In August 2020, in the wake of mass antigovernment protests, a group of military personnel known as the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) staged a coup d’état and compelled President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta to resign. In September 2020, the CNSP selected Bah N’Daou, a former military officer and Keïta-era defense minister, as acting president. Colonel Assimi Goïta, the CNSP’s leader, was made vice president. In May 2021, another coup d’état took place and Goïta declared himself transitional president.

The prime minister, the head of government, is appointed by the president. Boubou Cissé was appointed in 2019, but removed by the CNSP in the August 2020 coup. Moctar Ouane, his successor, was appointed in September 2020 and removed from office following the May 2021 coup. In June 2021, Goïta appointed a new civilian prime minister—Choguel Maïga, a leading member of a coalition that spearheaded the anti-Keïta protest movement. Prime Minister Choguel Maïga was removed from his post by Goïta in November 2024 after he criticized the junta for postponing elections without informing him. Within days, the junta appointed General Abdoulaye Maïga as interim prime minister, bringing the office under military control.

The government has repeatedly delayed holding the next presidential election. In 2023, the government delayed the presidential election that had been scheduled to take place in early 2024 without specifying a new date. In May 2024, participants in a junta-organized national dialogue recommended that the transition period be extended. Goïta promised to implement the recommendations, which would postpone democratic elections until at least 2027 and allow him to contest future presidential elections.

Prior to the 2020 coup, members of the 147-seat unicameral National Assembly served five-year terms. Thirteen seats were reserved to represent Malians living abroad.

Overdue parliamentary elections were held in two rounds in March and April 2020, but the process was marred by violence, low turnout, and disagreement over the results. Voters were subjected to intimidation, while observers reported vote-buying incidents. COVID-19 restrictions also affected the balloting. A group of civil society observers reported a first-round turnout figure of 7.5 percent.

Keïta dissolved the National Assembly in August 2020 after he was detained by the CNSP, along with then–Prime Minister Boubou Cissé and other officials. A 121-member National Transitional Council (CNT) was appointed in December 2020, with CNSP member Colonel Malick Diaw as its president. Security forces directly controlled 22 seats, while political parties and organizations were granted 11. The M5–RFP, an alliance of opposition parties and civil society groups, separately held 8 seats.

In September 2023, the government announced that legislative elections scheduled for the end of 2023 would not go ahead as planned. Following the conclusion of the junta-organized national dialogue in May 2024, democratic elections were postponed until at least 2027.

A multiyear effort to create a single election management body was realized when the Independent Election Management Authority (AIGE) became operational in 2022. The body comprises 15 representatives, including 8 named by the government, 4 from political parties, and 3 from civil society groups. Electoral operations were previously divided among three administrative bodies: the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), and the General Office of Elections (DGE). The Constitutional Court also participates in the electoral process by validating election results and resolving disputes.

In 2022, the transitional president enacted a new electoral law that establishes the procedures and guidelines governing elections, including the eligibility criteria for candidates, the composition and the mandate of the AIGE, the duration of the electoral campaign period, and the litigation process for contesting election results. Under the new electoral system, presidential and legislative candidates must still win a majority of the votes, either in the initial vote or a runoff. Despite earlier promises to the contrary, the law now permits members of the junta to compete in elections if they step down from their posts at least six months ahead of the vote.

According to official information on the constitutional referendum that took place in 2023, 97 percent of voters were in favor of the new constitution, which expanded presidential powers. The official turnout was 38 percent. Opposition figures expressed concern that it would concentrate power in the hands of the president and dismay that it had not been drafted by a democratic, civilian government.

The creation and functioning of political parties are governed by a legal framework known as the Political Parties Charter, which is generally fair. The charter prohibits the creation of political parties on an “ethnic, religious, linguistic, regionalist, sexist, or professional basis.”

There are more than 100 registered political parties in Mali, though fewer than 20 are active. Parties are usually built around a particular personality and poorly funded. Policy differences between them are not always clear.

Individuals, groups, and parties critical of the transitional government have faced harassment and arbitrary arrests. The junta’s crackdown on the opposition escalated in April 2024, when the government suspended all political party activity; the ban remained in place until July. The suspension came days after a group of over 80 political parties and associations called on the junta-led government to hold elections as soon as possible.

In June, 11 opposition leaders were arrested at the home of Moustapha Dicko, the vice president of the opposition Alliance of Democracy in Mali–African Party for Solidarity and Justice (ADEMA–PASJ) party, and charged with plotting against the state and “opposing legitimate authority.” In April, the government dissolved the February 20 coalition, an organization formed to demand a swift return to a democratically elected government.

Prior to the coup, electoral competition was generally open to opposition forces. However, in 2016, the ruling majority adopted amendments to the electoral code that favored establishment and majority parties by requiring presidential candidates to make a significant financial deposit and receive support from a certain number of incumbent elected officials.

In 2023, the transitional government announced that the legislative elections scheduled for the end of the year would not take place; the next presidential elections, planned for February 2024, were similarly postponed. In May 2024, participants in a government-organized national dialogue—which was boycotted by most of the opposition—recommended that the transition period be extended, delaying elections until at least 2027.

Also in May, opposition politicians announced that they had formed a transition government in exile in Senegal. Members of this opposition group said that its goal was to mobilize the opposition within Mali despite the junta’s suspension of political activity.

The military junta that took power in August 2020 has consolidated its authority. It has appointed key officials and set election timetables without meaningful public input. Although there have been some opportunities for civil society and political parties to participate in consultative processes, there was little to no opportunity for them to provide meaningful input on the new constitution, which significantly expanded presidential powers. In late 2023, the transitional government called for the establishment of an “inter-Malian national dialogue for peace and reconciliation.” The national dialogue, which concluded in May 2024, brought together civil society, religious, and government leaders, but was boycotted by most of the opposition and ultimately recommended extending the transition period. The junta has repeatedly postponed elections and delayed the country’s transition to civilian rule.

No law limits political rights for members of minority groups, and no single ethnic group dominates the government or security forces. Tuareg pastoralist groups in the north have historically occupied a marginal position in national political life.

Societal attitudes can discourage women and ethnic, religious, and other minority groups from participating in political processes. While a 2015 gender quota law mandates that 30 percent of elected and appointed positions are to be filled by women, just over 28 percent of CNT seats are held by women, and the 28-member cabinet that was established in November 2024—after the ouster of civilian Prime Minister Choguel Maïga—included only three women.

The August 2020 coup d’état replaced an elected national government with a military regime; a second coup in May 2021 reinforced the military’s hold on power, causing renewed uncertainty about the reintroduction of civilian rule. A civilian, Choguel Maïga, was appointed as prime minister in June 2021, but several key government positions were filled by military leaders, and the junta has remained firmly in control of the government. Prime Minister Maïga was removed from office in November 2024 after criticizing the junta’s repeated postponement of elections, and replaced by General Abdoulaye Maïga. The appointment of General Maïga as prime minister consolidated the military’s control of both the executive and legislative branches of government in Mali.

A transition deadline of March 2024 was formalized in 2022 as part of an agreement reached by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Malian authorities. The agreement was followed by the lifting of the sanctions that ECOWAS had placed on Mali that January in response to delays in the planned transition to civilian government. The junta did not meet the March 2024 transition deadline. Elections scheduled for February were postponed indefinitely, and junta authorities later announced that elections would not take place before 2027.

Corruption remains a problem in government, notably in public procurement. The suspension of the country’s institutions and the junta’s intimidation of critical voices within Malian civil society has likely worsened the problem. Bribery and the embezzlement of public funds is common, and impunity for corrupt officials is the norm. The Office of the Auditor General is an independent agency responsible for analyzing public spending, but despite its identification of sizable cases of embezzlement, very few prosecutions have taken place. Corruption and criminal activity in the government has fed alienation among citizens.

After the 2020 coup d’état, the CNSP launched a crackdown on apparent abuses by government officials but took no action to fight corruption within the military. In 2022, arrest warrants were issued for several former government officials, including former Prime Minister Cissé, purportedly for the crime of forgery, among other things. In 2023, corruption-related arrest warrants were also issued for the former security minister, Salif Traoré, and the former minister for transport, Traoré Seynabou Diop. Although the junta has publicly conducted many high-profile corruption investigations, analysts have expressed concern that the ongoing crackdown against former ministers is not indicative of a legitimate fight against corruption, but is instead designed to undermine the legitimacy of civilian politicians.

Government operations remain opaque, and Mali does not have a comprehensive legal framework for freedom of information. While numerous laws provide for public access to some official documents and information, they are replete with extensive and vague exceptions. Journalists face obstacles when attempting to obtain information, particularly about military expenditures.

Opposition figures have criticized the constitution drafting process undertaken in 2022, and some have called for a more democratic drafting process. The draft constitution was not made public when it was submitted to military leadership, and the transitional government did not provide precise information about its contents in the run-up to the 2023 constitutional referendum.

Though the media environment in Bamako and in the rest of the south was relatively open prior to the 2020 coup, reports of censorship, self-censorship, and threats against journalists have risen significantly since then.

Members of the media who are perceived to be critical of the transitional government are targeted by harassment and intimidation. News outlets face pressure to report “patriotic news” that glorifies the junta and its approach toward politics. Defamation is a crime that can draw fines or prison time. Mali’s High Communication Authority (HAC) continues to undermine outlets with independent perspectives, and local media sources sometimes report the disappearance of journalists.

The accreditation process for foreign journalists is intrusive, and it has become effectively impossible for independent foreign journalists to become accredited. French broadcasters Radio France Internationale (RFI) and France 24 remain banned from broadcasting. Numerous foreign media outlets were suspended in 2024, including broadcasters France 2 in January and La Chaîne Info in July. The outlets were issued suspensions—four months and two months, respectively—for airing content that the junta authorities deemed inappropriate, purportedly for security reasons. In April, the HAC ordered all media outlets operating in the country to cease reporting or otherwise sharing information on the activities of political parties or associations.

Reporting on the situation in the north remains dangerous due to the presence of active militant groups. Journalists have been abducted and held hostage by militant groups in recent years. International observers, including Reporters Without Borders (RSF), have condemned the increased restrictions placed on journalists operating in Mali since the coup, as well as the resultant lack of access to reliable reporting within the country.

The 2023 constitution guarantees religious freedom in Mali and recognizes the country as a secular state. Discrimination on the basis of religion is prohibited. Religious groups, except for groups practicing Indigenous religious beliefs, are legally required to register with the government, although is no penalty for failing to do so. The population is predominantly Sunni Muslim, and Sufism plays a role in the beliefs of most residents.

Armed extremist groups have terrorized northern and central Mali since the 2012 Islamist uprising, attacking those whom they perceive as failing to follow their strict interpretation of Islam. Such groups have occasionally carried out targeted kidnappings of Christians and subjected them to sometimes violent harassment.

While academic freedom is upheld in areas with a consolidated government presence, universities are affected by violence and crime. Academics critical of the junta face repression and threats of dismissal. According to researchers, Mali is no longer compliant with some of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) recommendations on academic freedom.

Academic freedom is severely limited in areas affected by conflict and militant activity. In areas controlled by Islamist militant groups, schools have been forced to use curriculums in line with the groups’ ideologies. Roughly half a million children have seen their schools close due to violent conflicts in several parts of the country.

Since the August 2020 military coup, freedom of expression has become restricted. It can be dangerous for individuals to discuss the deteriorating security situation or to criticize the junta-led transition process. Online journalists report that the government uses sophisticated online surveillance mechanisms to identify potential regime opponents. Even in cases where there is insufficient evidence to incarcerate journalists, individuals can be thrown into prison temporarily.

The United Nations (UN) and several international human rights associations describe a shrinking civic space in the country, featuring increased self-censorship among individuals, especially online. Expression is also restricted in areas with a militant Islamist presence or where intercommunal violence has flared.

Though the transitional charter guarantees freedom of assembly, this right is often not upheld in practice. While rallies in support of the interim government have been permitted, the junta has restricted demonstrations by its critics, including protests against the delay of elections and the junta’s pro-Russian foreign policy.

Compared to recent years, significantly fewer protests and demonstrations were held during 2024. Demonstrations calling for a return to civilian democratic rule, rare since the 2020 coup, were almost completely absent. In April, the junta indefinitely suspended all political activities as part of its wider crackdown on real or perceived opponents of the regime, significantly restricting assembly rights. Opposition protests were banned, and security forces arbitrarily arrested a number of participants in “unauthorized” protests during this time. The suspension on political activity was ultimately lifted in July.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to more severe crackdowns on opponents of the regime and a regime-imposed ban on all political activities for three months.

Since the August 2020 coup, the work of organizations engaged in human rights or governance-related work has faced restrictions. Such groups have reported facing death threats and threats of detention, as well as physical harassment and violence. This is particularly true for organizations that research conflicts in northern and central Mali, as well as organizations that portray Russia and the Wagner Group’s engagement in Mali in a critical light.

The junta further cracked down on civil society during 2024, introducing new restrictions on the freedom of association. The authorities dissolved at least four civic associations between December 2023 and March 2024, including the Observatory for Elections and Good Governance, accusing the groups of posing threats to public order and safety. Both the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Mali’s National Human Rights Commission expressed concern about the increasing restrictions placed on the right to associate freely and called on the Malian authorities to protect civic space.

In 2022, the government banned nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that received financing from the French government. Many of the affected NGOs provide humanitarian aid and have had difficulty finding alternative donors. As a result of the policy, all NGOs’ funding streams became subject to mandatory government review.

Ongoing and worsening insecurity and violence in some parts of the country hamper NGOs’ efforts to provide aid and services to returning refugees and others affected by instability.

The constitution guarantees workers the right to form unions and to strike, with some limitations for workers in essential services and requirements involving compulsory arbitration. The government has broad discretionary power over the registration of unions and recognition of collective bargaining, and the authorities do not effectively enforce laws against antiunion discrimination. The transitional government has at times arbitrarily prevented the registration of trade unions.

Trade unions are represented in the CNT and were represented on the committee that drafted the new constitution. In June 2024, trade union leader Hamadoun Bah was arrested on forgery charges. Bah’s union, the National Union of Insurance, Banks, and Financial Institutions of Mali (Synabef), launched a strike in protest of his arrest, which union representatives said was politically motivated. The strike ended several days later, when Bah was released from prison following the intervention of transitional President Goïta.

The judiciary is beholden to the executive, despite constitutional guarantees of judicial independence. The 2023 constitution tasks the president with ensuring judicial independence. Judges are appointed by the president, and constitutional amendments adopted in 2023 give the president sole control over appointments to the Supreme Court. The minister of justice supervises both law enforcement and judicial functions.

Violent conflict in northern and central Mali hinders judicial procedures. The military justice system still exercises its jurisdiction over crimes committed by on duty military personnel against civilians. Militant attacks against judicial personnel have prompted some judges to vacate their posts.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to a constitutional change that allows the president unilateral control over Supreme Court appointments.

Due process rights are inconsistently upheld. Detainees are not always charged within the 48-hour period set by law, and arbitrary arrests are common. Detainees also face extended pretrial detention periods. High costs and lengthy procedures inhibit access to the justice system.

A state of emergency remained in place through year-end 2024 due to tense security conditions in the country.

Due process rights were not consistently upheld for high-ranking officials detained by the military in the August 2020 coup d’état.

The Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (CJVR) created in 2014 is responsible for investigating human rights violations committed since 1960, but its activities have been restricted by terrorist activities and intercommunal tensions within Mali’s borders. The Commission held its fifth and last public hearing in Bamako in mid-2022. Its investigators ultimately collected testimony from tens of thousands of victims. Promised next steps, including the debut of two additional transitional justice bodies, had not materialized as of year-end 2024.

Due process is not upheld in areas under militant control.

The security situation in Mali has continued to deteriorate, leading to a decline in the protection of human rights across the country. In 2024, Islamist militant groups continued to carry out acts of violence against civilians in the country’s northern and central regions. Tuareg groups that were party to a 2015 peace agreement resumed hostilities against the Malian state in 2023.

According to data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), Islamist militant attacks resulted in numerous civilian fatalities in 2024. In September, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) fighters carried out simultaneous attacks on a gendarmerie school and on Modibo Keïta Airport in Bamako, causing a reported 90 fatalities. Conflict between nonstate armed groups has displaced hundreds of thousands of people in recent years.

In June 2023, the Malian government called on the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to depart the country “without delay.” Several peacekeepers were injured by attacks as MINUSMA began its withdrawal. The hastened withdrawal of UN forces opened a security vacuum in northern Mali, and MINUSMA’s departure that December strengthened the secessionist Tuareg rebel forces. In July 2024, a combined Malian and Wagner mercenary force was forced to retreat following a clash with Tuareg secessionist fighters, resulting in significant losses among state forces.

Malian military personnel have been known to engage in human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and arbitrary arrests.

Prisons are characterized by overcrowding, insufficient medical care, and a lack of proper food and sanitation.

Members of a northern caste known as Black Tamasheqs face societal discrimination, including slavery-like treatment and hereditary servitude. Authorities sometimes deny them official documents or discriminate against them in housing, schooling, and police protection. Arabs and Tuaregs also face discrimination.

Same-sex sexual acts are legal, but LGBT+ people face discrimination, including violence by family members that is meant as a corrective punishment.

Although the constitution nominally guarantees equal rights and prohibits discrimination based on sex, men and women do not have the same legal status, and women are required by law to obey their husbands. Sexual harassment is not prohibited by law and is a common practice in schools and the workplace.

Conditions in northern Mali have left many refugees unable or unwilling to return, as continuing insecurity in the region complicates resettlement.

Freedom of movement and choice of residence remain constrained by insecurity, especially in northern and central Mali. Violent conflict involving armed groups, militant-imposed blockades on supply roads, and natural disasters have impacted free movement for hundreds of thousands of people in recent years. As of September 2024, there were over 378,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Mali, according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Citizens have the right to own property and engage in private enterprise, but these rights are not consistently respected, and widespread corruption hampers normal business activities. It is generally necessary to pay bribes in order to operate a business.

Traditional customs sometimes undermine the right of women to own property. The law discriminates against women in matters of inheritance.

The law puts women at a disadvantage on personal status issues including marriage and divorce. Rape and domestic violence against women are widespread, and most such crimes go unreported. There are no specific laws prohibiting spousal rape or domestic violence. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is legal and commonly practiced in the country. Same-sex couples cannot form civil unions, marry, or adopt children in Mali.

Although trafficking in persons is a criminal offense, prosecutions are infrequent, and law enforcement lacks adequate resources to effectively combat the problem.

Traditional forms of slavery and debt bondage persist, particularly in the north, with thousands of people estimated to be living in such conditions. The government has taken steps to eliminate child labor, but it remains a significant concern. Armed groups regularly recruit and use child soldiers.