• Strengthen efforts to prosecute allegations of labor trafficking criminally instead of administratively through targeted training for officials to recognize potential trafficking crimes that originate as contractual or labor violations.
• Significantly increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes and convict traffickers, including Kuwaiti citizens and allegedly complicit officials, under the 2013 anti-trafficking law rather than other criminal laws, when applicable.
• Increase training for law enforcement, immigration officials, and detention center staff to proactively screen for trafficking indicators among vulnerable populations, including Cuban regime-affiliated workers, individuals arrested for immigration violations or individuals who flee abusive employers and face countercharges, and those pending deportation proceedings.
• Ensure victims are not inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked.
• Institute reforms to the employer-based visa system, including allowing workers to change employers at any time and leave the country without requiring employer approval.
• Strengthen enforcement of the domestic worker law by increasing inspections of registered and fraudulent recruitment agencies, increasing the number of Domestic Worker Department (DWED) investigators and improving screening of domestic worker complaints to identify potential labor trafficking cases through targeted training for investigators.
• Increase efforts to identify male victims and refer them to the recently established male shelter, ensuring unhindered access for all potential victims, including those who self-refer, regardless of legal status or alleged criminal charges, including “absconding.”
• Enforce the new Residency Law, including by penalizing noncompliant employers and companies for wage theft with deterrent penalties, and ensure officials screen all wage theft cases for other trafficking indicators.
• Fully implement the NRM by training officials on its use and ensuring guidelines are publicly accessible.
• Take steps to eliminate recruitment or placement fees charged to workers and establish penalties for non-compliant agencies and employers who subject workers to such fees.
• Expand efforts to raise awareness on existing protections for migrant workers, penalties for traffickers, and indicators of labor trafficking, particularly among vulnerable populations, including domestic workers, as well as employers, company owners, recruitment agencies and the public.

The government decreased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts.

The 2013 anti-trafficking law criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to 15 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving an adult male victim and up to life imprisonment for those involving an adult female or child victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. During the reporting period, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) established an advisory working group within the Permanent National Committee for the Implementation of the National Strategy to Prevent Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants (National Committee) to review and propose amendments to the 2013 anti-trafficking law; the government did not report any outcomes of the working group.

The Ministry of Interior (MOI) maintained a specialized anti-trafficking unit. In 2024, the Public Prosecution Office (PPO) expanded its scope and allocated additional resources, including staffing, to handle trafficking cases, while retaining oversight over other crimes. In 2024, the government investigated three alleged trafficking cases, a decrease compared with 25 investigations in 2023, and prosecutors determined none of the three cases involved trafficking, instead classifying them as “visa trading.” The government did not report prosecuting or convicting any traffickers under the 2013 law in 2024, compared with the prosecution and conviction of five labor traffickers in one in case in 2023. Media reported the government prosecuted and convicted 12 individuals in a case with sex trafficking indicators, but the government did not pursue the case under the anti-trafficking law. Judges retained broad discretion to defer and delay issuance of verdicts in trafficking cases, as they did in other cases, which – in some cases – prolonged case resolutions and undercut broader anti-trafficking efforts.

Kuwaiti authorities did not generally consider labor complaints or violations where trafficking indicators were present as potential trafficking crimes. Instead, officials resolved such violations, including cases of severe exploitation, through administrative mechanisms such as transfer of the employee to a different employer, mandated back payment of wages, fines, and blacklisting or suspension of companies and agencies. Law enforcement primarily focused trafficking-related investigations, prosecutions, and convictions on crimes involving visa fraud. For example, authorities investigated, prosecuted, and convicted perpetrators for “visa trading” crimes – a trafficking-related crime where companies forced or deceived workers into paying for visas but did not provide legitimate employment, rendering the worker without status or legal protections and heightening their vulnerability to trafficking. In January 2025, the government enacted a new Residency Law that explicitly prohibited “visa trading” for the first time and included stricter penalties – up to five years’ imprisonment and fines up to 10,000 Kuwaiti dinar (KD) ($32,500) – for convicted perpetrators; such penalties may deter future “visa trading” crimes and reduce workers vulnerability to further exploitation, including trafficking. The government did not prosecute some cases of domestic servitude because of a lack of evidence or witness testimony, and some domestic workers who were victims of abuse, including trafficking, ultimately chose not to move forward with court proceedings because of fear of deportation, inadequate government support and prolonged trial periods. In previous years, the government only prosecuted severe cases of domestic servitude – usually involving significant bodily injury or death – as violations of other criminal laws and only sometimes under the anti-trafficking law as labor trafficking.

Corruption and official complicity in trafficking and trafficking-related crimes remained a concern. In previous reporting periods, some officials allegedly took bribes or overtly sold legitimate or fraudulent work permits to illegal labor-recruiting companies or directly to migrant workers, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking. In February 2025, media reported the government referred three alleged perpetrators, including an MOI General Department of Residency Affairs employee and a Public Authority for Manpower (PAM) employee, to prosecution on charges of “visa trading”; the officials allegedly manipulated company records and official transactions and took bribes to issue fraudulent work visas to migrant workers, rendering hundreds of workers without status or legal protections and increasing their vulnerability to trafficking. In January 2025, the Department of State suspended the G-5 visa sponsorship privileges afforded to officials accredited to Kuwait’s Permanent Mission to the UN for one year due to a Kuwait diplomat’s alleged mistreatment of three domestic workers. The Government of Kuwait did not waive immunity for U.S. criminal proceedings to proceed and did not initiate its own prosecution. The Kuwaiti government did not report holding the diplomat accountable for the third consecutive year.

The government trained – directly and in partnership with international organizations – PAM officials, including shelter staff and labor inspectors, officials from the DWED, National Committee members, law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges on victim identification, trafficking indicators, implementation of the NRM, enforcing the 2013 anti-trafficking law, and international trafficking protocols. The government did not train officials to recognize contractual or labor violations as potential indicators of a trafficking crime, including as evidence of force, fraud, or coercion employers used to exploit victims, leading to limited accountability for traffickers, particularly for domestic servitude crimes.

The government made mixed efforts to protect trafficking victims.

In 2024, the government identified 71 adult female labor trafficking victims, all of whom were identified via the government shelter’s screening process upon presenting themselves at the shelter and referred to MOI for further investigation. MOI did not determine any as victims of trafficking. In 2023, the government identified two victims through this process, indicating improved implementation of screening procedures by shelter staff. While the identification of 71 victims represented an overall increase, law enforcement and judicial actors did not identify any victims in 2024, compared with identifying all 44 victims in 2023. Additionally, the government did not identify any male or sex trafficking victims in 2024. The National Committee worked to implement the NRM to identify and prevent cases of trafficking. Although front-line officials and investigators continued to follow prescribed procedures regarding victim identification and used the NRM to refer abused workers and potential trafficking victims to the shelter, observers reported many officials were not aware of the mechanism, hindering effectiveness. The NRM was not publicly available, limiting its use for non-government stakeholders.

Some front-line officials – including those working in anti-trafficking entities, immigration officials, and detention center staff – did employ proactive identification procedures within the NRM to screen vulnerable groups, such as migrant workers, individuals who fled abusive employers or faced “absconding” charges, individuals in commercial sex, and those awaiting deportation. In 2024, MOI’s specialized anti-trafficking police established two offices at the international airport to enhance victim identification, particularly for foreign workers fraudulently recruited, a key trafficking indicator, before arriving to Kuwait. However, the government did not identify any trafficking victims through existing screening mechanisms or the new airport offices.

As of December 2024, 2,562 vulnerable female migrant workers and 80 children sought assistance at the shelter, compared to 1,623 in 2023; the majority of the children were accompanied by guardians, though others were first admitted unaccompanied and referred to social services. This included 651 vulnerable female domestic workers referred to shelter by the DWED and 1,911 female workers who either self-referred or were referred by their embassies. NGOs and labor-source country embassies reported the majority of those admitted to the shelter were potential labor trafficking victims who had fled poor working conditions, including physical and emotional abuse, excessive hours, delayed payment of wages, and passport confiscation, or desired to return to their country of origin. In 2024, the government spent 191,000 KD ($620,130) for female migrant worker shelter operations and protection programs for trafficking victims, compared with 105,000 KD ($340,910) in 2023; this allocation was dependent on the number of vulnerable workers assisted. The government-run shelter received referrals from embassies, NGOs, international organizations, the DWED, the MOI’s anti-trafficking unit, churches, private citizens, and other migrant workers; it reported accepting all referred workers into the shelter. The shelter served as a one-stop facility, providing medical and psycho-social care, food, and access to officials from various ministries to facilitate legal and repatriation assistance. International organizations and NGOs continued to have access to victims and reported the shelter assisted workers with repatriation or finding new employment. PAM maintained agreements with three civil society organizations (CSOs), which included embedded offices in the shelter to provide access for such organizations to monitor shelter operations and provide assistance to its residents. Residents at the shelter had access to cell phones and freedom of movement. Shelters were staffed by supervisors, medical staff, and investigators 24 hours per day.

In March 2025, the government opened a shelter dedicated to male migrant workers, including trafficking victims; however, the shelter did not host male migrant workers, including trafficking victims by the close of the reporting period. Officials reported the shelter could host up to 300 male migrant workers, including trafficking victims, and provided shelter, healthcare, and legal assistance, among other services to residents. The shelter had specialized staff, including a team to screen workers for trafficking indicators upon arrival and refer them to law enforcement for criminal investigation, if warranted. The government provided embedded office space in the men’s shelter for CSOs to operate and monitor shelter conditions. Officials reported all workers – regardless of legal status – would be accepted; this included workers with “absconding” charges or other non-violent criminal charges.

Some foreign embassies continued to maintain their own domestic worker shelters and worked with the Kuwaiti government to seek compensation and legal redress for their nationals subjected to exploitative working conditions in the country. NGOs reported a lack of awareness of the government shelter and its services among domestic workers, noting many workers receiving assistance from their embassies did not know the government shelter existed. In cooperation with international organizations and foreign embassies, the government could assist victims in obtaining documentation and funding for repatriation; however, observers reported the government was slow to process exit clearances for foreign nationals seeking repatriation, and, in some cases, other foreign governments funded repatriation of their own nationals.

Due to inadequate screening and inconsistent implementation of the NRM’s victim identification procedures among vulnerable populations, the government did not take effective measures to prevent the inappropriate penalization of potential victims solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Observers reported law enforcement and immigration authorities did not often implement victim identification guidelines within the NRM because they did not understand why the guidelines were relevant to their roles, expecting victims instead to self-identify. Advocates asserted Kuwaiti law enforcement and immigration officials continued to deport undocumented migrants without screening for trafficking indicators or considering why such workers lost their legal status. MOI authorities reported deporting more than 26,000 foreign workers in 2024, most of whom were deported for immigration violations, including “absconding.”

Observers continued to report workers were generally hesitant to report trafficking to law enforcement because of a fear of detainment or deportation and financial and legal obstacles. In some instances where workers experienced prolonged labor dispute proceedings, observers reported workers, including potential trafficking victims, returned home without owed wages or end-of-service benefits prior to a verdict. In the case of administrative deportation of vulnerable migrant workers, officials reportedly provided airline tickets and worked to recoup associated costs from accused employers; however, observers noted in cases where authorities arrested workers for immigration violations or other alleged crimes, they quickly deported workers, limiting opportunities to screen for trafficking.

The government allowed victims residing in its shelter to either change employers and visa sponsors or be repatriated to their country of origin once their residency status was resolved or pending the resolution of a legal case or unpaid bills, without approval by their former visa sponsor. Once the shelter admitted a victim, employers could not press “absconding” charges. The government did not report deporting those who faced retaliation or retribution in their respective home countries. Rather, the government allowed all trafficking victims to change employers and maintain residency in Kuwait or otherwise request resettlement to a third country; however, most shelter residents chose repatriation to their home country.

The government reported public prosecutors willingly tried cases on victims’ behalf using their verbal and written statements; however, the government did not have privacy laws to protect victims against potential retribution and often did not provide adequate care for victims throughout the duration of legal proceedings. In May 2024, the National Committee signed an MOU with the Kuwait Bar Association to provide specialized legal assistance to trafficking victims; the government did not report whether any victims were provided legal support. The government reported victims could obtain restitution from defendants in criminal cases and file civil suits against traffickers for damages; however, the government did not report awarding restitution or victims filing such civil suits.

The government made mixed efforts to prevent trafficking.

The National Committee, composed of senior officials and tasked with implementing the government’s anti-trafficking strategy, convened eight times; certain agencies also met three times to coordinate awareness raising activities. The government continued to implement its 2023-2028 anti-trafficking NAP. The National Committee, in coordination with an international organization, financially supported and conducted public awareness campaigns targeting employers, workers, religious organizations, and the general public on trafficking trends, reporting mechanisms, penalties for trafficking crimes, and worker rights. PAM separately raised awareness on its social media and website in several languages on domestic worker rights, its hotline, and prohibitions on transferring a domestic worker to a different sponsor, wage theft, and a worker’s right to communicate with his or her family. The government continued to disseminate pamphlets, available in seven languages, to educate migrant workers, including domestic workers, on their rights in airports, embassies, the PAM shelter, and labor-recruitment agencies. The PPO launched a function on its website to report potential trafficking crimes electronically, and the National Committee continued to provide a reporting method via its official website, which also hosted awareness materials; the government did not report whether either mechanism received reports of potential trafficking cases. The MOI continued to operate a trafficking-specific hotline; however, officials did not report identifying any victims or potential trafficking cases via the hotline in 2024. PAM also continued to operate a hotline at the women’s government shelter; staff received 13 calls and referred them to MOI for further investigation.

Although the labor law prohibited employers from recruiting foreign workers unless authorized by PAM, the law did not explicitly prohibit worker-paid recruitment fees. Article 10 of the labor law stated the government “shall issue a resolution setting forth the procedures, documents and fees that shall be paid by the employer”; however, it did not issue such a resolution. The domestic worker law prohibited employers or recruitment agencies from charging workers recruitment or placement fees. The government reported that in practice, cases where workers paid recruitment fees would be considered fraud under the penal code; however, the government did not report efforts to address such instances during the reporting period. Migrant workers were reportedly routinely charged recruitment fees in their home country, and, coupled with Kuwait’s employer-based visa system, many workers were forced to remain in abusive employment situations to pay off debt incurred from illegal recruitment fees. Media reported some migrant workers paid between 1,500 and 2,000 KD ($4,886 to $6,514) to recruitment agencies for jobs in Kuwait, including at times with the approval of Kuwaiti embassies abroad. PAM continued to regulate foreign-worker recruitment, recruitment agency licensing, and labor relations, including disputes among workers, employers, and recruitment agencies for the private and public sector. In 2024, PAM continued the Tamkeen program with two international organizations and reported the International Recruitment Integrity System – a voluntary accreditation mechanism to connect employers, employees, and recruiters to promote ethical recruitment – was fully operational.

Observers, diplomats, and NGOs continued to report wage theft – a key trafficking indicator – among migrant workers remained pervasive, which increased workers’ vulnerability to trafficking. Observers reported private sector workers were often forced to withdraw cash from ATM cards after they received their salary electronically, rendering the worker unable to prove wage theft with a record of full payment. In October 2024, the Minister of Interior issued a directive to increase monitoring and inspections of companies to verify salary payments. The MOJ coordinated with the Central Bank of Kuwait to issue a circular to other Kuwaiti banks to enable low-wage earners – including migrant workers – to open bank accounts to receive wages electronically; the government directed banks to streamline processing and lower costs to open accounts for such workers. The new Residency Law also included provisions and penalties for wage theft that applied to both individual employers and company owners. However, the government did not report identifying cases of wage theft via inspections or penalizing any employers for wage theft during the year.

PAM officials used arbitration, administrative fines, and closure of recruitment firms and companies to resolve most disputes and complaints, including potential labor trafficking crimes. If the parties could not agree on a settlement, officials referred the case to the labor courts. Labor inspectors conducted routine inspections of worksites and recruitment agencies. The government reported penalizing 4,243 companies for committing labor violations in 2024 and referring 1,711 companies to MOI for further investigation; this was a significant decrease compared with penalizing 12,081 companies and referring 7,896 to MOI in 2023. Like previous years, the government did not report penalties for violating companies or whether any of the labor violations referred to law enforcement included potential trafficking crimes. As of December 2024, PAM received 24,125 official grievances from foreign migrant workers in the private sector, the most common of which included pay discrepancies, passport confiscation, employer denial of job transfers after the required three years with a visa sponsor, worker’s request for employment transfers due to allegations of mistreatment by their employer, and overtime pay disputes – all indicators of trafficking; this was a significant increase compared with PAM receiving 14,779 complaints from workers in 2023. The government did not report referring any potential trafficking cases identified from submitted labor cases for criminal investigation under the anti-trafficking law.

The domestic worker law (Law 68/15) required domestic workers have one day off per week, a maximum 12-hour workday with rest, minimum wages paid per month, paid annual leave, end-of-service benefits, and access to file formal grievances at DWED, among other protections. Despite strong legal protections in law, domestic workers regularly experienced conditions indicative of labor trafficking, including being forced to work longer than 12 hours per day without overtime compensation, wage theft, and denial of rest days and end-of-service benefits. Although the law required DWED to provide domestic workers standardized employment contracts, many workers reported being subjected to contract switching, were not aware a standard contract was required, did not understand the contents of their contract, or did not have a copy of their contract in their possession; such actions increased vulnerability to trafficking. The law did not allow DWED to inspect private homes, which limited the enforcement of the domestic worker law. In addition, observers noted DWED had limited resources and personnel to enforce domestic worker protections. The government maintained an online platform for domestic workers to submit complaints, including for trafficking, that aimed to make grievance mechanisms more accessible and reportedly allowed the DWED to track recruitment agency inspections and complaints. Observers reported workers experienced challenges in submitting complaints because the platform was only available in Arabic and a lack of awareness of the platform. In addition, the platform required employer information, which many workers did not have access to, particularly if they were filing a complaint against their employer.

For issuance or renewal of a license for a domestic worker recruitment firm, the DWED required single offices to submit financial deposits of 40,000 KD ($129,870) with a two-year validity and larger companies to present a letter of guarantee worth 100,000 KD ($324,675). The DWED continued to investigate domestic worker recruitment agencies to ensure compliance with the domestic worker law. It also initiated investigations based on grievances filed by domestic workers, employers, recruitment offices and companies, and embassies of labor-source countries. The government arbitrated such grievances either through extrajudicial administrative proceedings or through the labor courts. The DWED could refer suspected trafficking cases to the MOI for further investigation but did not report doing so for the third consecutive year. As of December 2024, the DWED had conducted 65 inspections of domestic worker recruitment firms that resulted in 133 violations against registered recruitment agencies; the government identified violations against 190 companies in total, which it subsequently suspended for three to six months. Officials did not report referring any of the violating recruitment agencies or companies for criminal investigation or prosecution as potential trafficking cases for the second consecutive year. The government’s centralized recruitment company, Al-Durra, worked to reduce recruitment costs, curb illegal recruitment fees, provide greater oversight of recruiting practices, hire male domestic workers, and secure labor agreements for female employees. Al-Durra reported in cases where a domestic worker suffered abuse or maltreatment from an employer, the agency filed a complaint against the employer and reported the complaint to the “competent authorities.” The government also maintained agreements with several labor-source countries specific to domestic worker recruitment.

Despite explicit prohibitions on passport confiscation, a well-known trafficking indicator, the government did not report penalizing noncompliant employers with deterrent penalties or referring any complaints or violations to law enforcement for criminal investigation as a potential trafficking crime. Additionally, the domestic worker law allowed employers to take a worker’s passport with the approval of the domestic worker, which limited the effectiveness of the prohibition. As such, instances of this practice remained pervasive in Kuwait and rendered many workers vulnerable to trafficking. The government limited job mobility for foreign workers, only enabling private sector workers to transfer jobs without employer approval after three years of consecutive service and with three months’ notice to the employer, while domestic workers remained unable to change jobs at any time without employer approval; such restrictions increased workers’ vulnerability to trafficking. In cases of abuse or mistreatment, a private sector worker could submit a complaint to PAM against his or her employer that would allow a transfer; however, transfers still required approval from PAM. Workers, including potential trafficking victims, submitted a total of 7,872 complaints of employers’ denying transfers. Between June and September 2024, the government temporarily permitted domestic workers to transfer to a job in the private sector with previous employer approval. While this may have enabled workers to remove themselves from exploitative employment situations, observers reported the limited timeframe was inadequate. In November 2024, PAM allowed workers from small and medium businesses to change jobs within the same sector after one year of service; however, the transfer still required previous employer approval. These limits to job mobility, coupled with Kuwait’s employer-based visa system, rendered workers unable to leave exploitative employment, increasing their risk to trafficking.

Between March 2024 and June 2024, the government allowed undocumented migrants, including trafficking victims, to legalize their residency status. Advocates reported that while this effort could reduce the vulnerability of further exploitation, including trafficking, for some individuals who sought to return home, the high costs to legalize status prohibited others from doing so, particularly if they incurred debt to come to Kuwait and remained without legal employment while undocumented. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.

Trafficking affects all communities. This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit foreign victims in Kuwait. Men and women primarily from Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and increasingly from sub-Saharan Africa work in Kuwait’s service, sanitation, construction, healthcare, medical supply, transportation, security, hospitality, grocery and food delivery, and domestic service sectors. Unskilled laborers and female domestic workers are especially vulnerable to labor trafficking because they often have limited access to assistance outside their worksite or employer’s home. Bidoon (stateless residents of Arab heritage) without government-issued identification documents face challenges obtaining lawful employment opportunities and remain vulnerable to labor trafficking; members of the Bidoon community also reportedly exploit victims in sex trafficking. Numerous labor-source countries, including Bhutan, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, restrict their female nationals from employment in domestic work in Kuwait due to documented cases of trafficking within the sector. However, many workers continue to circumvent the bans by transiting through third countries before arriving in Kuwait, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking. Following an 18-month ban, in July 2024, the Government of the Philippines again allowed Filipino workers with prior overseas work experience to apply for domestic worker visas in Kuwait; first time workers remained banned from employment.

Upon arrival, some visa sponsors exploit migrants in labor trafficking, and to a much lesser extent, sex trafficking, through various illegal measures: non-payment of wages, excessive work hours, denial of food, substandard housing, threats, harassment, physical or sexual abuse, restriction of movement, and passport confiscation. Passport confiscation by employers remains pervasive and is usually undertaken to prevent a worker from fleeing to another position, exercise control over an employee’s conduct, extort money in exchange for a worker’s documents, or compel a worker to remain in a job through coercive conditions that violate contract terms. Many migrant workers pay exorbitant recruitment fees to agents in their home countries, are coerced into paying broker fees in Kuwait, or both, rendering workers vulnerable to trafficking, including debt bondage. Reporting indicates there were Cuban regime-affiliated medical workers in Kuwait. The Cuban regime may have forced Cuban medical professionals in Kuwait to work.

“Visa trading” continues to be a common manifestation of trafficking in Kuwait. Some illegal recruitment companies facilitate trafficking by using deceptive techniques to bring migrant workers to Kuwait via unenforceable contracts, fraudulent visas, and nonexistent positions. Some officials allegedly take bribes or overtly sell work permits to illegal labor-recruiting companies or directly to migrant workers. Kuwait’s sponsorship law, which ties a migrant worker’s legal residency and valid immigration status to his or her employer, restricts workers’ movements and penalizes them for leaving abusive workplaces. Despite limited reforms for private sector workers, workers continue to experience challenges changing jobs, including being illegally charged a fee by former employers to transfer a visa or residence permit from one sponsor to another. Given these impediments, workers routinely leave their original sponsors and take other jobs without transferring sponsorship, risking fines, deportation, or blacklisting for falling out of legal residency status, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking. Domestic workers remain unable to change jobs without sponsor approval, and reports of employers “selling” workers to other employers on social media and online platforms continue. Domestic workers are particularly vulnerable to labor trafficking inside private homes. Many workers report experiencing work conditions substantially different from those described in the contract. In some cases, officials do not provide workers copies of their contracts, or the contracts are not written in a language they can read. Domestic workers in such situations often leave their employer, losing their status in the country – which is a criminal offense – and increasing their vulnerability to detention, deportation, and trafficking. In addition, traffickers, including recruitment agents, sometimes exploit domestic workers who flee their abusive employers in sex trafficking and threaten to report the worker’s undocumented status to ensure workers will not report the exploitation.