According to 2022 constitutional amendments, the president, who holds most executive power, is directly elected for a single seven-year term. Former President Nazarbayev had maintained special constitutional powers as Kazakhstan’s “first president,” which exempted him from term limits and made him chairman of the Security Council for life after his 2019 resignation. Nazarbayev’s constitutional privileges were removed in 2022. In 2023, the Constitutional Court annulled “leader of the nation” legislation that had offered Nazarbayev and his family immunity from prosecution for most offenses.

President Tokayev, first elected to a five-year term in 2019, won a snap election for a nonrenewable seven-year term in 2022, taking 81.3 percent of the vote, according to the election commission. He faced five other candidates, none of whom were considered serious contenders. Observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) found that the election was neither free nor fair, while critics accused Tokayev of engaging in electoral manipulation just as Nazarbayev had.

The Senate, the upper house of the bicameral Parliament, has 50 seats; 40 senators are chosen by lawmakers from the regions and major cities, and 10 are appointed by the president. Senators, who are officially nonpartisan, serve six-year terms, with half of the elected members up for reelection every three years. The lower house, the Majilis, has 98 members, 30 percent of whom are elected according to a majoritarian system; the rest are elected by proportional representation on party lists. Members serve five-year terms.

In 2023 snap elections, President Tokayev’s party, Amanat, won 62 Majilis seats. Auyl won 8, Respublica and Aq Jol each won 6, the People’s Party of Kazakhstan won 5, the National Social Democratic Party won 4, and independents won 7. While more parties entered the lower house than in the last term, none offered serious opposition to Tokayev in practice. Independent candidates in single-member districts faced obstacles, including being barred from running based on technicalities and the improper counting of ballots in favor of progovernment candidates. OSCE observers said the elections featured “elements of competitiveness” but were marred by problems including “superficial” media coverage and the obstruction encountered by self-nominated candidates.

Kazakhstan’s legal framework is not sufficient to ensure free and fair elections, and safeguards that do exist are not properly enforced. Electoral laws make it difficult for opposition parties to obtain parliamentary representation. Parties must clear a 5 percent vote threshold to enter the Majilis and are barred from forming electoral blocs, preventing them from pooling votes and campaign resources.

Presidential candidates must also pass a Kazakh language test with unclear evaluation criteria, have at least five years of public-service experience, and submit their medical records. Independent candidates may not run for president, and the eligibility requirements, including those concerning education and residency, are onerous and out of line with OSCE standards.

In October 2024, Kazakhstan held a nationwide referendum on a proposal to build the country’s first nuclear power plant. Despite opposition to the financial and environmental costs associated with such a plant, the proposal passed with 73 percent of the vote, according to official results. There were reports of ballot stuffing and interference with independent observers’ activities. Several activists who opposed the plant were detained. The OSCE did not send observers, but representatives of the Beijing-based Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and other regional bodies claimed there were no violations, disregarding evidence to the contrary.

While 2022 constitutional changes made it easier to register political parties by reducing the number of members required from 20,000 to 5,000, the registration process remains onerous, and officials have broad discretion to delay or deny party registration in practice. The law prohibits parties based on ethnic origin, religion, or gender. Opposition parties have been banned or marginalized via antiextremism laws; their leaders have faced criminal charges, and other restrictions have been imposed on their activities.

In April 2024, the opposition party Alga Kazakhstan was denied official registration for the 24th time since 2022. The party’s leader, Marat Zhylanbaev, had been sentenced to seven years in prison in November 2023 on charges of financing an extremist organization; human rights groups condemned the case as politically motivated. In August 2024, three Alga Kazakhstan activists were detained and fined for holding a protest outside the Justice Ministry to demand the registration of their party and the release of political prisoners.

The leader of another unregistered opposition party, the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, was given a six-year suspended prison sentence in April 2023 on charges of organizing an illegal rally. In September 2024, the Supreme Court rejected an appeal to overturn the sentence.

Kazakhstan experienced its first transfer of power in 2019, when Nazarbayev stood down as president, though Tokayev, his chosen successor, was elected in a poll that lacked credible opposition candidates. Opposition parties are effectively prevented from gaining power or influence through legislative elections. The ruling party holds a supermajority of Majilis seats, and the other five parties with representation in the body are considered loyal to Tokayev’s regime.

While voters and candidates are not subject to undue influence from the military, the political system is dominated by a small group of elites. The extent of the Russian government’s influence over Kazakhstani politics is unknown, though there is evidence to suggest that Russian propaganda influences Kazakh-language media, especially in relation to Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

The legal ban on parties with an ethnic, religious, or gender focus—combined with the dominance of Amanat—limits the ability of women and members of minority groups to organize independently and advocate for their interests through the political system. A gender quota for party lists was introduced in 2019, but women held only 18.4 percent of the Majilis’s seats after the 2023 snap elections. The Kazakh language test for presidential candidates presents an obstacle for non-Kazakh ethnic minorities and many Russian-speaking people.

Government policies are determined by the executive branch irrespective of the constitutionally defined roles of the executive, judiciary, and legislature. Parliament does not serve as an effective check on the executive, and instead largely provides formal approval for the government’s legislative initiatives.

Constitutional changes that were approved in a 2022 referendum ostensibly shifted power from the president to the Majilis. However, the president retained the authority to appoint the prime minister, the prosecutor general, the security chief, local governors, and other senior officials in government.

Corruption is widespread at all levels of government. Cases are often prosecuted at the local and regional levels. Charges against high-ranking political and business elites have been rare, typically emerging only after an individual had fallen out of favor with the leadership. In restoring order after the violence of January 2022, Tokayev initiated the arrest and detention of former Nazarbayev allies on charges including corruption.

In 2023, Tokayev announced that corruption had been “eradicated” because of the reforms he had introduced, yet high-profile corruption cases continued to unfold, especially against associates of Nazarbayev. In February 2024, the former minister of culture and sports, Arystanbek Mukhamediuly, was sentenced to 11 years in prison for allegedly embezzling 1.5 billion tenge ($3.2 million) between 2017 and 2019. In August, Gulmira Satybaldy, the former wife of Nazarbayev’s nephew who was already serving an eight-year prison sentence for embezzlement, was handed a concurrent 12-year sentence after an Almaty court found her guilty of forcing her former business partner to give up ownership of several businesses.

The government and legislature offer little transparency on their decision-making processes, budgetary matters, and other operations. The media and civil society do not have a meaningful opportunity to provide independent commentary and input on pending laws and policies. A law on public access to government information was adopted in 2015 but is poorly implemented in practice. Officials’ asset and income declarations are not publicly available.

The government has failed to release information about the extent of its crackdown on individuals involved in the protests and violence that took place in January 2022.

Media independence is severely limited in Kazakhstan. While the constitution provides for freedom of the press, most of the media sector is controlled by the state or government-friendly owners. Independent outlets and journalists are routinely shut down or harassed, and self-censorship is common. Libel is a criminal offense, and the criminal code prohibits insulting the president and other officials. The authorities reportedly use internet blackouts, targeted blocking, or throttling to restrict access to independent online media outlets, including the website of Azattyq, the Kazakh service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Journalists are required to confirm the accuracy of information prior to publication by consulting with relevant government bodies or officials, obtain consent for the publication of personal or otherwise confidential information, and acquire accreditation as foreign journalists if they work for foreign outlets. They are also required to work with a “host” when reporting on government events.

In 2023, Tokayev signed a law that penalizes the dissemination of purportedly false news with administrative fines. In June 2024, the president signed a new law on mass media. Among other provisions, it updated the definition of mass media to include online sources. Critics of the legislation expressed particular concern about a vague clause that could give the Ministry of Foreign Affairs broad discretion to refuse accreditation to foreign media outlets and journalists. The legislation also empowered the Ministry of Information to monitor the media for potential moral harms to society and violations of family values.

The constitution guarantees freedom of worship, and some religious communities practice without state interference. However, activities by unregistered religious groups are banned, and registered groups are subject to close government supervision. The government has broad authority to outlaw organizations it designates as “extremist.”

The 2011 Law on Religious Activities and Religious Associations prohibited the distribution of religious literature outside places of worship, required state approval of all religious literature, and banned unregistered missionary activity, among other provisions. Amendments to the law that came into force in 2022 placed further bureaucratic restrictions on holding religious meetings in unregistered places of worship.

Local officials continue to harass groups defined as “nontraditional,” including Protestant Christians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Muslims who do not adhere to the government-approved version of Islam. In March and April 2024, police raided the premises of three unregistered Protestant churches in Shu District and issued at least six fines for the lack of registration.

Academic freedom remains constrained by political sensitivities surrounding certain topics, including Nazarbayev and his inner circle, as well as relations with Russia. Self-censorship on such topics is reportedly common among scholars and educators. A number of private educational institutions are allegedly owned by politically connected elites or their relatives.

Authorities are known to monitor social media, and users are regularly prosecuted on charges such as inciting social and ethnic hatred, insulting government officials, and promoting separatism or terrorism. The media law makes it impossible for internet users to leave anonymous comments online, further limiting free expression.

Mobile service providers instruct customers to install special encryption software on mobile phones, allowing security services to intercept data traffic and circumvent email and messaging applications’ encryption features. Those who do not install the software face difficulties in accessing the internet, particularly social media platforms.

Amendments to the law on the protection of children’s rights that were adopted in 2022 required social media companies with over 100,000 daily visitors to register and open offices in Kazakhstan within six months, ostensibly to prevent cyberbullying. Critics argued that the revisions allowed authorities to shut down any platform that fails to comply with their speech-related restrictions. In August 2024, Facebook blocked access to accounts associated with an activist group campaigning against high recycling fees; the group’s administrators attributed the move to pressure from authorities.

Individuals also faced retribution for expressing their views on politically sensitive topics during 2024. In July, stand-up comedian Aleksandr Merkul was sentenced by an Almaty court to 10 days of administrative arrest for “petty hooliganism” due to jokes he made about social issues, and activist Maria Kochneva was sentenced to 10 days of administrative arrest in response to her public performance of an antiwar song.

Despite constitutional guarantees, the government imposes tight restrictions on freedom of assembly. Under a public assembly law that was revised in 2020, organizers must give notification three to seven days in advance of a protest and then wait for approval by the local administration. Only officially registered groups may give notification, and gatherings are only allowed at state-approved sites, which are often located far from city centers. Organizers and protest participants who do not comply face fines and imprisonment.

In the run-up to the October 2024 referendum on the construction of a nuclear power plant, authorities detained activists who protested against the proposal and denied permission to organize peaceful demonstrations in seven cities across Kazakhstan. Authorities also broke up smaller protests throughout 2024, including a May demonstration against a new gold mine by residents of a village in eastern Kazakhstan. In July, police in Almaty disrupted activists who were gathering to honor the memory of an opposition journalist, Aidos Sadykov, who had recently been murdered in Kyiv.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continue to operate but face government harassment when they attempt to address politically sensitive issues. There are extensive legal restrictions on the formation and operation of NGOs, including onerous financial rules and harsh penalties for noncompliance. Organizations can incur fines and other punishments for vaguely defined offenses like interfering with government activities or engaging in work outside the scope of their charters.

Workers have limited rights to form and join trade unions or participate in collective bargaining. The government is closely affiliated with the largest union federation and major employers, while genuinely independent unions face repressive actions by the authorities. The country’s major independent trade union body, the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions (KNPRK), was dissolved in 2017. The International Labour Organization argues that Astana is not meeting its obligations under its convention for the freedom of association and protection of unions.

During 2024, oil-sector workers in the Mangystau Region engaged in a series of strike actions aimed at improving their pay and working conditions, among other demands. Authorities and employers responded with tactics including dismissals of striking workers, court rulings that the strikes were illegal, and criminal investigations of those involved.

The judiciary is effectively subservient to the executive branch, with the president nominating or directly appointing judges based on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council, which is itself appointed by the president. Judges are subject to political influence, and corruption is a problem throughout the judicial system.

Police reportedly engage in arbitrary arrests and detentions and violate detained suspects’ right to assistance from a defense lawyer. Prosecutors, as opposed to judges, are empowered to authorize searches and seizures. Defendants are often held in pretrial detention for long periods. Politically motivated prosecutions and prison sentences against activists, journalists, and opposition figures are common.

Security forces illegally detained, tortured, and denied legal representation to hundreds of peaceful protesters in January 2022. Ongoing trials and prosecutions of participants in the protests and related events that year are considered by critics to be politically motivated.

Attorneys are required to become members of a state chamber and to register with a government-controlled digital information system. Local and international lawyers’ associations have criticized the law, saying it imposes undue state control over legal professionals and threatens their independence.

Conditions in pretrial detention facilities and prisons are harsh, with regular reports of torture and deaths in custody. Police often use excessive force during arrests, and torture is widely employed to obtain confessions. Those who engage in physical abuse and other mistreatment of detainees are rarely brought to justice. In July 2024, 12 prison guards went on trial for allegedly torturing inmates at the Atbasar prison colony, including antiwar activist Timur Danebayev. Physical abuse within the military is also a problem. In October, a military court began proceedings against officer Zhanbota Shakirov for alleged abuse of power leading to the death of an army conscript, Dosymzhan Salimzhan.

Terrorist violence is rare in Kazakhstan, though some residents have traveled abroad to support the Islamic State (IS) militant group.

While the constitution guarantees equality before the law and prohibits discrimination based on gender, race, and other categories, it does not explicitly prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.

Major segments of society face discrimination in practice, particularly ethnic minority groups and migrant workers, who are often undocumented and are frequently exploited. Members of the sizable Russian-speaking minority have complained of discrimination in employment and education. LGBT+ people continue to experience societal discrimination, harassment, and violence, despite the decriminalization of same-sex relations in 1998. Traditional cultural biases limit economic and professional opportunities for women, and the law offers no protection against sexual harassment in the workplace. In October 2024, some Majilis members called for the feminist and LGBT+ human rights organization Feminita to be deemed an extremist organization and banned, and a group of participants at a Feminita event in Almaty were briefly detained by police.

Kazakhstani citizens can travel freely but must register their permanent residence with local authorities. Citizens must also register temporary residences lasting more than a month with local authorities or face fines.

While the rights of entrepreneurship and private property are formally protected, they are limited in practice by bureaucratic hurdles and the undue influence of politically connected elites, who control large segments of the economy.

NGOs continue to report instances of early and forced marriage, particularly in rural areas. Women are also encouraged to support large families; those who raise at least six children receive a medal from the government, along with tax breaks and modest monthly benefits.

Domestic violence is a serious problem that often goes unpunished, as police are reluctant to intervene. In April 2024, President Tokayev signed new legislation that included protections against domestic abuse and violence against women, though domestic violence is not specifically considered a criminal offense under the law. In a high-profile case that had drawn attention to the topic, Kuandyk Bishimbayev, a former government minister, was sentenced in May to 24 years in prison for torment, extreme cruelty, and murder after he killed his wife, Saltanat Nukenova, in an Astana restaurant.

Migrant workers from neighboring countries often face poor working conditions and a lack of effective legal safeguards against exploitation. Both migrants and Kazakhstani workers from rural areas are vulnerable to trafficking for the purposes of forced labor and prostitution in large cities. Some experts claim that official statistics do not fully capture the extent of trafficking in Kazakhstan. The authorities reportedly make little effort to assist foreign victims. The country’s first dedicated legislation to combat human trafficking was signed into law in July 2024, with provisions on the definition of trafficking, identification of victims, and institutional responsibility for detecting and punishing offenses.