Document #2118982
USDOS – US Department of State (Author)
Overview: Terrorist organizations exploited Niger’s extensive borderlands and sparsely populated regions to attack and recruit among populations where access to government services was weak and economic opportunity negligible. Niger’s efforts to fight terrorism were hampered by the small size of its defense force, ineffective coordination among security services, budget shortfalls, and instability in Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, and the Lake Chad Basin. As a result of the July coup d’état, assistance for the government of Niger was restricted pursuant to section 7008 of the annual appropriations act.
Terrorist groups active in Niger included ISIS-Sahel, Boko Haram, ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA), and al-Qa’ida affiliate JNIM.
2023 Terrorist Incidents: Terrorist organizations carried out at least 299 attacks in Niger during 2023, including attacks from ISIS-Sahel and JNIM in the West and Northwest, and from ISIS-WA and BH in the Southeast. The following five incidents are examples of the most significant attacks:
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Before the coup d’etat, Niger was recognized by regional partners as a leader in prosecuting terrorism suspects through its specialized antiterrorism court. A DOJ/Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training program Resident Legal Advisor worked to improve the capabilities of counterterrorism (CT) investigators, prosecutors, and judges, to support proactive investigations; to increase efficiency in case processing; and to reduce the number of pending cases. Assistance was paused following the coup d’etat and remained suspended at the end of year. A draft penal code revision also was suspended following the coup and remained suspended at year’s end.
Niger uses border security systems through the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, a bureau within the national police responsible for travel documents, identification credentials, and border security. U.S. Department of State Antiterrorism Assistance programs provided equipment, training, and mentorship for National Guard and Gendarmerie border security operations and urban crisis response. Assistance was paused following the coup d’etat and was subsequently restricted under section 7008.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Niger is a member of the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa, and its Financial Intelligence Unit, the National Financial Intelligence and Processing Unit of Niger, is a member of the Egmont Group. There were no significant changes in 2023.
Countering Violent Extremism: Supported by the U.S. Department of State, Niger’s national Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Reconciliation (DDRR) framework provided violent extremist organization defector screening by the National Police’s Central Service for the Fight Against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime (SCLCT-CTO) and the national prosecutor to determine rehabilitation eligibility. In 2023, at least 267 individuals voluntarily left terrorist groups and participated in reintegration activities under the DDRR framework in the Diffa and Tillabéri Regions. The SCLCT-CTO, an interagency body formed by members of the National Police, the National Guard, and the Gendarmerie, managed CT investigations. Assistance was paused following the coup d’etat and was subsequently restricted under section 7008.
International and Regional Cooperation: Niger’s transitional authorities withdrew from the G-5 Sahel on November 29, and later formally communicated Niger’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States. The country remained a member of the Lake Chad Basin Multinational Joint Task Force. Niger signed a mutual defense pact called the Alliance of Sahel States with Mali and Burkina Faso on September 16 and conducted joint operations against terrorist groups throughout the year.