The National Assembly elects both the president and the prime minister, meaning the democratic legitimacy of these votes rests largely on the fairness of parliamentary elections. The president’s duties are mainly ceremonial, but they may influence appointments and return legislation for further consideration before signing it into law. The president is limited to a maximum of two terms.

The 2022 parliamentary elections were deemed severely flawed by observer missions, which noted that the rules were administered to advantage the Fidesz–Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) ruling coalition. In 2022, Fidesz parliamentarians elected Katalin Novák, a former minister and legislator, as the first woman president of Hungary. Novák resigned in February 2024 after it emerged that she had pardoned a man convicted of covering up sexual abuse in a state-run children’s home. The parliament elected Fidesz-nominated candidate Tamás Sulyok, then president of the Constitutional Court, as Novák’s successor later that month without the support of the opposition.

The prime minister holds most executive power. Viktor Orbán has been prime minister since 2010, winning reelection for a third time in the flawed 2022 elections.

Voters elect representatives every four years to a 199-seat, unicameral National Assembly under a mixed system of proportional and direct representation (106 from single-member districts and 93 from compensatory party lists). The Fidesz–KDNP coalition won the 2022 parliamentary elections with 54.13 percent of the vote, securing a fourth consecutive term and a two-thirds majority with 135 seats. The coalition of opposition parties, United for Hungary, took 57 seats, and the far-right Our Homeland (Mi Hazánk) won 6 seats.

An election observation mission performed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) found that the elections were well organized and professionally managed, but they failed to provide a level playing field and equality of opportunities among candidates. Significant media bias towards ruling parties and the misuse of state resources hindered voters’ ability to make informed choices. The OSCE/ODIHR report emphasized the lack of effective legal remedy against irregularities, as electoral authorities ruled mostly in favor of the Fidesz–KDNP coalition, and noted several legal changes in recent years that may have impacted the election’s outcome. Human Rights Watch (HRW) found that the government misused personal data in several ways to disseminate Fidesz campaign messages. Other civil society organizations documented a series of attempts at electoral fraud, and independent media revealed evidence that postal ballots in Romania and Serbia were potentially tampered with by Fidesz allies.

Both European Parliament (EP) and Hungary’s municipal elections were held in June 2024. Voter turnout for both polls, which were held on the same day, was strong. In the municipal elections, Orbán’s Fidesz won majorities in all 19 counties’ assemblies, and took 15 of 25 mayorships. Notably, the Fidesz-backed candidate lost the mayoral election in Budapest. Additionally, although Fidesz won 44 percent of the vote and 11 seats in the European Parliament—down from its previous 13—the vote marked the party’s worst-ever performance in an EU election. The EP election was characterized not by the Fidesz victory, but rather by the strong performance of the opposition, led by former Fidesz insider Péter Magyar and his Tisza (Respect and Freedom) party. Tisza ultimately received nearly one-third of the votes in the European Parliament election, taking 7 seats.

The electoral framework that was established by the Fidesz–KDNP majority has been amended regularly based on the political interest of the ruling coalition, and since 2010 Fidesz has redrawn constituency boundaries in its favor. In November 2024, Fidesz introduced electoral amendments that, among other things, would redraw electoral districts to reduce the number of constituencies in opposition-friendly Budapest and make it easier to request postelection vote recounts. The amendments were passed by the National Assembly in December.

Electoral authorities are not independent. Members of the National Election Commission (NVB) are nominated by the president and confirmed to nine-year terms by the parliament. There is no formal parliamentary debate or public consultation process to inform the selection of NVB members, and observers have raised concerns about the body’s impartiality.

In recent years, Orbán’s government has been largely successful in superseding impartiality requirements. Voters living outside Hungary are not guaranteed equal access to vote, and national minority voters have long faced systemic challenges in exercising their right to vote.

Political parties can organize legally, but they face some practical impediments to garnering popular support. Opposition parties are disadvantaged by the politicized distortion of the advertising market, including the market for the country’s many billboards.

Individual politicians face smear campaigns in progovernment media outlets, and the government has taken steps to split the opposition vote in recent elections. Authorities have also interfered with opposition figures’ peaceful political activities, and some opposition politicians have faced politicized prosecution.

In 2024, the government repeatedly tried to discredit prominent opposition leader and former Fidesz insider Péter Magyar. Despite such attempts, Magyar built a reputation as a serious challenger to the Orbán government during the year, and his Tisza party received nearly one-third of the votes in the June 2024 European Parliament election.

Since 2020, political parties have been required to field candidates in 71 (instead of the previous 27) single-member constituencies on a single list, forcing opposition parties to combine and field one consolidated list of candidates in the 2022 general elections. The government maintains effective control of the State Audit Office (ÁSZ), which monitors campaign activities and party spending. In recent years, the ÁSZ has imposed sanctions on opposition parties for financial irregularities, while condoning or overlooking problematic spending of state subsidies by Fidesz.

Fidesz has dominated the political landscape since the 2010 election. Opposition parties faced significant obstacles and restrictions that detracted from their ability to gain power in the 2022 elections, despite banding together to present one unified slate of candidates. These included unequal access to media, smear campaigns by progovernment media outlets, politicized audits, and a campaign environment skewed by the ruling coalition’s mobilization of state resources. The OSCE found a pervasive overlap between ruling coalition resources and government resources. Third-party spending, especially in social media, also strongly benefitted the ruling coalition.

The government used similar tactics to garner support ahead of the June 2024 European Parliament and local elections. Following the June local elections, which saw opposition candidates defeat Fidesz incumbents in several municipalities, the government and outgoing Fidesz mayors took steps to reassign responsibilities and reallocate financial resources away from the municipalities won by the opposition.

Individuals are largely able to participate in public affairs without encountering undue influence over their political choices. However, Fidesz has increasingly harnessed its members’ political and economic power to sideline opposition groups and prevent them from presenting a meaningful challenge to its dominant position. The 2022 OSCE observation mission stressed recurring concerns of illegal practices that typically affect Roma, including vote buying and stigmatizing campaign rhetoric.

Women are underrepresented in political life. Only 30 of 199 National Assembly members are women, and as of June 2024, no women served in cabinet positions. Ruling party ministers and progovernment media occasionally make derogatory and sexist remarks toward women parliamentarians. In 2024, two of Hungary’s most prominent women politicians, the president and the justice minister, were forced to resign in response to the child-abuse pardon scandal.

Hungary’s constitution guarantees the right of ethnic minority populations to form self-governing bodies, and all 13 recognized minorities have done so. Minorities can also register to vote for special minority lists—with a preferential vote threshold—in parliamentary elections. Minorities without a parliamentary mandate can send a “national minority advocate” to the parliament without voting rights.

Roma have long been underrepresented in politics and government and have been the target of derogatory rhetoric from Fidesz members in recent years.

Though individual opposition politicians have openly supported equal rights for LGBT+ people, and the party Momentum has done so explicitly, LGBT+ people’s interests are not successfully represented in the parliament.

The governing coalition is effectively able to draft and implement laws and policies at will. Fidesz continues to dominate governance through a parliamentary supermajority acquired by means of elections that were not fully competitive. Prime Minister Orbán, the party’s leader, exerts considerable influence over the legislature. The ability of the opposition to check government activities remains limited.

Lawmakers’ behavior in the National Assembly has been restricted in several ways. The speaker of the National Assembly has disciplined and fined opposition lawmakers for occupying the lectern and bringing signs onto the floor.

In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government declared a “state of danger” and passed the widely denounced Authorization Act, conferring sweeping emergency powers to the executive, which it has used without accountability to restrict civil liberties unrelated to public health or safety. This COVID-19 emergency legal regime enabled the government to rule by decree and was prolonged several times until November 2022, when the government declared another state of danger related to the Russia-Ukraine war. The order remained in force throughout 2024. The government continued to misuse its emergency power to regulate issues unrelated to the war.

Corruption remains a problem in Hungary, and instances of high-level government corruption have not been properly investigated. Fidesz has established control over auditing and investigative bodies, including the ÁSZ. The new Sovereignty Defense Office, established in early 2024, harassed anticorruption organizations and investigative media with frivolous and arbitrary investigations during the year.

Prosecutors have been reluctant to investigate long-standing allegations of the misuse of public development funds disbursed by the European Union (EU), despite the severity of the problem. Although the government has adopted a series of anticorruption measures in recent years, anticorruption bodies have only been granted limited power to investigate and suspend ongoing public procurement processes. In December 2024, the EU announced that Hungary had been denied €1.04 billion ($1.08 billion) in EU funding for rule of law breaches, including failing to implement sufficient anticorruption reforms.

In March, opposition leader Péter Magyar leaked a recording in which his ex-wife, former justice minister Judit Varga, implicated prominent government officials, including Orbán’s cabinet chief, Antal Rogán, in the manipulation of evidence in a high-level corruption case. Varga had resigned as justice minister in February following public backlash against the 2023 pardoning of a man convicted of covering up the sexual abuse of children.

Hungary’s Freedom of Information Act contains numerous exemptions and is inconsistently enforced. In many cases, information is only made available because of litigation, but the implementation of the judgments is still insufficient. A narrow legal definition of what constitutes public funds hampers oversight of large amounts of public money.

Major legislation is frequently rushed through the parliament, leaving citizens and interest groups little time to provide feedback or criticism. Important proposals are hidden in long omnibus bills, and the government tends to submit substantial bills overnight, or just before the final vote takes place. The government continues to use manipulative “national consultations” and billboard campaigns to spread government propaganda and feed anti–EU sentiment.

Journalists face arbitrary restrictions on movement and recording while covering parliamentary events, often preventing them from performing their duties.

The constitution protects freedom of the press, but Fidesz has undermined this guarantee. While privately owned opposition-aligned media outlets exist, national, regional, and local media are dominated by progovernment outlets, which are frequently used to smear political opponents and highlight false accusations. Government advertising and sponsorships favor progovernment outlets, leaving independent and critical news sources in a financially precarious position.

The Fidesz governing coalition and their allies have worked to close or acquire many critical media outlets. The Sovereignty Defense Office, established in February 2024, has repeatedly targeted independent journalists and media outlets with spurious claims that the outlets were serving foreign interests. In recent years, Hungarian authorities have reportedly used the Israeli-made spyware, Pegasus, to surveil independent journalists. Some independent journalists and media outlets are regularly prevented from attending government press conferences.

Public service media controlled by the government has disseminated disinformation and Russian war propaganda since the Russian military’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. During 2024, the newly formed Sovereignty Defense Office spuriously accused independent media outlets of spreading disinformation and so-called Western prowar narratives about the war in Ukraine.

Since 2010, Fidesz has gradually taken over artistic and cultural institutions and film and publishing industries and redirected funding for projects and artworks openly promoting nationalistic and Christian values. Following a government resolution, in July 2024, several previously independent museums were brought under the supervision of a single office with the goal of “strengthening Hungarian identity.” In recent years, booksellers have been heavily fined for selling young adult novels that include LGBT+ content without wrapping the books in plastic—deemed a violation of a 2021 law banning the “display or promotion” of LGBT+ content to minors.

The constitution guarantees religious freedom and provides for the separation of church and state, though these guarantees were weakened in the 2011 version of the constitution, the preamble of which makes direct references to Christianity. Constitutional amendments enacted in 2018 and 2020 reinforced those references, obliging all state organs to protect “Christian culture” and guaranteeing children’s right to education based on Christian values.

The government has led xenophobic campaigns in recent years, often with anti-Muslim sentiment.

The Fidesz-led government has maintained its efforts to bring schools and universities under close supervision. A gradual overhaul of the public education system raised concerns about excessive government influence on school curriculums, and the parliament has restructured institutions and their finances to increase government-appointed chancellors’ powers. Authorities have increasingly threatened the academic autonomy of well-established institutions, pulling support, interfering in their affairs, and landing progovernment supporters in leading positions.

The government has revoked accreditation from all gender studies programs.

Progovernment media outlets commonly target activists, academics, programs, and institutions, often by calling them “Soros agents,” referring to Hungarian-born financier and philanthropist George Soros. Fidesz has targeted specific institutions by changing the requirements for operating universities in Hungary and by interfering in the appointment of universities’ governing bodies. In 2023, the European Commission announced that it had suspended the rights of 21 universities managed by Fidesz-controlled boards to participate in the EU’s Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe programs until the risk of executive interference with university autonomy was reduced. The suspension remained in place at year-end 2024.

During 2024, the government took steps to centralize the national research funding system, which critics fear will result in “more centralized, opaque, and potentially arbitrary” decisions on funding. The government also continued to push for the “privatization” of state universities, intended to replace public management of the institutions with government-appointed boards of trustees.

While freedom of expression is constitutionally protected, ongoing efforts to sideline voices and perspectives that authorities find unfavorable, including many found at academic institutions, NGOs, and media outlets, have discouraged open criticism of the government and other politically sensitive speech.

Human rights groups have also raised concerns that provisions in the 2023 Sovereignty Defense Law can be used to intimidate and arbitrarily silence people who express criticism of the government.

In 2021, an investigation by a team of international journalists revealed that journalists, businesspeople, lawyers, and politicians were the targets of secret surveillance conducted with the Israeli-made spyware, Pegasus. The Hungarian government has failed to fully execute European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) rulings to incorporate effective institutional guarantees against improper surveillance.

The constitution provides for freedom of assembly, and the government has generally respected this right in practice. Police have at times used disproportionate force to disperse demonstrations.

Numerous large protests against the Orbán government were held during 2024, including in May, ahead of the national and EU parliamentary elections. In October, thousands of protesters gathered to condemn government constraints on press freedom, denouncing the state broadcaster as a pro-Fidesz “propaganda factory” and calling for an independent public media service.

In 2023, Hungarian authorities also prevented pro-Palestinian rallies from being held following an intervention by Prime Minister Orbán, who called the rallies “pro-terror demonstrations.”

NGOs whose activities conflict with government priorities have come under continued pressure since Fidesz took power. Fidesz has instituted burdensome registration and reporting requirements for NGOs, and police have illegally raided NGO offices. Civil society organizations are required to submit to yearly financial audits by the ÁSZ should they report donations of more than €55,000 (approximately $59,000).

The government continues to stigmatize NGOs as “foreign agents” or “Soros agents,” and frequently scapegoats them for developments unfavorable to the government or deemed unpopular in the eyes of the public. Organizations assisting asylum seekers have also been subject to Hungary’s “Stop Soros” laws, which heavily restricted the right to asylum and criminalized activities supporting asylum seekers. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in 2021 that the “Stop Soros” laws violated EU law, but 2022 amendments to the criminal code continue to threaten NGOs that assist asylum seekers with sanctions on vaguely defined grounds.

The new Sovereignty Defense Office, which began operating in early 2024, has extensive, vaguely defined powers to investigate and report on any activity suspected of serving foreign interests and capable of violating or endangering “the sovereignty of Hungary.” NGOs have condemned the 2023 Sovereignty Defense Law, which created the body, as an attempt to harass, intimidate, and silence activists and groups who criticize the government. In June, the office launched an investigation against Transparency International (TI) Hungary, and in October, announced that the investigation had found that TI Hungary had engaged in “political activity disguised as civic action.” TI condemned the allegations, saying that the findings contained “baseless assumptions,” “factual mistakes,” and “serious distortions.”

In February, the EU opened an infringement procedure against Hungary over the Sovereignty Defense Law, arguing that it violates numerous provisions of EU law. The European Commission later filed a lawsuit with the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in October, saying that the Hungarian government had not satisfactorily addressed the grievances it had initially laid out.

Workers’ rights to form associations and bargain collectively are generally recognized, but the 2012 Labor Code weakened the position of trade unions by curtailing their rights. There are significant limitations on what can be considered a lawful strike, and the government has successfully blocked efforts to organize strikes in recent years. Union membership is low, trade unions are present in less than 25 percent of workplaces, and only 7 percent of workers belong to one.

In 2022, teachers’ unions organized strikes across the country demanding higher salaries and lightened workloads in public education. The government responded by seriously curtailing the right to strike in schools and eliminating teachers’ public servant status. Protesting teachers were threatened with sanctions by their employers, and many of them were dismissed.

Judicial independence remains a matter of concern. Rulings in recent years on politically sensitive cases have favored government interests. High-ranking government officials and progovernment media berate judgments that are detrimental to Fidesz’s interests and regularly launch attacks against judges who publicly speak up against measures threatening judicial independence. Judicial reforms passed in 2023 included provisions that strengthened the independence of the Supreme Court, but observers have expressed concern about whether the reforms will do so in practice.

Significant powers are vested in the president of the National Judicial Office (NJO), while the powers of the judicial self-governing body, the National Judicial Council (NJC), which supervises the president of the NJO, were relatively weak. In 2023, the government adopted a large-scale judicial reform—required to access frozen EU funds—which, among other things, entrusted the NJC with stronger powers intended to counterbalance the powers of the NJO. However, the election of new NJC members in early 2024 featured several irregularities, including considerable political and administrative pressure on the judiciary to choose specific electors and NJC members.

In April 2024, the parliament passed a legislative amendment that provides the justice minister with unlimited access to judicial and prosecutorial decisions, including protected information that the state would not otherwise be able to access, creating the risk of government interference in the outcomes of such decisions.

Low salaries and wage stagnation for judicial employees have increased the judiciary’s susceptibility to government interference. In 2024, the Ministry of Justice offered to increase judicial officials’ salaries in return for the judicial leadership’s agreement to government-proposed reforms. The NJC, NJO, and Curia agreed to the controversial proposal in November, prompting condemnation from hundreds of judges, who said that the agreement reduced judicial independence. In December, the president of the NJC resigned over widespread criticism of his decision to sign off on the reforms.

Due process rights are enshrined in the constitution and are generally respected. However, Hungarian courts have shown some resistance to European judicial oversight on due process matters.

Although staffing issues and a backlog of pending cases sometimes cause delays, the justice system is generally efficient. Litigation costs are relatively high, while access to legal aid is limited. There have been concerns about the quality of lawyers appointed for defendants who are unable or unwilling to retain legal counsel on their own.

Physical abuse by police is a problem, and there are systematic deficiencies in reporting, indicting, investigating, and sanctioning such conduct. Inadequate medical care and poor sanitation in the country’s prisons and detention centers remain problems.

The rights of refugees and asylum seekers are routinely violated in Hungary, where frequent changes to asylum policy—including the uncontestable declaration, by law, of Serbia as a safe third country—and the construction of barriers along the country’s southern border made it nearly impossible for individuals to apply for asylum and receive protection. Despite European court rulings and in breach of EU law, the government has failed to discontinue the practice of “pushbacks,” or the removal of asylum seekers to Serbia. In the past, asylum seekers were frequently detained in poorly equipped transit zones, and few were recognized by Hungarian authorities as refugees.

In 2020, the CJEU ruled that Hungarian asylum procedures were incompatible with EU law, and placing asylum seekers in the transit zones constituted unlawful detention. The government subsequently closed the transit zones but passed legislation requiring asylum seekers to present their documentation at diplomatic missions in other countries. Although the CJEU found this “embassy procedure” to be in violation of EU law in 2023, no substantial changes were made, and in June 2024, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) fined Hungary €200 million ($216 million) for deliberately failing to reform its asylum system. The government has ignored the ruling, missing two deadlines for paying the fine, and the regulation remained in force at year-end 2024. The European Commission has taken steps to withhold the €200 million fine from Hungary’s portion of the EU budget.

While the country’s southern borders are closed to asylum seekers, the government has opened Hungary’s eastern borders for those fleeing Ukraine, reflecting its discriminatory migration policies. Hungary has provided temporary protection status for Ukrainian citizens. However, a new decree enacted in breach of EU law in August 2024 canceled housing benefits for Ukrainian refugees who fled from places outside of what Hungarian authorities have deemed “war-torn areas,” leaving thousands without housing. The decree disproportionately affected women and children, as well as ethnic Roma.

Anti-immigration rhetoric is frequently deployed by the government. New immigration legislation enacted during 2024 gradually tightened the employment regulations for so-called guest workers from certain countries outside of the EU. Other legislation changes, however, made it easier for citizens of Russia and Belarus to gain residence in Hungary, prompting criticism from EU leaders, who fear that the scheme poses significant security risks for Europe.

Roma are Hungary’s largest ethnic minority and face widespread discrimination, societal exclusion, violence, and poverty. Roma students continue to be illegally segregated or improperly placed in schools for children with mental disabilities.

Women in Hungary are subject to employment discrimination and tend to be underrepresented in high-level business positions.

The Fidesz government has been increasingly and openly discriminatory toward many groups, but particularly LGBT+ people. In 2020, the parliament voted to end the legal recognition of gender identity, passed a law that severely restricts same-sex couples’ ability to adopt children, and declared that the legal parents of a child are a woman and a man. Senior Fidesz politicians, the government, and government-aligned media use anti–LGBT+ rhetoric extensively, often conflating homosexuality and expressions of gender identity with pedophilia. A 2021 law banned the discussion of gender and sexual diversity in schools, the media, advertising, and other public places.

Antisemitism persists in Hungary, and the government’s anti-Soros campaigns pander to individuals with those sentiments. In 2021, the Equal Treatment Authority—one of Hungary’s most effective institutional mechanisms to fight discrimination—was abolished. Its powers were transferred to the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, whose independence and effectiveness is highly questionable.

There are no significant restrictions on Hungarians’ freedom of travel or their ability to change their place of residence or employment.

Individuals have the right to own property and establish private businesses. However, the success of a business is somewhat dependent upon its owner’s government connections. Businesspeople whose activities are not in line with the financial or political interest of the government are likely to face harassment and intimidation, and are subject to increasing administrative pressure for a possible takeover.

The government has at times intervened to remove or reduce legal barriers and unduly favor industries and investments important to its economic policies. Foreign companies operating in Hungary, including multinational food retailer SPAR, have encountered excessive regulatory burdens and government pressure. In 2024, members of SPAR’s leadership claimed that officials close to Prime Minister Orbán had implied that giving the Hungarian government a stake in the company would ease such pressure; Orbán has denied these claims.

The constitution defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman. LGBT+ individuals are allowed to pursue civil unions.

In 2020, the National Assembly ended the legal recognition of gender identity for transgender people. As a result of the Ninth Amendment of the Fundamental Law, the constitution now stipulates that “the mother is a woman, the father is a man,” and “Hungary protects the right of children to self-identify in line with their birth sex.” Furthermore, the law effectively limits the right to adoption only to married couples, excluding single people and unmarried partners—among them same-sex couples—from this right.

Domestic violence and spousal rape are illegal, but the definition of rape hinges on the use of force or coercion, not on lack of consent. NGOs describe government responses to violence against women as inadequate.

Though the constitution defines life as beginning from conception, the statutory regime makes abortion broadly available.

Hungary is a transit point, source, and to a lesser extent, destination for trafficked persons, including women trafficked for prostitution. Prevention, coordination efforts, and processes to identify and support victims remain inadequate, while trafficking investigations and enforcement of relevant laws are unreliable.