The 2014 constitution laid out a semipresidential system in which a popularly elected president served as head of state and exercised circumscribed powers, while the majority party in the parliament selected a prime minister, who served as head of government. The president was directly elected for up to two five-year terms. The last presidential election held under the 2014 constitution took place in October 2019. Kaïs Saïed, an independent candidate, won a runoff against businessman Nabil Karoui with 73 percent of the vote.

Saïed has exercised greatly expanded powers since 2021, when, claiming emergency authority under the 2014 constitution, he unilaterally dismissed the prime minister and suspended the elected parliament. Under a new constitution adopted in 2022, the prime minister and cabinet are appointed and dismissed by the president. The presidential term limit remained in place. In August 2024, Saïed dismissed Prime Minister Ahmed al-Hachani, who had served since August 2023, and replaced him with Social Affairs Minister Kamel Madouri.

In the October 2024 presidential election, Saïed won a new term after an unfair contest that featured the repression of opposition candidates. Most prospective challengers were disqualified by the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE). Only three of the 17 candidates who applied were ultimately approved in August, including the incumbent. By comparison, 26 candidates had been approved to compete in the 2019 election. A month prior to the October vote, the ISIE refused to comply with an Administrative Court order to reinstate several disqualified candidates, and the parliament later moved to strip the court of its election oversight authority. One of the three approved candidates, Ayachi Zammel, was accused by the Saïed regime of falsifying signatures on his candidacy documents and was sentenced to 12 years in prison on September 30, just a week before the election.

According to the official ISIE results, Saïed won with 90.7 percent of the vote, followed by Zammel with 7.4 percent and Zouhair Maghzaoui with just under 2 percent. Prominent watchdog organizations in Tunisia were denied accreditation to observe the voting. Voter turnout was reported at less than 30 percent.

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 0 because the presidential election lacked genuine competition, with opposition candidates arbitrarily excluded or jailed and independent observers unable to monitor the balloting.

Tunisia’s 2014 constitution established a unicameral parliament, the 217-seat Assembly of the Representatives of the People (ARP). The last legislative elections under the old constitution took place in 2019. International and national observers declared the balloting to be competitive and credible. President Saïed unilaterally suspended this parliament in 2021 as part of a broader set of emergency measures aimed at concentrating power in the presidency. Saïed formally dissolved the parliament in March 2022.

In the fall of 2022, Saïed announced legislative elections for a new, significantly weakened parliament under the new constitution and electoral law. The chamber would include 161 members elected in single-member constituencies, including 10 representing Tunisians living abroad. The first round of voting took place in December 2022, and the second round in January 2023. Only 1,058 candidates campaigned for office—a steep drop-off from prior legislative elections. Candidates’ party affiliations were not listed on the ballot, effectively making it a nonpartisan contest. Due to onerous candidacy restrictions and a boycott led by major opposition parties, turnout was extremely low at roughly 11 percent in both the first and second rounds.

The 2022 constitution also envisioned the creation of a second nonpartisan legislative body, the National Council of Regions and Districts, with 77 members chosen through a tiered system of indirect elections and selections by lot. Direct elections for the local councils at the base of this system were held in December 2023 and marked by low turnout rates of about 11.7 percent. The final round of indirect elections was conducted in March 2024, and the first session of the national council was held in April.

From the 2011 revolution through the last elections under the 2014 constitution in 2019, the ISIE’s supervision of parliamentary and presidential balloting was well regarded by Tunisian and international observers, and the authority itself was seen as politically independent.

In May 2022, Saïed replaced the ISIE’s executive committee, and the newly appointed body was tasked with organizing the referendum on his draft constitution in July. The new constitution, promulgated that year, removed the rules governing the process by which ISIE members must be appointed, leaving the ISIE open to greater presidential interference.

Saïed issued a new electoral law by decree in September 2022. In addition to replacing the proportional-representation system for parliamentary elections with voting in single-member districts, the law imposed new requirements on candidates. The decree also eliminated public funding for campaigns, removed a ceiling on private fundraising, barred anyone ever charged with a legal violation from candidacy, and revoked prior laws promoting gender parity and youth representation on electoral lists. Finally, the decree ramped up punishments for “electoral crimes,” including receiving illegal donations or “intentionally exploiting another candidate’s honor or familial or geographic affiliation.”

In 2024, the ISIE’s lack of independence was confirmed when it approved only three candidates, including Saïed, to run in that year’s presidential contest. In September, the ISIE refused to comply with an order from Tunisia’s Administrative Court to reinstate several barred candidates. Following this ruling, the parliament stripped the Administrative Court of its power to oversee elections and transferred the responsibility to the general appellate courts.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to the election authority’s arbitrary exclusion of all but three candidates in the presidential election, its refusal to comply with a court order to reinstate several disqualified candidates, and late legal changes that weakened judicial review on election-related matters.

In the decade following the 2011 revolution, Tunisia’s numerous political parties represented a wide range of ideologies and interests. However, since President Saïed seized extraordinary powers in 2021, opposition politicians and political parties have experienced serious restrictions on their ability to operate. The new electoral framework, including the 2022 electoral law, was widely seen as a blow to political parties. Many former lawmakers and political figures have been subjected to repressive measures, including travel bans, detention, and politically motivated prosecutions.

While parties continued to exist as of 2024, numerous politicians from the 2011–21 era were charged, sentenced, or remained in prison during the year. They included figures from across the political spectrum, such as Ennahda party leader Rached Ghannouchi, Free Destourian Party president Abir Moussi, Republican Party head Issam Chebbi, and Ettakatol party member Khayam Turki.

In the decade following the 2011 revolution, opposition parties and independents participated actively in political processes, resulting in multiple rotations of power at the executive and legislative levels. However, major opposition parties boycotted the 2022–23 parliamentary elections to protest adverse conditions created by the new constitution and electoral law. The lack of meaningful competition contributed to an extremely low voter turnout.

Opposition candidates were largely excluded from the October 2024 presidential election, and President Saïed’s leading challenger among the approved candidates was jailed in the weeks before election day. Several other potential candidates had been convicted for alleged vote-buying efforts and barred from seeking office in July and August, and Ennahda party members were subjected to mass arrests in September.

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 due to the government’s broad crackdown on opposition party leaders and members ahead of the presidential election, including the imprisonment and disqualification of virtually all opposition candidates.

Individual voters are generally able to cast ballots without undue interference from extrapolitical actors. However, their choices have been limited by heavy restrictions on candidacy and party participation in the most recent local, parliamentary, and presidential elections, resulting in extremely low turnout.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations have worked to increase the political participation of marginalized groups. A 2017 law required an equal number of men and women at the top of candidate lists, as well as at least one candidate with a disability and three people under the age of 35 on each list. Representation of women in subsequent elections was comparatively high.

However, the 2022 electoral law eliminated the 2017 quotas, and in the December 2022 parliamentary elections, only 11 percent of the candidates were women, 4 percent were aged 35 or younger, and two were people with disabilities. Following the January 2023 second round, women held 25 of 161 seats in the parliament.

Other segments of the population, including the Amazigh ethnic community, Black Tunisians, and LGBT+ people, remain underrepresented in electoral politics. Black Tunisians have achieved some progress in advancing their political interests over the past decade, including passage of an antiracism law in 2018, but they are largely excluded from leadership positions. Societal discrimination and laws criminalizing same-sex sexual activity impede active political participation for LGBT+ people.

Both the 2014 constitution and the new charter adopted in 2022 state that the president must be a Muslim.

Executive and legislative officials have not been freely elected under the current legal framework, and the 2022 constitution formally concentrated power in the presidency, reducing the parliament’s ability to serve as a check on executive authority. Among other changes, it eliminated the parliament’s ability to impeach the president, gave the president unilateral authority to appoint the prime minister, and required a two-thirds majority for the parliament to remove the prime minister and cabinet. Bills promoted by the president are also given priority over those promoted by legislators.

Tunisia’s anticorruption legislation has historically been considered weak. The Economic Reconciliation Law of 2017 effectively offered amnesty to those implicated in corruption under the pre-2011 regime of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, though its initial provisions were partly rolled back due to public disapproval.

The National Commission for the Fight against Corruption (INLUCC) was established in 2011, but it lacked adequate funding and authority to compel legal action. Its operations have been suspended since August 2021, when police shut down its headquarters and President Saïed dismissed its secretary-general.

Saïed issued a decree in 2022 that expanded the concept of “criminal reconciliation,” allowing businesspeople facing corruption charges to avoid punishment by repaying allegedly stolen funds or investing them in designated regional development projects. The process was to be managed by a commission appointed by the president.

President Saïed’s centralization of power after July 2021 exacerbated the government’s existing opacity regarding official decision-making and actions by law enforcement agencies. A 2016 freedom of information law was faulted by watchdog groups for its security-related exemptions.

An academic study of budgetary processes, published in 2023 by a researcher at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, criticized the government for “untransparent, ad-hoc, volatile, and arbitrary decision-making.” Saïed has largely governed through executive decrees and grants few opportunities for meaningful consultation with legislative or nongovernmental actors. Authorities have also increasingly banned journalists from observing government activities, including parliamentary committee meetings and certain court cases related to national security.

The 2014 constitution and its 2022 replacement formally guarantee freedom of opinion, thought, expression, information, and publication, subject to some restrictions. During the 2011–21 period, independent outlets proliferated, including online media.

Since Saïed’s seizure of extraordinary powers in 2021, journalists have faced increasing pressure and intimidation from government officials in connection with their work, including criminal penalties for defamation and other alleged offenses. Decree Law 2022-54 assigns penalties for crimes including the circulation of “false news” and “hate speech.” In practice, this law makes it easier to prosecute journalists working on sensitive topics. According to the International Federation of Journalists, Tunisian authorities arrested more than 30 journalists during 2023.

A pattern of arrests and prosecutions continued in 2024. In March, journalist Mohamed Boughalleb was arrested and sentenced to eight months in prison on charges of insulting a public official. In May, prominent radio and television journalists Borhen Bsaies and Mourad Zghidi were arrested and each sentenced to one year in prison for defamation and spreading false news. Also in May, Sonia Dahmani, a radio commentator and lawyer, was arrested based on her critical remarks about Tunisia’s migration policies. She was sentenced to eight months in prison in September, and received an additional two-year sentence in October for her radio commentary about racism against sub-Saharan African migrants. Another journalist, Chadha Hadj Mbarek, remained in pretrial detention as of December 2024, having been arrested in June 2023 on charges of conspiring against state security, disturbing public order, and offending the presidency.

According to human rights groups, Decree Law 2022-54 and the trend of targeting journalists has created an atmosphere of fear and self-censorship among many media workers. Several independent and alternative news outlets still exist and report on contentious topics such as immigration and other social issues. However, a number of popular radio commentary shows have been canceled, and some well-known hosts have resigned, due to the hostile legal environment and police investigations against them.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to the authorities’ increasing legal pressure on journalists and media outlets in recent years, including numerous arrests, criminal prosecutions, and prison sentences.

Both the 2014 constitution and the new charter adopted in 2022 call for freedom of belief and conscience, but they also contain provisions that give Islam an official status. Blasphemy remains illegal, and police may invoke it as a pretext for arrests. Islamic education is a required component of the curriculum in public schools. Members of the small Christian minority, particularly converts, have reported experiencing harassment and discrimination.

Article 33 of the 2014 constitution protected academic freedom, which improved in practice after 2011, and Article 45 of the 2022 constitution provides a similar guarantee. However, self-censorship by academics persists in some instances. Students have reported being unable to pursue dissertation research on sensitive topics including sexuality and gender identity. In October 2024, a French doctoral student conducting research on the aftermath of the 2011 revolution was arrested on orders from a military judge; he was released a month later following diplomatic pressure from the French government.

Private discussion was generally open and free in the decade after the 2011 revolution, though public speech on certain topics, including criticism of the military, could draw official reprisals. The criminal ban on same-sex sexual activity also discourages open discussion of issues affecting LGBT+ people.

Since 2021, the authorities have increasingly prosecuted individuals for speech-related offenses. The Saïed administration has used a 2015 counterterrorism law to detain regime critics without trial. Authorities have also exploited Decree Law 2022-54, which imposes heavy prison sentences and monetary penalties on individuals who spread “false information or rumors” through online or offline communication networks. Those convicted can face up to 10 years in prison if the content targets public officials. The law also grants civilian and military law enforcement officers greater latitude to access and search private devices and materials.

While most people prosecuted for speech-related crimes in recent years have been individuals with significant online or offline platforms, measures like Decree Law 2022-54 can be applied to ordinary citizens, and the steady increase in high-profile cases has discouraged critical speech more broadly. According to Amnesty International, more than 70 individuals, including journalists, political activists, and social media users, have been subjected to arbitrary prosecution since late 2022.

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 due to the authorities’ increasing use of arbitrary detentions and prosecutions to punish critical speech by prominent individuals and encourage self-censorship in the general population.

Like the 2014 constitution, the 2022 constitution guarantees the rights to assembly and peaceful demonstration. During the postrevolutionary period, public protests on political, social, and economic issues were frequent and well attended. However, the 2015 counterterrorism law and successive states of emergency imposed significant constraints on such gatherings.

Opponents of Saïed’s regime held protests on several occasions during 2024. At a large protest prior to the October election, demonstrators used the 2011 revolutionary slogan “the people want the fall of the regime.” Other protests emphasized social issues, such as unemployment, price increases, and the right to collective bargaining through the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), the country’s largest union organization.

Police routinely use violent tactics to disperse public demonstrations. Journalists have photographed officers at various times using batons, tear gas, and armored vehicles against protesters.

Tunisia’s Decree-Law 2011-88 on associations generally protected NGOs from government interference. Partly as a result of the legislation, tens of thousands of new NGOs began operating after the 2011 revolution, including many organizations dedicated to promoting governmental transparency, civil liberties, and social development.

The environment for civil society has grown more hostile since Saïed’s 2021 emergency measures. Over the course of 2024, several antidiscrimination and migrants’ rights activists were arrested and accused of financial crimes or terrorism offenses. Also during the year, members of parliament continued to discuss a draft law that would give the prime minister broad authority to suspend, dissolve, or deny the establishment of NGOs. Tunisian associations that accept foreign funding without prior authorization would face sanctions and possible dissolution. Rights advocates have expressed concern that this legislation, if adopted, would significantly suppress Tunisian civil society.

The constitution adopted in 2022, like its 2014 predecessor, guarantees the right to form labor unions and to strike, with exceptions for the military, security forces, and customs officials. The new charter also prohibits strikes by judges. Large-scale strike actions across all sectors of the economy occur frequently in Tunisia.

The UGTT is the predominant union organization, though smaller independent unions also exist. Historically, it has played a significant role in brokering political agreements during moments of crisis. Although the UGTT did not swiftly condemn Saïed’s emergency measures in 2021, it has since become more critical of his administration. In 2024, the UGTT denounced the exclusion of candidates from the October presidential election and organized protests in response to antiunion and anti-immigrant measures. In July, union leaders condemned unilateral attempts by the government to revise the country’s labor law.

Tunisian authorities have sometimes arrested or detained union officers. In March 2024, for example, Tahar Mezzi, the UGTT deputy secretary-general and head of the union’s private-sector division, was arrested and briefly detained ahead of a major protest. In a statement, the UGTT accused the government of fabricating charges against him.

Between the 2011 revolution and President Saïed’s seizure of extraordinary powers in 2021, elected officials took steps to institutionalize an independent judiciary. Legislation adopted in 2016 established the High Judicial Council (HJC), a body tasked with ensuring the independence of the judiciary and appointing a third of the Constitutional Court judges. Council members were elected that year by thousands of legal professionals, though the government and lawmakers never established the Constitutional Court as envisioned by the 2014 constitution.

In 2022, Saïed dissolved the professionally elected HJC and issued a decree creating a new, appointed body to replace it. That June, he issued a decree allowing the president to unilaterally dismiss judges, then immediately fired 57 judges on grounds of alleged corruption. The Administrative Court ordered the reinstatement of 49 of the dismissed magistrates in August, citing a lack of due process, but the government had not yet complied as of 2024.

While the 2022 constitution preserved both an HJC and a Constitutional Court in name, it granted the president final authority over judicial appointments. In addition, the new constitution removed a clause of the 2014 constitution that granted the Constitutional Court authority to rule on the extent of the president’s powers. In 2024, the degradation of judicial independence was underscored by the ISIE’s defiance of the Administrative Court order to reinstate opposition presidential candidates, and by the parliament’s subsequent move to transfer the Administrative Court’s electoral oversight role to the general appellate courts.

Though civil and criminal procedures improved after 2011, a state of emergency in place since 2015 and renewed repeatedly has given police broad discretion to arrest and detain people on security- or terrorism-related charges. In some cases, civilians are tried in military courts, particularly on charges of defaming the army.

President Saïed’s administration has pursued politically motivated prosecutions against real and perceived opponents, including journalists, lawyers, businessmen, and opposition politicians. Many such individuals remained incarcerated at the end of 2024. In August 2024, a judge ordered the detention of Sihem Bensedrine, former president of the Truth and Dignity Commission, which had been established in 2014 to examine past human rights abuses and issued a final report in 2020. She remained in pretrial detention at year’s end, facing charges related to her work.

The police force is the subject of long-standing brutality complaints, with officers accused of abusing civilians and detainees with impunity. Police unions have resisted reform efforts aimed at addressing the problem. Several imprisoned opposition figures and activists began hunger strikes during 2024 to protest their lack of due process, poor conditions of detention, and alleged mistreatment in custody.

While some offenses can still draw the death penalty under Tunisian law, the authorities have not carried out an execution since 1991.

Physical security has been periodically threatened by terrorist attacks in recent years, including some claimed by the Islamic State (IS) militant group.

Although the constitution guarantees gender equality, women experience discrimination in employment, and sexual harassment in public spaces remains prevalent. Black Tunisians face chronic disparities on indicators including employment and education; societal bias remains a widespread problem, though a 2018 law criminalized racial discrimination.

Tunisia faces pressure from the EU to block irregular African migration through the Mediterranean to European countries, a dynamic that has contributed to the Tunisian authorities’ mistreatment of migrants. Black African migrants in Tunisia have experienced extreme levels of violence and expropriation in recent years, and government officials including the president have been accused of encouraging such abuses by using xenophobic rhetoric. In July 2023, more than 1,000 migrants were forcibly expelled and stranded in the desert between Tunisia and Libya, where they were subject to high temperatures and lacked basic provisions. Security forces continued to engage in arbitrary expulsions of migrants during in 2024.

LGBT+ people continue to face legal discrimination. Same-sex sexual activity is illegal, with Article 230 of the penal code calling for prison sentences of up to three years for “sodomy.” The law has been enforced in practice in recent years. In June 2024, activists mounted a small protest after two people received two-year prison sentences under Article 230.

The constitution guarantees freedom of movement within the country, as well as the freedom to travel abroad. However, authorities have broad discretion under the state of emergency to restrict individuals’ movement without initiating formal charges, and thousands of people have been affected by such orders.

The protection of property rights and the freedom to operate businesses are impeded in part by high levels of corruption and a large court backlog of property disputes.

Under existing law, women are granted half the share of inheritance that men receive, and efforts to establish gender equality in inheritance rights have failed to make progress in the parliament.

Tunisia has long been praised for relatively progressive social policies, especially in the areas of family law and women’s rights. In 2017, the Justice Ministry repealed a decree that had banned Tunisian women from marrying non-Muslim men. However, women face high rates of domestic abuse. The 2017 Law on Eliminating Violence against Women addressed domestic violence and included language intended to protect women from harassment in public and from economic discrimination, but implementation has been hampered by inadequate training and other shortcomings.

Public displays of affection can lead to charges of violating public morality laws, which carry penalties including jail time.

Despite efforts by civil society groups to combat such problems, some Tunisian women and children are subject to sex trafficking and forced domestic work. Refugees and other migrants are also susceptible to exploitation by traffickers. Cases of exploitation in the agriculture and textile sectors are prevalent; women often work long hours with no contracts, benefits, or legal recourse.

Many people in Tunisia are informally employed. Informal employees usually lack work contracts, leaving them open to exploitation by employers.