Despite marginal gains in internet access, Ethiopia remains one of the least connected countries in the world.

As of February 2024, DataReportal found that Ethiopia’s internet penetration rate was 19.4 percent of the total population.1 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) also cites a 19 percent penetration rate in its most recent data.2 However, state-owned Ethio Telecom, the leading internet service provider (ISP), states that there are about 36.4 million internet users in the country, which would represent about 29.5 percent of the population.3 Internet penetration rates vary substantially between urban and rural areas (see A2).

Internet speeds slightly increased during the coverage period. As of February 2024, Ookla reported median mobile data download and upload speeds of 29.49 Mbps (megabits per second) and 17.33 Mbps, respectively.4 The median fixed-line download and upload speeds increased during the coverage period to 8.77 Mbps and 9.5 Mbps, respectively.5

In September 2023, Ethio Telecom launched commercial fifth-generation (5G) mobile network technology at 145 sites in the capital, Addis Ababa.6 This rollout was followed by the launch of Ethio Telecom 5G services in Adama, Jigjiga, Dire Dawa, Harar City, and Haromaya Town.7 8

Electricity infrastructure is somewhat unreliable, and internet access was inhibited by power outages and protracted conflict during the coverage period. Despite recent investments to address the persistent electricity shortfalls in Ethiopia,9 citizens still suffer daily outages.10

Beginning in November 2020, internet and electricity services were disrupted in Tigray Region due to a civil war between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).11 After a peace agreement was signed in November 2022,12 such services were partially restored. In November 2023, Ethio Telecom announced that it had repaired 1,800 kilometers of fiber-optic cables and restored 466 stations in Tigray that had been damaged or destroyed due to armed conflict. 4G service was restored in the cities of Mekele, Shire, Adigrat, and Axum in November 2023, and work was ongoing to restore services to other towns in Tigray.13 Service remained slow and unreliable for much of the region during the coverage period. Electricity was scheduled to be fully restored by June 2024, after the end of the coverage period.14

While a series of price reductions in recent years have made mobile and fixed-line broadband internet services more affordable for Ethiopians,15 prices have been kept artificially high due to state-owned Ethio Telecom’s dominant market position.16 Prior to the price cuts, Ethiopians had spent an average of $85 per month for limited mobile or fixed-line internet access, whereas better-quality services in neighboring Kenya and Uganda cost less than $30 a month.

In January 2022, Ethio Telecom instituted price cuts of up to 45 percent for broadband services as a new, competing service provider prepared to enter the market (see A4).17 In 2023, Cable estimated that the average monthly cost of a broadband package in Ethiopia was $27.41,18 while the average cost of 1 GB of mobile data was $0.68 as of September 2023.19

Telecommunications infrastructure is often absent from rural areas, where nearly 80 percent of the population resides.20 In smaller towns, users often hike to the top of the nearest hill to receive a stronger signal for their mobile devices. Efforts have been made to improve rural connectivity: Ethio Telecom reported completing 41 mobile stations in 10 regions between July and December 2023, as well as expanding 3G service to 92 existing sites.21 Ethio Telecom launched 4G service in parts of Oromia Region in February 2021, making high-speed mobile data accessible outside of Addis Ababa for the first time.22 As of 2022, 33 percent of the population was covered by a 4G network.23

Many Ethiopians rely on cybercafés, universities, and government offices for internet access. In rural areas and small towns, cybercafés are reportedly the most common means of accessing the internet. Cybercafé prices range from 7 to 10 birr ($0.12 to $0.18) for an hour of access. Rates in rural cybercafés tend to be higher. Coffee houses and hotels in some towns offer free Wi-Fi to attract potential customers, making it easier for people to connect to the internet.24

There have been some efforts to address the urban-rural divide and the gender gap in internet usage. In March 2019, Ethio Telecom announced plans to distribute mobile phones to women in rural areas.25 That July, it announced that it would provide mobile customers with 1 GB of internet data and 20 minutes’ worth of local calling credits free of charge.26 In a bid to boost smartphone ownership, Ethio Telecom introduced installment and credit plans for prospective customers in early 2020.27 The impact of such efforts remains unclear.

The government regularly imposes connectivity restrictions, often for political reasons and with little transparency.

In August 2023, following the escalation of conflicts in Amhara Region between the Ethiopia National Defense Force (ENDF) and Fano militias, authorities restricted mobile internet connectivity and disconnected phone lines in 19 cities across Amhara in a partial communications blackout.28 Mobile service was partially restored in November 2023,29 but restrictions were not fully lifted across Amhara until July 2024, after the end of the coverage period.30 During this time, fixed-line internet service reportedly remained accessible, though such connections are uncommon.31 Authorities had previously blocked access to mobile data in several cities in Amhara from April to May 2023 in response to protests over the federal government’s decision to dissolve Amhara’s regional special forces.32

In November 2020, a total internet and telecommunications blackout was imposed in Tigray Region after conflict broke out between federal and Tigrayan security forces.33 The shutdown remained in place until a peace agreement was reached in November 2022.34 The disruption obstructed the flow of information throughout the conflict,35 preventing the media from reporting on military actions by federal forces, allied forces from neighboring Eritrea, and the rebel TPLF that human rights groups later described as mass atrocity crimes.36 The communications restrictions also impeded the documentation of rights abuses and the distribution of humanitarian aid.37 Since November 2022, connectivity in Tigray has been partially restored, though many residents remain offline as the slow process of rebuilding infrastructure continues (see A1).

In February 2022, internet and phone services were reportedly suspended in some parts of Oromia Region, including Kellem Wollega, amid an escalation in violence attributed to Ethiopian forces, forces affiliated with the rebel Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), and Amhara regional forces.38 Kellem Wollega suffered another communications and internet blackout in July 2022.39 Authorities reportedly continued to sporadically restrict connectivity in conflict-affected areas in Oromia,40 though the number and duration of these restrictions could not be verified.41

The Ethiopian government’s predominant control over the country’s telecommunications infrastructure via Ethio Telecom enables it to restrict information flows and access to internet and mobile phone services. As a landlocked country, Ethiopia has no direct access to submarine cable landing stations; instead, it connects to the international internet via satellite, a fiber-optic cable that passes through Sudan and connects to its international gateway, and another that passes through Djibouti to an international undersea cable. All connections to the international internet are completely centralized under Ethio Telecom, allowing the government to cut off traffic at will.

The space for independent initiatives in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector, entrepreneurial or otherwise, is extremely limited. Ethio Telecom long held a firm monopoly on fixed-line and mobile services, and while a second telecommunications provider recently began operating, it still faces considerable disadvantages.

In June 2021, the ECA issued a license that would allow the Global Partnership for Ethiopia to become the country’s second telecommunications provider. The partnership—a consortium led by Safaricom of Kenya that also included Britain’s Vodafone, South Africa’s Vodacom, the Sumitomo Corporation of Japan, and British International Investment (formerly the CDC Group)—bid $850 million for the license.42 Safaricom began providing mobile service in Addis Ababa in October 2022,43 and by the end of 2023, the company reported that its network covered 33 percent of the population.44

Safaricom operates in Ethiopia through an infrastructure-sharing agreement with Ethio Telecom.45 In December 2022, Ethio Telecom threatened to sue Safaricom, blaming it for a service interruption in Afar Region that lasted for several hours. The issue was eventually resolved through an agreement between the two parties.

In November 2022, the Ethiopian government expressed renewed interest in selling a stake in Ethio Telecom, and it raised the size of the stake for sale from 40 to 45 percent in February 2023.46 In November 2023, however, the French telecommunications firm Orange, which had expressed interest in acquiring Ethio Telecom in 2021, announced that it had withdrawn from the process to purchase the stake.47 An estimated $40 million of a $300 million World Bank loan finalized in 2019 was committed to support the diversification of the telecommunications sector, including the restructuring and partial privatization of Ethio Telecom.48

The ECA also announced its intention to issue an additional telecommunications license to new bidders in 2022,49 though it failed to attract new bids from telecom companies over concerns regarding the country’s volatile security situation.50 The government had previously rejected MTN’s bid for a third telecommunications license in 2021.

China is a key source of investment for the Ethiopian telecommunications industry. Two major Chinese firms, ZTE and Huawei, were involved in upgrading Addis Ababa’s mobile broadband networks to 4G technology and expanding 3G networks elsewhere.51 In February 2020, the Ethiopian government paid Huawei 173 million birr ($3.1 million) to install long-term evolution (LTE) network infrastructure in Addis Ababa.52 The partnership enabled the government to maintain its hold over the telecommunications sector,53 though the networks built by the Chinese firms have been criticized for their high cost and poor service.54 In 2018, the Beijing-based telecommunications company Hengbao was contracted to supply SIM cards for Ethio Telecom.55 These relationships have led to growing fears that Chinese entities may be assisting the authorities in developing more robust ICT censorship and surveillance capacities (see C5).56

While the government maintains that ICT infrastructure is crucial for the modernization of the economy,57 onerous government regulations still stymie the sector. For example, imported ICT items are tariffed at the same high rate as luxury items, unlike other imported goods such as construction materials and heavy-duty machinery, which are given duty-free import privileges to encourage investments in infrastructure.58 Ethiopians are required to register their laptops and tablet computers with the Ethiopian customs authority before they travel out of the country, ostensibly to prevent individuals from illegally importing electronic devices. Observers believe the requirement enables officials to monitor citizens’ ICT activities by accessing the devices without consent.59

Cybercafés are subject to burdensome operating requirements under the Telecom Fraud Offences Proclamation of 2012,60 which prohibits them from providing Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services and mandates that owners obtain a license from Ethio Telecom through an opaque process that can take months. Violations of the requirements entail criminal liability, though no cases of prosecution have been reported.

In August 2019, the government established the ECA, the primary regulatory body overseeing the telecommunications sector.61 Prime Minister Abiy appointed Balcha Reba as its first director general; Balcha previously led the ECA’s predecessor, a directorate of the Ministry of Innovation and Technology.62

The ECA has sometimes opened processes for public consultation on its draft directives, including regulations for consumer protection, dispute resolution, and telecommunications licensing.63 However, activists and civil society groups have raised concerns about the ECA’s independence and transparency. In May 2020, Kinfe Yilma, a law professor at Addis Ababa University, wrote that the regulator’s mandate remained unclear, referring to overlapping responsibilities that it appeared to share with other government ministries and agencies.64 The April 2024 approval of Ethiopia’s Personal Data Protection Proclamation was met with concerns from rights groups after the ECA was designated as the data protection authority (see C6), further expanding its mandate.65

In October 2021, the Information Network Security Administration (INSA), a government entity that has de facto authority over the internet with a mandate to protect the communications infrastructure and prevent cybercrime, was placed directly under the supervision of Prime Minister Abiy after he formed a new government in the wake of the June 2021 general elections.66

Score Change: The score improved from 2 to 3 because nationwide blocks on social media platforms were lifted in July 2023.

The government blocks internet content, sometimes including entire social media platforms. In February 2023, the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) expressed outrage at the government for interfering in its internal affairs, after the government recognized a breakaway synod of Oromo bishops.67 The EOTC attempted to organize a public rally that month via social media, which prompted the government to restrict access to prominent social media platforms such as TikTok, Facebook, Telegram, and YouTube. The blocking lasted until July 2023.68

Ethiopia has a nationwide internet blocking and filtering system that can be deployed at any time for political reasons. To filter the internet, authorities generally block specific internet protocol (IP) addresses or domain names at the level of the connection to the international gateway. Deep packet inspection (DPI) is also employed, enabling blocking based on a keyword in the content of a website or of a communication such as an email message.69

Internet users have reported incidents of content removal, and a 2020 law requires social media companies to remove comments that are considered hate speech or disinformation within 24 hours’ notice.

Supporters of the government sometimes push for the suspension of opposition YouTube channels. In October 2022, an Oromo nationalist advocacy group publicized a grievance alleging that Ethio 360, a YouTube-based media outlet, was spreading hate speech and false information, and encouraged supporters to report the channel to YouTube.70 Ethio 360 faced repeated suspensions from YouTube,71 and the channel remained suspended as of April 2024. In March 2024, Ethiopian Satellite Network TV (ESAN TV) expressed its concerns regarding YouTube’s suspension of Dere News, part of ESAN TV’s network, and referred to the suspension as part of a broader pattern in which the platform’s community guidelines have been used to selectively suspend channels that are critical of the Ethiopian government without explanation. ESAN TV’s chief executive, Abebe Gellaw, alleged that government cadres regularly file false reports of community guidelines violations in order to silence critical voices, and called on YouTube to uphold freedom of expression and reinstate the suspended accounts.72

In February 2020, the government passed the Hate Speech and Disinformation Prevention and Suppression Proclamation (see C2). Under the law, social media companies are required to remove content that is reported as disinformation or hate speech within 24 hours of receiving notice, though there are no penalties or sanctions for companies that do not comply.73

Nonstate actors such as organized youth groups have reportedly coerced bloggers and other users into removing objectionable content, usually by way of threats. In the past, politically unfavorable content was often targeted for removal by security officials, who personally sought out users and bloggers and instructed them to take down the material in question.

There are no transparent procedures for determining which websites are blocked or why, precluding any avenues for appeal. The authorities do not publish lists of blocked websites or criteria for how blocking decisions are made, and users receive a generic error message when trying to access blocked content. The decision-making process does not appear to be controlled by a single entity, as various government bodies—including INSA, Ethio Telecom, and the Ministry of Innovation and Technology—seem to maintain their own lists, which has contributed to a phenomenon of inconsistent blocking.74 The lack of transparency is exacerbated by the government’s typical refusal to admit its censorship efforts. Government officials have flatly denied the blocking of websites or jamming of international satellite services while also stating that the government has a legal and a moral responsibility to protect the Ethiopian public from extremist content.

Following the suspension of several digital diaspora media outlets from YouTube (see B2), journalists and supporters raised concerns that the platform was selectively using alleged community guidelines violations to restrict access to critical reporting on the government. After the online outlet Ethio 360 was repeatedly suspended in response to complaints from an Oromo advocacy group (see B2), its supporters petitioned YouTube in August 2023 to review the repeated suspensions of both Ethio 360 and other channels, as well as to improve the transparency of communication to affected creators about the decision-making process for enforcement of community guidelines.75 After the March 2024 suspension of Dere News, part of the ESAN TV network (see B2), Dereje Habtewold, an exiled journalist who operates the channel, stated that he had not received notice of any policy violations prior to the channel’s suspension, and that YouTube did not provide an explanation.76

Social media companies operating in Ethiopia have faced criticism for a lack of transparency in content moderation and enforcement of their community standards. Photos showing violent deaths have in some cases remained on platforms for years without content warnings, despite requests from family members that the posts be removed.77 In December 2021, Meta’s Oversight Board called for the company to conduct a human rights due diligence assessment on the role of its platforms Facebook and Instagram in spreading hate speech that increased the risk of violence in Ethiopia.78 In January 2022, Meta stated that it would examine the feasibility of such an assessment while continuing existing human rights due diligence efforts.79 There is no evidence that this due diligence assessment was ever conducted.80 Meta has stated that it invests in technology to moderate hate speech in Ethiopia, but violent or harmful content is often not removed in a timely fashion. In December 2022, two individuals filed a case in Kenya, where Meta’s East African content moderators are located, accusing the company of failing to remove Facebook posts that incited hatred and violence against an Ethiopian professor who was later murdered and a human rights researcher who fled Ethiopia (see B7).81

Media freedom and freedom of expression were further curtailed in Ethiopia during the coverage period, as the government and security forces used the state of emergency declared in August 2023 to crack down on journalists covering the conflict in Amhara. The online environment was rife with manipulation, misinformation, and targeted harassment (see B5, B7, and C7), contributing to self-censorship.

Arbitrary detentions and harassment of journalists deterred uninhibited reporting on the conflict in Amhara (see C3); similar tactics had previously been directed at journalists covering the conflict in Tigray prior to the 2022 peace agreement for that region.

Ethiopia’s media regulator, the Ethiopian Media Authority (EMA), has politicized licensing to retaliate against media coverage that it deems unfair. In March 2021, the authority’s deputy director general threatened to take measures against non-Ethiopian media organizations that were “disseminating misinformation and unbalanced reporting,” alleging that some of those outlets were coordinating with the TPLF.82 The authority has suspended the press licenses of foreign journalists and triggered their detention and expulsion from the country (see C3).83 In November 2021, the EMA warned four international media outlets that their licenses would be revoked if they continued to disseminate what it called false propaganda and undermined Ethiopia’s national security in their coverage of the Tigray conflict (see B6).84

In May 2023, the EMA temporarily suspended the media license of an association affiliated with the EOTC after it aired a breaking news alert and shared a statement from a committee regarding “lingering tensions” between bishops.85 The EMA claimed that the content could provoke conflict among church followers.86

Self-censorship remains common in the LGBT+ community. Same-sex sexual activity is a criminal offense in Ethiopia,87 deterring open discussion of related topics. Although there are various Ethiopian LGBT+ groups on Facebook, most are run by anonymous accounts.

Online misinformation is rife in Ethiopia. The government has sought to shape the information environment, and some nonstate actors control large numbers of followers who engage in trolling and harassment.

In April 2024, a report from the Amharic-language service of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) revealed that the ruling Prosperity Party was using an extensive “media army” to manipulate public opinion online. A network of Addis Ababa city administrators and district party leaders used WhatsApp and Telegram groups to direct volunteers, frequently drawn from members of the party’s youth and women’s leagues, who employed fake accounts to like and comment positively on government Facebook posts, as well as to attack prominent government critics and media outlets, all with the goal of boosting the image of the government and ruling party online.88 Participation in these social media campaigns was reportedly used as a criterion for evaluating party officials’ performance. Other members of government offices who spoke to the BBC said they had hired people to like, comment on, and share their official posts. Following the three-month media investigation, Meta reported that it had removed a network of accounts and pages that violated the company’s fraudulent behavior policy by mass-producing comments to artificially increase the reach of Ethiopian government posts.89 The Prosperity Party denied using fake or paid accounts, though it stated that it encouraged party members to promote its positions on their pages.

After the April 2023 assassination of Girma Yeshitila, the head of the ruling Prosperity Party in Amhara Region, the purported recording of a phone conversation between alleged members of Amhara’s informal Fano militias surfaced online, suggesting that the militia had plotted to murder Girma. The authenticity of the audio, which was posted by an anonymous account and then circulated by government supporters and state-affiliated media, was contested by Amhara activists, who claimed that it was doctored by government authorities as a pretext to prosecute Amhara activists and journalists.90 A fact-checking organization then disputed claims that a digital forensics company had proven the audio to be false and generated using artificial intelligence (AI) tools.91 After the release of the audio on social media, 47 suspects, including journalists, were detained on accusations of plotting to overthrow the government (see C3).92 That same month, another recorded phone conversation, allegedly between journalist Meskerem Abera and prominent Amhara physician Wondwosen Assefa, was leaked by government supporters on the social media platform X (known as Twitter until 2023); the recording featured criticism of the government, and both individuals were arrested.93

In November 2021, Facebook removed a post by Prime Minister Abiy because it allegedly incited and supported violence. In the post, the prime minister vowed to “bury” his government’s enemies.94

In June 2021, Facebook announced that it had removed a network of inauthentic accounts associated with INSA. The accounts posted primarily in Amharic and promoted Abiy, his Prosperity Party, criticism of Egypt and Sudan related to their objections to Ethiopia’s Blue Nile dam project, and criticism of opposition groups including the Oromo Liberation Front, the Ethiopian Democratic Party, and the TPLF.95 In response, the director of INSA accused Facebook of removing accounts that posted about the reality in Ethiopia and announced that it was building a domestic social media platform to replace Facebook and WhatsApp.96

The government and the TPLF both sought to shape the online information environment during the Tigray conflict. Social media accounts falsely claiming to represent diplomats, journalists, and other experts spread progovernment narratives online.97 The government attempted to label online critics as sources of disinformation and established an online fact-checker that spread partisan narratives in response to purported misinformation,98 further degrading trust in information shared on social media.99 The TPLF allegedly coordinated party loyalists in the “Digital Woyane” campaign,100 in which participants posed as members of different ethnic groups to incite tensions on social media. Ethiopian officials and progovernment social media users accused pro-Tigrayan accounts of being Digital Woyane members coordinated by the TPLF, without substantiation.101 Misinformation in general proliferated during the Tigray conflict (see B7), exacerbated by the restriction of internet access in Tigray (see A3).

Opposition groups, journalists, and dissidents used the contemptuous Amharic colloquial term “Kokas” to describe progovernment commentators under former prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn (2012–18).102 According to observers, Kokas posted negative comments about Ethiopian journalists and opposition groups on Facebook and Twitter and were known to receive benefits such as money, land, and employment promotions in return.103 Supporters of the former government have accused the current government of using the same manipulation tactics, referring to supporters of the current government as “Tekas.”

Lack of adequate funding is a significant challenge for independent online media in Ethiopia, as the risk of government reprisal dissuades local businesses from advertising with politically critical websites. A 2012 Advertising Proclamation also prohibits advertisements from firms “whose capital is shared by foreign nationals.”104

The process for launching a website on the country’s .et domain has become less expensive in recent years, with a new domain now costing 1,375 birr or $120.105

The Media Proclamation, which took effect in April 2021, reformed media laws in the country. It restructured the Ethiopian Broadcast Authority into the EMA; established a mandate for the EMA to regulate all media outlets, including online media; and created a new self-regulatory mechanism for the media industry. The reform package also decriminalized defamation (see C1).106 In June 2021, the EMA began licensing online media outlets and monitoring the 30 that were initially registered.107

In July 2021, the EMA recalled the certification of registration of Addis Standard, a prominent news site, causing the outlet to suspend operations; a government official cited content published by Addis Standard that allegedly advanced the agenda of the TPLF.108 After the outlet’s executives met with EMA leadership, the regulator returned its registration certification.109

Various constraints impede the development of diverse media outlets and perspectives online. With few exceptions, the media tend to favor the government in their coverage. Domestic usage of social media platforms, particularly Facebook, X, YouTube, Telegram, and Instagram, has been expanding and slowly replacing the popularity of older blogging services, but these platforms also suffer from misinformation and polarization.110

The spread of unconfirmed information, the phenomenon of purportedly false news, and the growing problem of hate speech in the context of ethnic clashes have had a major negative effect on the credibility of legitimate online information. In February 2023, when the rift between the EOTC and the government dominated the online conversation, hate speech and misinformation prevailed on social media despite the blocking of several platforms (see B1). Influencers on TikTok posted videos that featured ethnic slurs, hate speech, and in some cases explicit calls for violence against other ethnic groups.111 The Ethiopian diaspora community has also played a significant role in spreading and amplifying disinformation and hateful or polarizing speech online, both in support of and in opposition to the Ethiopian government.112

Misinformation has led to offline violence and made the documentation of human rights abuses more difficult in Ethiopia. Social media companies, especially Meta, have been accused of failing to take adequate and timely measures to remove hate speech and other content that could incite violence from their platforms.113 In November 2021, university professor Meareg Amare was murdered following the spread of Facebook posts inciting hatred and violence against him, which the company failed to remove until after his death (see B3).114 Fisseha Tekle, a researcher at Amnesty International, fled Ethiopia and said he feared for his life after he received a flood of harassment on Facebook for his work uncovering human rights violations, the group reported in late 2022.115

The Tigray conflict spurred widespread misinformation on social media sites. The government and the TPLF both sought to control the information environment (see B5), with journalists facing harassment and accusations that they were misinformed.116 Connectivity restrictions in Tigray made it much more difficult to access news about what was happening on the ground (see A3), facilitating the spread of speculation and falsehoods.117

Ethiopian online media lack diversity in some sensitive areas, such as coverage of LGBT+ issues. In August 2023, LGBT+ rights groups blamed a wave of harassment and attacks against the country’s LGBT+ community on a series of TikTok posts calling for violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity (see C7), which the platform allegedly failed to remove in a timely manner.118

Despite hostile conditions caused by poor internet access and repressive laws, online activism has gained considerable momentum and influence in recent years. Social media and other communications platforms have been integral to the mobilization of widespread antigovernment protests in Oromia and Amhara Regions since 2015.119 Activists have also used social media to consistently report on arrests, trials, and releases of political prisoners. The government has routinely shut down networks and blocked social media applications in order to hinder such mobilization efforts (see A3 and B1).

During the coverage period, Amhara activists and diaspora-based advocacy groups used the hashtag #WaronAmhara on X to highlight the conflict affecting the region.120

In February 2023, the Ethiopian government restricted access to TikTok, Facebook, Telegram, and YouTube in response to a planned protest against the government’s support for a breakaway synod within the EOTC; the blocks were not lifted until July 2023 (see B1).

Social media users mobilized around the Tigray conflict and the need for humanitarian aid. Under the #TigrayGenocide and #NoMore hashtags on Twitter, users shared information about the ways in which Tigrayans were affected.121 The #NoMore hashtag has also been used to demand the end of foreign interference in Ethiopia’s domestic affairs.122 Appeals made under the banner of the #AllowAccesstoTigray hashtag demanded that the government grant humanitarian access to the region, where residents faced mass food insecurity and physical attacks.123 In November 2021, Twitter suspended the trending hashtags feature in Ethiopia, alleging that it was being used to incite physical harm. Protesters then used the #NoMore campaign to criticize Twitter for limiting their ability to share their narratives on the war.124

The law formally guarantees fundamental freedoms for Ethiopian internet users, but these rights have been routinely flouted in practice. The 1995 constitution provides for freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and access to information, while also prohibiting censorship.125

The Media Proclamation, which reformed media laws in the country, took effect in April 2021. Prime Minister Abiy linked the new law to support for freedom of expression and press freedom; it allowed for partial foreign ownership of media companies and decriminalized defamation.126 The 2008 Freedom of Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation, known as the press law, also affirms constitutional safeguards for fundamental rights.127 The Media Proclamation repealed problematic provisions of the 2008 law that restricted free expression, such as complex registration processes for media outlets and high fines for defamation.128 The criminal code previously penalized defamation with a fine or up to one year in prison.129

Article 93 of the constitution permits the government to suspend the “political and democratic rights” when a state of emergency is declared.130

In August 2023, having restricted mobile connectivity (see A3), the Council of Ministers declared a six-month nationwide state of emergency due to an outbreak of conflict between the federal army and Fano militias in Amhara Region.131 In February 2024, Parliament extended the state of emergency by four months.132 During the state of emergency, authorities cracked down on media, detaining dozens of journalists and activists for months without charge (see C3).

The judiciary is officially independent, but in practice it is subject to political interference, and judgments rarely deviate from government policy.

Several laws that were designed to restrict and penalize legitimate online activities remained in place during the coverage period.

In February 2020, the government enacted the Hate Speech and Disinformation Prevention and Suppression Proclamation, a law intended to combat online disinformation and speech that “deliberately promotes hatred, discrimination, or attack against a person.” The law criminalizes posting or sharing content on social media that authorities determine to cause violence or disturbances of public order. Its penalties include fines of up to 100,000 birr ($1,800) or up to five years’ imprisonment, with the steepest punishments for users with more than 5,000 followers. The law does not carry penalties for tagging such content.133

The 2016 Computer Crime Proclamation also criminalized an array of online activities.134 Civil society activists expressed concern that the law would be used to intensify a crackdown on critical commentary, political opposition, and public protest.135 For example, content that “incites fear, violence, chaos, or conflict among people” can be punished with up to three years in prison.136 Other problematic provisions ban the distribution of unsolicited messages to multiple email addresses (spam), which carries up to five years in prison,137 and the dissemination of defamatory content, which can be penalized with up to 10 years in prison.138 The latter provision was nullified by the 2021 Media Proclamation’s decriminalization of defamation in the media (see C1).

The 2012 Telecom Fraud Offences Proclamation extended the violations and penalties defined in the 2009 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation and the criminal code to electronic communications, including both fixed-line and mobile internet services.139 However, the antiterrorism legislation was repealed in January 2020.140

Online journalists were arrested in large numbers during the coverage period, as the government cracked down on media outlets and reporters in reprisal for their work. Users occasionally receive harsh sentences for online defamation.

In March 2024, authorities in Somali Region arrested journalist Muhiyadin Mohammed Ali, who publishes on his Facebook page, and charged him under the Hate Speech and Disinformation Prevention and Suppression Proclamation for a video in which he criticized road closures during a celebration by “nonbelievers.”141 He was held at an undisclosed location by security forces for six days before he was transferred to a police station. Police refused to release him even after he posted 30,000 birr ($530) in bail in March 2024. Muhiyadin was sentenced to two years in prison in May 2024; he appealed the conviction. He had previously been arrested in 2023 for his criticism of the regional ruling party on Facebook Live.142

In May 2024, a Facebook user known as Petros Ashenafi Kebede was sentenced in absentia to eight years in prison under the 2016 Computer Crime Proclamation for using his platform to defame actress Helen Bedilu.143 The posts in question were made prior to the 2021 Media Proclamation’s decriminalization of defamation (see C1). Bedilu dropped charges against another Facebook user, Yesuf Legas, after he issued an apology for using his platform to defame her and her family, and for violating the liberty and reputation of persons under Article 13 of the Computer Crime Proclamation.144

Authorities have used the state of emergency enacted in August 2023 to arbitrarily detain many online journalists reporting on the Amhara conflict, holding them in military prison camps for months without formal charges.

In August 2023, journalist Abay Zewdu from the YouTube-based Amhara Media Center was arrested and sent to a military camp in Awash Arba after 11 days in detention. He was transferred to a prison in Addis Ababa in January 2024, where he remained detained on terrorism-related charges as of April 2024.145

Tewodros Zerfu, cohost of a political program and commentator, respectively, for the online outlets Yegna TV and Menelik Television, was accused of breaching the state of emergency and detained without charge in Addis in August 2023; he was then transferred to the Awash Arba military camp (see C7).146 His Yegna TV cohost, Nigussie Berhanu, was detained four days later and also later transferred to Awash Arba.147 Tewodros was released in June 2024.148

In August 2023, authorities arrested Bekalu Alamrew, founder and chief editor of YouTube-based media outlet Alpha Media, who was covering the conflict between the military and Fano militias in Amhara Region.149 He was detained at Awash Arba until his release in June 2024.150 Bekalu has been a subject of multiple arbitrary arrests in the past, including as a journalist at Awlo Media, an online outlet that was shuttered by the government in 2021.151

Belay Manaye, a cofounder of the YouTube-based media outlet Ethio News who has reported extensively on the conflict in Amhara, was arbitrarily detained in November 2023 and sent to the Awash Arba military camp in December (see C7).152 Belay was released without charge in June 2024.153

Yidnekachew Kebede of Negari TV, another YouTube-based outlet, was arrested in August 2023 for allegedly "aiding 'anti-peace elements'” and producing videos intended to provoke violence. Before his arrest, he had published Facebook posts criticizing the government’s failure to protect civilians and the detention of activists and other civilians. Yidnekachew was detained for two weeks before he was granted a 6,000 birr ($110) bail without charge in September 2023.154

Firew Tekle, an employee of the YouTube channel Ethiopia Selam, was arrested in September 2023 on accusations of using social media to support militias fighting the Ethiopian military. He was released on bail in October 2023.155

In April 2023, online political commentators Meskerem Abera, Abay Zewdu, and Dawit Begashaw were arrested by security forces, prompting international advocacy groups to call for their release.156 According to local reports, police accused Meskerem Abera, who founded the YouTube-based media outlet Ethio Nikat, of providing military training to informal groups. Meskerem had previously been detained for several weeks in December 2022 on charges of using social media to undermine the government.157 Later that month, authorities arrested 47 individuals in connection with the assassination of a senior Amhara official (see B5), and released a list of 11 individuals outside Ethiopia whom the government sought to extradite, including online journalists from Ethio 360 who were located in the United States, as well as Gobeze Sisay, a journalist with Yegna TV, who was arrested in Djibouti after fleeing the country and returned to Ethiopia in May 2023.158

Meskerem, as well as Genet Asmamaw, Dawit Begashaw, and Gobeze Sisay, were charged with terrorism in June 2023. They were transferred to a maximum-security prison in Addis Ababa after being denied bail in July 2023. In December 2023, the Federal Supreme Court suspended their trial indefinitely, pending a ruling on codefendants who were charged in absentia.

In May 2023, after being abducted and going missing for two weeks,159 social media activist Ermias Mekuria appeared in court on terrorism charges.160 His case was ongoing at the end of the coverage period.

Authorities have also detained foreign journalists or revoked their accreditations over their reporting. Antoine Galindo, a French web journalist, was arrested in February 2024 and detained for a week on allegations of trying to “create chaos and violence” after he interviewed a member of the Oromo Liberation Front.161 Authorities said he had “overstepped” his accreditation and that he was not authorized to cover domestic Ethiopian politics.162 Galindo was deported after his release.

In May 2023, the federal police announced that they would take action against individuals who “spread false information to mislead the public” on social media.163 The statement also claimed that those spreading false information were attempting to undermine investigations into suspected terrorists.

Online media contributors were arrested amid the tensions surrounding the EOTC schism in early 2023. In February of that year, security forces detained Tewodros Asfaw, a founder of the YouTube channel Ethio Selam, which is known for its criticism of the government. After spending nine days in detention, he was released on 30,000 birr ($530) in bail.164 He was detained again in April 2023 and held for two months before being released on 15,000 birr ($270) in bail in June 2023.165 Asfaw fled the country a month after his release (see C7).166

Online journalists covering conditions in Tigray continue to face arrest and detention. Three online journalists, Teshager Tsigab, Mehari Kahsay, and Mehari Selemon, were detained and beaten in September 2023 for filming opposition protests in Tigray (see C7). Kahsay and Selemon were released on bail after two days in detention; Teshager was freed after four days. Officials reportedly accused them of participating in illegal protests, but none were formally charged.167

In January 2023, a court in Mekelle, the capital of Tigray Region, acquitted three out of five journalists from Tigrai TV who had been detained for eight months by the TPLF-led regional government. They were accused of spreading misinformation and enemy propaganda due to their work during the period that the outlet was controlled by the federally backed Tigray interim regional administration. The other two journalists facing the same charges, Hailemichael Gesesse and Dawit Meknonnen, remained in prison as of December 2023, according to the International Federation of Journalists.168

Anonymous communication is compromised by strict SIM-card registration requirements. Upon purchase of a SIM card through Ethio Telecom, Safaricom, or an authorized reseller, individuals must provide their full name, address, government-issued identification number, and a passport-sized photograph. Ethio Telecom’s database of SIM registrants enables the government to terminate individuals’ SIM cards and bar them from registering new ones. Internet service subscribers are also required to register their personal details, including their home addresses, with the government.

There are no explicit restrictions on encryption, though police officers and members of the security services may assume malign intent on the part of individuals who use encryption.

Government surveillance of online and mobile phone communications is pervasive in Ethiopia, and the relevant laws and practices have not been reformed since Prime Minister Abiy took office in 2018. Police have been known to force detainees to hand over passwords to their phones and social media accounts, enabling manual searches of their devices.

Activists have reported in previous years that their phone communications were under surveillance. A recording of an alleged phone conversation between journalist Meskerem Abera and a Fano militia member was leaked and circulated online by progovernment bloggers in April 2023.169 The authenticity of the recording could not be independently verified, but its circulation raised concerns that Meskerem was under communications surveillance.170

In June 2024, after the end of the coverage period, a bill was introduced that would allow authorities to intercept digital communications without judicial authorization in cases of counterfeiting or terrorism financing; investigators would also be allowed to monitor network servers and other computer systems without a court order, raising significant concerns that such a law would be vulnerable to abuse if enacted.171

The 2016 Computer Crime Proclamation strengthened the government’s surveillance powers, enabling real-time monitoring or interception of communications when authorized by the justice minister. The law also obliges service providers to store records of all communications and metadata for at least a year.172

Ethiopia’s telecommunications and surveillance infrastructure has been developed in part through investments from Chinese companies with backing from the Chinese government, leading to strong suspicions that the Ethiopian government has implemented highly intrusive surveillance practices modeled on the Chinese system. A 2014 Human Rights Watch report revealed significant evidence that the Ethiopian government had deployed a centralized system developed by Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE to monitor mobile networks and the internet.173

ZTE’s customer-management database (known as ZSmart) has been installed at Ethio Telecom, providing the government with full access to user information and allowing it to intercept short-message service (SMS) text messages and record phone conversations.174 ZSmart also allows security officials to locate targeted individuals through real-time geolocation tracking of mobile phones.175 While it is unclear whether the government has made full use of ZTE’s sophisticated surveillance system, the authorities frequently present intercepted emails and phone calls as evidence during trials of journalists and bloggers, or as a scare tactic during interrogations.176

Exiled dissidents have been frequent targets of surveillance-enabling malicious software, or spyware, over the years. In 2018, the Toronto-based Citizen Lab published research detailing how spyware from an Israeli company was used against Jawar Mohammed, an Oromo political activist and the once-exiled executive director of the diaspora-run news outlet Oromia Media Network (OMN), which had been banned by the previous government for allegedly inciting violence and promoting terrorism.177

Previous Citizen Lab research published in 2015 found that Remote Control System (RCS) spyware had been used against employees of ESAT, a diaspora-run media outlet based in the United States, in 2014.178 Analysis of the RCS attacks uncovered credible links to INSA.179

Ethiopian law allows the government to obtain user information from telecommunications service providers.

The Computer Crime Proclamation requires service providers to store records of all communications and related data for at least a year, and this information must be shared with the government if requested.180 The lack of separation between state-owned Ethio Telecom and the government raises significant concerns about the company’s degree of cooperation with authorities.

Following a system glitch at the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) that allowed customers to freely withdraw the bank’s money from automated teller machines, resulting in significant losses, CBE proceeded with a “name and shame” campaign to recoup the missing funds. The company published the names and photographs of 117 customers who had not returned the money they obtained during the glitch.181 CBE’s decision to publish individuals’ personal information was highly criticized by rights groups as a violation of privacy.182

The Council of Minsters approved the Personal Data Protection Proclamation in October 2023,183 and in April 2024 Parliament passed it into law (see A5).184 The final draft establishes the ECA as the agency responsible for overseeing and enforcing the implementation of the law. Rights groups expressed concern about the independence of the ECA and called for an independent body accountable directly to the House of People’s Representatives—the lower house of Parliament—to implement the law.185

Online journalists and ordinary users face the threat of extralegal violence, particularly amid the heightened interethnic hatred associated with armed conflicts in Tigray and Amhara. Journalists and activists who were arbitrarily imprisoned in military camps under the state of emergency during the coverage period reported experiencing torture and inhumane conditions in detention. The threat of violence or arbitrary detention has led dozens of journalists to flee the country.

Authorities used the state of emergency declared in August 2023 to arbitrarily detain journalists who reported on the conflict in Amhara Region for months without charge (see C3). Many of those detained were held at a military prison camp in Awash Arba that is notorious for its inhumane conditions and human rights abuses.186 Belay Manaye and Tewodros Zerfu, two online journalists who were held in the Awash Arba camp until June 2024 (see C3), were both injured after a sandstorm demolished part of the camp in February 2024, and they were not able to receive medical treatment for their injuries.187 Prisoners released from Awash Arba have described physical and psychological torture inflicted on detainees.188 Those detained at the same camp during the earlier conflict in Tigray had similarly reported facing torture and inhumane conditions.189

According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, at least 54 journalists have fled Ethiopia since 2020.190 In January 2024, a journalist for the YouTube channel Ethio News, Belete Kassa, reported that he was under surveillance and that security agents had been asking questions about him. He fled the country in March 2024, reportedly fearing for his life and that he would be arbitrarily arrested like his outlet’s cofounder (see C3).191

Tewodros Asfaw, founder of the YouTube-based media outlet Ethio Selam, fled the country in July 2023 due to harassment and surveillance he had faced from intelligence services after being released from prison a month earlier (see C3).192

Two journalists with the YouTube-based media outlet Ethio Forum, Yayesew Shimeles and Abebe Bayu, were abducted in June 2022.193 Both were released in July after being held for more than a week.194 In June 2023, they announced that they had left Ethiopia and began posting Ethio Forum videos from abroad.195

In April 2023, Genet Asmamaw, a journalist for the YouTube channel Yeneta, was abducted and beaten by security forces after she interviewed the former commander of Amhara’s regional special forces,196 prompting international organizations to call for an investigation to hold the perpetrators accountable.197 She was later arrested on terrorism charges and remained in prison as of the end of the coverage period (see C3).

Hate speech proliferated during the 2020–22 Tigray conflict, with many social media users employing ethnic slurs to characterize the opposing side, or harassing people simply for sharing content related to the conflict. A 2021 report that studied online misinformation in Ethiopia found that about a quarter of sampled posts contained hate speech, with an even greater amount of hate speech shared in response to those posts.198 Ethiopians reported an escalation of violent ethnicity-based attacks during the conflict, including incidents targeting Tigrayan and Amhara people.199 Experts raised concerns that online hate speech was contributing to an environment conducive to offline abuse and violence.200

Journalists reported experiencing increased online harassment during the Tigray conflict,201 especially as internet users mobilized along progovernment and pro-TPLF lines (see B5, B7, and B8). Lucy Kassa, a journalist who reported on abuses committed in Tigray, fled to Nairobi after she was targeted with posts inciting violence on social media. A government account then called for her arrest, and activists called for violence against her and urged the government to “do something” about her.202 Fearing for her life in Nairobi, Kassa fled again to Europe in 2022.203 Tom Gardner, a journalist for the Economist whose accreditation was revoked in May 2022, accused the government of using social media to spread claims that he was “aligned with the TPLF,” which prompted harassment against him online.204

Almost a third of 487 Ethiopian women surveyed by Pollicy, a technology consulting firm, in a 2020 study reported experiencing online sexual harassment, stalking, or other forms of harassment.205 LGBT+ people also experience online harassment. An LGBT+ rights group reported a wave of online harassment and physical attacks in August 2023 as a result of TikTok posts that claimed to identify LGBT+ individuals and incited violence against members of the LGBT+ community; advocates accused the platform of failing to remove the posts in a timely manner (see B7). One student who was targeted by two such videos was severely beaten by his classmates and suffered a fracture to his cheek after the first TikTok item appeared. Several LGBT+ Ethiopians reported fleeing the country in response to the uptick in online abuse and ensuing offline violence.

Government institutions are frequently targeted with cyberattacks, though reported hacks directed against the media and civil society have decreased in recent years.

In October 2023, INSA reported that it had thwarted 96 percent of cyberattacks targeting Ethiopian institutions, preventing 23 billion birr ($410 million) in damages and lost revenue.206 Malware and denial-of-service attacks were the most common types, according to INSA’s head of cybersecurity audits and evaluation, who also stated that attacks were carried out by perpetrators “who wanted to profit from insecurity and political instability.”207

In April and May 2023, the cybersecurity firm Kaspersky identified a hacking team called Mysterious Team Bangladesh (MTB) that targeted at least 10 Ethiopian government, financial, and energy institutions with distributed denial-of-service attacks.208 The duration and effects of these attacks were unknown. In March 2024, the same group claimed responsibility for an attack that temporarily disabled the website of Ethiopia’s Ministry of Health.209