Document #2129831
International Crisis Group (Author)
Crisis Group expert Franklin Nossiter considers the implications of Wagner Group’s departure from Mali, and its replacement by the Africa Corps
On 6 June, the Russian paramilitary Wagner Group announced that it was leaving Mali. Wagner has had between 1000 and 2000 troops present in the country since late 2021. They deployed to fight alongside the military against jihadists and other insurgents who have sown insecurity in the Central Sahelian country. Wagner claims the group’s mission is “complete” but fighting rages on, and Russo-Malian security cooperation seems certain to persist, though in a slightly different form.
Indeed, this is less a departure than a replacement. Africa Corps, a force created by the Russian Ministry of Defense in part to replace Wagner and already present in Mali, has stated that there would be “no changes” to Russian deployments in the country. Social media exchanges on Telegram channels used by knowledgeable Russian observers suggest that 70-80 per cent of Africa Corps personnel are former Wagner fighters. Moscow has sought greater control over Wagner’s operations since the group’s founder and leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, was killed in a plane crash in August 2023 – two months after leading an insurrectionist march on Moscow.
This restructuring of Russia’s presence in Mali does not mask the issues that have plagued Russo-Malian security cooperation in recent months and are likely to persist.
First is the issue of payment. The Malian state reportedly paid as much as $10 million a month for Wagner’s services. It is unclear what financial arrangements underpin Africa Corps’ presence, but Russian forces are unlikely to work for free. Bamako, which has lost financial support from its Western partners, faces a budget crunch, and could struggle to pay the Russians.
Secondly, there is a question of effectiveness. Mali’s partnership with Wagner both failed to restore security in the country, and saw a surge in violence by both the paramilitaries and Malian security forces against civilians. The Malian army has suffered several major setbacks in recent weeks, with jihadists attacking three important military camps and the city of Timbuktu, causing hundreds of Malian casualties. On 4 June, the jihadists claimed to have detonated an explosive at a Malian-Wagner training camp on Bamako’s outskirts. This follows a brazen jihadist attack on Bamako in September 2024 and the Malian-Wagner defeat at the hands of insurgents at Tinzawaten two months earlier. While Wagner claimed credit for some important victories – notably the recapture of onetime separatist stronghold Kidal in November 2023 – its tenure was marked by an overall deteriorating security picture.
It is not at all clear that passing the baton from Wagner to Africa Corps will improve the situation absent a wholesale change in strategy. Both Mali’s past partnership with France, and its more recent partnership with Wagner, suggest that a predominantly military approach to containing jihadism will yield disappointing results. A more successful approach will almost surely require Bamako to develop a broader political strategy to come to terms with the insurgents and give the country a chance at peace.