El Salvador’s president is directly elected for a five-year term. The constitution prohibits reelection, but in 2021 the government-controlled Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) paved the way for President Bukele to run for a second straight term. Bukele won by a landslide in the February 2024 election, garnering 84.7 percent of the vote, according to the TSE. Voter turnout was 52.6 percent. Manuel Flores of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) garnered 6.4 percent, followed by Joel Sánchez of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), with 5.6 percent.

In a report on the 2024 presidential and legislative elections, the Organization of American States Electoral Observation Mission (OAS/EOM) stressed that holding elections under states of emergency “can hinder their normal organization and functioning.” Furthermore, it noted “an atypical and inequitable electoral campaign,” and “deficiencies and bad practices that affected aspects of fairness and transparency of the elections.” It also cited delays in vote counting and instances of the NI intimidating observers and representatives of other parties.

Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 2 because President Nayib Bukele was permitted to run for a second consecutive term—banned in the constitution—and won in a flawed contest that involved significant irregularities.

El Salvador’s unicameral Legislative Assembly is elected for three years. In March 2023, the NI-controlled legislature repealed a ban on changing the electoral law within a year of elections; it then reduced the number of legislators from 84 to 60, modified the method for vote distribution to favor the largest party, and introduced overseas voting.

In the February 2024 legislative elections, held concurrently with the presidential election, the governing NI party won 54 of the 60 seats. Under the old method of vote distribution, it would have won 44 seats. ARENA and the National Coalition Party (PCN) won two seats each, with the remaining two seats going to smaller parties.

As in the presidential poll, the results reflected the popular will but the campaign environment heavily favored the NI, with violations including the use of significant state resources to favor the ruling party. The OAS/EOM also noted that political parties had inequitable access to state campaign funding. Further, the NI dominated the advertising environment, accounting for 98 percent of electoral messaging carried on television, radio, print media, billboards, and the internet, civil society organization Acción Ciudadana found.

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because legislative elections were held under conditions that heavily disadvantaged the opposition.

El Salvador’s electoral framework is designed by the legislature and administered by the TSE, both of which are controlled by the governing NI party.

In September 2021, the CSJ, dominated by unconstitutionally appointed magistrates allied with Bukele, ruled that the president may serve two consecutive terms, in violation of the constitution. The TSE ruled it would comply with the change and that its decision could not be appealed. In January 2023, the legislature introduced prison sentences of up to 15 years for “impeding or obstructing the inscription of candidacies” in elections, which was widely seen as a measure to intimidate critics of Bukele’s reelection.

In March 2023, the legislature repealed a ban on modifying the electoral system within a year of the next election. In June, the government pushed through major reforms, reducing the number of legislators from 84 to 60 and changing the voting system to favor the largest party. The reforms also reduced the number of municipalities from 262 to 44, thus eliminating many offices held by opposition members.

The OAS/EOM found these changes to be “at odds with internationally recognized best practices.” The mission stated that the NI held a “dominant position in the different critical stages of the electoral process, and, on occasion, over the electoral institutions” Furthermore, it found that the TSE “introduced inequities and distortions in the election process, while also fueling distrust in the electoral authority.” In a number of polling stations, the TSE had inadequate control over the organization of election officials, the final vote count, and the custody of ballots.

The OAS/EOM also expressed concern that complaints filed by opposition parties often received no meaningful response from the TSE. Meanwhile, neither the police nor prosecutors agreed to investigate the allegations against the TSE.

Salvadorans have traditionally been free to organize in different political parties or groupings. However, in 2021, politically motivated corruption charges resulted in raids on opposition party offices, and opposition figures were arrested or had arrest warrants issued against them. Those who were arrested remain in pretrial detention. Increasing political violence against women candidates, especially online, further disincentivizes political engagement.

The unconstitutional state of emergency instituted in March 2022 also serves to intimidate citizens—including politicians and party activists—and deters them from criticizing government policy and potentially corrupt practices, limiting the ability of opposition parties and candidates to effectively campaign ahead of the 2024 elections.

During the 2024 campaign, political parties had such difficulty accessing state funding that only 8.5 percent of funds were disbursed before the February elections. State funding for political parties is linked to election performance, and the near-elimination of opposition representation in the 2024 elections is expected to lead to further economic constraints on their ability to function.

Opposition parties are legally able to increase support and gain power through elections, but this is severely limited in practice. In the run-up to the 2024 elections, opposition parties faced extreme pressure from the government and were incapable of mounting any viable electoral alternative. Furthermore, the 2023 municipal and electoral reforms decreased the opposition’s opportunities to gain representation in elections. NI has also used state resources, including illegal surveillance technology, to undermine the opposition and the independent media. Several opposition politicians are in prison and others are in exile.

In the 2024 polls, President Bukele’s vote share rose from 53 to 85 percent, and the governing coalition’s share of legislators rose from 67 percent to 90 percent. Of the remaining legislators, three are allied with the government and only three are in opposition. NI also won at least 39 of the 44 mayors’ offices. As a result, the OAS/EOM concluded that the 2023 reforms “resulted in a drastic reduction in political pluralism.”

The mission also noted an increase in “political violence” against female candidates and journalists on social media during the 2024 election campaign.

Public funding for parties and election campaigning is calculated on the basis of their performance in the past election, meaning the opposition will receive severely reduced public funding ahead of the next elections, while funding for the NI will increase.

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 due to the surveillance and harassment of opposition parties, and the emergence of an unequal electoral environment that has made it very difficult for opposition parties to gain power through elections.

The OAS/EOM expressed concern that the ongoing state of emergency “results in self-censorship due to possible reprisals by the government,” limiting political participation and financial contributions to opposition parties.

High-level politicians from all major parties have been accused of links to organized crime. Journalists have regularly uncovered evidence of covert negotiations between the Bukele government and gang leaders, chiefly to rein in gang-related crimes in exchange for various concessions. A criminal investigation into the government’s negotiations was shut down when the government-controlled legislature replaced the attorney general in 2021.

All citizens have full political rights and electoral opportunities under the law, regardless of gender, ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation, but women and racial, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups are underrepresented in the legislature and in high-level government positions. Only around 18 percent of mayors elected in 2024 are women. The interests of LGBT+ and Indigenous peoples are poorly represented in practice.

The Bukele administration’s legislative supermajority since May 2021 enables it to swiftly rubber-stamp new laws and policies. The NI government routinely denies opposition legislators access to key information, including draft legislation, inhibiting substantial deliberation of proposed laws. The government also makes record use of legislative process waivers, which expedite most legislative proposals to a vote within hours of their submission to the legislature. Bukele has harassed lawmakers from other parties who criticize NI policies or officials.

The governing party dominates most public institutions, and the Bukele administration has co-opted other government bodies that might have served as a check on its power.

Corruption remains a problem in government, and anticorruption bodies and prosecutions have been systematically dismantled since 2020.

In August 2023, the legislature appointed new members to the Court of Accounts, which performs audits of the executive branch and public funds. At least some of the new members—including the court’s head—are tied to the governing party, in breach of a Constitutional Court verdict.

Alejandro Muyshondt, Bukele’s former national security advisor, became a whistleblower in mid-2023, accusing government officials of links with drug traffickers. He was swiftly arrested, and—after suffering physical abuse—died in state custody in February 2024.

The 2011 Access to Public Information Law instituted strong mechanisms for transparency and oversight of public institutions. While there have always been issues with compliance, government bodies have been far less transparent during the Bukele presidency. Executive and legislative decrees impinge on the independence of the oversight and enforcement body, the Access to Public Information Agency (IAIP), which is now governed by partisan commissioners.

Under the state of emergency that began in March 2022, the Bukele government removed administrative regulations on the use of public funds and state contracts. Furthermore, authorities restricted the right to access public information, impeding civil society’s ability to expose corrupt actors, and passed a law that enables authorities to manage public funds without adhering to the relevant law. NI has also never publicized the sources of their party and electoral funding, and no senior officials in the Bukele administration have disclosed their assets, as required by law.

Government officials continue to withhold information on expenditures, including the state’s investment of more than $100 million in Bitcoin, even amid widespread allegations and indications of corruption.

NI has routinely used its parliamentary supermajority to pass laws while providing minimal information to opposition lawmakers and the public. Government plans and expenditures are not publicly accessible, nor is basic information about the ongoing state of emergency, including the number of incarcerated persons.

Despite a vibrant media space and constitutional protections, journalists report that they self-censor because of the harassment that has followed critical coverage of corruption and public policy; some have left the country. Internet access is unrestricted, and online outlets are vital sources of independent reporting. However, most Salvadorans rely on social media and privately owned television and radio networks for news, and ownership in the broadcast sector is highly concentrated.

Disinformation campaigns are widespread and fomented by government-affiliated troll farms and media outlets, including ones set up and run by the Bukele government. Independent outlets have suffered cyberattacks, illegal wiretaps, and surveillance, and at least 35 Salvadoran journalists were targeted with Pegasus spyware in 2020 and 2021, allegedly by the government. In September 2024, news outlet Infobae reported that it had obtained recordings of top presidential officials planning electronic surveillance of journalists and politicians.

An October 2024 report by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) documented the use abusive lawsuits and audits to harass the press; restrictions on access to information; doxing and threats against journalists by Bukele and his supporters on social media, with female reporters facing severe harassment; and increasing self-censorship.

Religious freedom is widely respected by state and nonstate actors.

Academic freedom is largely respected, and the educational system is generally free from extensive political indoctrination. However, there is increasing self-censorship in the academic community when it comes to criticizing the government, its policies, or the governing party, amid concern over public or even legal backlash.

While private discussion and personal expression are generally free, the Bukele government uses illegal surveillance mechanisms as part of the state of emergency that began in March 2022. Authorities have used surveillance powers to arrest private individuals who criticize government figures or policy, discouraging open discussion of policy issues. Many Salvadorans link the firing of nearly 25,000 public servants since Bukele’s election in 2019 to expression of their views or their union involvement.

In a July 2024 survey, 85 percent of respondents identified some degree of probability that a person or institution may suffer negative consequences for expressing criticism of the government or the president; 54 percent reported some degree of fear of being intimidated or threatened for speaking about issues of national importance or the decisions of the government.

Freedom of assembly is generally upheld, and public protests and gatherings are permitted. However, the Bukele government has surveilled activists who organize such events, pushing citizens to refrain from participating due to fear of potential repercussions. The 2022 state of emergency suspended the right to free assembly, but this was reinstated in 2023. Demonstrations do take place, notably among the families of individuals swept up in mass arrests under the state of exception and among the nearly 25,000 public servants who have been fired by the Bukele government.

NGOs have historically operated freely and played an important role in society and policymaking. However, they have largely been excluded from engagement with policymakers under the Bukele government and are frequently attacked by the president and other officials over critical stances toward government policy or officials’ conduct.

The government targeted several nongovernmental human rights organizations using Pegasus spyware in 2020 and 2021, according to a January 2022 report. Under the state of emergency that began in March 2022, authorities have cracked down on programs that support the rehabilitation and reintegration of formerly incarcerated individuals.

Labor unions have long faced obstacles in a legal environment that favors business interests, including by giving only light penalties to employers who interfere with strikes. The law prohibits strikes in sectors deemed essential, a designation which is vaguely defined. The government has used the state of emergency in effect since March 2022 to threaten and arrest labor activists, especially those who work in state institutions.

Between 2019 and 2024, 18 unions were eliminated, and a total of 58 unions saw their members dismissed from their jobs despite their union membership. In 2024, several thousand workers lost their jobs due to mass layoffs and reorganizations in the public sector, where unions have been strongest, serving to undermine organized labor. Some public sector union organizers lost their jobs within days of taking part in demonstrations or criticizing the government.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to the harassment of labor activists and dismissal of union members under the state of emergency.

Judicial independence has long been under pressure, and the judicial system is hampered by corruption. Elected officials do not always observe judicial rulings and powerful individuals can evade justice by exerting pressure on the judiciary.

In the first session of the new legislature in May 2021, the government-aligned legislators removed all members of the CSJ’s Constitutional Chamber, as well as the prosecutor general. That August, President Bukele announced a “purge” of the judiciary, and days later the legislature passed measures to dismiss judges and prosecutors over 60 years old or who had more than 30 years of service, impacting one in three judges and numerous prosecutors.

The government unconstitutionally instituted a state of emergency in March 2022 and extended it on multiple occasions. The CSJ has failed to rule on the legality of the ongoing state of emergency, resolve habeas corpus petitions, or address thousands of human rights violations linked to the more than 83,000 arrests that authorities have carried out under the state of emergency. Criminal courts have broadly failed to act independently, and defiant judges have been removed.

Since the end of the civil war in 1992, due process rights have been constitutionally guaranteed but systematically violated. Human rights advocates report that police routinely carry out arbitrary arrests and fabricate and plant evidence, and defendants have long been provided inadequate access to effective legal counsel.

These long-standing challenges escalated sharply in March 2022, when the government instituted an indefinite state of emergency, leading to the arbitrary arrest of some 83,000 people accused of gang links. The government increased the maximum sentence for being gang leader to 45 years and for being a gang member to 30 years. The criminal procedural code was also amended to mandate pretrial detention for those charged with gang membership, homicide, and extortion, and to remove the limit on the duration of pretrial detention in these cases, effectively allowing unlimited incarceration without a conviction. The same changes apply to minors.

Authorities continue to impinge on the rights of people accused of crimes, and violate citizens’ right to privacy by allowing law enforcement to access and surveil their communications without a court order. In 2023, the legislature approved mass hearings and trials for those detained during the state of emergency, allowing courts to hear hundreds of cases at one time. Many accused of gang-related crimes have been placed in indefinite pretrial detention.

A July 2024 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report found that over 3,000 children had been arrested since the start of the state of emergency, many as part of indiscriminate sweeps and with little apparent connection to gangs’ illegal activities.

In September 2024, the government arbitrarily dismissed some 60 percent of public defenders, severely undermining the already limited capacity of the criminal defense system.

Crime and violence, which were long linked to gangs, remain issues of public concern. However, armed violence has declined sharply since mid-2019 due to alleged secret negotiations between the Bukele government and the country’s gangs. After agreements reportedly broke down in March 2022, the government implemented an ongoing state of emergency that has kept crime rates at historically low levels.

Under the state of emergency, the total number of incarcerated individuals has increased from 39,000 to more than 105,000, leading to acute overcrowding in prisons and gross violations of basic rights. People who are imprisoned are not allowed family visits and have limited access to lawyers. As of September 2024, local media and rights groups had documented 314 deaths in prison under the state of emergency, including four babies in prison with their mothers and 11 people who had been ordered released by the courts. Law enforcement officers largely enjoy impunity for abuses of power.

After the end of the civil war in 1992, citizens had access to some means of petition and redress against illegitimate use of physical force by authorities, although the process was flawed. Since 2022, however, the relevant institutions are controlled by the Bukele government and wholly ineffective in terms of protecting citizens, to such an extent that Salvadorans—especially youth—tend to restrict their movements in public space for fear of arbitrary harassment or arrest by the police or military.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because effective impunity for law enforcement officers, the absence of due process rights, and a lack of prison oversight have permitted the inhumane treatment of prisoners on a large scale.

Men and women are granted equal rights under the law, but women are often subject to discrimination. Indigenous people disproportionately face poverty, unemployment, and labor discrimination. Certain other populations, particularly internally displaced persons and LGBT+ people, also have inadequate access to the justice system. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is prevalent, and LGBT+ people are often the targets of hate crimes and violence, including by state security agents. In February 2024, the Bukele government banned the teaching of “gender ideology” in public schools.

While freedom of movement within El Salvador was long been complicated by gang activity, since the government implemented a state of emergency in March 2022, the degree of gang territorial control has dropped sharply. Conversely, certain population groups—especially young men—limit their movements, are internally displaced, or are exiled due to fear of police harassment or arbitrary arrest.

The rights to property and to start and run a business enjoy legal and regulatory protections. Since the mid-2000s, many businesses and citizens have been subject to extortion, chiefly by gangs. However, the state of emergency in effect since March 2022 vastly reduced the prevalence of extortion and gangs’ broader impact on the operating environment of businesses.

Political favoritism, cronyism, and bribes affect the awarding of state contracts.

Men and women have equal legal rights on matters such as marriage and divorce, and there are few formal restrictions on such decisions. However, same-sex couples are denied rights including marriage, adoption, and inheritance. Abortion is punishable by up to 40 years in prison for aggravated homicide, even in cases where an abortion was considered a component of life-saving care. Some women have been imprisoned despite credible claims that their pregnancies ended due to miscarriages.

The prevalence of adolescent pregnancy is a serious problem, accounting for approximately a third of all pregnancies, and many are the result of sexual assault. Female students with children often leave education, sometimes under pressure from their schools. Gender-based violence, including domestic violence, sexual violence, and femicide, is also common.

El Salvador remains a source, transit, and destination country for the trafficking of women, children, and LGBT+ people. There are instances of forced labor in the construction and informal sectors. According to the 2024 edition of the US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report, the government investigated and prosecuted more traffickers than in the previous reporting period, and stepped up assistance to victims. Legislation from 2019 introduced temporary residency rights to trafficking survivors, although there is no public information showing that anyone has been granted such rights.

Children are vulnerable to economic exploitation, with over 82,000 minors engaged in child labor, many of them under hazardous conditions in agriculture.