• Train government officials on Law 13.344 to ensure a uniform understanding of human trafficking and dispel the misconception it is only a crime of movement.
• Vigorously investigate and prosecute traffickers using the anti-trafficking statute rather than offenses with lesser penalties when possible, and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, which should include significant prison terms.
• Resolve criminal proceedings against alleged traffickers expeditiously and without prolonged delays.
• Increase efforts to proactively identify trafficking victims, especially sex trafficking victims, and refer them to services; provide victims shelter and specialized assistance.
• Improve interagency coordination on anti-trafficking efforts at all levels of government, especially among victim assistance and law enforcement officials.
• Improve the mobile inspection group’s (GEFM’s) evidence collection process and coordination with the Federal Police (PF) and the Federal Public Ministry (MPF) anti-trafficking unit.
• Increase prosecution of labor traffickers in criminal courts.
• Compile, and effectively communicate between federal and state authorities, comprehensive data on victim identification and assistance; and investigations, prosecutions, and convictions, disaggregated between sex and labor trafficking cases.
• Increase the number of specialized anti-trafficking offices, especially in Mato Grosso do Sul, Piaui, Rondônia, Roraima, and Santa Catarina states.
• Create and implement an actionable, comprehensive SOP on the identification, referral, and assistance of trafficking victims and train officials on its use.
• Ensure the law criminalizing child sex trafficking does not require the elements of force, fraud, or coercion.
• Increase efforts to raise awareness of all forms of trafficking.

The government maintained inadequate law enforcement efforts.

Brazilian law criminalized labor trafficking and sex trafficking. Article 149-A of the penal code (the anti-trafficking statute) criminalized some forms of sex trafficking and all forms of labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of four to eight years’ imprisonment and a fine, which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. Article 149-A required force, fraud, or coercion for child sex trafficking cases and therefore did not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. However, Article 244-A of the child and adolescent statute criminalized inducing a child to engage in sexual exploitation without the need to prove the use of force, fraud, or coercion and prescribed penalties of four to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine, which were sufficiently stringent and commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. Article 149 of the penal code (the anti-slave labor statute) criminalized “reducing a person to conditions analogous to slavery,” and defined the crime to include degrading work conditions and exhausting work hours, a broader definition than labor trafficking, which requires a showing of force, fraud, or coercion. It prescribed penalties of two to eight years’ imprisonment and a fine. The government still used the now-replaced Articles 231 and 231-A, which criminalized some forms of trafficking in persons involving movement during the reporting period when the alleged crimes occurred prior to the enactment of Article 149-A in 2016.

In practice, officials did not consider forced labor to be a form of trafficking and instead addressed alleged labor trafficking as “slave labor. While the government could pursue slave labor cases in criminal courts, it commonly tried these cases in civil courts and very few perpetrators of slave labor were held criminally accountable. The failure to prosecute and convict forced labor as a criminal act created a culture of impunity for labor traffickers. Additionally, officials prioritized transnational sex trafficking, potentially overlooking domestic cases.

Federal authorities initiated 17 human trafficking investigations in 2024, compared with initiating 10 human trafficking investigations in 2023. The government did not report the number of ongoing investigations in 2024, compared with 303 ongoing investigations in 2023 (77 for human trafficking and 226 for slave labor). The federal government reported opening 29 new prosecutions under the anti-trafficking statute (17 for sex trafficking and 12 for labor trafficking) in 2024, compared with opening 41 prosecutions (19 for sex trafficking and 22 for labor trafficking) in 2023. State courts also filed 62 new prosecutions under the anti-trafficking statute (55 for sex trafficking and seven for labor trafficking), compared with 81 state prosecutions in 2023 (70 for sex trafficking and 11 for labor trafficking). Additionally, state and federal courts reported filing 35 new prosecutions under Articles 231 and 231-A, and 337 new slave labor prosecutions under Article 149; some of the alleged crimes in these cases may have amounted to human trafficking. The government did not report the number of ongoing prosecutions under the anti-trafficking or related statutes in state or federal courts.

In 2024, the government reported five initial trafficking convictions (one for sex trafficking and four for labor trafficking) under the anti-trafficking statute from federal first instance courts, compared with no initial convictions under the anti-trafficking statute in 2023. In addition, state first instance courts issued six initial convictions (all for sex trafficking) under the anti-trafficking statute, compared with 20 such convictions (all for sex trafficking) in 2023. State and federal courts also reported five initial convictions under statutes Articles 231 and 231-A, and 73 initial slave labor convictions under Article 149; some of the crimes committed in these cases may have amounted to human trafficking. The government did not report any final convictions under the anti-trafficking statute in federal courts in 2024 but reported six final convictions (all for sex trafficking) under this statute in state courts. This compared with a combined five final convictions (all for sex trafficking) under the anti-trafficking statute in federal and state courts in 2023. All initial convictions were subject to appeal and, generally, court-ordered sentences did not begin until appeals were exhausted, which weakened the deterrence of initial convictions. Final convictions, where the courts’ decision was binding, were not subject to appeal. Traffickers’ sentences, especially those involving fewer than four years’ imprisonment, often involved community service, work release, and other alternatives to full-time imprisonment.

The government continued to report ongoing prosecutions under the Articles 231 and 231-A, earlier statutes which could be applied to alleged trafficking crimes committed before the 2016 adoption of Article 149-A. However, judges ultimately dismissed many of these cases. In some cases, courts dismissed trafficking charges because the statute of limitations lapsed. Brazil allowed successive appeals in all criminal cases, and convicted traffickers usually filed multiple appeals over several years before convictions became final. Lengthy case timelines and high acquittal rates contributed to a culture of impunity for traffickers, especially labor traffickers prosecuted under the slave labor statute.

The PF was the primary law enforcement entity charged with responding to trafficking crimes; it maintained central units monitoring human trafficking and migrant smuggling crimes (DRTP) and slave labor crimes (NUTRAF), but assigned locally posted human rights investigators to lead human trafficking investigations. States’ civil police units were responsible for investigating trafficking crimes without international elements; the Federal Highway Police could also support investigations. Coordination between federal, state, and municipal law enforcement units varied considerably across the country. Law enforcement units at all levels had insufficient funding, expertise, and staff to investigate trafficking. Federal and state governments shared responsibility for prosecuting human trafficking crimes under Article 149-A. MPF oversaw cases with international or inter-state elements, while state prosecutors oversaw cases within a state’s physical territory. MPF also had authority to prosecute slave labor crimes, including forced labor, under Article 149, although criminal prosecutions of slave labor were uncommon relative to the number of cases recorded. In July 2024, the MPF created a specialized prosecutorial unit (UNTC) responsible for prosecuting international human trafficking crimes, which comprised six prosecutors based in four cities. Non-specialized MPF prosecutors across Brazil could also oversee human trafficking and slave labor cases and could request assistance from UNTC.

Labor officials had primary authority over cases of slave labor, although they could not file criminal charges. The Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE) had a dedicated unit, the Secretariat of Labor Inspections (SIT), which documented situations of slave labor. The Public Labor Ministry’s (MPT’s) labor prosecutors could apply civil penalties and collect back wages for exploited workers. Many government officials preferred civil proceedings to criminal prosecutions in cases of slave labor, noting that civil proceedings concluded more swiftly and granted victims more immediate benefits for victims in the form of back wages and compensation. Interagency coordination and data collection efforts were inadequate and impeded prosecution efforts. Federal and state agencies did not have a shared database or routine procedure for sharing data on trafficking investigations or slave labor inspections, which limited coordination. In particular, poor evidence collection hindered MPF prosecutors’ efforts to build criminal cases against slave labor perpetrators; prosecutors relied on labor inspection reports, which rarely included sufficient evidence to criminally convict or build cases. Officials reported evidence collection improved markedly when MPF prosecutors participated in inspections; however, prosecutors only attended 25 percent of slave labor inspections due to staffing limitations. Prosecutors often received case files several years after slave labor inspections took place, preventing them from collecting additional evidence to support prosecution.

Many federal, state, and municipal officials demonstrated an incomplete understanding of trafficking crimes, including misconceptions of both sex and labor trafficking. Federal anti-trafficking efforts prioritized transnational sex trafficking involving female Brazilian victims exploited abroad, reducing focus on other forms of the crime. Observers reported federal and state officials lacked an understanding of domestic sex trafficking as a crime, which plausibly inhibited efforts to identify trafficking situations and hold traffickers accountable. Although the federal government reported sub-national authorities were responsible for investigating domestic sex trafficking, there were no reported prosecutions or convictions of sex trafficking in state courts.

Officials did not recognize forced labor as a form of human trafficking, seemingly based on an outdated definitional understanding predating Law 13.344. Consequently, officials typically considered instances of forced labor as slave labor cases and criminal investigations of forced labor under the anti-trafficking statute were uncommon. According to stakeholders, judges demonstrated an incomplete understanding of human trafficking, including the irrelevance of initial consent, which contributed to low conviction rates. The government offered limited training opportunities in partnership with civil society organizations, including awareness training for state law enforcement officials. The government reportedly required new labor judges to complete a training on slave labor, but did not report how many judges participated in the course; by contrast, 76 new judges completed the training in 2019, the last year for which data was available.

The government reported coordinating with British and U.S. counterparts to investigate human trafficking and, during the reporting period, signed new cooperation agreements with Bolivia and Colombia.

The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes. The government did not confirm whether it continued to investigate previously reported cases of officials allegedly complicit in trafficking crimes, including a 2022 investigation involving a police officer and a 2016 child sex trafficking case involving an elected official in Parana state. Similarly, there were no updates on the prosecution’s appeal of an inadequate sentence given to a civil police investigator in 2016 for his involvement in a child sex trafficking ring.

The government maintained protection efforts.

The government reported identifying 362 trafficking victims in 2024, compared with identifying 337 victims in 2023 and 588 in 2022. Among these victims, there were 207 male victims and 155 female victims; sixty-five victims were children. The government did not report how many were victims of sex trafficking or labor trafficking. The government also reported identifying 2,004 victims of labor exploitation in 1,035 operations against “slave labor,” compared with 3,190 victims of labor exploitation in 2023; however, the government did not specify how many, if any, were trafficking victims, as opposed to victims of other forms of labor exploitation. The government did not publish its regular assessment of the number of trafficking victims within the previous year’s population of identified victims of labor exploitation. In 2022, the last year for which data was available, officials assessed as probable trafficking victims 1,970 of 2,575 victims of labor exploitation. Brazil did not have a centralized database to track victim identification and service provision, which made it difficult to analyze protection data, perform year-to-year comparisons, and draw conclusions. Several agencies at various levels of government collected victim data; however, each agency used its own methodology, limiting the ability to share information across institutions and develop effective approaches to protect victims. Officials sometimes struggled to refer victims to services due to incomplete victim records or insufficient coordination between service providers, especially when victims identified in one jurisdiction sought support in another.

The government did not have specialized services for trafficking victims and, instead, provided care to victims through the public health system and civil society; some trafficking victims received services through programs designed for slave labor victims. The government had a national SOP for assisting Brazilian trafficking victims exploited abroad, but the SOP was not comprehensive because it did not outline steps for identifying and assisting victims of trafficking exploited within Brazil. Instead, the federal government deferred to state and local governments to establish their own SOPs for this purpose. In March 2025, with support from an international organization, the government published an updated resource guide for sub-national governments working with trafficking victims exploited within Brazil. The guide outlined best practices and federal anti-trafficking stakeholders that offered assistance services. The government also had a national SOP for assisting slave labor victims, the National Flow for the Assistance of Slave Labor Victims (“National Flow”); the government did not report how many trafficking victims, if any, it referred to care through the National Flow in 2024.

Some sub-national governments maintained their own SOPs; for example, the state of Rio de Janeiro had a combined SOP, developed in 2022, which established procedures for assisting both trafficking and slave labor victims. According to observers, sub-national governments sometimes used outdated identification guidance, such as the previous federal resource guide published in 2013.

Because of this partial protection framework, authorities did not consistently implement nationwide mandates requiring the government provide trafficking victims with temporary shelter; legal, social, and health assistance; and protection against re-victimization. Efforts to identify victims and the quality of care available to them varied considerably from state to state. Authorities in most states did not proactively or consistently identify victims of sex trafficking or forced labor outside the slave labor context. MTE’s Labor Inspection Secretariat (SIT) identified victims of slave labor through unannounced inspections of businesses or employers suspected of using slave labor. SIT had a mobile team (GEFM) that conducted multidisciplinary inspections of rural worksites in remote areas; it performed 1,035 inspections in 2024, a significant increase compared with 598 inspections in 2023. SIT inspectors provided slave labor victims with pamphlets outlining available resources upon identification. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security’s (MJSP’s) six Advanced Posts for Humanitarian Assistance to Migrants (PAAHMs) supported recently-arrived migrants at airports and bus stations; authorities at PAAHMs could screen for trafficking indicators. The government reported limited examples of training local officials to identify and refer trafficking victims during the reporting period.

Authorities operated three municipal-level and 18 state-level anti-trafficking offices (NETPs), which connected victims with service providers and coordinated assistance efforts between local, state, and federal stakeholders. NETPs were unevenly distributed across the country and 10 states lacked an NETP facility. Federal funding for NETPs was insufficient; wealthier states sometimes supplemented their NETPs’ budgets, improving the quality of assistance and coordination. The government did not report whether NETPs assisted any victims in 2024, compared with 397 potential trafficking victims assisted in 2022, the last year for which data was available. NETPs could refer victims to the Ministry of Social Development’s Social Assistance Service (SUAS) or to other service providers, including civil society. NETPs could also refer child trafficking victims to guardianship councils (CTs). However, CTs often lacked the expertise and resources to adequately support trafficking victims.

The government reported that SUAS was the primary federal agency providing services to trafficking victims; SUAS-CREAS assisted 362 victims in 2024, compared with 388 victims in 2023. The government did not have specialized services for trafficking victims, with the exception of seven anti-trafficking legal clinics at public universities, some of which relied on funding from international donors. Instead, trafficking victims could receive non-specialized services through federal, state, or local government programs for vulnerable individuals, such as healthcare, literacy programs, and transportation. States, local governments, and civil society organizations furnished many of the services available to victims; the availability and quality of these services varied considerably. SUAS could support trafficking victims at its nationwide network of Specialized Social Service Centers (CREAS) for vulnerable populations, which offered psychologists and social workers.

Slave labor victims were eligible for non-specialized services offered by federal, state, and local authorities; the government had more systematic means of furnishing these services to slave labor victims than to trafficking victims. Many, but not all, slave labor victims also received three months of unemployment insurance following their identification.

SUAS could accommodate victims in its network of non-specialized shelters for vulnerable populations. In practice, very few of these shelters served trafficking victims. Officials could place trafficking victims in similar state-, city-, or civil society-operated shelters, when available. Authorities sometimes inappropriately penalized victims for offenses committed solely as a direct result of being trafficked, including foreign women forced to transport drugs. The government had measures to encourage victims to testify against traffickers and courts encouraged the use of video testimony in criminal cases. Observers continued to express concern about the under-reporting of trafficking crimes, attributing it in part to victims’ lack of awareness of available protection services and fear that filing complaints would lead to further exploitation, deportation, or other harm; others suggested victims were discouraged by the long duration of trial proceedings.

The law entitled foreign victims of trafficking to a residence permit; in April 2024, the government revised the permit procedure to extend eligibility to victims regardless of their agreement to testify or otherwise support law enforcement, and to victims’ family members. The government did not report issuing residence permits to slave labor or trafficking victims in 2024. The government could assist trafficking victims with repatriation; in 2024, the government reported funding the repatriation of 48 Brazilian trafficking victims from nine countries. The government did not report any victims requesting or receiving restitution in 2024; officials suggested lengthy case timelines discouraged prosecutors and victims from pursuing restitution.

The government marginally increased efforts to prevent trafficking.

The MJSP’s coordination office for anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling efforts (CGETP) oversaw the inter-ministerial group responsible for the implementation of the NAP. In July 2024, the government adopted its 2024-2028 NAP, which it developed in collaboration with an international organization. The NAP included objectives to improve coordination, build capacity, and research gaps in prosecution, protection, and prevention efforts. The MJSP also funded the seven-member anti-trafficking advisory committee (CONATRAP), which included representatives from federal government agencies and NGOs; CONATRAP met at least twice during the report period., The government continued to partner with academic and civil society institutions to produce reports and assessments of trafficking trends and certain government efforts. Where present, NETPs supported the coordination of sub-national anti-trafficking efforts. Coordination between federal and state agencies remained uneven and varied in efficacy.,

Most awareness-raising efforts in Brazil focused on addressing child abuse, child labor, or slave labor more broadly; few campaigns attempted to raise awareness of human trafficking specifically. Federal, state, and municipal governments hosted workshops and performances or published online materials to raise awareness of human trafficking and related crimes, most of which were scheduled to commemorate World Day against Trafficking., The MTE continued its national campaign to raise awareness of the risk of exploitation, including trafficking for domestic workers. The government maintained two human rights hotlines that could receive trafficking-related calls. Hotline operators could refer victims to law enforcement. The government did not report receiving any trafficking-related calls to these hotlines in 2024, compared with 259 trafficking-related calls in 2023. The government did not indicate whether it initiated any investigations from calls to the hotlines. Some states operated their own human rights hotlines.

Authorities made limited efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts by coordinating with a foreign government to prevent known sex offenders from entering Brazil. MTE published a “dirty list,” or lista suja, twice annually; the dirty list made public the names of individuals and businesses found guilty of using slave labor. MTE added 176 new employers to the registry in October 2024. The October 2024 registry listed 727 employers. Offending employers were listed in the registry for two years. In July 2024, MTE created a secondary registry, allowing employers to be removed from the “dirty list” early through additional fines, enhanced monitoring from MTE, and a commitment to improve workplace conditions. MTE had not yet published a version of the secondary registry by the end of the reporting period. MTE officials reported the most-represented industries on the list in 2024 were charcoal producers, housekeeping services, cattle ranchers, and mining companies. Officials indicated the number of labor inspectors employed by the government was insufficient to adequately perform inspections across the country; the government initiated, but did not complete, a round of hiring for 900 inspector positions during the reporting period. Labor inspectors’ initial and continuing education courses included material on slave labor, but the government did not report how many inspectors utilized this programming.

Trafficking affects all communities. This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking as reported over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Brazil, and traffickers exploit victims from Brazil abroad. Traffickers exploit women and children from Brazil and other South American countries – especially Bolivia, Paraguay, and Venezuela – in sex trafficking in Brazil. Child sex trafficking is common along Brazil’s major highways, including BR-386, BR-116, and BR-255. Traffickers exploit Brazilians – especially Afro-Brazilian men – in situations that could amount to forced labor. Organized criminal groups are associated with the exploitation of women and girls in sex trafficking in the states of Amazonas, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and others. Commercial child sexual exploitation and abuse by foreign visitors in Brazil remains endemic, particularly in resort and coastal areas; many perpetrators of this crime are from Europe and the United States. Forced labor in rural Brazil is associated with charcoal production, cattle ranching, salt industries, logging, mining, and the cultivation of sisal fiber, sugar, grapes, coffee, garlic, and carnauba wax. In Brazil’s urban areas, forced labor occurs in factory work, including Sao Paulo’s textile industry; construction; domestic work, where cases sometimes involve decades of exploitation; and the hospitality sector. Traffickers force victims, especially foreigners from Bolivia, South Africa, and Venezuela, to engage in drug trafficking and other crimes.

Many identified trafficking victims are from northeast Brazilian states, such as Maranhao. Most identified trafficking victims are people of color, and many are Afro-Brazilian or otherwise of African descent. Multiple sources reported that individuals who advocates described as transgender women are incredibly vulnerable to trafficking in Brazil and abroad, due to social ostracization, high rates of violence, and demand for commercial sex acts from this population. Reporting shows traffickers manipulate or manufacture debts to coerce victims who advocates described as transgender, charging them for room and board, protection, or medical procedures. Traffickers commonly employ deceptive recruitment and debt-based coercion to facilitate victims’ exploitation. They increasingly rely on online advertisements, social media platforms, and other digital means of recruitment. Slave labor perpetrators operated with impunity and victims of slave labor, including trafficking victims, are highly vulnerable to re-victimization.

Recent research into the prevalence of human trafficking in Brazil suggests traffickers are extremely active. One study suggested that up to 16 percent of girls (ages 14 – 17 years) in a northeastern metropolitan area were likely victims of commercial sexual exploitation. Another organization estimated traffickers are exploiting up to 4,500 victims in forced labor in artisanal gold mines. A recent estimate suggests up to 18 percent of hired agricultural workers displayed indicators of forced labor. For cattle ranching, research indicates approximately 14 percent of workers in the sector presently demonstrate indicators of forced labor.

Cuban regime-affiliated medical workers associated with Mais Medicos program, which ended in 2018, continued to pursue a class-action lawsuit against an international organization for its role in their alleged trafficking. The lawsuit alleges the Cuban regime forced the Cuban Mais Medico participants to work in a triangular arrangement facilitated by the international organization. In 2022, Brazilian authorities announced plans to restart the Mais Medicos program without an affiliation with the Cuban regime.

Traffickers exploit Brazilians in sex and labor trafficking abroad in Western Europe, Southeast Asia, the United States and other destinations, often recruiting them with fraudulent job offers. For example, traffickers offer Brazilians jobs overseas in technology or customer service, often in Thailand, and then exploit them in forced labor in online scam operations; these cases have been reported in Burma, Cambodia, and the Philippines. Brazilian martial artists, performers, and domestic workers are vulnerable to trafficking abroad.