The 2008 constitution provides for a directly elected president. The president has the constitutional authority to dissolve the National Assembly, which triggers new elections for both the legislature and the presidency. Then-President Guillermo Lasso Mendoza invoked this authority after lawmakers moved to impeach him in May 2023, and early elections were held in August of that year.

No candidate won a majority in the first round of the presidential election. Noboa, backed by the conservative National Democratic Action (AND) party, defeated leftist Citizens’ Revolution candidate Luisa González Alcívar in the October runoff, taking nearly 52 percent of the vote. Noboa was set to serve through the end of Lasso’s four-year term in May 2025, but was eligible for reelection. Although the balloting generally adhered to international standards of integrity, the campaign was marked by unprecedented levels of political violence. Several candidates at both at the local and national levels were murdered during the campaign period, including presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio Valencia.

The potential for violence remained a major concern during 2024, ahead of the general elections scheduled for early 2025, prompting one presidential candidate to cease public campaign activities in November.

In April 2024, based on the 2022 census, the National Electoral Council (CNE) approved an increase in the number of seats in the National Assembly from 137 to 151. The new total comprised 15 members elected by national proportional representation, 130 provincial representatives elected in multimember districts (up from 116), and 6 representatives for constituencies of Ecuadorians living abroad. This change was slated to take effect with the February 2025 general elections.

Legislative polls were held concurrently with the first round of the presidential election in August 2023, but issues with the telematic voting system used by Ecuadorians abroad prompted electoral authorities to repeat that balloting in October. No party won a majority in the snap elections. Citizens’ Revolution secured 51 seats, Villavicencio’s liberal Build Ecuador Movement (MCE) won 26, the Social Christian Party (PSC) won 18, and ADN won 14. No other party won more than 10 seats. Several members had shifted allegiances by the time the new legislature met in November, leaving Citizens’ Revolution with 51 members, the MCE and the PSC with 18 each, and the ADN with 17. While violence marred the elections, domestic and international observers concluded that they were credible and fair.

Although the CNE has generally displayed transparency and independence, electoral authorities have sometimes faced accusations of politicization and bias. The procedure for replacing the council’s members on a rolling basis, overseen by the Citizen Participation and Social Control Council (CPCCS), has been delayed for several years due to legal and political obstacles, and it remained stalled during 2024. One dispute centered on the question of whether members could be replaced while the 2025 electoral process was already underway. Separately, in August 2024, three judges of the Electoral Disputes Tribunal (TCE) removed fellow judge Fernando Muñoz as the tribunal’s president, a move that Muñoz said was motivated by “partisan interests and personal ambitions.”

Multiple parties compete in Ecuador’s political system, but historically they have been largely personality based, clientelist, and fragile. According to the 2008 constitution, political organizations must collect voters’ signatures equivalent to 1.5 percent of the electoral roll to register and participate in general elections. If a party or group fails to win 4 percent of the vote for two consecutive elections, its registration can be revoked, disadvantaging smaller parties.

Ecuador’s legal framework creates opportunities for political parties to opportunistically delay and challenge the registration of rival candidates, especially in the context of early elections. International observers noted that this factor stalled the registration of a candidate to replace Villavicencio in 2023. Also that year, several presidential candidates failed to comply with campaign expense reporting as required by the CNE; lack of enforcement could benefit some parties more than others.

Ecuador has undergone regular rotations of power through elections in recent decades, and opposition forces are often well represented in the legislature. In the 2023 elections, the opposition Citizens’ Revolution maintained its status as the single largest party in the National Assembly, even as Noboa prevailed in that year’s presidential election; Lasso, the incumbent, did not seek reelection.

In August 2024, a total of 17 presidential candidates sought registration with the CNE ahead of the 2025 general elections. In November, the TCE disqualified United Society More Action (SUMA) candidate Jan Topic, who was considered a leading challenger to Noboa. Although Topic had been able to run in 2023, the TCE argued that he retained “effective control” over companies whose shares he had divested, allegedly violating a ban on candidates owning companies that contract with the state. The secretary general of the Organization of American States had warned that Topic’s disqualification would be “a serious setback for Ecuadorian democracy,” prompting the government to denounce the remarks as improper interference in Ecuador’s domestic affairs. SUMA registered another candidate to replace Topic later in November.

Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 3 because an electoral court disqualified a prominent opposition presidential candidate on dubious grounds.

Ecuadorians’ political choices are increasingly constrained by criminal organizations and related violence. The surge in political violence in 2023 and concerns about illicit campaign financing persisted in 2024. At least three mayors were murdered during the year, leading the Association of Municipalities of Ecuador (AME) to petition the government for special police protection. The AME’s president reported that at least 100 of the country’s 221 mayors were at risk of criminal violence. In addition, journalists have exposed the ability of organized crime groups to co-opt and bribe political and security authorities, particularly to protect lucrative activities such as illegal mining, which also facilitates money-laundering operations.

Citizens enjoy formal political equality regardless of race, gender, and other such distinctions, though some disparities in access and influence persist in practice. Electoral regulations mandate that women account for 50 percent of the candidates on party lists in multimember districts, and women must also lead half of a party’s lists; presidential tickets must include a woman candidate for president or vice president. However, efforts to increase electoral participation among ethnic and racial minority groups, as well as LGBT+ people, remain incomplete. While some parties, such as the Indigenous movement Pachakutik, advocate for the interests of minority groups, these issues are not a focus of major parties’ platforms.

Recurring power struggles between the presidency and legislature have disrupted governance in recent years, culminating in President Lasso’s decision to trigger early elections in 2023. Severe disagreements between the two branches continued under President Noboa in 2024, complicating their efforts to implement comprehensive economic and social reforms.

Separately, a strained relationship between President Noboa and Vice President Abad escalated into a legal dispute late in the year. Noboa had given Abad the additional role of ambassador to Israel in an apparent effort to avoid assigning her domestic responsibilities. She was transferred to Turkey in September, then suspended from her duties in November after she failed to promptly relocate. Although a judge overturned the suspension in December, the vice president was again assigned to diplomatic duties in Turkey. Observers suggested that the moves were designed to prevent Abad from serving as interim president while Noboa went on leave to campaign for reelection in early 2025.

In January 2024, Noboa declared an “internal armed conflict” and deployed the military to combat organized crime, but high levels of insecurity and criminal activity continued to undermine the ability of national and local elected officials to exercise effective control over state institutions and the country’s territory.

Ecuador has long been racked by corruption, and the weak judiciary and lack of investigative capacity in government oversight agencies contribute to an environment of impunity. In April 2024, the government transformed the former Anti-Corruption Secretariat into the Secretariat of Public Integrity, which will oversee the implementation of public integrity policies and advise the president on such issues, though it was unclear whether the new body would have more resources or authority than its predecessor. In another notable action during the year, the Public Enterprises Coordinating Company (EMCO)—which had been linked with several corruption scandals in recent years, particularly in the energy sector—was formally liquidated in August, in keeping with reform legislation adopted in late 2023.

The law guarantees citizens’ right to access public information, though some government bodies remain reluctant to disclose such information. Public procurement processes are frequently opaque, and malpractice involving government contracts is common.

Since coming to power in 2023, the Noboa administration has been criticized for a pattern of secrecy and delayed public responses in the face of certain crises, such as electricity blackouts that intensified in the final quarter of 2024.

Although the previous two presidents oversaw significant improvements in press freedom, including a 2018 reform of the restrictive Organic Communications Law that permitted more diverse coverage in state-run outlets, the threat of criminal violence and political pressure have increasingly constrained the work of journalists in recent years.

In June 2024, Los Irreverentes, a political opinion show that often featured criticism of the government, was canceled by the television broadcaster Canal RTU and taken off the air. RTU had reportedly been threatened with the possible suspension of government advertising contracts and unusual information requests from the Telecommunications Regulation and Control Agency (ARCOTEL), though RTU’s general manager declined to comment on the matter.

Also in June, the government revoked the visa of Alondra Santiago, a Cuban journalist who had lived in Ecuador for almost two decades. She had recently posted a social media video that was critical of the Noboa administration. Separately, a series of Ecuadorean journalists have sought safety abroad after facing threats for investigating organized crime and corruption, and this trend continued in 2024.

Freedom of religion is constitutionally guaranteed and generally respected in practice.

Academic freedom is generally upheld, and the education system is mostly free of political indoctrination. In the country’s largest public universities, however, political parties and movements have traditionally controlled key positions of authority.

Discussion of controversial topics among private citizens is generally free, but criminal groups continue to intimidate voters, community leaders, and activists in certain parts of the country.

Protests typically occur throughout the country without incident. However, national security legislation provides a broad definition of sabotage and terrorism, extending to acts against persons and property by unarmed individuals. States of emergency that were declared for security reasons in recent years have also periodically affected freedom of assembly.

In January 2024, President Noboa declared a state of emergency to combat organized crime, then announced an “internal armed conflict” shortly thereafter. The emergency decree, which was in place or renewed for most of the year, specifically allowed security forces to limit freedom of assembly. The Constitutional Court, ruling in November on the latest version of the emergency declaration, struck down that component and stated that the right to peaceful protest must be respected.

Current regulations for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), although less restrictive than under former President Rafael Correa, still allow authorities to close organizations that are perceived to be participating in politics, or organizations that are deemed to perform activities different from those for which they were created.

Private-sector labor unions have the right to strike, though the labor code limits public-sector strikes. Only a small portion of the general workforce is unionized, partly because many people work in the informal sector.

The Constitutional Court has earned a reputation for autonomy in recent years, repeatedly demonstrating a willingness to challenge sitting governments. The broader judicial system has been implicated in extensive corruption and exposed to the influence of organized crime.

In 2024, the Attorney General’s Office announced corruption indictments against several current and former public officials, including members of the judiciary. In one case that came to light during the year, the former president of the Judicial Council, who had been arrested in 2023 as part of an investigation into organized crime, was separately accused of interfering in the process of appointing judges to the National Court of Justice.

Judicial processes remain slow, and procedures designed to expedite cases have been implemented at the expense of defendants' due process rights. Many people are held in pretrial detention for longer than the law allows. While the number of public defenders has increased in recent years, the state is still unable to provide adequate legal counsel to all defendants who are unable to obtain their own. In cases that involve powerful political interests, certain guarantees of due process and a fair trial are subject to manipulation and corrupt influence.

Ecuador’s homicide rate is among the highest in the world. The rate of 38.76 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants recorded in 2024 was the second highest in the country’s history, surpassed only by the figure of 45 per 100,000 in 2023. In January 2024, a group of armed assailants took over the premises of the public television station TC Televisión. This crisis, along with a prison break by organized crime leader José Adolfo “Fito” Macías Villamar, led President Noboa to declare a state of emergency and “internal armed conflict” that month.

Noboa identified 22 organized crime groups as terrorist organizations and deployed security forces, including the military, to combat them. In the subsequent campaign, there were reports of abuses during patrols, arrests, and enforcement actions within detention facilities. For example, in February, a 19-year-old with no criminal record was fatally shot by security personnel at a Guayaquil military checkpoint. In a separate high-profile incident in December, also in Guayaquil, four children disappeared after they were detained by a military patrol. Weeks later, the children’s remains were found in a field near a military base, showing signs that they had been burned and mutilated. Prosecutors subsequently brought charges against 16 military personnel who were allegedly involved.

Ecuador’s laws and public policies formally guarantee equal treatment to all segments of the population. However, some de facto practices, such as discrimination in employment and education, effectively disadvantage groups including women, ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees, and LGBT+ people.

Indigenous people suffer widespread societal discrimination, and oil-drilling and mining projects on Indigenous lands are frequently carried out without consulting local Indigenous communities, as required by the constitution. In 2020, the Constitutional Court reinforced consultation requirements for proposed changes to the status of Indigenous ancestral territories, and in 2023, referendum voters approved a proposal—long demanded by Indigenous groups—to end new oil exploration in the Yasuní National Park.

There are typically few formal restrictions on the free movement of citizens, but the current security situation has resulted in temporary or de facto restrictions, particularly in sectors of the country’s coastal and Amazon regions where the presence of the state and law enforcement agencies is very limited or violently challenged.

After the president’s declaration of a state of emergency in January 2024, a curfew was imposed throughout the country, and it remained in force in 61 out of 221 cantons until early April. As the year progressed, the curfews were limited to provinces with the most significant organized criminal activity.

Due to a combination of economic difficulties and the threat of violence and extortion, tens of thousands of Ecuadorians emigrated north through Central America during the year.

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because Ecuadorians’ freedom of movement within the country was constrained by government-imposed curfews and ongoing criminal violence.

The government does not impose significant restrictions on the right to own property and establish private businesses. However, corruption can obstruct business activity, and extortion by criminal groups is a major threat to property rights.

There are few significant restrictions on people’s freedom with respect to marriage, divorce, and other personal status issues. Same-sex marriage has been legal since 2019. However, abortion remains criminalized except in cases of rape or when the woman’s life is at risk, and protections against domestic violence are inadequate. A study from the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses found that 65 percent of Ecuadorian women had suffered abuse in some form during their lives. Ecuadorian NGOs documented 274 femicides in 2024, including 126 cases involving intimate partners, family members, or sexual violence.

Adults and children are sometimes subjected to forced labor and sexual exploitation in Ecuador; Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian people, as well as migrants and refugees, remain most vulnerable.

The government has taken some action to address the problem of economic exploitation, including by increasing human trafficking–related law enforcement operations. However, services for victims are inadequate, and some public officials believed to be complicit in trafficking operations have escaped punishment.