Internet access continues to grow in Kyrgyzstan. In 2023, the Ministry of Digital Development's Service for the Regulation and Supervision of the Communications Sector (SRSCS), formerly known as the State Communication Agency (SCA), reported that there were almost 7 million active subscribers out of 7.15 million inhabitants, which amounts to a 98 percent internet penetration rate. In 2021, it reported that there were 5.8 million subscribers.1 However, the reliability of the SRSCS’s data on internet penetration, which comes from service providers, has been called into question by some analysts. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) reported that Kyrgyzstan had a 79.8 percent internet penetration rate in 2022, with a fixed broadband penetration rate of 6.45 percent and a mobile broadband penetration rate of 92.1 percent in 2023.2

The government has also undertaken efforts to improve infrastructure, though the launch of fifth-generation (5G) technology remains delayed. According to the SRSCS, the length of fiber-optic lines increased almost threefold between 2017 and 2023.3 Fourth-generation (4G) services are available in most of the country, with 98.8 percent of inhabited localities covered, according to the SCA.4 In August 2022, the government gave mobile service providers permission to begin testing 5G technology, and the first test was completed in Bishkek, the capital.5 The SRSCS had planned 5G frequency auctions for 2023, but these were not held by year’s end due to legislative changes delaying the start of auctions to 2024. The auctions had not begun by the end of the coverage period.6

Despite being more readily available, mobile internet connections are slower and of lower quality than fixed ones. According to April 2024 data from Ookla’s Speedtest, the median download speed on mobile internet connections was 37.21 megabits per second (Mbps), compared to 65.26 Mbps on fixed-line connections.7

In October 2022, residents in Bishkek and other areas of Kyrgyzstan were either unable to access the internet or experienced dramatically slow speeds. Mobile operators and internet service providers (ISPs) attributed the disruption to issues with the backbone of the upstream provider. Although the disruption coincided with nationwide protests against the transfer of the Kempir-Abad reservoir to Uzbekistan,8 measurement sources did not indicate that the disruption was intentional.

In recent years, the average price of a mobile internet connection has decreased, becoming more affordable for much of the population, though fixed-line broadband prices remain steep. Prices offered by ISPs in Bishkek, where the information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure is well-developed and competition is greater, are lower than in rural areas. Additionally, the quality of connection is better in Bishkek than in rural areas, where most of the population lives.9

According to 2023 data from the ITU, a 5-gigabyte (GB) fixed-line broadband subscription cost 4.79 percent of gross national income (GNI) per capita, while a monthly mobile broadband plan offering 2 GB of data cost 0.93 percent of GNI per capita.10 The monthly price of a 8 Mbps fixed-line broadband subscription in Bishkek was 555 soms ($6.30) in 2024.11 The monthly price for the same subscription in the rural Batken region was 646 soms ($7.40).12 According to the World Bank, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2023 was $1,969.90.13

Score Change: The score declined from 5 to 4 because the government blocked TikTok during the coverage period.

In past coverage periods, the government has throttled or restricted access to the internet.

In April 2024, most internet providers in Kyrgyzstan blocked access to the social media platform TikTok, allegedly to “prevent harm to the health of children.” Providers implemented this measure based on a letter from the Ministry of Digital Development's SRSCS, which followed a decision from the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) to block TikTok.14 In August 2023, the Ministry of Culture announced that it planned to block TikTok because of the alleged danger the application poses to children.15 After regional TikTok representatives met with the ministry, it initially postponed the decision while it was in negotiations with the company.16 As of May 2024, TikTok is inaccessible from all mobile ISPs, but remains accessible on some fixed ones.

To connect to the international internet, ISPs are not required to use government-owned channels, though getting their own channel can be challenging, as it requires permission from the Border Control Service. Kyrgyzstan’s 14 major ISPs operate international internet connections via Kazakhstan and China.

There are three internet exchange points (IXPs) in Kyrgyzstan: two managed by a telecommunications industry group, the Association of Telecommunications Operators,17 and one controlled by the Kyrgyzstani branch of the Internet Society (ISOC).18

Aside from the formality of obtaining a license, there are no direct obstacles for ISPs and mobile service providers seeking to enter the market. However, providers still confront several indirect barriers, including the high cost of building ICT infrastructure. Existing ISPs are not obligated to share their infrastructure, and there is no cap on the prices they can charge for renting out bandwidth. Another is the obligation to install surveillance equipment on all communications networks, which increases start-up costs (see C5 and C6).19 Finally, the industry has been marred by corruption scandals in recent years.

There are four mobile service providers offering mobile broadband: Beeline, MEGA (previously known as MegaCom), Nur Telecom (operating under the brand “O!”), and KT Mobile.20 Nur Telecom claims to be the leading operator in terms of market share.21 MEGA was nationalized in 2010 amid political upheaval. The state-owned KyrgyzTelecom remains the largest internet service provider in the country.22

In May 2022, the Cabinet of Ministers gave the Ministry of Digital Development the authority to act on its behalf as a controlling shareholder of MEGA and KyrgyzTelecom, among other entities (see A5).23

In October 2023, the State Development Bank bought 100 percent of the shares of the state mobile operator MEGA (Alfa Telecom CJSC).24 This followed the Fund for State Property Management’s July 2023 announcement that it planned to auction all of MEGA’s shares, valuing the company at a minimum of $167 million and mandating that buyers pay a fee equal to 7 percent of the bid.25 However, it quickly became clear that the State Development Bank was the only buyer, which simply shifted management from the State Property Management Fund to the bank. Critics have raised concerns surrounding the State Development Bank's ability to manage MEGA effectively because it has been plagued by scandals, lacks transparency and capital, and was founded only recently. While the sale of MEGA was pending, press secretaries of government agencies and supporters of Sadyr Japarov launched an online campaign supporting the State Development Bank’s purchase.26

In recent years, a wave of scandals concerning the SCA, telecommunications companies, and the sale of radio frequencies have come to light. SCA officials have been accused of impeding the work of operators,27 bribery, 28 extortion,29 and corruption.30

Regulatory bodies that oversee service providers do not always operate in a free and fair manner.

The Ministry of Digital Development, which was created in May 2021 after a regulation transformed the State Service of Digital Development, assumed the functions previously performed by the State Committee of Information Technologies and Communication (SCITC)—created in 2016—and its subsidiary, the SCA.31 The Minister of Digital Development serves as vice prime minister.32 The SCA was renamed the SRSCS in 2023, but it continues to carry out the same functions.

In September 2023, Talantbek Imanov, the Minister of Digital Development, resigned from his position and was appointed head of the National Investment Agency.33 Nuriya Kutnaeva, the former head of the Personal Data Protection Agency under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic, succeeded Imanov as the head of the ministry.34

The Ministry of Digital Development inherited the responsibilities of the SCITC and the State Registry Service, including developing ICT policy, governing the ICT sector, facilitating the sector’s development, and maintaining the population registry. The ministry also issues licenses for ISPs, sets standards, and ensures those standards are followed.35 Institutional memory within the ministry is limited, as incoming heads usually change all key staff.

Authorities continued to engage in disproportionate and arbitrary blocking of online content during the coverage period. The government and judiciary’s broad application of antiextremism laws has impacted various websites hosting user-generated content. The government has continued blocking websites under the Law on Protection from False Information (see B3). As of May 2024, 474 websites were blocked by a court decision. Most of them are blocked for allegedly hosting extremist content.36

In September 2023, independent media outlet Kloop’s Russian-language site was blocked under the Law on Protection from False Information based on a complaint filed by the GKNB concerning an article covering imprisoned opposition politician Ravshan Jeenbekov’s testimony that he faced torture at the hands of the GKNB. The Ministry of Culture, which handles all complaints under the law, ordered the article to be removed, claiming that it was unreliable and discredited the reputation of the GKNB (see B2).37 After Kloop refused to remove the article, several ISPs immediately implemented blocking measures.38 In November 2023, the Ministry of Culture used the same article as a pretext for its decision to block the Kyrgyz language version of the website.39 In March 2024, a Bishkek administrative court judged that the Ministry of Culture’s decision on blocking the Russian language version of Kloop’s website was invalid, which sent the case to the Bishkek City Court.40 In June 2024, after the coverage period, the Bishkek City Court overturned the March 2024 decision and ruled that the blocking of the website was legal.41

The order to block Kloop followed an August 2023 lawsuit demanding that the outlet shut down because it had not registered as a media organization. In February 2024, a court ruled that Kloop should be dissolved (see B6).42 In May, the Bishkek City Court refused to consider the organization’s appeal, saying that it had missed the deadline to file an appeal. Later in May, following the decision of the Bishkek City Court, lawyers for Kloop Media filed a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court,43 which was denied in August 2024, after the coverage period.44

In October 2022, the Ministry of Culture blocked Radio Azattyk’s website because of social media posts containing a video, which was produced by the partner outlet Current Time TV, that alleged Kyrgyzstani military units had attacked units in Tajikistan; the ministry subsequently tried to shut down the outlet (see B6 and C3). The ministry also claimed the video contained hate speech and would sow divisions within society.45 In March 2023, the Bishkek Administrative Court sided with the ministry, upholding the blocking of Radio Azattyk, which is the Kyrgyzstan service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (see B3).46 In May, the Bishkek City Court upheld the decision of the administrative court.47 In July, the Bishkek administrative court canceled its previous decision after Radio Azattyk settled with the ministry, agreeing to remove the video. As part of the settlement, the Ministry of Culture requested that the Ministry of Digital Development unblock Azattyk.48

In August 2022, the SCA ordered the blocking of 24.kg, one of the country’s largest news outlets, because the Ambassador Hotel claimed a story that 24.kg ran about the hotel was false. The website was blocked under the Law on Protection from False Information (see B3) for several hours until the Ministry of Culture reversed the initial order.49

In June 2022, the Ministry of Culture blocked news outlet Res Publica under the Law on Protection from False Information. The blocking followed a request from Asan Toktosunov, the former director of Manas Management, to delete articles on corruption at the Manas International Airport. The Ministry of Culture initially tasked the SCA to order Res Publica to delete the content. When the outlet refused, the website was blocked for two months, in accordance with the law. The Ministry of Culture also stated that they were not obliged to check the veracity of the information.50

The government forced news outlets to remove content during the coverage period under the Law on Protection from False Information (see B3, C4, and C6). Journalists who work online have occasionally removed political content under threat of violence from unknown actors (see C7).

In October 2023, online media outlet NazarNews was forced to remove an article about the head of the Cabinet of Ministers, Akylbek Japarov. The Ministry of Culture, Information, Sports, and Youth Policy claimed that the article violated the Law on Protection from False Information because it defamed the head of the cabinet. According to the editor in chief of NazarNews, Guljan Sheripbaeva, she agreed to remove the content only after receiving the order and facing significant external pressure from influential people.51

In September 2023, the Ministry of Culture, Information, Sports, and Youth Policy of the Kyrgyz Republic ordered Azattyk to remove two articles about the Kempir-Abad water reservoir, saying that they violated the Law on Protection from False Information. Previously, the articles, which stated that Kyrgyzstan ceded control of the reservoir to Uzbekistan in October 2022, were criticized by President Sadyr Japarov, who called them “attempts to fool people.” Azattyk removed the articles prior to the order.52

In September 2023, the Ministry of Culture demanded that Kloop remove an article about Ravshan Jeenbekov’s claims that he was tortured on the orders of the GKNB. The ministry alleged that the article violated the Law on Protection from False Information because it contained false information and discredited the reputation of the GKNB. After refusing to remove the article, Kloop’s site was blocked in September 2023 (see B1).53

Under the Law on Protection from False Information, the Ministry of Culture ordered the removal of a Res Publica article covering corruption at Manas Airport in June 202254 and an article on 24.kg about the Ambassador Hotel in August 2022 (see B1).55 When both outlets refused to comply, their websites were blocked (see B1). The decision to block Radio Azattyk in October 2022 was ultimately resolved in July 2023, when the outlet agreed to remove a video claiming that Kyrgyzstani military units had attacked Tajikistan’s military, which allegedly violated the Law on Protection from False Information (see B1).56

Twitter did not produce a transparency report covering the reporting period.57 In 2023, the government issued one content removal request concerning two items to Google, but the company did not take any action.58 Meta, Facebook’s parent company, did not remove any content based on government requests in 2023.59

Court orders are often used to block websites and remove content in Kyrgyzstan. The government recently enacted a law enabling a body within the Ministry of Culture to issue content removal demands and subsequently order the blocking of websites and platforms that refuse to comply.

The courts justify blocking sites under Article 315 of the criminal code, which prohibits extremist materials. These are expansively defined under the Law on Countering Extremist Activity as anything that stokes “ideological, political, racial, national, or religious hatred or enmity.”60 The prosecutor general’s office can also issue blocking and content removal requests to courts. The reasons for blocks are indicated in the court materials, which are only shared with the parties involved. Furthermore, the appeals process for challenging blocking orders is only open to the owner of the web resource being blocked or their official representative.

In July 2021, President Japarov signed the Law on Protection from False Information, which poses threats to free expression and user privacy.61 The law enables individuals or companies to file a complaint about false or defamatory information to a unit in the Ministry of Culture, which will have two days to respond to these complaints. If the content meets the criteria, websites or social media platforms must remove it within 24 hours. If the content is not removed, the individual or company who filed the complaint can then request the suspension of the website or the social media account that posted the information.62 The department can then issue a request to the ISPs to shut down the website or webpage for a period of up to two months.63 In April 2022, the Cabinet of Ministers passed regulations outlining the procedures for implementing the law.64

In August 2023, President Japarov signed amendments to two laws, the Law on Measures to Prevent Harm to the Health of Children, Their Physical, Intellectual, Mental, Spiritual, and Moral Development and the Law on Mass Media, which enable the government to fine individuals who post content deemed harmful to children.65 In June 2023, the parliament passed the law, stipulating that individuals who post “harmful” content can be fined $290 (see C2). Jamilya Isaeva, the parliamentarian who introduced the law, included content that promotes “nontraditional sexual relations” or that disparages parents in the definition of “harmful content.” Earlier that month, a ministry official said the government aimed to collaborate with Meta to block material to protect children. The Media Policy Institute, which focuses on free expression issues in the country, criticized the law as an attempt to allow censorship.66

The Ministry of Justice’s official site, which hosts the official list of banned extremist and terrorist materials,67 contains outdated information and does not offer a full picture of website blocking. Compounding this lack of transparency, only a few ISPs, such as Megaline, publish lists of blocked sites and display a descriptive page when these sites are reached.

While ISPs are not directly liable for the content on their networks, they can lose their licenses if they fail to carry out a court order to block content.

Self-censorship worsened during the coverage period, due in part to increased website blockings and prosecutions (see B1 and C3). All posts on online forums are strictly moderated to limit hateful content, and online journalists, bloggers, and everyday users generally try to avoid issues concerning ethnic relations. The Law on Protection from False Information (see B3, C4, and C6), recent orders to remove content and block websites (see B1 and B2), and the detention of critics (see C3) have had a chilling effect. In June 2023, Article 19, an organization focusing on free expression, noted the deterioration of “free expression, media freedom, and civic space” as the government continues to introduce and enact repressive legislation.68

In February 2024, the Ministry of Culture, Information, Sports, and Youth Policy sent a letter to media outlets outlining recommendations for content. The ministry urged media outlets to pay close attention to the information that they publish, in accordance with the Law on Mass Media (see B6).69 Media lawyers criticized the letter, arguing that the conditions are overly vague and this lack of clarity contributes to an environment of self-censorship.70

Other laws may increase self-censorship, such as those governing defamation.

Online platforms, such as forums and social networks, have been used to manipulate public opinion. Trolls hired by various actors influence online discussions by expressing favorable or unfavorable views on politicians and political issues.

In June 2023, a Checkit Media investigation revealed that a network of fake Facebook accounts closely associated with the National TV and Radio Broadcasting Corporation had used the social media platform to praise President Japarov and denigrate independent media and human rights defenders. According to the report, the network is led by the president’s press secretary, Daiyrbek Orunbekov, who also previously ran a troll farm linked to oligarch Raimbek Matraimov. The network was active during the transfer of the Kempir-Abad reservoir in the fall of 2022.71

An August 2023 Kloop investigation also revealed that both fake and authentic social media accounts spread homophobic propaganda against those who criticized the government.72

According to a report from the Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting, candidates contesting the November 2021 snap parliamentary elections offered individuals $19 per day to publicly support the candidate in online groups on social media.73

In the wake of the October 2020 elections, a network of trolls linked to former customs official Raimbek Matraimov began promoting Japarov’s candidacy.74 A report by Kloop revealed that the same troll team continued to support Matraimov and President Japarov,75 with monthly salaries for individuals ranging from $100 to $3,000 depending on the activities they performed.76 According to a 2022 report from Factcheck.kg, which quotes sources within Mekenim Kyrgyzstan, another troll factory supporting the party in the 2020 elections employed an automated artificial intelligence (AI) system that created up to 150 inauthentic profiles per day for $350,000. The accounts created by this software were able to post both negative and positive comments after they were trained by a small team.77

Various online media outlets, some of which are owned by politicians or powerful business interests, are also used as tools of political influence.78

News outlets, including those that publish online, are sometimes given editorial guidance by their owners.79 These instructions are at times the result of government pressure.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because of legal pressure on online media outlets and a law requiring a broad range of nongovernmental organizations to register and post disclaimers on their online content.

Most online media outlets are not required to register with the government, though “mass media” outlets are. According to the 2022 Vibrant Information Barometer (VIBE) by the International Research and Exchange Board (IREX), “advertising revenues for all traditional media have decreased significantly as advertisers have shifted their focus to social networks.”80

In March 2024,81 the parliament adopted a new law on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which enables the government to create a registry of all “foreign representatives” that engage in broadly defined “political activities,” obtain organizations’ administrative documents, attend events organized by NGOs, and evaluate NGOs’ expenditures, with a specific focus on NGOs that receive foreign funding. The law also requires NGOs that receive foreign funding to note that all their publications are “produced and distributed by a noncommercial organization performing the functions of a foreign representative.”82 Earlier draft versions of the law criminalized participation in an NGO with up to 10 years in prison, but parliamentarians removed it before the final version passed.83 In May 2024, the Ministry of Justice published the Regulation on the Procedure for Maintaining the Register of Nonprofit Organizations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent and Conducting Audits of their Activities, which details the procedures related to the registry.84

In February 2024, a court in Bishkek ordered the liquidation of Kloop Media Public Foundation, the umbrella organization that runs online news outlet Kloop, which was blocked in 2023 (see B1).85 In August 2023, a state prosecutor initially ordered the liquidation of Kloop because it was not a registered media organization. The court also alleged that Kloop undermined government policies, influenced migration patterns, disparaged Russian nationals, and contributed to societal issues like psychological disorders and addiction.86 In May 2024, the Bishkek City Court announced that it would not hear Kloop’s appeal in the case because the foundation had allegedly sent the appeal to the wrong address.87 In August 2024, after the coverage period, the Supreme Court denied Kloop’s cassation appeal.88

Online outlet 24.kg underwent a sudden change in ownership in March 2024, shortly after the GKNB had raided the outlet in January (see C3). Former employee Almasbek Turdumamatov assumed ownership from former owner and director Asel Otorbaeva, who stated that she had planned to step down for over a year due to health and family reasons. The timing of the ownership change and the opaque circumstances surrounding it have fueled speculation about potential political pressure and forced sale.89

In October 2022, following the Ministry of Culture’s order to block Radio Azattyk’s website earlier that month (see B1 and C3), the outlet’s bank accounts were blocked after a criminal case was opened under Article 14 of the Law on Counteracting the Financing of Terrorist Activities and the Legalization (Laundering) of Criminal Proceeds. In November 2022, in response to a request from Radio Azattyk, the State Financial Intelligence Service (SFIS) under the Ministry of Finance explained the outlet had been put on the “list of individuals, groups, organizations in respect of which there is information about their participation in the legalization (laundering) of criminal proceeds” based on a letter from the GKNB written that month. Television and radio providers stopped broadcasting Radio Azattyk on national channels. Also in November, the ministry filed an appeal to the district court requesting that the court rule that Azattyk Media no longer be recognized as mass media, under the definition of the law on mass media.90 In April 2023, the Lenin District Court ruled to terminate Radio Azattyk’s operations.91 In July 2023, the Bishkek City Court “annulled” the April ruling, allowing Radio Azattyk to begin operating again. The ruling came as a result of a settlement between the outlet and the Ministry of Culture, which mandated that Azattyk remove the video of military skirmishes at the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border.92

In September 2022, the president’s office presented a draft mass media law to replace the existing 1992 law. The draft would compel any website with more than 5,000 unique visitors a month, including social media pages, to register as mass media. The draft would prevent websites from disseminating information that reveals state secrets, incites or justifies terrorism, and contains “obscene language,” among other things. After criticism from the media and other experts, the president’s office agreed to establish a working group focused on amending the draft.93 After debate in the parliament and meetings with the heads of leading mass media in Kyrgyzstan, Japarov ordered the withdrawal of the bill in March 2024.94

The internet, and in particular social media platforms and messaging applications, have become an important source of alternative information for people. According to IREX’s 2024 Vibrant Information Barometer (VIBE), Kyrgyz, as opposed to Russian, has become the primary language for online content consumption for individuals outside of Bishkek. The study also found that recent media trends have led to a reduction of “ideological diversity” across both online and traditional media.95

Score Change: The score declined from 5 to 4 because those who organized protests and rallies online were detained and charged during the coverage period.

Digital activism remains limited in Kyrgyzstan, despite the availability of online mobilization tools. The government cracked down on online organizing during the coverage period.96

In August 2023, writer, activist, and government critic Oljobai Shakir was detained and placed under two months of pretrial detention for allegedly attempting to organize mass unrest and seize power. Shakir had regularly criticized the government, but he believed that the arrest stemmed from his social media posts calling for a peaceful protest against the transfer of four resorts along the Issyk-Kul lake to Uzbekistan.97 In May 2024, he was sentenced to five years in prison (see C3).98

Following the parliament’s approval of the first reading of a bill to modify the national flag in November 2023, Kyrgyz citizens used social media to express their disapproval. They flooded President Sadyr Japarov’s Instagram and Facebook accounts with comments urging him to denounce the change. In December 2023, activist Aftandil Jorobekov was detained in Bishkek by the GKNB because he had organized a “Hands off the Kyrgyz Flag” car rally, planned for the following day. After Jorobekov had been questioned, a Bishkek City Court sentenced him to two months of pretrial detention (see C3).99

In October 2022, protesters gathered in Bishkek to support independent media outlets, including Azattyk, Kloop, and Kaktus.media, that had been threatened earlier in the month (see B6, C3, and C7).100 Throughout October, there were several rallies against the transfer of the Kempir-Abad reservoir to Uzbekistan. Several participants were detained, and activists and politicians were arrested for allegedly organizing violent mass riots.101

The constitutional reforms initiated by President Japarov in 2021 pose threats to freedom of expression and the independence of the judiciary.

The constitution, adopted by referendum in May 2021, concentrated power in the hands of the president and introduced vague terms that could be used to place limits on freedom of expression. A joint opinion from the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) highlighted issues with the process of drafting the constitution, including the limited opportunity for public consultation and the general “lack of respect for the principles of rule of law and legality.”102 Additionally, Article 10 on mass media mentions that activities that contradict the “moral and ethical values and public consciousness of the people of the Kyrgyz Republic” may be restricted by law to protect the younger generation.”103 The law also gives the president power to strip immunity from parliamentarians and to appoint judges, including judges at the local level.104

Article 32 of the constitution guarantees the right to freedom of thought, expression, speech, and the press.105

In June 2023, the Constitutional Court ruled that citizens could choose their paternal or maternal names as a patronymic. The head of the GKNB, Kamchybek Tashiev, criticized the decision and informed the Constitutional Court it was legally forbidden.106 In September 2023, amendments to the law on the Constitutional Court, which would allow the court's decisions to be revisited, were introduced to the parliament. Later that month, the parliament passed the law without debate in three hearings.107 President Japarov signed the law in October 2023.108 In November, the Constitutional Court reversed its earlier decision allowing matrilineal naming.109 This move was criticized by legal experts because it sets a precedent for the reversal of legal decisions under political pressure​.

There are several vaguely defined laws used to penalize legitimate online activities.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the parliament amended the code of violations in April 2020 to introduce fines for disseminating false information “aimed at violating the rule of law, or actions that violate public order and peace of individuals” during a state of emergency or when martial law has been declared.110

In October 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecutor general’s office must obtain the approval of the president before filing lawsuits in defense of their “honor and dignity.” The ruling further required that such defamation lawsuits must only seek nonpecuniary damages.111 The ruling followed a series of defamation lawsuits filed by the prosecutor general’s office in 2017 against media outlet Zanoza for libeling then president Almazbek Atambaev in articles that compared him to well-known authoritarian rulers and implied that he was corrupt.112

In 2011, the parliament decriminalized libel, aligning the law with the 2010 constitution.113 Defamation is only a criminal offense in cases of insult against judges and other participants in legal proceedings or desecration of the state, state symbols, and state institutions.114

The criminal code, which entered into force in January 2019, outlaws inciting ethnic, national, racial, religious, or interregional hostility (Article 313, previously Article 299-1) and provides for prison terms of 5 to 10 years for violators.115 The code also punishes the possession of “extremist materials” with the intent to distribute (Article 315, previously Article 299-2) with up to five years in prison.116 Previously, possession of “extremist materials” was illegal regardless of intent. In some cases, the government has sought to apply these antiextremism laws to restrict nonviolent political speech.

Several laws also impose disproportionate restrictions on freedom of expression. In February 2023, President Japarov signed a new Law on Countering Extremist Activities, which replaced the previous law, last amended in 2016.117 Like its predecessor, the law criminalizes public expressions of approval of and justification for extremism or terrorism, raising concerns about possible restrictions on legitimate expression online. The law also defines the scope of extremist materials prohibited by Article 315 (previously, Article 299-2) of the criminal code.118 However, the new version of the law also criminalizes calls for a violent seizure of power, which could be used against those who criticize the authorities.119

Under a 2014 amendment to the criminal code, those found guilty of disseminating “knowingly false messages about the commission of crimes” faced steep fines and prison sentences of up to three years.120 In the 2019 criminal code, the maximum sentence under this provision, Article 344, was increased to five years.121 Even though, according to case law, this provision does not apply to mass media, the GKNB has nevertheless used it to harass online media outlets (see C3).122

Under August 2023 amendments to two laws, the Law on Measures to Prevent Harm to the Health of Children, their Physical, Intellectual, Mental, Spiritual, and Moral Development and the Law on Mass Media, the government is able to impose a fine of up to $290 on individuals who post content deemed harmful to children, which is broadly defined and could include LGBT+ content (see B3).123

There was a notable increase in criminal penalties for protected online expression during the coverage period. According to Radio Azattyk, between late 2020 and the end of 2023, 29 citizens have faced prosecution for their online expression, with criminal cases being initiated against 25 of them. The individuals have largely faced criminal charges under articles in the criminal code related to calling for mass riots or the violent seizure of power and concerning the incitement of racial, ethnic, national, religious, or interregional hatred or hostility.124

In May 2024, the Alamadun District Court sentenced activist and writer Oljobai Shakir to five years in prison for allegedly organizing mass unrest and attempting to seize power (see B8).125 He was initially arrested in August 2023 and sentenced to two months in pretrial detention. Though Shakir had a history of criticizing the government, he believed this arrest was related to his online calls for a peaceful protest against the transfer of land on Issyk-Kul lake to Uzbekistan.126

In March 2024, musician Askat Jetigen was charged with inciting “mass unrest” and a “seizure of power” because of videos he published online that criticized Japarov and the crackdown on the media. In July 2024, after the coverage period, Jetigen was found guilty of demanding a seizure of power and sentenced to three years in prison (see C7).127

In September 2023, activist Zarina Torokulova, who routinely criticized the government officials on social media, was charged for inciting mass riots because she reposted Shakir’s call for a protest and another post criticizing the government. She remained in pretrial detention until January 2024,128 when she was sentenced to five years in prison with three years’ probation. Her lawyers appealed the ruling, but in April 2024, a court upheld the five-year prison sentence.129

In January 2024, the GKNB raided the offices of online news outlet 24.kg and confiscated their equipment (see B6 and C7). The searches, approved by the Pervomaisky District Court, were part of an investigation tied to a criminal case under Article 407 of the criminal code, which concerns "war propaganda.”130 More than a week after the raid, 24.kg's director, Asel Otorbaeva, requested that the GKNB lift the seizure of the office and equipment; the GKNB denied her request without providing any specific reason.131

In January 2024, 11 journalists associated with prominent exiled investigative journalist Bolot Temirov's projects, including "Ayt Ait Dese" and "TemirovLIVE,” were detained and placed in pretrial detention for two months. The authorities accused them of "inciting mass unrest" through their critical reporting. The accusations stem from several videos published in November and December 2023 that allegedly "discredit the government." However, legal experts and Temirov himself argue that the videos contain legitimate criticism of the government, which is not a criminal offense. They point out that the accusations are based on speculation and misinterpretations, with no clear evidence of direct calls for violence or unrest. Furthermore, some of the detained journalists had not worked for Temirov's projects for over a year.132 President Japarov claimed the 11 journalists are "bloggers" who irresponsibly spread misinformation and threatened national security. He also raised concerns about the origins of the funding received by the journalists.133 Following the detention of the journalists, media outlets and investigative journalists worldwide launched a campaign demanding their release, using the hashtag #FreeKyrgyz11.134 In March 2024, the court extended eight of the journalists’ pretrial detentions for two months, released two on house arrest, and released one with a travel ban.135 In June 2024, after the coverage period, four of the eight journalists still in custody were released and placed under house arrest or given travel bans; the court extended the remaining four journalists’ pretrial detentions until August 2024.136

In January 2024, several activists and individuals were summoned by law enforcement over social media posts that highlighted discrepancies between the flag hanging in Bishkek square at the new year and the official flag (see B8).137

In October 2023, Chynygul Sherkulova, a member of the Butun Kyrgyzstan party, was arrested for spreading false information about the transfer of land along the Altyn-Mazar river to Tajikistan. In January 2024, she was sentenced to three years in prison, though the imposition of the sentence has been postponed because she has young children.138

In November 2023, a court in Jalal-Abad fined 70-year-old Saliya Tashtanova 50,000 soms ($563) for "public calls for the violent seizure of power." She was charged for making a Facebook post in which she criticized the role that the president and the head of the GKNB played in the rising cost of living and bemoaned the lack of accountability. She was initially detained on October 6 and placed in pretrial detention before being released under house arrest 11 days later.139

In December 2023, the GKNB detained activist Aftandil Jorobekov for his role in organizing the “Hands off the Kyrgyz Flag” motor rally, which protested proposed changes to the Kyrgyzstani flag (see B8). After questioning, he was taken to the GKNB headquarters and placed in pretrial detention for two months.140 In March 2024, the case was suspended because of discrepancies in the results of two linguistic experts who had been consulted on whether Jorobekov’s statements were “a call for mass unrest”;141 in May 2024, after a repeat expert examination found no evidence of incitement to riot in the activist's statements, the court granted the prosecutor's motion and sent the activist's case back for further investigation.142 In June 2024, after the coverage period, he was released on house arrest.143

In November 2023, Kubanychbek Asanov was placed under house arrest for Facebook posts he made that allegedly incited ethnic hatred. He was initially arrested in May 2023 and had previously posted in support of imprisoned former parliamentarian Adakhan Madumarov.144

In September 2023, the Pervomaisky District Court of Bishkek sentenced Mirlan Uraimov, a member of the opposition Butun Kyrgyzstan party, to a year in prison for publicly calling for a seizure of power. He was initially arrested in February 2023 in relation to a post that called for a new government of Kyrgyzstan, though Uraimov claims he did not write the post.145

In June 2023, Ondurush Toktonasyrov, a longtime activist, was summoned for his critical Facebook posts. His case had been pending with Pervomaisky District Court of Bishkek since September 2023.146 In May 2024, the trial resumed; as of that month, Toktonasyrov stood accused of violating Article 330 of the criminal code, which concerns the incitement of racial, ethnic, national, religious, or interregional hostility.147

In January 2023, the Bishkek City Court sentenced Adilet Baltabai, blogger and activist, to five years in prison for inciting mass riots, annulling a November 2022 ruling from the Pervomaisky District Court that commuted the five-year prison sentence to three years of probation.148 In June 2022, Baltabai, who had been working for online news channel Next TV at the time, was summoned for questioning over 20 to 30 Facebook posts that criticized the government, including its efforts to restrict freedom of expression. Although the Supreme Court overturned the Bishkek City Court’s decision and upheld the Pervomaisky District Court’s decision to commute the sentence, in November 2023, the Sokuluk District Court reinstated the five-year sentence because he allegedly violated his probation.149

In November 2022, the Bishkek City Court ordered that Bolot Temirov, be deported to Russia for falsifying his passport, and prevented from entering Kyrgyzstan for five years on drug charges, which Temirov claimed law enforcement planted during a January 2022 raid.150 Bolot Nazarov, a poet and folk artist who posts his songs on the TemirovLIVE channel, was also arrested in the raid, charged with drug possession, and placed under house arrest.151 Just two days before the raid, TemirovLIVE published an investigation alleging that the relatives of GKNB chief Kamchybek Tashiev were involved in corruption.152 After an April 2022 follow-up investigation, Temirov, who is also a Russian citizen, was charged with falsifying the documents he used to obtain his Kyrgyzstani passport and in turn, “illegal border crossing.”153 In September 2022, the Sverdlovsk District Court acquitted him on the illegal border crossing and drug possession charges, but found him guilty of falsifying his passport.154 Temirov was deported to Moscow in November 2022, and remained in exile during the coverage period. In September 2023, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower courts.155

In November 2022, the government opened an investigation into Radio Azattyk under Article 14 of the Law on Counteracting the Financing of Terrorist Activities and the Legalization (Laundering) of Criminal Proceeds,156 threatening the outlet’s ability to operate in the country. The case followed the Ministry of Culture’s decision to block Radio Azattyk’s website after the outlet shared a video produced by Current Time TV depicting military clashes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan at the border (see B1 and B6) on its social media channels. In July 2023, the courts closed the broader case following a settlement between the ministry and Azattyk, which resulted in Azattyk removing the video and the ministry ordering the unblocking of the website.157

In October 2022, the Pervomaisky District Court sentenced a woman to one year in prison for a tweet in which she declared that Kyrgyzstani people owe everything to Russians. The court found that the post incited hatred among ethnic groups.158 In November 2022, the Bishkek City Court confirmed the decision.159

In September 2022, Taalaibek Duishenbiev, the director of Next TV, was found guilty of extremism and sentenced to five years in prison, but the judge commuted the sentence to three years of probation, during which he will have to remain in Bishkek and routinely check in with the authorities.160 The charge stemmed from Duishenbiev’s March 2022 arrest over a Next TV report alleging that the former head of Kazakhstan’s intelligence service claimed to have knowledge of a “secret agreement” for Kyrgyzstan to provide military support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.161 At the end of March, a Bishkek court ruled that the post, which Next TV published on both Facebook and Telegram, was "extremist."162

In August 2022, 19-year-old blogger Yrys Jekshenaliev published an old video showing former GKNB head Adil Segizbaev criticizing the idea of developing the Jetim-Too goldfield in Naryn. In the same month, residents rallied against the development the field, and Jekshenaliev was arrested for calling for “violent seizure of power and mass riots.” In April 2023, prosecutors requested a six-year prison sentence for Jekshenaliev,163 but he was acquitted by the Pervomaisky District Court of Bishkek in December 2023. Although the prosecutor's office appealed the decision, the Bishkek City Court upheld the acquittal in February 2024.164

Some legal measures place restrictions on anonymity. The Law on Protection from False Information, which the president signed in July 2021 (see B3), requires ISPs, mobile service providers, and owners of public Wi-Fi hotspots to “identify their subscribers.”165

In June 2022, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the regulation that would require International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) registration for mobile phones and smart devices.166 The Ministry of Digital Development had initially published the regulation in December 2021. The implementation of IMEI registration and the maintenance of the database will be handled by a private company, raising questions about the security of the data.167

Since 2014, service providers have been required to register SIM cards at the time of purchase, making it more difficult for individuals to use mobile devices anonymously.168 In September 2023, a new provision came into effect, which expanded the methods for registering SIM cards.169

State surveillance of internet activities often infringes on users’ right to privacy. Article 29 of the new constitution (see C1) nominally protects privacy, including private communications shared by phone or electronic methods, and forbids the collection or dissemination of confidential information without the subject’s consent, but existing protections are frequently ignored in practice.170

The state’s surveillance apparatus is modeled after Russia’s System for Operational Investigative Activities (SORM). Every ISP and mobile service provider is obliged to install SORM–compliant equipment on their ICT infrastructure to allow the authorities unfettered access to internet traffic and subscribers’ information (see C6). If a provider does not comply, its license can be canceled.

These requirements could enable mass surveillance without judicial oversight, and there has been evidence of abuse since they were implemented. For example, in August 2021, the Ministry of Interior admitted to wiretapping several individuals in January and February 2021, allegedly for their roles in the October 2020 protests. However, the list of individuals also includes people who were not involved in the protests.171

In May 2022, the parliament passed a law that would enable the GKNB to conduct video and audio surveillance without a prior court decision.172

By law, service providers are required to aid the government in monitoring users’ communications. In 2014, the government adopted a resolution requiring ISPs and mobile service providers to make their infrastructure compliant with the latest iteration of SORM (see C5).173 The resolution further requires providers to store subscribers’ metadata for up to three years and to allow authorities direct, real-time access to their communications networks without notification and oversight, even from prosecutors. In addition, ISPs must purchase and update equipment at their own expense to ensure compliance with SORM.

The August 2021 Law on the Protection from False Information (see B3 and C4) mandates that all ISPs and mobile service providers identify their users.174

The parliament passed a personal data law in 2008 that provided for the establishment of an authority for personal data protection, but such an agency was not created until September 2021.175 In 2017, amendments to the 2008 law were passed to protect personal data more effectively.176

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because of reports that users faced violence in custody in retaliation for their online activity.

ICT users, including online journalists, faced physical attacks, often in custody, and online harassment.

In April 2024, representatives of the ombudsman’s office reported that Makhabat Tajibek-kyzy, the wife of journalist Bolot Temirov, showed signs of being beaten in prison.177 She was arrested in January 2024 when law enforcement arrested several journalists associated with Temirov’s projects. The same month, the authorities raided news agency 24.kg and seized its equipment (see C3).

In March 2024, well-known composer and musician Askat Jetigen published a video criticizing a recent interview with Japarov. One day later, he was detained by the GKNB for alleged calls to seize power. Jetigen claimed he was tortured by the GKNB (see C3).178

In January 2024, activist Alga Kylychev reported he was pressured and physically assaulted during an interrogation by the GKNB for a post on social media about discrepancies between the flag displayed on Bishkek's main square and the official design approved by the parliament.179

In June 2023, former director of the Osh resort house Mamatkarim Koichukulov physically assaulted journalist Ydyrys Isakov while Isakov was reporting on the privatization of the property. Isakov posted a video of the attack on his Facebook page. The case was initially registered under the charge of "minor hooliganism," but was later dropped in July 2023 due to a lack of evidence of a crime, though Isakov said he withdrew his complaint.180

In October 2022, a crowd gathered in front of the Radio Azattyk office in Bishkek demanding the closure of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) service and other outlets, including Kloop and Kaktus.media. The crowd also urged the government to pass a law on foreign agents (see B6). During the rally, the participants threatened to burn the Azattyk office and to injure its employees.181 Journalists recognized some protesters as supporters of the current government, who are regular participants in rallies against media outlets.182

Also in October 2022, Super TV journalist Bektursun Jorobekov was attacked by four men. According to Super TV editor in chief Elvira Karaeva, Jorobekov sustained serious head injuries and the assailants filmed the attack, forcing him to apologize to one of the men, who he had previously covered in a report.183

In September 2022, a journalist for Voice of America’s regional agency was attacked in Osh and severely beaten by two men while recording a story on humanitarian aid to the Batken region. He told reporters that the attack may have been related to his Tajik appearance, as it occurred during the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border conflict.184

Online hate speech toward feminists and LGBT+ people is commonplace.

During the coverage period, the practice of politically motivated cyberattacks continued.

In February 2024, several journalists working for independent and traditional media outlets reported that they had faced attempted hacks of their Telegram accounts.185

In August 2022, an unknown entity hacked the website of the parliament, bringing it offline. After 24 days, the website returned online. The parliament’s website was previously hacked in October 2020.186

In October 2022, two news outlets, Kloop and T-media, reported that live broadcasts from Uzgen during the rally against the transfer of the Kempir-Abad reservoir to Uzbekistan were interrupted due to a cyberattack on the Facebook pages of the journalists covering the event.187