• Strengthen efforts to collect, analyze, and share data on anti-trafficking efforts.
• Dedicate increased resources to expand and strengthen victim protection services, including specialized training and capacity building for officials, and reopen the shelter for child trafficking victims in La Paz.
• Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, including those involving complicit officials, and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, which should involve significant prison terms.
• Allow authorities and the public to refer possible victims directly to service providers without first requiring formal identification from law enforcement.
• Amend the anti-trafficking law to ensure that a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion is not required to constitute a child sex trafficking offense.
• Expand training of officials on the use of established protocols for the proactive identification of trafficking victims among vulnerable populations, for the referral of victims to care services, and on distinguishing between human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and retain trained officials in specialized positions.
• Proactively screen individuals in commercial sex, Venezuelan and other migrants, and Chinese laborers – particularly those in high-risk areas, such as El Alto and mining regions – for trafficking indicators and refer those identified to care.
• Expedite the issuance of humanitarian visas for victims of trafficking and allow recipients to legally work in Bolivia.
• Enforce laws against illegal mining and related crimes that facilitate trafficking.
• Conduct outreach and prevention programs targeted to at-risk populations, including rural Indigenous communities, using culturally appropriate methods and local languages.
• Draft and fund a new NAP to come into effect after the current NAP’s expiration at the end of 2025.

The government decreased prosecution efforts.

Law 263 of 2012 – the Comprehensive Law against Trafficking and Smuggling of Persons – criminalized labor trafficking and some forms of sex trafficking through amendments to Bolivia’s Criminal Code and prescribed penalties of 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment for adult trafficking and 15 to 20 years’ imprisonment for child trafficking. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties for other grave crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with the definition of trafficking under international law, the definition of trafficking under Article 281-bis required a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking offense and therefore the article did not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. Article 281-bis defined trafficking broadly to include illegal adoption without the purpose of exploitation, the sale of organs, and unlawful biomedical research. Article 321 of the Criminal Code criminalized pimping using force, fraud, or coercion and was used to prosecute sex trafficking crimes. The law prescribed penalties of 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment for crimes involving adults, 12 to 18 years’ imprisonment for crimes involving children ages 14 to 18, and 15 to 20 years’ imprisonment for crimes involving children younger than 14, which were sufficiently stringent and commensurate with penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. Article 321 did not require a showing of force, fraud, or coercion for victims younger than 14 years of age but did require a demonstration of such means for offenses involving children ages 14 to 17. Additionally, Article 322 criminalized the purchase of sex with a minor and prescribed penalties of eight to 12 years’ imprisonment for crimes involving victims 14 to 17 years of age. Penalties increased by one-third for crimes involving children younger than 14. While the Criminal Code included separate criminal offenses for trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling, one government agency was responsible for both crimes, and that agency often conflated the two crimes in its collection of data and response to perpetrators and potential trafficking victims.

The Attorney General’s Office (AGO) reported 921 investigations into suspected trafficking offenses under articles 281-bis, 321, and 322 in 2024; in comparison, according to a report, the AGO opened 1,169 potential trafficking cases between January and November 2023. Conflation of trafficking with other crimes, such as migrant smuggling, was common in Bolivia and it was unclear how many of these cases constituted human trafficking as defined under international law. The government did not report how many individuals authorities prosecuted for suspected trafficking crimes for the third consecutive year. The government reported courts convicted eleven traffickers under trafficking and related statutes in the criminal code (five under article 281-bis, four under article 321, and two under article 322), an increase from 2023, when a report indicated judicial authorities convicted and sentenced seven traffickers under Law 263. However, data inconsistencies limited the ability for year to year comparison. The government again did not provide details on sentences imposed on convicted traffickers, hindering an assessment of whether punishments were adequate to deter the crime.

Backlogs in the judiciary, insufficient resources and personnel, and inadequate training of law enforcement officials hindered effective anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. The government maintained specialized police units in each department dedicated to investigating human trafficking crimes, but police personnel rotated into new positions every three months to one year, impeding specialization in the investigation of trafficking crimes and disrupting continuity of investigations. The government had specialized prosecutors in all nine departments focused on human trafficking and migrant smuggling cases. The AGO managed a program to monitor and respond to cybercrimes involving child sexual abuse material, and an international law enforcement agency trained staff from this office on investigating suspected trafficking cases. Officials did not provide information on the activities of the specialized police or prosecutors in 2024. The government devoted severely limited funds to the entire criminal justice system, leaving units responsible for combating trafficking crimes with inadequate funding. In previous years, the majority of arrested suspects, including traffickers, served prolonged periods in pre-trial detention, and often avoided justice by paying bribes to corrupt officials to avoid prosecution. The government partnered with international organizations to train police, lawyers, and NGOs in Santa Cruz on identifying and responding to human trafficking and to train specialized prosecutors on developing parallel financial investigations into money laundering connected to other crimes. The government maintained a joint unit with Chilean authorities to investigated transnational criminal organizations. However, the government did not report whether it cooperated with foreign law enforcement counterparts on any investigations or prosecutions of suspected trafficking.

Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action during the year. In December 2024, the government announced it had issued an arrest warrant and charged a former president with suspected trafficking crimes in connection with an ongoing investigation into alleged sexual offenses against a child; authorities also charged the victim’s parents with trafficking, alleging they facilitated the sexual exploitation of their daughter in exchange for political or other benefits. The former president failed to appear in court and authorities did not execute the arrest warrant during the reporting period. Since the government announced the charges, there have been complaints alleging the suspect’s involvement in additional cases as well as other parents who facilitated his sexual exploitation of their children in exchange for financial or political benefits; the government did not report whether it opened investigations into additional cases. The government did not report prosecuting or convicting any other public officials allegedly complicit in human trafficking crimes. The government did not provide updates on a case from the previous reporting period, where media reports indicated a senior elected official was accused of exploiting three women and two girls in sex trafficking. According to reports, the alleged trafficker knowingly sought child victims exploited in commercial sex and was suspected of offering some of the victims employment opportunities in the country’s senate chamber in exchange of sex acts. According to public reports, disciplinary and ethical actions may be under consideration. It was unclear if authorities took criminal actions in this case.

The government decreased protection efforts.

The government did not report identifying or assisting any victims, compared with officials identifying 707 potential victims in 2023; these numbers included disappearances, and these individuals may not have been victims of a trafficking crime as defined under international law. The government had a nationwide standardized protocol for government officials and non-governmental organizations to identify victims and refer them to service providers, including measures to proactively screen members of vulnerable groups for trafficking indicators. Police had additional guidelines for identifying and referring victims within its investigation manual and a separate protocol for assisting child trafficking victims; the Ministry of Labor had a victim identification protocol for labor inspectors, and the Ministry of Health and Sports had a victim assistance protocol for medical professionals. During the reporting period, the government collaborated with international organizations to develop a written protocol for consular officers in overseas missions to assist Bolivian victims exploited abroad. The government conducted a virtual training on the protocol for relevant officials posted overseas. The government did not report whether it identified or assisted any Bolivian victims exploited in other countries; in comparison, officials assisted 20 and repatriated seven Bolivian trafficking victims identified in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, and Peru in 2023. The government reported issuing new guidelines for immigration and border authorities to identify and respond to suspected cases of human trafficking or migrant smuggling.

The government required victims to obtain formal identification from law enforcement before they could access services, including legal aid, shelter, and reintegration programs. Local observers reported this process could be slow and complex, impeding victim’s timely access to critical support. Furthermore, authorities often placed the burden of proof on a victim and failed to provide formal identification to many victims; these victims, and those who chose not to speak with law enforcement, were left without access to protection services. Civil society reported officials inconsistently implemented screening procedures and the government did not provide sufficient training to front-line officials to effectively identify possible victims. Authorities infrequently identified victims from groups that were especially vulnerable to trafficking, including women and children from small Indigenous communities. The government’s legal framework and understanding of human trafficking, which overlapped with related crimes, such as labor exploitation, sexual abuse, and migrant smuggling, led to conflation between crimes and impeded trafficking victim identification efforts.

The government did not offer specialized services for trafficking victims. The Public Ministry’s victim assistance units, which employed multidisciplinary teams including social workers and psychologists, or municipal-level child protection offices may have provided general support to some trafficking victims. Government and civil society service providers could provide some additional services to victims, such as psychological counseling, legal assistance, education, and job training, but these offerings were limited and not available in all regions. Officials placed some child victims with family members despite their involvement in the child’s exploitation, leaving those children vulnerable to re-victimization. NGOs and faith-based organizations provided most services for child and women trafficking victims. Male victims had difficulty accessing care and there were few, if any, government or civil society services available for adult male victims.

An NGO continued to operate a shelter in El Alto providing specialized care for girl trafficking victims – Bolivia’s only specialized trafficking shelter. Some departmental governments operated shelters for vulnerable populations that could serve trafficking victims, but these shelters were underfunded and did not provide specialized care. Civil society organizations operated shelters in Cochabamba, La Paz, and Santa Cruz, and that assisted vulnerable children and young adults; these shelters have offered shelter and support to trafficking victims but did not provide comprehensive, specialized care. A civil society shelter in Cochabamba closed during the reporting period and a government shelter in La Paz remained closed throughout 2024, further limiting shelter space for victims. Civil society reported the government referred some victims to shelters, but the government again did not report the number of victims authorities referred. Shelter space was inadequate to meet the needs of all victims; the specialized trafficking shelter did not have the capacity to accommodate all referrals and law enforcement officers sometimes provided victims funds for a short hotel stay or were unable to secure safe accommodations for victims. Shelters primarily accommodated female victims, with limited options available to assist for male victims.

The government had laws and policies to provide support to and minimize re-victimization of victims participating in cases against traffickers, but it did not report on their implementation. Foreign victims who assisted in the prosecution against their traffickers could receive a humanitarian visa, but the process often took years and victims could not work legally during that time. Authorities did not report whether it granted any foreign victims humanitarian visas or facilitated the repatriation of any foreign victims who sought to return to their home countries. Foreign victims had access to the same services as Bolivian victims and NGOs reported authorities treated foreign victims fairly and according to legal standards. The government had Gesell chambers – specialized spaces designed for conducting single interviews with crime victims – in every department, and in lieu of testifying in person, victims could provide recorded testimony or submit a written statement to the court. Under Bolivian law, victims and prosecutors could request a judge order a convicted trafficker to pay restitution for damages. When victims did not participate in the prosecution against the traffickers, they or prosecutors could still file restitution claims within three months of sentencing. The government did not report whether any victim or prosecutor sought restitution in a trafficking case.

The government maintained prevention efforts.

The Plurinational Council against Human Trafficking and Smuggling, chaired by the Ministry of Justice and including civil society representation, was responsible for coordinating anti-trafficking efforts at the national level. The government maintained departmental councils to coordinate efforts at the sub-national level. In 2024, the national council held three routine meetings and one additional meeting and the nine department councils met altogether twice; in comparison, authorities at the national and department level met 21 times in 2023. Two sub-ministerial units were responsible for coordinating anti-trafficking efforts at the technical level. The government maintained a 2021-2025 NAP against human trafficking and migrant smuggling (The Plurinational Policy against Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants, and Related Crimes) and individual ministries reported annually to the national council on their activities. The Ministry of Justice held workshops with officials across Bolivia’s nine departments to support implementation of the NAP at the department level. The government developed and disseminated material to raise awareness of trafficking risks among members of the public through various platforms include television, radio, and social media. The government also conducted several trainings and awareness events to educate public officials on identifying and responding to suspected human trafficking cases.

The government required all employment agencies to register under a federal registry and provide the Ministry of Labor (MOL) with all recruitment and job placement records. However, authorities did not report reviewing or investigating any applications that raised trafficking concerns. The MOL provided training on labor trafficking to its employees. Authorities in the La Paz metropolitan area maintained a hotline for members of the public to report trafficking crimes and the department of Cochabamba also had a hotline to report trafficking crimes. Authorities did not report identifying any victims or initiating any investigations as a result of calls to the hotlines. There were reports that the Ministry of Tourism investigated suspected cases of extraterritorial sexual exploitation and abuse in the country, but the government did not report any arrests or prosecutions of foreign citizens suspected of these crimes. The government did not report other efforts to reduce the demand for participation in extraterritorial sexual exploitation and abuse; in previous years it trained individuals in the tourism sector and conducted public outreach and awareness campaigns on this issue. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government did not make efforts to hold mining cooperatives accountable for illegal practices that facilitated sex trafficking and forced labor, and there were allegations the government fired an environmental lawyer and initiated legal action against him in retaliation for investigations into mining cooperatives. The Institute for Normalization of Quality, a semi-autonomous government agency, continued operating a “triple seal” certification program for sugar producers whose final products were certified to be free of child labor, discrimination, and forced labor. However, officials did not report issuing new certifications in 2024.

Trafficking affects all communities. This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Bolivia, and traffickers exploit victims from Bolivia abroad. Traffickers exploit Bolivian adults and children in sex trafficking and forced labor within the country and abroad. To a more limited extent, traffickers exploited women from neighboring countries, including Brazil, Colombia, and Paraguay, in sex trafficking in Bolivia. Traffickers exploit an increasing number of Venezuelan victims in sex trafficking and forced labor within the country. Media reports and NGOs indicate Tren de Aragua, a transnational criminal organization that originated in Venezuela, is involved in human trafficking in Bolivia. Venezuelan migrants living in and transiting through Bolivia remain at high risk of exploitation in trafficking. Traffickers subject some foreign migrants traveling to or through Bolivia to sex trafficking and forced labor.

Perpetrators of extraterritorial commercial sexual exploitation and abuse exploited children in sex trafficking in rural Indigenous communities in the north of the La Paz department, in and around the cities of Rurrenabaque and Santa Cruz and in tourist areas in the departments of La Paz and Beni. Local organizations report extraterritorial commercial sexual exploitation and abuse crimes are increasing in Bolivia. Traffickers sexually exploit children for the production of child sexual abuse material and profit from selling the material online; local organizations observed an increase in this form of child sex trafficking, centered in Cochabamba, El Alto, and Santa Cruz. Experts report rural and poor Bolivians, most of whom are Indigenous, are particularly at risk for sex and labor trafficking, and that some children and young adults are more vulnerable to trafficking based on their sexual orientation or identity. Parents frequently facilitate their children’s exploitation; local experts report factors such as social tolerance for sex trafficking crimes, forced displacement, and systemic lack of access to justice and protection compound risks for children who are members of small Indigenous communities. Bolivian women and girls are exploited in sex trafficking within Bolivia and nearby countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Panama, and Peru. Local experts note a connection between forced disappearances of women and girls in cities like El Alto and La Paz and their subsequent exploitation in sex trafficking in brothels and other commercial establishments. In 2024, wildfires led to widespread displacement, forcing many people to flee their homes for temporary shelters or neighboring regions, and local experts reported displaced individuals experienced heightened risks of forced labor and sex trafficking in Bolivia or neighboring countries. Rural to urban trafficking, including within departments, remains the most common form of domestic trafficking. Within the country, traffickers exploit Bolivian adults and children in forced labor in domestic work, mining, ranching, and agriculture. In Bolivia’s gold mining regions, adults and children are subjected to harsh working conditions and dangerous mercury exposure; traffickers capitalize on these workers’ economic desperation, the remote and inaccessible locations of mining camps, and the government’s lack of oversight to compel workers into forced labor. Traffickers, including Chinese nationals and Bolivian representatives of Chinese national-backed mining cooperatives, lure women and girls to mining town with false promises of work as cooks, waitresses, or nannies, and subsequently exploit them in sex trafficking in commercial establishments in and around mining camps. Chinese nationals work illegally on barges used to dredge for gold in Bolivian rivers; some of these workers, who are confined to the barges for days or weeks at a time, may be victims of forced labor. Forced criminality continues to be a problem, including cases of children forced to commit crimes, such as robbery and drug production or transportation, and others exploited in forced begging.

Traffickers exploit Bolivians in forced labor in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in sweatshops, agriculture, brickmaking, domestic work, textile factories, and the informal sector. Traffickers continue to use social media as the primary recruitment tool, luring vulnerable individuals with fraudulent employment opportunities and then exploiting them in forced labor or sex trafficking. Civil society organizations report low-level official complicity in trafficking crimes persists and there have been allegations that senior elected officials participate in sex trafficking. In mining regions, some local officials reportedly exploit sex trafficking victims, procured by mining operators, in exchange for benefits to the mining operations.