Limited territorial control, lack of funding, weak law enforcement capabilities, corruption, security threats, and social unrest hindered the government’s efforts to combat human trafficking. The transition government reported that capacity and access limitations negatively affected its ability to collect law enforcement and victim protection data. The 2014 Anti-Trafficking Law (No. CL/20140010) criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of seven to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine ranging from 200,000 to 1.5 million Haitian gourdes (HTG) ($1,524 to $11,430), which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. The law provided for increased penalties of up to life imprisonment when the victim was a child.

The National Committee for the Fight Against Human Trafficking (CNLTP) served as Haiti’s interministerial anti-trafficking coordinating body. The Haitian National Police (HNP), including its Brigade for the Protection of Minors (BPM) and Border Police (POLIFRONT), were the principal law enforcement bodies pursuing trafficking cases as part of a broader mandate. The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions in 2024. In 2023, the government initiated 24 investigations (one under the Anti-Trafficking Law and 23 under child protection laws), 30 prosecutions (five under the Anti-Trafficking Law and 25 under child protection laws for child rape that may have involved trafficking), and five convictions under other laws that may have involved trafficking. The government did not report updates to an investigation reopened during the previous reporting period against the former president of the Haitian Football Federation who was accused of sex trafficking between 2014 and 2020; a judge initially dismissed the case in 2021 because of a lack of evidence, although observers noted victim-witnesses most likely experienced intimidation. The HNP collaborated with Interpol Haiti in the investigation and arrest of a Dominican nightclub owner suspected of child sex trafficking– Interpol identified 23 sex trafficking victims (17 Dominican and six Venezuelan).

The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns. The CNLTP and law enforcement experienced a lack of resources and technical capacity. The government reported training officials, including law enforcement and border officials, on victim identification and referral procedures; however, trainings were limited due to the security situation. The government also reported training lawyers on trafficking cases. POLIFRONT was present at the four official Haiti-Dominican Republic border crossing points but lacked sufficient resources to monitor other parts of the border and its officials had limited understanding of human trafficking. The government signed a bilateral arrangement with the Government of Colombia on border security cooperation to counter transnational crime, including trafficking.

Identification and protection measures were overall hindered due to insufficient resources and gang violence. Some officials reportedly continued to use SOPs for victim identification and referral; however, first responders were often unaware of identification and referral mechanisms due to lack of training. The government and international organizations (IOs) reported reduced capacity to access certain parts of the country, including major roads, hindering the government’s ability to reach populations vulnerable to trafficking, identify victims, and provide protection services. Observers noted victims of crime, including trafficking, often did not self-identify because of fears of retaliation from traffickers and social stigmatization.

Efforts to screen for trafficking indicators among IDPs were severely limited, as 75 percent of the informal settlements where they resided were in gang-controlled areas or abandoned. Gangs also targeted schools, hospitals, and humanitarian assistance efforts, further exacerbating the lack of access to essential services and increasing the displacement of populations vulnerable to trafficking. The law required the government to provide protection, medical, legal, and psycho-social services to victims and create and administer a government-regulated fund to assist victims. In practice, the government remained reliant on civil society to provide most adult care, although civil society efforts were hindered due to gang threats and violence. The anti-trafficking law stipulated money and other assets seized after conviction of trafficking suspects should fund services for trafficking victims and the CNLTP; however, there was no evidence this occurred. The government reported the quality of legal services depended on victims’ finances and ability to pay for lawyers.

The government did not report on the availability of shelters for trafficking victims; however, an IO reported a decrease in the availability of shelters for victims of crime as a result of gangs expanding their territory. Civil society organizations located along the border with the Dominican Republic could provide lodging and humanitarian assistance to potential adult victims among migrant populations; officials referred unaccompanied children registered with the National Migration Office to the Institute for Social Welfare and Research (IBESR). The government did not screen the approximately 250,000 at-risk Haitians deported to Haiti in 2024, mainly from the Dominican Republic and via the land border. Potential and confirmed child victims could remain in a transitional facility for up to 90 days until placed with a family member, foster family, or a registered and accredited private orphanage.

IBESR funded all child trafficking victim services and was the only government agency that regularly provided victim care services; however, IBESR previously reported their facilities had limited capacities and were overburdened. An IO reported challenges identifying child victims of forced criminality due to the normalization of the exploitation of boys in gangs and perceptions among officials that victims willingly engaged in these activities. During the reporting period, IBESR established a rehabilitation center, which provided services to 134 children, some of whom may have been victims of forced criminality.

Authorities did not require victims to participate in the investigation or prosecution of traffickers in order to access protection services. The government reported victims had the right to have a representative present when speaking with law enforcement. The law did not explicitly prohibit remote testimony; however, a judge previously refused to allow a victim to testify virtually who resided abroad and could not return to Haiti due to insecurity. For foreign victims, the law included provisions for voluntary repatriation, temporary residency during legal proceedings, and permanent residency if the country of origin could not ensure victims’ safety or well-being. The law also provided protections to prevent victims’ penalization for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked; however, observers reported child victims exploited by gangs were at risk of being arrested for their perceived association with gangs. The lack of physical protection, especially in high profile cases, dissuaded victims from participating in public hearings. A government prosecutor previously reported courts provided security for victim-witnesses only when victims came physically to court, but protection was not guaranteed after testimony. The law allowed prosecutors to pursue cases even if victims withdrew their complaints or refused to cooperate with an investigation or prosecution. Judges could mandate compensation for related crimes under Haiti’s civil code, but there were no awards of restitution or compensation. An NGO reported there were 68 Cuban regime-affiliated medical workers, who may have been forced to work by the Cuban regime, in Haiti in 2025, including in hospitals or private medical centers, particularly in the departments of Ouanaminthe and Nord-Est.

The transition government made some efforts to prevent trafficking. The appointed members of the CNLTP included representatives from nine agencies and three from civil society. The CNLTP reported it met throughout the reporting period despite security limitations and a constrained budget of 15 million HTG ($115,000); however, it struggled to operate effectively due to a lack of resources. The government finalized a 2025-2035 NAP but did not report how it would fund its activities. The government allocated 1.5 million HTG ($11.5 million) to support IDPs, many of whom were vulnerable to trafficking. The government reported conducting anti-trafficking awareness campaigns and signing an MOU with a university for collaboration on awareness raising efforts. The government previously reported running two hotlines for reporting crime that could be used to report child trafficking cases and a general HNP hotline where trafficking could also be reported; however, it is unknown if they operated during the reporting period and the government did not report identifying any victims through them. In addition, two IOs ran hotlines but did not report identifying any victims through them.

IBESR previously reported ensuring all Haitian children departing Haiti by commercial or charter planes possessed valid travel documentation and were under either the care of a parent or guardian with parental consent. During the previous reporting period, an IO supported the National Office of Migration in screening all deported Haitians at the Port-au-Prince airport and Cap-Haitien seaport and airport; authorities did not identify any trafficking victims among these deported migrants. Despite improvements to the civil registry system, the continued dysfunction of the civil registry system and weak consular capacity to provide identification documentation was one of the factors that left many Haitians who remained in the Dominican Republic at risk of remaining undocumented and vulnerable to trafficking. The Haitian National Identification Office, in collaboration with a foreign donor and an IO, distributed an unknown number of identification cards throughout Haiti during the reporting period. Observers reported 30 percent of children aged one to five years old were not registered at birth and were particularly vulnerable to trafficking. The vast majority of IDPs from the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince did not have identification cards or birth certificates; the lack of identification cards hindered their access to humanitarian aid and social services. The government, in collaboration with an IO, launched an awareness-raising campaign throughout towns along the Haiti and Dominican Republic border to inform migrants where to obtain legal identification and travel documents, potentially reducing their vulnerabilities to trafficking.

Although the labor code required recruiters to obtain a license and prohibited charging recruitment fees, the government did not report efforts to enforce the labor code. It was previously reported that the labor inspectorate had insufficient staff and resources to inspect worksites for labor trafficking indicators. Inspectors previously reported some women working in factories feared loss of employment if they were to accuse their employers of sexual abuse or forced labor. The government previously reported IBESR staff and labor inspectors did not receive adequate training on child labor issues. The lack of a minimum age for domestic work and exceptions in laws governing child labor previously hindered investigations and prosecutions of child domestic servitude. IBESR had inadequate oversight of orphanages and foster care homes – typically operated by NGOs or religious communities – which had widely varied conditions; IBESR’s ability to enforce closures of orphanages and foster care homes not in compliance with the 2014 anti-trafficking law was limited by insecurity. The government required the registration and accreditation of all privately run orphanages; however, only 179 out of 754 institutions known to be operating were registered. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The law required resorts, restaurants, and bars to report to IBESR and HNP-BPM any suspected incidents of extraterritorial child sexual commercial exploitation and abuse, including cases of children in a hotel without their parents, but the government did not receive any reports. Haitian law did not prohibit Haitian nationals from engaging in such activity abroad.

This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Haiti, and traffickers exploit victims from Haiti abroad. Haitians, including IDPs and especially children in gang-controlled areas, and adults and children in irregular status in the Dominican Republic, continue to be highly vulnerable to trafficking. In 2023, the CNLTP estimated three million Haitians were at risk of trafficking. An NGO reported an increase in cases of child forced labor in 2024. Gang control of parts of the country, including Port-au-Prince, limited safe mobility. An IO reported there were over one million IDPs in the country as of January 2025, with children making up more than 50 percent, due to ongoing gang violence, including massacres, the collapse of essential services, and worsening food insecurity; the majority of those displaced are from the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Most IDPs live in overcrowded informal settlements with limited access to essential services, and 75 percent are in areas controlled by criminal groups. Gangs confiscate and destroy identification documents of recruits and those unable to pay passage fees in gang territory, increasing trafficking vulnerabilities. According to an IO, an unknown but significant number of individuals do not have identification cards and 2.5 to three million individuals do not have birth certificates, exacerbating their lack of access to services.

Children forcibly recruited by gangs and those assumed to be affiliated with gangs due to their lack of identification documents also face retaliation from society, including law enforcement and vigilante groups known as bwa kale, due to their gang affiliation; therefore, these children are likely to remain vulnerable to trafficking by gangs. According to an IO, child forced criminality is a prevalent form of trafficking in Haiti, with close to 50 percent of gang members being children, and a 70 percent increase in child recruitment in 2024. Children often rely on gangs for basic necessities, including food and shelter, and are often coerced or forced into joining a gang to support their families or under threats. Populations inside gang-controlled areas often do not have access to resources and are at higher risk of exploitation. Gangs use social media to lure children, offering a false image of success. Gangs exploited women and girls in sex trafficking and domestic labor, and exploited children in their ranks for sex trafficking and labor trafficking, including in activities such as spying, surveilling, caring for hostages, killing, kidnapping, looting, extorting, trafficking drugs, operating checkpoints, and participating in attacks, including against the HNP. Individuals, including children, fearing reprisals from gangs are vulnerable to forced criminality as they may seek protection within other gangs.

A large portion of Haiti’s trafficking cases involve children in forced labor and sex trafficking in child domestic servitude (restavek) situations, in which children are often physically abused, receive no payment for services, and have significantly lower school enrollment rates. In previous years with greater numbers of tourists, sex trafficking victims typically were identified in upscale neighborhoods and resort areas that catered to foreigners. According to NGOs, extraterritorial child sexual commercial exploitation and abuse also previously occurred in Haiti; however, most tourism stopped because of gang violence. Girls are vulnerable to trafficking through the practice of “bride-buying,” in which men pay families of girls as young as 14 years old. Children are exploited in agriculture, domestic services, begging, construction, fisheries, and street vending. Traffickers target Haitian children and adults who are stateless or at risk of becoming stateless. Observers reported the number of IDPs fleeing violence in Port-au-Prince to other departments increased children’s risks to forced domestic work and sexual exploitation in the restavek system. In 2022, an NGO estimated that of those children in restavek situations, two-thirds are girls, mostly victims of sex trafficking, and one-third are boys, mostly victims of labor trafficking. Many children flee or are cast out of these situations and begin to live and/or work on the street, facing further risk of re-trafficking. Observers noted children in orphanages and foster care remained vulnerable to trafficking; in June 2023, media reported 30,000 children were in orphanages. “Orphanage entrepreneurs” operate unlicensed orphanages that exploit children in trafficking. Approximately 80 percent of children in orphanages have at least one living parent, who may place children in an institution deemed more likely to be able to care for them.

Migrants remain at risk of trafficking, including from migrant smugglers who exploit migrant women in commercial sex to repay alleged debts. Haitian maritime migrants seeking to enter the United States illegally are highly vulnerable to migrant smugglers, who charge exorbitant fees for passage to Florida and Puerto Rico through the Bahamas, Jamaica, Turks and Caicos, Cuba, Dominican Republic, and international waters, and Colombia to cross the Darien Gap, often under false pretenses to exploit them. Haitian children smuggled into the Dominican Republic to board flights to Chile and Brazil for family reunification programs are vulnerable to exploitation by smugglers while in the Dominican Republic; an IO noted it was often unclear who met these children upon arrival at their final destination. According to psychologists present on site during a previous reporting period, many returned migrants, including those deported from other countries, report experiencing some form of trafficking or fraudulent exploitation scheme either while traversing South and Central America or when boarding a migrant vessel departing from Haiti. According to observers, Haitians deported from the Dominican Republic to Haiti are at risk of trafficking, particularly debt bondage, by migrant smuggling networks who offer to smuggle them back into the Dominican Republic soon after being deported. An IO reported Dominican nationals, mainly Dominicans of Haitian descent, have been sent to Haiti during deportation efforts and were eventually repatriated; however, Dominican nationals deported to Haiti by mistake may become vulnerable to exploitation. Common forms of cross-border trafficking of Haitians, often involving fraudulent recruitment, include forced labor in the Dominican construction, service, and agricultural industries and sex trafficking in the Dominican tourism industry.

Haitian citizens are vulnerable to exploitation in Chinese companies operating in the Dominican Republic in cases that feature forced labor indicators. Haitian adults and children, including those seeking to migrate to North America illegally, are also at risk of fraudulent labor recruitment, forced labor, and other forms of trafficking in other Caribbean countries, South and Central America, and the United States. Cuban medical workers have had a continuous presence in Haiti since 1998 and may have been forced to work by the Cuban regime. Haitians were eligible for educational grants and clinical training in Cuba in exchange for Haiti’s hosting of medical workers. Observers have reported police and immigration officials were complicit in human trafficking crimes at the Haiti-Dominican Republic border and traffickers avoided detection by crossing at unofficial points. Officials allegedly interfered with cases, and judges accepted bribes from traffickers. Civil society reported certain government officials may supply weapons and financial resources to gangs who recruited and coerced children into gang activity.