The president is the chief of state and head of government and is elected by popular vote to four-year terms. Only a plurality is necessary to win the office; there is no runoff.

Following severe irregularities in the 2017 presidential election, the National Congress created two new electoral bodies in 2019, the Electoral Court of Justice (TJE) and the National Electoral Council (CNE).

In November 2021—and in the first presidential contest administered by the TJE and CNE—Xiomara Castro Sarmiento of the left-wing Libre was elected with 51.1 percent of the vote, ending 12 years of PN executive control. Castro, the country’s first female president, was elected amid high voter turnout and was inaugurated in January 2022.

Members of the 128-seat unicameral National Congress are elected for four-year terms using proportional representation by department. All seats are renewed in each election.

In the November 2021 polls, Libre won 50 seats, the PN won 44, the PL won 22, and the Savior Party of Honduras (PSH) won 10. The Christian Democratic Party (PDCH) and the Anticorruption Party (PAC) each won 1. The legislative and municipal contests were competitive but were also marred by severe political violence; at least 68 candidates were murdered in the run-up to the elections.

The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) came under heavy criticism for its administration of the 2017 presidential poll, which prompted protests and allegations of TSE incompetence and pro-PN bias. In 2019, the National Congress created the TJE and the CNE to replace it. The 2021 elections benefited from an electoral law passed that year, which incorporated several reforms to improve public trust and encourage stability and transparency in the electoral process.

Political parties are free to operate. While power has mostly been concentrated in the hands of the PL and the PN since democratization in the early 1980s, party politics in Honduras shifted in the 2010s. In 2013, Libre and the PAC participated in elections for the first time. Six parties won National Congress seats in 2021.

In 2021, the PN was ousted from the presidency for the first time in 12 years by President Castro. The PN also lost its congressional majority. Although opposition parties were affected by acts of political violence and electoral irregularities favoring the PN, they remained competitive.

Elites have traditionally exerted significant influence over political parties, limiting people’s political choices. The military remains politically powerful. Gangs, many with ties to drug trafficking, also sway decisions at the national and subnational levels.

Political violence is widespread and includes harassment, threats, and intimidation directed at candidates, politicians, and voters, especially women. Members of Libre-affiliated colectivos have physically attacked opposition members in legislative debates and rallies.

Adult citizens have the right to vote. Ethnic minorities, the LGBT+ population, and women, however, remain politically underrepresented, though political parties must abide by a 40 percent gender quota for their slates of congressional candidates. Some 27.3 percent of the National Congress’s seats are held by women, the highest figure Honduras has seen in the 21st century.

Under measures adopted since 2014, power has been consolidated in the executive branch. The military, which has traditionally maintained substantial autonomy from civilian oversight, has played an increasing role in both internal security and programs unrelated to security.

The state of emergency introduced in 2022 was sometimes implemented without legislative oversight. In a report released in July 2024 and covering events in 2023, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) noted three occasions where emergency-related decrees did not receive legislative ratification.

Concerns persist over the political influence that President Castro’s husband, former President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, and other members of the Zelaya family wield. In a 2023 report, the National Anticorruption Council (CNA), a nongovernmental organization (NGO), noted that relatives of President Castro had received posts within the cabinet, National Congress, and Supreme Court.

The government moved to limit legislators’ ability to determine policy in 2023, as the National Congress was deadlocked over the appointment of a new attorney general and deputy attorney general. That November, a Libre-dominated committee appointed Johel Zelaya Álvarez and Mario Morazán Aguilera to those posts on an interim basis, a move that opposition parties denounced. In February 2024, Libre, the PN, and the PL reached an agreement allowing Attorney General Zelaya to remain at his post, while the PL’s Marcio Cabañas Cadillo succeeded Morazán as deputy attorney general. The three parties also split appointments for several other governmental bodies.

President Castro’s immediate predecessor, Juan Orlando Hernández, was directly implicated in corruption in 2019 when US prosecutors identified him and former President Porfirio Lobo as coconspirators in a drug-smuggling operation run by Hernández’s brother. Hernández was arrested by police in Honduras in 2022 and was extradited to face drug trafficking and arms charges in the United States. Hernández was convicted in March and received a 45-year prison sentence in June.

In August 2024, the government said that it would end its extradition treaty with the United States after Laura Dogu, the US ambassador to Honduras, criticized a meeting between the Honduran and Venezuelan defense ministers. The government announced its decision days before Carlos Zelaya Rosales admitted to meeting with drug traffickers in 2013.

In 2022, the Castro administration and the United Nations agreed to a memorandum of understanding on creating the UN-backed International Commission Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (CICIH), but negotiations remained ongoing at the end of 2024. The administration shared an updated draft agreement on the CICIH in September.

In January 2024, the Contracorriente news site reported that inauthentic accounts on social media targeted the CNA and its chief, Gabriela Castellanos, whenever it issued reports examining official corruption under Hernández and Castro. The news outlet also reported that figures close to the Castro administration had shared some of the content.

Government operations are generally opaque. Journalists and interest groups have difficulty obtaining information from the government. The Castro administration adopted some measures to foster transparency. The 2014 Hernández-era secrecy law, which was perceived as a vehicle for official corruption, was repealed in 2022. Also in 2022, legislators passed a law to improve transparency in the nomination of Supreme Court justices, although it was criticized for favoring the interests of political parties.

Legislators additionally repealed a law that created Areas of Employment and Economic Development (ZEDEs), which were meant to attract investment but prompted fears that they would facilitate corrupt activities, in 2022. In September 2024, the Supreme Court ruled that the ZEDEs were unconstitutional.

In March 2024, Contracorriente reported that legislators were receiving grants to fund social projects. While a Libre legislator told the outlet that the subsidies were disclosed through a public transparency portal, Contracorriente reported the opposite was true.

Politicians have maintained undisclosed ties to drug traffickers. In September 2024, the InSight Crime outlet reported on a secretly recorded video in which drug traffickers had offered financial support to Libre in 2013. Carlos Zelaya Rosales, President Castro’s brother-in-law and secretary of the National Congress when the footage was released, had attended that meeting. In the video, traffickers also discussed their support for former President Zelaya. Secretary Zelaya resigned his post in late August—saying he “fell into a trap” by attending the meeting—ahead of the video’s release. José Manuel, Carlos’s son then–defense minister, also resigned.

Authorities systematically violate the constitution’s press freedom guarantees. Reporters and outlets covering sensitive topics or who are perceived as critical of the authorities risk assaults, threats, blocked transmissions, and harassment. Journalists have access to a protection mechanism that also supports human rights defenders and justice officials, but that mechanism is ineffective. Journalists increasingly self-censor despite the existence of that mechanism.

The National Commissioner for Human Rights in Honduras (CONADEH) recorded 97 violent deaths of media workers between 2001 and 2023 and reported that most of those cases had gone unresolved. In January 2024, journalist Luis Alonso Teruel of Pecaligüe TV was shot and killed in the town of Atima. Pecaligüe TV’s owner asserted that Alonso’s death was linked to a story on deforestation he had produced.

Religious freedom is generally respected in Honduras.

Criminal groups undermine academic freedom, as they control all or parts of schools in some areas and subject staff to extortion schemes. Authorities sometimes move to suppress student demonstrations by arresting participants and dispersing the events, and violent clashes between police and student protesters sometimes occur.

Under the 2011 Special Law on Interception of Private Communications, the government can intercept online and telephone messages. Violence, threats, and intimidation by state and nonstate actors curtail open and free private discussion among the general population.

Freedom of assembly is constitutionally protected. In late 2022, the Castro administration enacted a state of emergency in response to gang-related violence. The state of emergency, which was still in effect in 2024, restricted the right to assemble in some areas.

Under the 2011 Special Law on Interception of Private Communications, the government can intercept online and telephone messages. Violence, threats, and intimidation by state and nonstate actors curtail open and free private discussion among the general population and the press. NGOs and their staff, especially in the human rights and environmental fields, often face significant threats, including harassment, surveillance, and smear campaigns aimed at undermining their work.

In September 2024, Juan López, an environmental activist and Libre councilor, was murdered. The OHCHR called his murder “part of a series of attacks, intimidation, and criminalisation” against the Municipal Committee for the Defense of Common and Public Goods, the NGO to which he belonged.

Labor unions are well organized and can strike. In the past, labor actions have resulted in clashes with security forces. The change in government temporarily decreased tensions with unions since many have ties with Libre.

Political and business elites exert excessive influence over the judiciary, including the Supreme Court. Judicial appointments are made with little transparency, judges have been removed from their posts for political motivations, and several lawyers have been killed in recent years.

While legislators limited prosecutorial access to financial information in cases of corruption in 2021, the National Congress has since legislated to increase prosecutorial powers in line with a 2022 memorandum of understanding on the creation of the CICIH. Legislators annulled three laws that had limited prosecutors’ access to documents and restricted their ability to pursue cases involving financial impropriety in 2023.

A law establishing new guidelines for the Nominating Board for the Supreme Court (JNCS) and limiting its discretionary power was passed in 2022. In 2023, the JNCS produced a list of candidates based on merit. Legislators selected a 15-member bench from the JNCS list that February but selected them on a partisan basis; six came from Libre, five from the PN, and four from the PL.

The lack of due process is a serious issue in Honduras. The judiciary and law enforcement agencies are often compromised and underfunded. As such, they are corrupt, targets of influence peddling and undue influence, and often engage in criminal activities.

In late 2022, President Castro announced a “war against extortion” and passed a state of emergency suspending constitutionally protected rights, which remained in place as of December 2024. In its July report on human rights in Honduras, the OHCHR warned that the state of emergency represented a threat to due process and said that unlawful arrests had been associated with it. The OHCHR also noted allegations that authorities planted evidence and searched homes without a warrant under the state of emergency.

The homicide rate has declined in recent years, but violent crime and gang violence remain serious problems and have prompted large-scale internal displacement and migration. In response to widespread violence, the Hernández administration empowered the Military Police of Public Order (PMOP) and other security forces to combat security threats, and that policy has continued under President Castro.

In its July 2024 report on human rights in Honduras, the OHCHR said seven potential enforced disappearances, five extrajudicial killings, and several cases of torture or other mistreatment were connected to the state of emergency.

Lands inhabited by Indigenous and Afro-Honduran people are particularly vulnerable to expropriation for development projects without adequate prior consultation. Communities that contest such projects are unable to assert their rights effectively. Violence and discrimination against LGBT+ people and Indigenous and Garifuna populations persist at high levels.

Ongoing violence and impunity have reduced personal autonomy and freedom of movement. Those living in gang-controlled territories face extortion, and dangerous conditions limit free movement and options for education and employment. The 2022 state of emergency has curtailed constitutional rights, allowing authorities to restrict movement in areas covered by the declaration. When the state of emergency was extended in August 2024, it was in effect in 226 municipalities.

Corruption, crime, and gang activity inhibit the ability to conduct business activities freely and dissuade entrepreneurs from establishing new businesses. Taxi and bus drivers are notable targets of gangs.

Same-sex marriage remains illegal in Honduras, despite calls for reform from LGBT+ activists. A 2019 law banned same-sex couples from adopting children despite the objection of activists, who called the bill excessive and discriminatory.

Abortion is illegal in Honduras, including in cases of rape or incest, with criminal sanctions including imprisonment for those accused of terminating their pregnancies. In 2023, Castro used executive powers to legalize the use of emergency contraception for women.

Gender-based violence remains widespread and largely goes unpunished. Honduras has one of the world’s highest femicide rates, and these murders are rarely investigated. The Women’s Rights Center (CDM) reported 231 femicides in 2024.

Lack of socioeconomic opportunities combined with high levels of crime and violence limit social mobility for most Hondurans and exacerbate income inequality. Human trafficking remains a significant issue. Honduras is a source country for women and children forced into prostitution. Adults and children are also vulnerable to forced labor in agriculture, mining, and other sectors, and as domestic servants.