The president is directly elected to a four-year term. As part of a series of 2015 constitutional amendments, presidential reelection was eliminated.

No candidate garnered an outright majority in the first round of the 2022 election. Following a polarized runoff campaign, Gustavo Petro, the left-wing PH candidate, took 50.4 percent of the second-round vote. He defeated the former Bucaramanga mayor Rodolfo Hernández, who was backed by several leaders in then-President Iván Duque’s party, the Democratic Center (CD). Voter turnout reached 58 percent, the highest for presidential elections in nearly 25 years. The balloting was considered competitive and credible, and stakeholders accepted the results. Election observers logged sporadic reports of vote buying and other violations in both rounds.

Congress is composed of the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives, with all seats up for election every four years. The nation at large selects 100 Senate members via proportional representation; 2 additional members are chosen by Indigenous communities, 1 seat is awarded to the runner-up in the presidential election, and 5 were reserved in 2018 and 2022 for the FARC under the peace accord. Following the 2022 elections, the Chamber of Representatives featured 188 members: 162 were elected by proportional representation in multimember districts, 2 chosen by Afro-Colombian communities, 1 each by Indigenous and expatriate voters, 1 seat reserved for the runner-up vice presidential candidate, 5 seats reserved for the FARC, and 16 seats reserved for representatives of victims of the country’s internal conflict; the latter were instituted following an August 2021 law implementing a peace accord provision.

The March 2022 legislative elections were peaceful, though observers reported some irregularities and officials from multiple parties accused the electoral authorities of fraud, vote buying, and allowing candidacies by people with connections to organized crime figures. Independent observers deemed the polls and results credible. The PH won a plurality in the Senate, taking 20 seats, followed by the Conservative Party with 15 seats and the Liberal Party with 14. In the Chamber of Representatives, three parties won 21 or more seats, led by the Liberal Party with 32. In its second balloting as a legal party, the FARC took no seats aside from the five guaranteed to it in each chamber.

The legal framework generally allows for competitive balloting in practice, though the nine-member CNE—which oversees the conduct of the country’s elections, including the financing of political campaigns and the counting of votes—has faced criticism for ineffective enforcement of electoral laws, blamed in part on the partisan selection system for its members. An internal audit of the National Registry, Colombia’s election management body, found irregularities in ballot reporting during the 2022 legislative elections, but did not find evidence that fraud had occurred.

Colombia’s historically rigid two-party system has diversified in recent years. The CNE reported in June 2024 that there were 32 legally recognized parties in Colombia, up from 18 in 2018. Some were new, while others emerged following a series of court rulings that facilitated the relaunching of parties that had been active during Colombia’s armed conflict. The Council of State and other authorities legally deregistered at least 18 political organizations in recent years, mostly due to their failure to meet a minimum voter threshold.

Democratic transfers of power between rival parties are routine at the national level and in many regions, though significant areas remain under the long-term control of machine-style political clans with ties to organized crime. Following the 2022 presidential elections, opposition leader Gustavo Petro became Colombia’s first leftist president and his PH party left the congressional opposition to lead the new governing coalition. Numerous prominent politicians represent parties other than the PH and CD. Opposition parties and independent candidates also did well in local elections held in October 2023.

For decades, political violence and insecurity accompanied elections. However, recent elections have been peaceful and safe for most voters. In limited areas, activity by the ELN; the successors of previously disbanded right-wing paramilitary groups; “dissident” FARC members; and criminal gangs has continued to impair the ability of citizens to participate freely in the political process. From January to September 2024, the Electoral Observation Mission, a civil society organization, reported 395 instances of violence against political and community leaders, including 205 threats, 108 assassinations, 51 attacks, 27 kidnappings, and 2 disappearances.

Women enjoy equal political rights, and at least 30 percent of the candidates on party lists must be women. Women held 31.4 percent of the Senate and 29.4 percent of the Chamber of Representatives as of July 2024. Female representation at the local level slightly improved from the 2019 regional elections to the October 2023 cycle, though women remain underrepresented. Following the 2022 presidential elections, Francia Márquez became the first Afro-Colombian vice president and the second woman to hold the post. Congress has historically disregarded women’s issues, but in 2021 legislators passed several laws intended to improve social and economic conditions for women, including on issues of family violence and employment opportunity.

LGBT+ people’s rights are legally protected and LGBT+ politicians and civil leaders participate in the political process. However, LGBT+ representation is poor in rural areas and in zones where armed groups dominate. In May 2024, the Ombudsman’s Office reported that 59 violent incidents against LGBT+ political leaders required the intervention of the National Police, public prosecutors, or the National Protection Unit in 2023.

Lighter-skinned Colombians occupy a disproportionate share of government posts. The government has undertaken a series of steps to incorporate Indigenous and Afro-Colombian voices into national political debates, but issues affecting Afro-Colombians and Indigenous groups are rarely priorities in national policymaking.

Elected officials generally determine government policy without interference. However, the Colombian state has long struggled to establish a secure presence in all parts of its territory, meaning threats from guerrilla groups and criminal gangs can disrupt policymaking and implementation in some regions and localities.

Corruption occurs at multiple levels of public administration. Graft scandals have emerged in recent years within an array of federal agencies, but investigations can result in convictions, including against senior officials.

Major corruption scandals erupted in 2023, one of which involved President Petro’s son, Nicolás. That August, Nicolás admitted that he received funds for his father’s campaign from individuals suspected of wrongdoing, but denied accusations of money laundering and illicit enrichment. Prosecutors formally charged Nicolás in January 2024.

In January 2024, the CNE opened an investigation into whether the Colombian Federation of Education Workers had inappropriately donated funds to Human Colombia, a party affiliated with the PH, allowing Petro’s campaign to spend more than the campaign limit. In May, magistrates reported on alleged violations of campaign-finance rules on the part of the campaign. In October, the CNE voted to investigate Petro’s campaign. Petro denounced the investigation, calling it a “coup d’état.” The Council of State rejected an appeal from Petro’s lawyer on the CNE’s investigation in the interim, though it ruled that only Congress could sanction the president.

In February 2024, Petro appointed his former chief of staff, Laura Sarabia, to a new role in the president’s office, despite Sarabia having been investigated for abusing her power in her previous role in 2023. Sarabia was allegedly involved in the wiretapping of a nanny accused of stealing money from her apartment. In March 2024, Petro appointed Armando Benedetti, who was also implicated in that incident, as ambassador to the Food and Agriculture Organization. Benedetti left that post in November amid questions over his personal conduct, saying that he would again become an advisor to Petro.

Finance Minister Ricardo Bonilla was suspected of participating in a scheme where diverted funds from the country’s disaster-response unit. The funds were allegedly used to bribe legislators; several other ministers and officials were implicated in the scheme when a chamber of the Supreme Court published a report in November. Bonilla maintained his innocence when he resigned in December.

Government information is generally available to the public, including details about public contracting, though information related to military and security affairs, as well as criminal justice processes, can be difficult to access. The transparency law of 2014 mandates disclosure of government information, but officials do not consistently follow it, sometimes forcing citizens to request judiciary measures to access information. Civil society groups and independent media have used the transparency law to expose irregularities in government spending and contracting in recent years.

The constitution guarantees freedom of expression, and opposition views are commonly aired in the media. However, journalists face intimidation and violence both while reporting and in retaliation for their work. The government has prosecuted several cases involving the murders of journalists in recent years, but convictions are rare. The Foundation for Press Freedom (FLIP) documented 525 aggressions against the press in 2024, including threats for uncovering illegal activities or for not publishing information favoring armed groups. FLIP recorded that two journalists were killed in 2024.

Self-censorship is common, and slander and defamation remain criminal offenses. The government does not restrict access to the internet, nor does it censor websites. X and other social media platforms have become important arenas for political discourse, but large areas of Colombia remain without local news coverage.

Government officials, including President Petro, regularly disparage members of the media in response to negative coverage of the government and ruling coalition.

The constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the government generally respects this right in practice.

Academic freedom is generally respected, and university debates are often vigorous. However, in some locations, armed groups have maintained a campus presence to generate political support and intimidate opponents.

In June 2024, the Higher University Council of the National University overruled the March selection of José Ismael Peña as rector and instead installed Leopoldo Múnera. Peña’s appointment prompted protests because Múnera had originally been preferred by the university community. In May, the Education Ministry intervened to order the council to appoint Múnera. Also in May, Culture Minister Juan David Correa was placed under investigation for allegedly misusing his power as the ad hoc education minister by interfering in the rector’s selection.

Individual expression is generally protected in major urban centers, but it remains inhibited in more remote areas where the state, insurgents, and criminals vie for control.

Although provided for in the constitution, freedom of assembly is restricted in practice, especially in areas where rule of law is threatened by armed groups, organized crime, or general lawlessness. While the 2021 national strike was marred by violence on the part of some protesters—and by a police crackdown that garnered domestic and international criticism—protests in recent years have been generally free of such incidents.

Protests at the National University, prompted by controversy over the appointment of its rector, were affected by violence. In early May 2024, hooded individuals set fire to a public transit station serving the university. The university also claimed that explosive devices were found.

In October 2024, several individuals sought to break into the US embassy in Bogotá during protests marking the Israel–Hamas war, though most demonstrators were peaceful.

The legal framework generally supports nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society is diverse and active, but the threat of violent reprisal poses a major obstacle to freedom of association. While the government provides protection to thousands of threatened human rights workers, hundreds of activists have been murdered in recent years, mostly by insurgents or the criminal organizations that succeeded demobilized right-wing paramilitary groups. Impunity is widespread, with indictments and convictions occurring in only a small minority of cases.

Land rights, victims’ rights, and ethnic and Indigenous rights advocates are frequently targeted by illegal armed groups and other powerful interests seeking to control local illicit economies or halt the implementation of rural development plans, especially coca substitution programs. President Petro committed to increasing protections for civil society leaders when he was elected, but in practice their security remains at risk. According to the Institute for Development and Peace Studies (Indepaz), 173 civil society leaders and rights defenders were killed in 2024.

Workers may form and join trade unions, bargain collectively, and strike, and antiunion discrimination is prohibited. Colombia’s illegal armed groups have killed thousands of union activists and leaders over the past three decades, though killings have declined substantially from their peak in the early 2000s. A special prosecutorial unit has substantially increased prosecutions for such assassinations since 2007, but few investigations have targeted those who ordered the killings.

The courts play a fairly independent role in checking the power of the president, government branches, and the military, and in protecting civil rights. However, aspects remain compromised by corruption, extortion, and severe inefficiency. The Constitutional Court, the Council of State, and the Supreme Court have exhibited independence from the executive, though corruption allegations involving members of the courts have damaged their credibility in recent years.

Colombia’s prosecutorial service is relatively professional, but watchdog groups suggest that key oversight institutions, including the Attorney General’s Office, became less independent during the Duque administration. Due process protections remain weak, and trial processes move very slowly.

The country’s two key transitional justice bodies, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and the Truth Commission, began operations in 2018 and amassed enormous volumes of evidence and received testimony from thousands of people in the following years. The Truth Commission delivered its final report in 2022, calling for “sweeping changes” to the country’s military and for a renewed focus on human rights. The JEP continued to work and deliver rulings in cases of human rights violations in 2024. The JEP also continued its work on the “false positives” extrajudicial killings, referring to the deaths of 6,400 civilians at the hands of the military, who had later called them left-wing fighters, between 2002 and 2008.

Many soldiers operate with limited civilian oversight, though the government has in recent years increased human rights training and investigated violations by security forces personnel. Collaboration between security forces and illegal armed groups has declined, but rights groups reported that paramilitary successor groups have been officially tolerated in some regions. The police lack necessary resources, some units are prone to abuse, and police are largely absent from many rural areas where the most dangerous groups are active.

The National Police remains under the purview of the Ministry of Defense. Concerns persist about the effective militarization of internal security, and authorities have deployed the military to address matters like patrolling drug-trafficking routes. Several proposals were made to move the police under a civilian authority, and the Petro administration has expressed its intention to move the police under a new ministry. In 2022, the Truth Commission called for police personnel to address criminal activity instead of the military.

Civil-military relations have been a source of significant tension in recent years. A portion of the armed forces opposed the peace process, and the ability of accused human rights violators within the military to receive benefits under the transitional justice system is one of the most controversial elements of the process. Scandals involving both corruption and rights violations have also buffeted the military.

Parts of Colombia, particularly resource-rich zones and drug-trafficking corridors, remain highly insecure. Remnant guerrilla forces—including the ELN and dissident factions of the FARC—and paramilitary successor groups regularly abuse the civilian population, especially in coca-growing areas.

The Petro administration has enacted its Total Peace agenda since taking office, with the government recommitting to the existing peace process, introducing social and land-use reform, and holding peace talks with armed and criminal groups. While violent incidents between security forces and armed groups reportedly fell in 2024, the Total Peace policy has also faced setbacks. In May, the ELN said that it would resume kidnappings for ransom. The government’s cease-fire deal with the ELN ended in August; in September, ELN fighters attacked a military base in Arauca, leading to fatalities. The government halted talks with the group until October. In July, the government ended a cease-fire with the Central General Staff (EMC), a dissident offshoot of the FARC.

The National Police reported that 279 people were kidnapped in 2024. According to Indepaz, 76 massacres occurred in 2024, resulting in 267 deaths.

The legal framework provides protections against various forms of discrimination based on gender, race and ethnicity, sexual orientation and gender identity, and other categories, and the government takes some measures to enforce these protections. Nevertheless, several vulnerable groups suffer serious disadvantages in practice.

Areas with concentrated Afro-Colombian populations continue to suffer vastly disproportionate levels of abuse by guerrillas, security forces, and criminal groups, as well as higher poverty and lack of public services. UN officials have reported that impunity is nearly absolute for killers of Afro-Colombian and Indigenous ex-combatants and social leaders.

Colombians are at risk of internal displacement due to continued violence. Afro-Colombians, who account for as much as 25 percent of the population, are especially affected by displacement. In May 2024, the International Committee of the Red Cross noted that 26,753 people were internally displaced nationwide in the first five months of the year, a 49 percent increase over the same period in 2023.

Most of Colombia’s Indigenous inhabitants, who make up more than 3 percent of the population, live on approximately 34 million hectares granted to them by the government, often in resource-rich, strategic regions that are highly contested by armed groups. Indigenous people have been targeted by numerous actors in the country’s various conflicts. In 2024, Indigenous communities in the departments of Chocó, Cauca, Valle de Cauca, and Nariño continued to suffer widespread violence and displacement perpetrated by former FARC members, paramilitary successors, and criminal groups.

Women face employment discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace, as well as gender-based violence. In 2023, President Petro signed a law establishing the Ministry of Equality and Equity, with vice ministries for groups including women, youth, various ethnic groups, and campesino communities. The Constitutional Court ruled that the ministry’s creation was unlawful in May 2024. The court gave the government two years to address procedural errors in the ministry’s formation.

Though Colombian law prohibits discrimination against LGBT+ individuals, they often suffer societal discrimination and abuse, and there are high levels of impunity for crimes committed against them. In July 2024, Colombia Diversa reported that 159 LGBT+ people were murdered in 2023, with 32 possibly being killed over their identity.

Advocates for refugees and other observers have expressed concern that the Petro administration lacks a coherent migration policy, though the government did announce new policies affecting Venezuelans in Colombia during 2024. Some 2.9 million Venezuelan migrants resided in Colombia as of September according to Human Rights Watch (HRW); 2 million held temporary protection status at the time. Venezuelans in Colombia have faced stigmatization, discrimination, and lack of access to services. The initial policy of granting full legal temporary status to Venezuelans who were present in Colombia ended in 2021. Those who entered legally were allowed to apply for a stay permit until November 2023. In June 2024, the government said it would offer a new type of permit to Venezuelans caring for minors who had already received temporary protection. In September, the Foreign Affairs Ministry said it would introduce a new visa for Venezuelans who did not receive a permit under the previous system.

A massive flow of migrants from the Caribbean, Venezuela, and other nations continued to cross Colombia to reach Panama through the Darién Gap, a dense jungle with no infrastructure, and ultimately make their way to the United States. The government allowed them to pass through, but abuses and human rights violations continued against migrants in transit areas. In August 2024, the governments of Colombia, Panama, and the United States issued a joint statement on addressing irregular migration as Panama began work to the close the border with Colombia and deport Colombians in an agreement with Washington. Some 302,000 people crossed the Darién Gap from Colombia to Panama in 2024, 42 percent fewer than in 2023. Some also started to use a maritime route from San Andrés into Nicaragua, facing great risks in the open sea.

Freedom of movement improved substantially in tandem with the peace process, but it remains restricted by ongoing violence in certain regions, many of which are home to marginalized groups. Travel in some remote areas is further limited by illegal checkpoints operated by criminal and guerrilla groups.

Some two million Venezuelans in Colombia held a temporary protection permit as of September 2024. The status allows them to work and move freely in Colombia for 10 years, though eligibility for that system ended in 2023. Permit-holders are eligible for a range of state-run programs and services, including health-care and education.

Violence and instability in some areas threaten property rights and the ability to establish businesses. Guerrillas, paramilitary successor groups, and common criminals regularly extort payments from business owners and rural property holders.

Progress remains slow on the implementation of the 2011 Victims and Land Law, which recognized the legitimacy of claims by victims of conflict-related abuses, including those committed by government forces. While affected citizens continue receiving compensation and modest progress has been made on land titling, the legal process for land restitution is heavily backlogged, and the resettlement of those who were displaced during the conflict moved slowly under Duque and Petro.

Personal social freedoms, such as those related to marriage and divorce, are largely respected. The Constitutional Court voted to legalize same-sex unions in 2016.

In 2022, the Constitutional Court decriminalized all abortions performed within the first 24 weeks of pregnancy. Prior to this, women continued to face criminal charges for abortion.

The National Police reported 134,600 domestic violence cases in 2024. The Ombudsman’s Office reported 745 femicides between January and October 2024.

Child labor, the recruitment of children by illegal armed groups, and related sexual abuse are serious problems in Colombia; recruitment declined following the peace accord but increased after 2020 amid pandemic-related disruption and violence. In coca-growing zones, armed groups exert coercive pressure on farmers to engage in coca cultivation and shun government-run crop-substitution programs.

A majority of Colombia’s labor force work informally, lacking a contract, retirement savings programs, and other protections. A 2023 labor reform bill faced criticism for lacking measures to reduce the informal labor rate.

According to the 2024 edition of the US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report, Colombians are at high risk of trafficking for sex or forced labor. LGBT+ people, Afro-Colombians, Indigenous people, the internally displaced, Venezuelans, and those seeking to cross the Darién Gap are especially vulnerable to trafficking.