to report instances of migrant workers, specifically domestic workers, subjected to conditions indicative of labor trafficking by Omani employers and recruitment agents in Oman. Labor recruiters deceive workers, mostly from Africa and Asia, either by paying illegal recruitment and visa fees and/or working in a job different than agreed upon and experiencing conditions different from those agreed upon in Oman, including non-payment of wages; restriction of movement; physical, verbal, and sexual abuse; contract switching; excessive hours; denial of medical care, food, and rest days; passport confiscation; threats of use of force, arrest and detention by police; and debt-based coercion through illegal “release fees” – all trafficking indicators. Migrant workers seeking low-wage jobs continue to be at risk for trafficking under the employer-based visa system in Oman, which grants recruitment agencies and/or Omani visa sponsors significant control over workers’ residency and work visas and, therefore, their legal status in the country.

The employer-based visa system continues to give employers the power to dictate the status of residence permits. Some unscrupulous recruitment agencies in Oman and their sub-agents in labor-source countries mislead migrant workers by providing fraudulent contracts with fictitious wages and charging exorbitant recruitment fees. Some victims face working conditions significantly worse than recruiting agencies promised. Reports of employers, sponsors, and recruitment offices seeking illegal “release fees” from exploited workers and potential trafficking victims for them to freely leave Oman or change jobs prior to the expiration of their contract remain common; such fees are generally to reimburse employers or recruitment offices for recruitment fees paid to hire the worker. In cases where a worker seeks to leave Oman, some employers refuse to remove a worker from their sponsorship if fees are not paid, effectively preventing a worker from leaving the country and restricting their movement through an “immigration block.” During the reporting period, labor-source governments and workers’ families paid Omani employers up to $3,900 per worker for the worker to return home; the government continues to actively condone this practice and, in some cases, facilitates payment or negotiates a settlement for repayment between a worker and employer, despite such fees being illegal. In other cases, labor-source embassy representatives continue to report negotiating such fees with employers to enable their citizens to return home.

Domestic workers who flee their employers are also vulnerable to sex trafficking. Some employers reportedly “kick out” their domestic employees who are consequently forced into commercial sex. Some workers enter Oman with full knowledge of their work obligations, but sponsors ultimately coerce them to work for little or no pay or in exploitative conditions under the credible threat of deportation. Some workers arrive in Oman on tourist visas or by first traveling to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) while willing employers secured their Omani work visas, thereby circumventing oversight of some workers’ home governments. Additionally, some victims originally intend to travel to the UAE but are subsequently compelled to accept work in Oman, or vice-versa. Traffickers often begin recruitment in labor-source countries with some promising retail jobs in well-known areas, such as Dubai. After arriving in the UAE, traffickers transport migrant workers to Oman and force them to work for lower wages and in austere conditions in the absence of legal contracts or in commercial sex. Media previously reported several Sri Lankan women were deceptively recruited for domestic work in the UAE and Oman; most recruited women ultimately reached UAE on tourist visas and were transferred to Oman. Once in Oman, traffickers exploited the women in domestic servitude and sex trafficking. Informal labor intermediaries operate legally but without regulation in Oman, communicating anonymously via social media platforms to promise Omani sponsors inexpensive domestic labor at a fraction of the cost stipulated by the formal, well-established recruitment agencies; this increases the vulnerability to labor trafficking among domestic workers placed in such households.