Users in Belarus benefit from the country’s well-developed information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure. Access to the internet has increased in recent years.

According to official statistics, 91.5 percent of the population was online by the end of 2023, an increase of 2 percent over the previous year.1 DataReportal reported that there were 8.48 million internet users in January 2024, resulting in an internet penetration rate of 89.5 percent.2 Belarus’s internet penetration regularly ranks as one of the highest in Central and Eastern Europe.3

The country maintains high fixed- and mobile-broadband penetration rates. The government reported a fixed-broadband penetration rate of 35 percent and a mobile broadband internet penetration rate of 103 percent.4

According to speed-testing company Ookla, as of May 2024, the median mobile-broadband download speed was 11.55 megabits per second (Mbps), and the median fixed-broadband download speed was 63.06 Mbps.5

As of February 2024, 2G and 3G mobile networks covered 99.3 percent and 98.6 percent of the territory of Belarus, respectively.6 In April 2024, 4G long term evolution (LTE) services, offered by mobile providers via the state-run Belarusian Cloud Technologies (beCloud),7 the sole owner of the country’s 4G infrastructure, covered 93 percent of the country’s territory and 99 percent of the population.8 A Belarusian government official declared in late 2023 that the deployment of 5G networks in the country was uncertain due to Western sanctions and “waning interest.”9

Among fixed-broadband connections, gigabit passive optical network (GPON) fiber-optic technology continues to replace older DSL (digital subscriber line) technology. Belarus is among Europe’s leaders in terms of penetration rates for household fiber-optic communication lines.10 The number of GPON subscribers exceeded 2.95 million by the end of 2023.11

Internet access in Belarus continues to be relatively affordable. In 2023, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) found that 2 GB of mobile data cost 0.57 percent of gross national income (GNI) per capita, while 5 GB of fixed broadband data cost 0.65 percent of GNI per capita;12 both were improvements over the previous year. Belarus regularly ranks among the countries with the cheapest internet.13

Some digital inequalities persist, but they are narrowing. In 2023, 93.8 percent of urban residents were internet users, compared with 83.7 percent of rural residents.14 Minsk, the capital city, remains better connected than the rest of the country.15 The urban-rural digital divide is reflected more strongly among certain segments of the population. In cities and towns, for example, 60.7 percent of citizens aged 65 and over used the internet in 2022; in villages the number was only 33.9 percent.16

As of 2023, more Belarusian women (92.1 percent) than men (90.7 percent) were online.17 The percentage of Belarusian women using the internet is higher than both the European and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) averages.18

The government did not shut down internet service during the coverage period, as it did in 2020 and 2021. In August 2023, local disruptions in mobile internet coverage were reported near the camp of Wagner paramilitary forces in Tsel following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner military forces, in a plane crash.19 At the end of December 2023, the government briefly blocked YouTube during while Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the leader of Belarus’s political opposition in exile, delivered her New Year’s address (see B1).

The government owns and oversees the backbone connection to the international internet and controls much of the information and communications technology (ICT) sector. 20 Belarus has a limited number of internet service providers (ISPs),21 and the market lacks diversity; only two state-run entities, the National Center for Traffic Exchange (NTEC) and Beltelecom, are permitted to handle connections with ISPs outside the country.22 The NTEC provides peering services through the BY-IX internet exchange point (IXP). Beltelecom, the country’s largest telecommunications company, owns and operates Belarus’s backbone network, upon which all other ISPs depend. Through these entities, the government can throttle or cut connections at will.

The authorities initiated a nationwide internet shutdown during the presidential election in August 202023 and then ordered localized and intermittent internet outages over the following two months, particularly during frequent Sunday protests.24 Internet connections were also reportedly jammed at protests and rallies that took place in June 2020, ahead of the election.25 The internet had previously been jammed in May and November 2019.

In 2021, the government amended the Telecommunications Law to allow it to shut down or limit the operation of telecommunications networks and facilities in response to alleged threats to national security involving the internet.26 The revised legislation provides the authorities with official grounds to implement internet shutdowns.

Article 13 of the Media Law permits the government to block websites “in the event of a threat to national security.”27

By law, all entities operating with .by and .бел domain names must use Belarusian hosting services (see C6).

The government strives to connect citizens for the purpose of economic development. However, it strictly limits the autonomy of service providers.28

By the end of 2023, 170 companies were providing telecommunications services in Belarus, a slight decrease from 2022.29 However, the state-owned Beltelecom remained dominant. Belarus had 3.2 million fixed-broadband subscribers in 2023; of that number, 2.5 million (78 percent) were through Beltelecom.30

Belarus has three major mobile service providers. The largest is MTS Belarus, a joint venture of Beltelecom and Russia’s Mobile TeleSystems. MTS Belarus had 5.7 million subscribers as of mid-2024.31 A1, which is part of the Telekom Austria Group, had more than 4.8 million mobile subscribers.32 In 2022, Turkcell acquired the remaining 20 percent stake in the Belarusian Telecommunications Network (BeST), branded as “life:),” which it did not already own, from the government’s State Committee on Property.33 As of March 2024, life:) had 1.5 million subscribers.34 In 2022, the government provided a license allowing Beltelecom itself to provide mobile services; the company began offering packages in December of that year.35

There is no independent regulator for ICTs in Belarus. The government established Beltelecom in 1995 and continues to oversee the entity via the Ministry of Communications and Informatization. In addition, the presidential administration’s Operations and Analysis Center (OAC),36 which initially was a subdivision of the State Security Committee (KGB), has the authority to oversee ISPs, set standards for information security, conduct online surveillance, and manage Belarus’s top-level domains. A 2019 presidential decree provided the OAC with additional powers related to international cooperation on matters of information security and called for it to serve as a national center for responding to computer-related incidents.37 Other governmental bodies with authority over ICTs include the State Telecommunications Inspectorate, State Control Committee, State Security Committee (KGB), and Prosecutor General’s Office.

While Belarus is home to a few ICT-related business groups, such as the Infopark Association and the Confederation of Digital Business, they were founded by, are supported by, and cooperate closely with the government. The Belinfocom Association, a nongovernmental organization (NGO), aims to represent and protect the interests of the privately-owned ICT companies it counts as members. In the past, it lobbied against Beltelecom’s monopolistic status, but it now appears to act more as an advocacy organization that works with the government to advance the development of the ICT sector.38

The government has continued blocking online news and information resources, including virtually all independent media and civil society websites. Although the list of blocked websites is itself restricted, the rights group Human Constanta found that there were over 10,000 blocked sites by the end of 2022.39 The group reported that approximately 2,000 additional sites were blocked in 2023.40 From 2020 to 2023, more than 4,000 websites and social media channels critical of the government were restricted, including more than 1,300 Telegram channels and chats, 491 websites belonging to independent media outlets, and 76 sites focusing on human rights and assistance to the repressed.41

The government began restricting access to independent news websites in 2014, and dramatically expanded efforts to block critical news, human rights, civil society, and political-opposition sites in the wake of the August 2020 presidential election and ensuing protests.42 The 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian government, which Belarusian authorities assisted with by allowing the use of its territory as a launching ground for attacks and in other ways, further spurred the blocking campaign.

After 2020, authorities also began restricting the ability to access some state websites from outside of Belarus.43 In 2024, these restrictions were expanded to include the websites of state media.44 This whitelisting limits foreigners and Belarusian exiles, including those working for online media and analytical groups, from carrying out their professional duties.

During the coverage period, the government continued to target the country’s remaining independent media websites, which were mainly regional publications. From May 2023 until January 2024, authorities fully or temporarily blocked Intex-Press, Brestnote.by, Palessie Life, NewGrodno.by,45 My Brest,46 and the website of the local television channel Ranak.47 During the coverage period, virtually all of the websites of the country’s major independent media organizations and NGOs remained blocked, with the exception of the Onliner web portal, which does not publish political content.

The political crackdown that began in 2020 led to an exodus of independent media from Belarus (see B7). As they departed, the sites left the national .by domain and reregistered their websites abroad, prompting Belarusian authorities to block the new foreign-based sites. In May 2021, the government blocked the domain portal of TUT.by, the country’s most popular and influential online news source.48 At the time of its blocking, TUT.by had 3.3 million daily users.49 In July 2021, former members of TUT.by launched a successor to the site, Zerkalo.io, that is based outside of Belarus. The government immediately blocked Zerkalo.io.50 In August 2023, Plan B, a new émigré publication by a former editor of TUT.BY, was also blocked.51

In 2021, Lukashenka launched a “clean-up” of “bandit” and “foreign agent” NGOs in Belarus, including media, think tank, and human rights organizations (see B6). Between 2021 and 2022, the government shut down more than 750 NGOs; another 400 decided to cease their operations due to official pressure.52 In 2023, another 336 NGOs ceased their operations or were shut down by the government.53 The closure of at least 1,665 independent groups between September 2020 and May 202454 —about half of all NGOs in Belarus55 —also resulted in the loss of their news, information, research, analytical, and cultural websites and other online publications. While some NGOs continue their activities from abroad, their new websites are routinely blocked.

The government also continued blocking websites peripherally connected to independent online information sources. In 2022, the government began blocking Patreon, a popular crowdfunding platform used by Belarusians to support creative content produced by bloggers, writers, and podcasters.56 In December 2023, authorities blocked the photo-sharing website Flickr.57

Authorities have also focused on restricting Belarusian-language websites, as they consider Belarusian to be the language of the opposition. In July 2023, the government blocked Kamunikat.org, the largest online source of Belarusian-language literature.58 In October 2023, a prosecutor in the Minsk region issued a decision that restricted Pastora.by, which promotes pro-Belarusian symbols.59

The government also blocks the websites of foreign news organizations that cover Belarus, including the Belarusian service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Deutsche Welle (DW), and the Voice of America (VOA) network Current Time.60 In August 2023, the authorities began restricting access to the Lithuanian and Latvian editions of Delfi, one of the most popular news portals in the Baltic States.61

Following the Kremlin’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Belarusian government began restricting access to Ukrainian websites reporting on the war as Belarusian consumption of Ukrainian news content increased. As of February 2023, at least nine Ukrainian media outlets had been blocked.62 The Belarusian authorities have similarly blocked Russian websites whose coverage of the invasion deviates from Kremlin talking points.63 The Belarusian government has also blocked a site which offered legal services to conscripts who did not wish to serve in the Belarusian military.64

As of January 2023, the Russian government had blocked the domains of 27 independent Belarusian news websites since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.65 In February 2024, the Belarusian and Russian governments initiated a process to create a “unified” database of “extremists” that would ensure websites banned in Russia would also be banned in Belarus.66

On December 31, 2023, the government partially blocked YouTube for at least 20 minutes to prevent Belarusians from watching Tsikhanouskaya’s New Year’s speech.67 This was reportedly the first time the authorities had attempted to block an entire social media platform in the country.68

In May 2024, Psiphon, Turbo VPN, HUB VPN and TunnelBear were inaccessible in Belarus, possibly in connection with the elections being conducted exclusively through a virtual private network (VPN) by the Coordination Council, an opposition political structure operating in exile (see C4).69

The Belarusian government also continued blocking messaging channels during the coverage period. According to official sources, authorities restricted access either fully or partially to over 3,000 such channels, primarily Telegram channels, in 2022. Approximately 5,000 channels had been blocked during the previous seven years.70 Most of the individual groups and accounts were blocked due to alleged “extremist” content (see B2). Social media and messaging platforms remain available, though Lukashenka has discussed following the Kremlin’s lead in seeking to block them.71

Both government bodies and state-owned and private ISPs carry out internet blocking in Belarus.72 As of 2022, the state-run NTEC had the capacity to block 40 percent of all incoming and outgoing internet traffic and to restrict access to up to 150 million URLs.73 A1, the largest private telecommunications firm in Belarus, and MTS, the country’s largest mobile telephone operator, have actively participated in internet blocking.74

In addition to its use of deep packet inspection (DPI) technology, the government employs basic techniques such as IP (internet protocol) filtering and disabling domain name system (DNS) records to block websites. It also uses other commercial filtering technologies, including some produced in the United States, for this purpose.75

Since the 2020 political crisis, the government has sought to upgrade its blocking capabilities. In 2022, Beltelecom announced a $4 million tender to modernize existing hardware and software “that collects and stores information about the user's visit to internet resources and blocks internet resources."76 The government is looking to the Kremlin for the technology to block social media platforms.77

During the coverage period, the government increased its use of “antiextremism” legislation to censor online content and limit freedom of expression (see C2, B6, and B7). When the authorities label organizations, informal groups, individuals, activities, or content as “extremist,” the designation bars all online media and users in the country from referring to them. Users of websites, social media platforms, and messaging applications who access, share, repost, or comment on extremist materials can be, and in practice are, prosecuted in both administrative and criminal courts (see C3). Other media outlets and users are required to delete such materials—and remove them retroactively—from their publications (see B3).78 A 2023 UN report concluded that the Belarusian government equates independent journalism with extremism.79

The government maintains a Republican List of Extremist Materials80 that identifies banned content. Prior to the 2020 political crisis, most items on the list propagated racism or religious extremism. As of April 1, 2024, the list included more than 5,200 items,81 over 1,700 of which were added in 2023,82 including the websites, social media accounts, and messaging channels of almost all independent media outlets. While roughly one-third of the materials banned as “extremist” are based on Telegram,83 the list also includes TikTok, Facebook, VK, OK, YouTube, Instagram, and X (formerly Twitter) accounts.84 The government labeled a site related to LGBT+ issues extremist for the first time in March 2024.85

The government continued to force outlets still hosted in Belarus to delete content. In 2023, Onliner.by, Officelife.by, and other websites were blocked, and authorities required them to remove certain content before allowing the public to regain access to them.86

Since the Kremlin’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Belarusian government has sought to limit the dissemination of information about military operations, including the movements of Russian troops in Belarus, especially in independent media outlets and Telegram channels (see C3).87

In 2022, the Belarusian government issued a decree that prohibits news aggregators from cooperating with sites that are blocked in Belarus. As a result, independent Belarusian media outlets and their content were excluded from the list of partners of Yandex.News (now known as Zen News), an automated personal-recommendation service that previously drove traffic to Belarusian independent media sites.88 By 2023, all Belarusian media, even state outlets, were excluded from this aggregator.89 Zen News is owned by VK, which is effectively owned by the Russian government.

To further limit access to independent news and information sites via social media, the Belarusian government requested that VK, which is popular in Belarus, restrict some pages and groups belonging to independent Belarusian media based outside the country.90 VK complied in 2022.91 In 2023, VK also blocked the pages of RFE/RL's Belarus Service and a number of other independent Belarusian media outlets, human rights groups, and civic initiatives.92

The Russian government has also forced the deletion of content related to its invasion of Ukraine on the Belarusian internet. Roskomnadzor, Russia's state media watchdog, successfully had articles removed from Belarusian independent and state media outlets, as well as NGOs and state agencies.93 In 2022, Russia’s general prosecutor’s office ordered VK to block the pages of Zerkalo, Belarus’s leading publication in exile, over its coverage of the war.94

Some social media platforms have acted to limit invasion-related content from the Belarusian government that they deemed to be disinformation, in light of the Belarusian authorities’ assistance with the illegal attack.95 For instance, Instagram regularly blocks and deletes accounts that promote the Belarusian government, largely because they violate the platform’s terms of service.96

Likewise, in 2022, Telegram began blocking the Yellow Plums channel, which is linked to Belarus’s security services and seeks to intimidate opposition and critical voices through “confessional videos” (see C7) and doxing, at the request of a Belarusian human rights group.97 In 2022, Telegram blocked five popular progovernment channels, with a total of more than 86,000 subscribers, on Apple devices for violating Apple’s rules concerning discrimination.98 In January 2023, Telegram blocked a swath of channels used by the security forces to publicize “confessional videos.”99

In 2023, Meta did not remove any content at the request of the Belarusian government.100 X did not produce a transparency report on content-removal requests that covered the reporting period.101 Google received no requests from the Belarusian government to remove content in 2023.102 The Russian government-owned social media platforms VK and OK are also popular in Belarus, but they do not release transparency reports.

The government’s internet restrictions are opaque, lack an independent appeals process, and are often invoked arbitrarily.

From 2021 to 2023, the authorities expanded legislation designed to combat “extremism” and “terrorism.” The legislation allows the KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs to arbitrarily designate internet resources and content producers as extremist, leading to their blocking and criminalizing their activities, as well as their consumption.103

The 2008 Media Law secures the state’s control over the country’s information space. Successive amendments have repeatedly tightened that control. New amendments approved in May 2023 continued this trend (see B6).

Amendments that took effect in 2021104 make it more difficult for individuals to register outlets and enabled the government to suspend media outlets. They allow the government to restrict online media for publishing material it considers to be propaganda, harmful to national security, or extremist, and also ban the publication of public opinion polls on sociopolitical issues conducted without official accreditation.105

Amendments that came into effect in 2018 empowered the Ministry of Information to warn, suspend, block, and close registered and unregistered online outlets without warning or judicial oversight.106 The amendments also let the ministry block social media platforms and hold website owners liable for hosting content that is deemed false, defamatory, or harmful to the national interest.107

In 2021, Lukashenka issued a decree expanding the authority of the Commission on Information Security, allowing it to restrict access to domestic and foreign websites and to close media outlets if it finds that their content is harmful to national interests. The list of the potential threats to national security is extensive and can be interpreted broadly. Offenses include manifestations of sociopolitical, religious, or ethnic extremism; promotion of politics contrary to national interests; calls for riots; information that has a destructive impact on an individual, society, or state institution; attempts to destroy national spiritual and moral traditions; the biased revision of history; and attempts to undermine public confidence in state institutions.108

In 2022, Lukashenka signed a decree that allowed the government to block news aggregators that disseminated materials from sites restricted by the Ministry of Information.109

In 2022, new legislation required ISPs to more stringently adhere to the government’s blocking policies.110 Previously, ISPs were required to check the list of websites to be banned once a day; now they are required to do so every three hours during the day and block access four hours after the site appears on the list.111 There is no judicial appeal process; however, outlets can correspond with the Ministry of Information and, after deleting certain materials and petition to have the decision reversed. The list of banned websites, to which any government body may contribute, is compiled by the Ministry of Information and maintained by the Ministry of Communications.112 Only government agencies and ISPs can access the list.113

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because a wave of repressive laws, website blocks, and arrests have fostered an environment where Belarusians routinely suppress their opinions online.

The government’s repressive laws, blocking of internet resources, expanding definition of what constitutes “extremism” and “terrorism,” and repression of journalists, civil society activists, opposition figures, cultural workers, and ordinary internet users have led to rampant online self-censorship in Belarus.

Since the 2020 protests, the escalation in government repression, including unprecedented criminal and administrative prosecution and physical violence (see C3 and C7), has compelled self-censorship among editors and journalists in Belarus. In 2024, UN investigators spotlighted the “pervasive climate of fear” in the country.114 Any media organization operating in Belarus must either practice self-censorship or expect to be shuttered.115 Belarusian media workers who do not self-censor have either left the country or been imprisoned. The last major independent outlet still functioning inside the country, Onliner.by, has abandoned its news and political coverage.116 Nevertheless, a 2024 Council of Europe report concluded that even “self-censorship no longer shields journalists,” as neutral or accommodating outlets and journalists have been caught up in the government’s media purge.117

Self-censorship extends beyond journalism. Attempting to “preserve and survive,” independent cultural workers “combine self-censorship and anonymity inside the country with transferring products of Belarusian culture abroad,” according to a March 2023 report from PEN Belarus.118

In 2022, a government official claimed that, after 372 internet resources had been labeled extremist, 500,000 people unsubscribed from “destructive” Telegram channels.119 This trend of unsubscribing from social media and messenger channels continued in 2023 and 2024 as the government’s list of extremist online resources grew ever longer, furthering self-censorship. Government repression has also caused Belarusians to self-censor their online interactions; those in the country and active on social media “are extremely limited in expressing feelings, emotions, and ideas.”120

The government’s practice of publicly shaming and ridiculing arrested individuals—including journalists, media workers, and critical internet users—with videos of forced confessions is a powerful driver of self-censorship (see C7).

Some journalists who remained in Belarus after 2020 have opted to stop reporting due to the dangerous environment. Despite this decision, they are sometimes prosecuted anyway (see C3). Belarusian journalists working outside the country may censor themselves to protect their family members or colleagues in Belarus.121

Between September 2020 and the end of May 2024, at least 632 Belarusian NGOs chose to close their organizations and discontinue their online presence—a form of preventative self-censorship—mainly due to pressure from the authorities and the country’s hostile legal and political environment.122

Confronting a polarized society, as well as international isolation and sanctions prompted by its political crackdown at home and assistance to the Russian government’s invasion of Ukraine, the Lukashenka regime has tightened its control over the country’s information landscape. During the coverage period, which saw Belarus’s first elections since the rigged 2020 election and ensuing protests, the government and state media boosted their use of propaganda123 and disinformation to bolster the regime and discredit domestic and foreign critics. The authorities continued their information campaign backing the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine, and also continued to aid and abet the saturation of Belarus’s information space with Russian propaganda and disinformation.

State propaganda is pervasive in Belarus, as is disinformation originating either within the country or in Russia.124 Both are key tools for maintaining and strengthening Lukashenka’s rule,125 and a major theme is that Belarus and Belarusians are doing well only because of their leader.126 In July 2023, Lukashenka credited state media and propaganda with helping him to retain his position after 2020.127 In 2024, an election year, the government doubled down on propaganda and disinformation in an attempt to legitimize the regime.

Belarusian state propaganda and disinformation have continued to promote three major narratives since the events of 2020: claims that the “West” and the Belarusian opposition are fomenting a “color revolution” to overthrow the government; antagonism directed against neighboring countries that have chosen a “Western” or “revanchist” path, including Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltic States; and the promotion of a historical, cultural, and political union with Russia.128 Negative developments in Belarus, the region, or internationally are blamed on conspiracies machinated by “the collective West.”129

Four years after the events of 2020, experts have noted some evolving trends. A January 2024 report from the International Strategic Action Network for Security noted a “creeping re-Stalinization” in Belarus to support its delegitimized leader.130 The government media has stepped up its vilification of131 the political opposition and critical voices operating outside of Belarus.132 Members of Lukashenka’s administration have hardened their attacks on critics of the regime, moving beyond labelling members of the opposition in exile as “extremists” or “terrorists”133 and suggesting that the government should kill those opposed to it.134

Prior to the 2020 crisis, there were notable differences in focus between Belarusian and Russian state propaganda and disinformation, especially during periods when Lukashenka sought closer ties with the United States and European Union. However, following Russia’s political, media, and security support to Lukashenka to counter the 2020–21 protests, and the Kremlin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, these differences have largely disappeared.135 A “special troll factory” overseen by the Belarusian Special Operation Forces is reportedly working to reinforce official Kremlin narratives, according to a 2022 RFE/RL report.136

The Belarusian government reinforces and is an important component of the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian narratives. State media declares that Ukrainians are “nationalists,” “fascists,” “Nazis,” “Russophobic,” and asserts that they are fighting a civil war or Western-inspired civilizational conflict rather than resisting an illegal Russian invasion. Ukraine is portrayed as a “puppet of the West” and an aggressor against Belarus.137 During the coverage period, Belarusian state media alleged that international support for Ukraine was flagging and that its supporters were materially benefitting from the war. State media also highlighted the government’s supposed attempts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict and support of Ukrainian refugees, especially children transported to Belarus by Russian forces,138 though the Belarusian government has helped facilitate the displacement of Ukrainian children.139

Meanwhile, actors affiliated with Russia have intensified their dissemination of Kremlin-sponsored disinformation and propaganda inside Belarus. Russian media outlets, think tank websites, and social media groups promote the ideology of the “Russian World,” which denies the existence of Belarusian history and culture. They also promote other vitriolic campaigns in the country. One seeks to discredit the Belarusian opposition, especially those who rose to prominence around the 2020 election, by portraying opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her allies as puppets controlled by the West.140

Kremlin-run and -linked media outlets, social networks, messenger channels, influencers, and government-organized nongovernmental organizations (GONGOs) are widely active inside Belarus.141 The number and activities of Russian-backed news and information websites in the country have increased significantly in recent years, including at the regional level.142

Belarusian state media’s echoing of Russian narratives has impacted domestic audiences. Public surveys indicate that Belarusian support for the Russian government’s invasion of Ukraine slightly increased during the coverage period, though the repressive environment has made obtaining accurate survey results on political issues increasingly difficult.143 A December 2023 survey from Chatham House indicated that support for Russia's actions correlated with consumption of information from Belarusian and Russian state media.144

In March 2023, the Belarusian Telegraph Agency (BelTA), the state press agency, announced that it would intensify its cooperation with China’s state news agency, Xinhua. It said this collaboration would focus on the internet and social media, as well as best practices and skills training for journalists and editors.145

Internal and international crises have led to the collapse of the business model that previously sustained independent media in Belarus. In addition to significant economic challenges, political persecution has forced almost all online outlets critical of the regime to close or leave the country.

Regulations tie content producers in Belarus to the information space controlled by the government. If an online entity wishes to earn revenue from advertising in Belarus, it must establish a Belarusian company, use a .by domain address, and utilize a Belarusian hosting company. All these processes are controlled by the Belarusian government and can be used to restrict the publishing of online content.146

Apolitical independent outlets remaining in Belarus face a difficult economic environment. The COVID-19 pandemic, ongoing political crisis, and international sanctions have all harmed Belarus’s already-struggling economy.147 While total spending on advertising grew by more than 20 percent in 2023,148 it remained lower than total spending in 2020, and roughly equal to spending in 2016.149 More than half of all advertising in Belarus went to online platforms but most revenue went to large global or Russian platforms, rather than Belarusian firms.150 In December 2023, the government amended the Laws on Advertising to strengthen government control over the industry, ban advertisements for jobs and educational opportunities abroad, and require companies to provide free advertising for “guaranteeing state and public security.”151

The media market remains distorted by government subsidies for state-owned media, and most state outlets would not survive without this assistance. In 2023, the authorities allocated slightly more funding for state media, 162 million rubles ($49 million). Of the total planned, almost 20 million rubles ($6 million) went to state online media, including progovernment Telegram and YouTube channels.152 The government increased overall support in 2024 to about 170 million rubles ($51 million), though it was limited by a depreciation in the currency.153

In July 2023, Lukashenka signed new amendments to the country’s Media Law. The legislation expanded the criteria that state can use to restrict access to online publications, news aggregators, and other internet resources under the guise of protecting “state and public interests” and “national security.”154 In addition, the law prohibits publishing the results of public opinion polls that relate to the country’s sociopolitical situation, as well as those relating to elections and referendums, if they were conducted without official accreditation.155 Finally, the amendments make it possible to ban the work of foreign outlets in the country due to the “anti-Belarusian” attacks of “foreign mass media, internet resources and journalists.”156 Banned outlets will lose their accreditation, see their bureaus closed, and have their content prohibited across Belarus.157

Provisions of the Media Law enacted in 2021 limit the ability of individuals or legal entities to start and operate media outlets. They also create expansive grounds on which the state can refuse to register outlets or revoke journalist accreditation. Under the provisions, an outlet can be suspended following two written warnings in 12 months, or immediately if it is deemed a national security threat.153 The government has a long record of using laws and regulations regarding the accreditation of journalists to arbitrarily stifle media freedom.154 In 2020, the government cancelled the accreditations of all foreign journalists working in Belarus and adopted rules that forced them to reapply under a new, more complicated process.158 Those who have since been accredited are from “friendly countries” and tend to follow the government’s line.

The extremism law (see B2 and B3) also places regulatory restrictions on the media. In 2021, the authorities began classifying media outlets as “extremist organizations” and “extremist formations.”159 In 2023, 10 media outlets, the Belarusian Association of Journalists, and five bloggers were declared extremist formations.160 By the end of May 2024, over 200 organizations and formations had been deemed extremist,161 including 31 independent media outlets.162

The government also maintains a watch list of individuals allegedly involved in “extremist activities,”163 including journalists, bloggers, and other critical online voices, who are banned from publishing.164 By the end of May 2024, it totaled over 4,100 individuals.165 There were 33 media workers who were added to the list in 2023166 and 4 added from January to June 2024. In 2023, the government also began labelling the personal social media accounts of independent journalists as extremist, a step designed to discredit them, thereby reducing their reach and influence.167

The government maintains a separate list of individuals and organizations, including journalists and bloggers, who are allegedly involved in “terrorist activities.” By early February 2024, when the KGB stopped publishing the list, there were more than 1,110 names on it, including 358 Belarusians.168 In 2023, 12 imprisoned media workers were added to the list.169 The government’s decisions regarding the extremist and terrorist lists are made behind closed doors and cannot be appealed. Reposting content linked to extremist or terrorist groups or individuals is illegal. The government has also criminalized donations, including ones made online, that support independent organizations or activities that it considers to be extremist or terrorist (see B8, C2, and C3).

Exiled media outlets face different economic constraints. Their publishing costs have typically doubled or tripled due to the higher salaries, taxes, and other costs in neighboring EU countries, as well as inflation following the COVID-19 pandemic, but commercial profits have collapsed. Advertising revenue is scant. Outlets working outside the country have gone from being partially or fully self-sustaining to depending on foreign governments or private donors. Belarusian media groups in exile have found it harder to obtain foreign support since the Kremlin’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as independent media outlets forced to leave Russia after February 2022 are now competing with their Belarusian peers for grants.

Favorable connections to the government are necessary for nonstate online media outlets in the country to succeed politically and financially. Restrictive amendments to the Law on Public Associations and the criminal code that were passed secretly in 2011 bar organizations—including online media outlets—from receiving foreign funding without state approval.

The government’s ongoing crackdown following the events of 2020 has severely constrained Belarus’s information landscape. Fewer independent organizations, journalists, and analysts are publishing and civic space continues to shrink.170 Additionally, since the Russian government’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Belarus’s media space has been flooded with propaganda and disinformation (see B5). Restrictions on content from independent media in Ukraine, Russia, and other foreign media outlets have also reduced diversity (see B1).

Prior to 2021, the most popular media and news websites in Belarus were independent outlets. This environment has changed significantly with the government crackdown. Many outlets have been banned, and only about half of the 1,300 members of the Belarusian Association of Journalists (BAJ) remained in Belarus by mid-2022.171 Many have ceased practicing their profession due to safety concerns,172 though others continue to work for their previous outlets that have reestablished themselves outside of the country, or have launched new projects.173 The last large independent media outlet within Belarus, Onliner.by, reduced its focus on news in general and on politics in particular to survive (see B4). Some independent journalists still operate anonymously in the country, but they face the risk of arrest and harsh persecution (see C3 and C7).

The government crackdown has forced most independent news outlets, think tanks, and NGOs representing diverse interests and communities to leave the country, regroup in exile, and publish online from neighboring countries. Exiled organizations—including at least 69 media outlets174 and dozens of NGOs—reach audiences in Belarus largely through social media and messaging platforms. The authorities have blocked virtually all foreign-based Belarusian media websites (see B1) and criminalized their social media channels (see B2 and B6). Additionally, Belarus’s exiled media face growing economic challenges (see B6) that undermine their diversity. As a result, independent Belarusian online media outlets operating outside the country have decreased in number and are producing less content,175 making Belarus’s exiled media landscape less diverse.

Despite the degradation of the online information landscape, there is evidence that many Belarusians continue to seek out independent news from exiled media outlets. A 2024 study found that as of late 2023, 67 media outlets based abroad had cumulatively generated over 21 million YouTube views and 1.3 million Telegram followers, as well as 19 million visits a month.176 At the same time, the Belarusian government has sought to reduce consumption of this information by criminalizing it,177 resulting in fewer Belarusians searching out news from independent sources and more relying on state media.178 Between November 2022 and November 2023, the consumption of independent media fell by 8 percent, according to Chatham House surveys.179 However, a Belarusian media expert declared that the audience of independent media likely “did not decrease” in 2023.180

Government repression and falling media consumption have also likely led to a decrease in trust. While independent media was trusted more than state media before 2021, the opposite is true today. According to a July 2023 survey by Chatham House, 68 percent of respondents trusted state media while only 57 percent trusted independent media.181 Independent experts, however, qualify these trends, noting that fear of the government complicates survey responses.182

New and ostensibly private media outlets indirectly linked to the state have also reduced the diversity and reliability of online content. These popular outlets offer a mix of entertainment items and news that both favors the Belarusian government and follows the Kremlin’s messaging on the war in Ukraine.

Following the government’s blocking of almost all independent news and analytical websites, users migrated to the organizations’ social media and messaging app channels. The use of such platforms is widespread. The independent internet measurement source Datareportal identified 5.68 million social media users in Belarus in February 2024, representing almost 59.4 percent of the total population, which was a growth of 1.4 million users (about 32 percent) from the previous year.183 Social media platforms continue to be the top source of news and information for Belarusians.184

The most popular social networks in Belarus for consuming news and information are YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, VK, and Facebook.185 Several YouTube channels popular in Belarus are linked to independent news outlets and bloggers.186 An expert who compiles YouTube rankings indicated in March 2024 that the rankings had not substantially changed, and that independent outlets continued to perform well. He also noted that the YouTube channels of state media have inflated viewer and subscriber numbers due to substantial audiences from Russia,187 manipulation of algorithms, and purchased views.188

Telegram is the most popular messaging app for news and politics. Independent media outlets and critical bloggers continue to dominate the rankings of Belarus’s top Telegram channels.189 This was also the case for Instagram190 and TikTok in 2021 and 2022, although the difference in the number of prodemocracy and progovernment users was noticeably smaller on TikTok.191

While Belarusian independent media perform well on social media and messaging apps, the nature of these platforms adversely impacts the quality of their reporting and reduces diversity. The content on these platforms tends to be shorter, less detailed, and more repetitive due to the reporting formats.192

Russian news and information outlets remain influential in Belarus. Four of the most popular websites in Belarus—Yandex.ru, VK.com, OK.ru and Mail.ru—are Russian-owned.193 Online broadcasts of Russian television channels are popular among Belarusian users.194 Belarusians, especially older people and those who live outside of major cities, trust Russian media more than independent media.195 With its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has limited the diversity of news and information offered by Russian sources by imposing a tightly-controlled, single narrative regarding any war-related topic.

The two most popular search engines and a state-linked content aggregator also limit diversity in the Belarusian online information landscape. Both Google and Yandex heavily promote the content of Belarusian and Russian government websites,196 according to Media IQ, as does the popular state-linked Belnovosti aggregator, which poses as an independent news portal.197

Belarusians utilize proxy servers and other methods to circumvent state censorship and surveillance.198 With the onset of the 2020 political crisis, the use of Tor and Psiphon surged, and, as of early June 2024, they remained among the top 25 communications apps in Belarus.199 However, a recent survey from Human Constanta found that less than 50 percent of Belarusians inside the country use VPNs.200

After the 2020 political crisis, the Belarusian national domain zones stopped growing for the first time in its history. The number of active sites fell in 2021 while, at the same time, Belarusians registered 13 percent more names in international domain zones.201 This trend continued in 2022, when the number of domains in the .BY and .БЕЛ domains fell by 6,000 and the number of registrations in international zones grew by 25 percent.202 In 2023, the .BY domain demonstrated slight growth, while Belarusians continued to register in alternative domains.203

In April 2023, for the first time, the government cancelled the domain name registration of an independent media outlet, EX-PRESS.BY.204 In December 2023, the authorities confiscated and cancelled the domain name of TUT.BY205 and, a month later, did the same to the domain name of the Belarusian Association of Journalists.206 In April 2024, the government ordered the cancellation of the domain names all independent media listed in its “Republican List of Extremist Materials.”207

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because of increased restrictions on online organizing, including on crowdfunding campaigns supporting Belarusians’ basic needs.

Prior to the events of 2020, internet-based platforms—especially social networks, messaging apps, crowdfunding services, and online petitions—were the main tools for advancing civic and political activism in authoritarian Belarus. Citizens actively used a wide range of digital resources to disseminate information, create communities, and organize issue-based campaigns. However, post-2020 government blocking, legal restrictions, and repression have significantly limited Belarusians’ ability to organize political, civic, and cultural online campaigns inside the country. Virtually all independent civil society initiatives, including more than 1,600 NGOs, have closed (see B6 and B7). Most online activism now takes place outside of Belarus or, rarely, involves groups in exile working furtively with citizens still in the country. Even online activism conducted from abroad is targeted and repressed by the government.

During the coverage period, Belarusian activists and civil society groups abroad continued to use the internet to organize, carry out solidarity campaigns, monitor and report on human rights violations, fundraise for and provide support to political refugees and prisoners, and mobilize their communities for political change. However, they operated on a reduced scale due to growing transnational repression. Many of the groups and individuals carrying out political, civic, or cultural work online from abroad have been labelled extremists, had legal cases launched against them, and seen their work criminalized (see B4 and B6).

The Kremlin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine precipitated several online civic initiatives focused on the war. The most popular and publicized is Belarusian Hajun (Spirit), an exile-based initiative that uses open-source materials to track and report on Russian and Belarusian military movements and related issues in Belarus. Founded by a popular political blogger, the initiative has collected, fact-checked, and published over 4,180 pictures and 860 videos related to the war.208 More than 30,000 people have provided information to the initiative, and at least 10 Belarusians have been arrested and convicted for doing so (See C3).209 Despite the government labelling it extremist, Hajun oversees the second-most popular Telegram channel in Belarus, with more than 380,000 subscribers.210

The Belarus Solidarity Foundation (BYSOL), based outside of Belarus, is a crowdfunding platform created in 2020 to assist those who had either lost their jobs for political reasons or been forced to leave the country.211 In three years BYSOL raised over $3.4 million (including over $1 million in 2023212 ) to assist political prisoners and their families, facilitate emergency relocations from the country, and conduct other civic and humanitarian initiatives.213 The foundation, declared extremist by the government, has assisted thousands of Belarusians,214 and more than 90,000 people have donated to it.215

Founded in August 2020, the US-based INeedHelpBY supports Belarusian families suffering financially because of political repression. It uses a Telegram bot that links Belarusians willing to provide food baskets with needy families in the country. By the end of 2023, the program had delivered more than 19,000 baskets, with a total value of almost $1.7 million, to approximately 2,300 families.216 In early 2024, however, the government declared the charity an extremist group and began arresting, jailing, and fining those who received groceries (see C3).217 As a result, the charity was forced to shift its mission to assisting needy Belarusians living outside the country.218

In July 2023, more than 20 independent media outlets in exile came together to host an online fundraising marathon entitled “We Care!”219 to benefit political prisoners and their families. Bloggers, opposition politicians, prominent cultural and sports figures, and civic activists appeared during the 12-hour broadcast, which was aired on numerous independent YouTube channels. More than 11,000 individuals in 86 countries donated a total of more than $575,000. That fall, the government launched criminal proceedings against the organizers and participants of the online event.220

While the rights to freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom are nominally guaranteed by the Belarusian constitution, the country’s authoritarian government does not respect them in practice. Belarus has no independent judiciary or parliament to defend these freedoms. To the contrary, the judicial and legislative branches, which are subordinated to the presidential administration, play a key role in the government’s strategy for restricting independent media and critical voices in Belarus.221 The Belarusian Association of Journalists was closed by the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court in 2021.

In 2022, under heavily repressive conditions, the government held a constitutional referendum that further consolidated Lukashenka’s autocratic power.222 In January 2024, Lukashenka signed into law a provision that gives him lifelong immunity to any form of criminal prosecution.223 In April 2024, a new constitutional body, the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, convened for the first time. The institution is not part of any branch of government and is, at least on paper, supreme to all of them. It has the power to overturn decisions made by the executive and parliament, and also has the final say in appointing and dismissing chairs, deputy chairs, and judges of the Constitutional and Supreme courts.224 At its inaugural meeting the assembly elected Lukashenka as its chairperson, further expanding and consolidating his power.

Belarus is one of only three European countries that is not a member of the Council of Europe. In 2022 the Council suspended all relations with Belarus due to its facilitation of the Russian government’s invasion of Ukraine. That same year, Lukashenka signed into law Belarus’s denunciation of the First Optional Protocol to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, blocking the UN Human Rights Committee’s mandate to receive and review human rights complaints from individuals in Belarus. The mandate represented one of the last remaining international mechanisms by which individuals could challenge the government. The order came into effect in February 2023.225

Laws introduced in the wake of the post-2020 political crisis criminalize legitimate forms of free expression, including online, and were invoked more frequently during the coverage period. Recent laws also allow death sentences for individuals convicted of terrorism and treason. While no such penalty had yet been imposed as of the end of the coverage period, authorities have previously applied broad definitions for such crimes, and the introduction of such harsh sentences appears designed to intimidate dissidents and potential critics.

At the start of 2021, Lukashenka declared that the authoritarian country’s laws were too “liberal” and that they had facilitated the 2020 protests.226 The government subsequently approved more than a dozen new laws, amendments, decrees, and resolutions227 that it uses to restrict critical online voices and criminalize freedom of expression. Several new or revised amendments were passed or came into force in 2023. Of note are several provisions designed to counter what the government defines broadly as “extremism.”228

During the coverage period, the authorities applied laws against extremism, terrorism, and treason, often retroactively, to the activities of online media outlets, journalists, human rights organizations, other NGOs, and internet users. In practice, any form of freedom of expression can fall under the government’s definition of extremism.229

In February 2024, the authorities announced the completion of a draft law against “LGBT propaganda.” In an April 2024 decree, the government reclassified the depiction of “nontraditional relationships” (including of same-sex relationships and transgender people) as “pornography,” thereby criminalizing and prohibiting such images from being distributed online.230

In May 2023, the government banned citizens facing “political charges,” leading officials, and law enforcement officers from traveling abroad. The ban came into effect in December 2023, and also bars people whose travel “contradicts the country's national security” from leaving Belarus.231

Amendments to the criminal code made in 2022, which came into effect in March 2023, included an article (289-1) that criminalizes “the propaganda of terrorism or its public justification,” including through the use of mass media or the internet, and prescribes a prison sentence of up to seven years.

In January 2023, Lukashenka signed amendments to the citizenship law that came into force in July 2023. The amended law allows the government to strip Belarusians of their citizenship following a court verdict confirming their participation in “extremist activities” or causing “grave harm to the interests of Belarus,” even while residing abroad.232 The law threatens thousands of individuals, including journalists and activists, who have already been labelled as extremists or convicted of extremism since August 2020. The law also obliges citizens to notify the authorities about any foreign citizenship, residence permit, or other document that gives them the right to receive benefits in a foreign state.

In 2022, Belarusian authorities amended the criminal code to allow “special proceedings”—criminal cases pursued without the defendant present. The amendments allow trials in absentia for those charged under 43 articles of the criminal code, including articles criminalizing “calling for sanctions” against Belarus, “high treason,” acts of terrorism and “extremist” crimes—all articles under which online journalists and social media and internet users have been charged. The government began launching “special proceedings” against critical voices in May 2023.233 Over the course of a year, 40 verdicts have been delivered in absentia, including for alleged online crimes (see C3).234

The authorities began bringing terrorism charges against opposition figures after the events of 2020 and, in 2022, amended the criminal code to include the death penalty among the punishments prescribed for those convicted of attempted terrorism.235 At the end of 2023, the Belarusian KGB’s official list of those charged for involvement in “terrorist activities” included 1,156 individuals, including 397 Belarusians236 and at least 12 media workers who had been jailed for alleged internet-related crimes.237 The government has labelled 12 media organizations238 and a number of critical Telegram channels as “terrorist organizations” (see B6).239 Possible terrorist activity is also used as a pretext to raid media outlets.240

In 2022, the government amended the criminal code to allow the death penalty or life imprisonment to be imposed on a government official or military officer who committed treason against the state. Lukashenka signed the legislation in March 2023.241 The amendments also created new offenses, including “propagating terrorism” and “discrediting the armed forces.”242 Since 2021, the government has applied Article 356 of the criminal code, which concerns treason, to journalists and internet-related activities. At least three journalists have been convicted of treason.243

An amendment to the criminal code that came into effect in 2022 recriminalized individual activities in unregistered NGOs under Article 193-1. The amendment provides that participation in unregistered or shuttered NGOs—including those whose work relates to media or online activities—can be punished with up to two years in prison.244

In 2021, Lukashenka signed into law a package of “amendments to laws on the protection of sovereignty and the constitutional order,” which included revisions to the law on states of emergency. They allow the government to suspend the publication and distribution of media products (including foreign media), establish tougher procedures for accrediting journalists, and restrict access to internet resources and online publications.245

In 2021, revisions to the 2007 Law on Countering Extremism came into force.246 These broadened the government’s authority to prosecute those expressing dissenting views by expanding the list of “extremist activities and materials” and introducing criminal liability for related offenses. The updated legislation targets individuals, political parties, or domestic or international organizations, including media groups, that “plan, organize, prepare, and commit encroachments on the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, the foundations of constitutional order, and public security” of Belarus.247 The amendments punish the dissemination “of knowingly false information about the political, economic, social, military, or international situation of the Republic of Belarus;” the insult of “a representative of the authorities in connection with the performance of official duties”; and the incitement of “various types of hatred” with up to six years in prison.248

Criminal code amendments that came into force in 2021 increased penalties for the "distribution of false information" which discredits the state on the internet and for participation in and collaboration with "extremist" groups.249 The legislation also increased punishments for libel and calls for actions deemed harmful to national interests, and specifically criminalized the defamation of law enforcement and other officials.250 According to human rights activists, some of the most commonly used articles in the criminal code relate to defamation: those for insulting the president, state officials, and judges, as well as those for desecrating state symbols (Articles 368, 369, 370, and 391).251 One article criminalizes the publication of the personal information of police and their family members. The revisions substantially increased criminal penalties for other existing crimes.252

The 2008 Media Law was amended in 2021 to add repressive measures that further stifle expression online (see B3 and B6).253 Along with it, the government amended the Law on Mass Events to ban the live streaming or real-time coverage of unsanctioned protests, including by media outlets, so as not to popularize them or promote “propaganda.”254 Journalists were barred from acting as organizers or participants in mass events “while performing their duties,” and activists were prohibited from raising, receiving, or using funds to pay fines or other expenses incurred by reporters and others who are prosecuted for violating the law.255

In 2021, the government enacted a revised administrative code,256 which made it an offense to “insult” a representative of a state organization performing his or her official duty in the mass media or in information distributed online.257

During the coverage period, the government continued to persecute media workers, opposition figures, bloggers, social media and messaging channel administrators, cultural figures, and ordinary internet users for their online activities.258 Dozens of journalists and activists were arrested or sentenced for their independent reporting and analysis. Hundreds of people were jailed, and thousands of ordinary Belarusians were criminally and administratively punished for their internet-related activities.259 Belarus held 1,410 political prisoners as of the end of May 2024, according to the Viasna Human Rights Center. In 2023, Belarus ranked first in Europe and third globally in terms of jailers of journalists, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists.260 The deaths of six political prisoners, including some who had been jailed for their online activities (see C7), have been attributed to the deplorable conditions and inhumane treatment experienced in Belarus’s prisons.261

The authorities continue to stifle freedom of expression under the guise of combating alleged terrorism, extremism, and defamation.262 During the coverage period new trends emerged, including the government prosecuting Belarusians for making online donations to independent organizations or for “extremist” materials found on their mobile phones during inspections.

Four years after the events of 2020, more than 40,000 Belarusians have been arrested on political grounds.263 By the end of May 2024, at least 5,133 people had been convicted in politically motivated criminal cases, and 36,418 had been subjected to administrative prosecution.264 In 2023, the government oversaw 6,386 arrests, 1,603 criminal convictions, and 4,466 administrative sentences.265 In the first quarter of 2024, there were 987 arrests, 99 criminal convictions, and 1,602 administrative prosecutions.266 The majority of these cases were related to online activities, including libel, defamation, and activities involving extremist groups and materials.267

Most of the alleged crimes that the government has prosecuted since 2020 have been connected to internet-related activities. Three years after the 2020 protests, the government claimed that more than 16,000 cases related to extremist crimes had been opened and that more than 70 percent of these were committed online.268 In 2024, the government raised the number of extremist-related crimes it claimed were committed since the protests to “about 19,000.”269

A majority of the criminal convictions given since 2020, as well as a majority of those issued during the coverage period, involved online libel cases—defaming or insulting Lukashenka, a government official, or state symbols.270 In 2023, more than 1,000 criminal cases were opened in Minsk alone over alleged insults against Lukashenka or state officials.271 The political activist Ihar Lednik, who died in prison in February 2024, had been jailed for three years for defaming Lukashenka in a publication.272

Similarly, of the almost 4,500 administrative penalties handed down in 2023, at least 3,091 involved “extremism.”273 A vast majority of the materials that the government has declared extremist are internet resources. Since 2020, more than 5,300 Belarusians have been convicted of “distributing extremist materials,”274 mostly for forwarding or reposting something. Even subscribing to prohibited materials is an administrative offence, subject to a fine, community service, up to 15 days in prison, and the confiscation of the device with the extremist material.275 In May 2024, the government opened its first criminal case for reposting extremist material.276

In the three years following the events of 2020, more than 670 journalists were arrested.277 Though there were fewer journalists in the country to persecute during the coverage period, the Belarusian Association of Journalists reported that in 2023 there were 16 criminal and 16 administrative sentences meted out to media workers, and that 6 new criminal cases were initiated, a slight decline from the year before.278 From January through May 2024, the government detained seven journalists and media workers, sentenced five in criminal cases and four in administrative cases, opened new cases against seven journalists, and conducted searches at eight personal premises.279 By the end of May 2024, 35 journalists remained behind bars.280 Each has been recognized as a political prisoner. PEN Belarus reported that cultural figures, who often carry out their work online, were the subjects of 76 criminal convictions, 79 new criminal cases, 143 administrative penalties, and 206 arbitrary detentions in 2023.281 Their repression continued into 2024, with at least 19 criminal convictions, 34 new criminal cases, 29 administrative penalties, and 35 arbitrary detentions by the middle of May.282

In August 2024, after the coverage period, journalists Ales Sabaleuski and Yauhen Hlushkou, who worked for the outlet 6tv.by, were sentenced to four years and three years in prison, respectively, for “participating in an extremist formation” (see C7).283

In June 2024, after the coverage period, freelance journalist Alena Tsimashchuk was sentenced to five years in prison for discrediting the Republic of Belarus, inciting hostility or discord, and participating in an extremist formation. Her articles were largely apolitical and as of June 2024 the specific reason for her sentencing was unknown.284

In April 2024, journalist and video blogger Aliaksandr Ihnatsiuk, who ran the local news site About Stolin, was sentenced to six years in prison under three articles of the criminal code, including slandering Lukashenka.285

In March 2024, journalist and blogger Ihar Karnei was sentenced to three years in prison for “participating in an extremist group” under Article 361-1 of the criminal code.286 Karnei was arrested in July 2023 and prosecuted for his online articles for the Belarusian Association of Journalists, which the authorities have labelled an extremist organization.”287

In March 2024, former videographer Andrei Tolchyn was sentenced to two and a half years in prison for “promoting extremist activities” under Article 361-4 of the criminal code and “libeling Aliaksandr Lukashenka” under Article 367 of the criminal code. He had previously been arrested for his journalistic activity, and was indicted based on files the police found when they searched his home.288

In April 2024, media worker Anastasia Matsiash was sentenced to two years in prison for “participating in an extremist formation.”289 That same month, journalist Aliaksandr Marchanka was sentenced to three years in prison.290 Earlier, in January 2024, photojournalist Aliaksandr Ziankou was sentenced to three years in prison for the same charge as Matsiash. In August 2023, Larysa Shchyrakova, a former journalist, was sentenced to three and a half years in prison under Article 369-1 of the criminal code for “discrediting Belarus.”291 In July 2023, journalist Pavel Mazheika was sentenced to six years in prison under Article 361-4 of the criminal code, which addresses “facilitating extremist activities.”292 Matsiash, Marchanka, Ziankou, Shchyrakova, and Mazheika were all associated with the Poland-based online television station Belsat TV, which the government has deemed an extremist group.

In December 2023, Aliaksandra Kasko, allegedly the administrator of several Telegram channels, was sentenced to 10 years in prison for violating eight articles of the criminal code, including “participating in an extremist formation,” “illegal actions with respect to personal data,” and insulting Lukashenka and other state officials. She was added to the government list of “terrorists.”293

In November 2023, Aliaksandr Mantsevich, editor in chief of the online newspaper Rehijanalnaja Hazieta, was sentenced to four years in prison for “discrediting the Republic of Belarus” under Article 369-1 of the criminal code.294

In July 2023, Yauhen Verkhavodkin, who oversaw a neighborhood Telegram channel, was sentenced to seven years in prison for participating in an extremist group and for “calling for actions aimed at causing harm to the national security” of Belarus, which is prohibited by Article 361 of the criminal code. He was also added to the government list of “terrorists.”295

In June 2023, a court sentenced Yana Pinchuk to 12 years in prison for inciting social hatred, creating an extremist and terrorist group, calling for the disruption of the constitutional order, and harming national security by administering protest Telegram channels, including Vitebsk97%.296

In May 2023, cultural activist Pavel Belavus was sentenced to 13 years in prison on four criminal charges, including treason. According to the government, Belavus was promoting Belarusian nationalism on social networks and websites, “the purpose of which was to change the state power in Belarus.”297

In March 2023, a court sentenced media professionals Maryna Zolatava and Liudmila Chekina to 12 years in prison each for “inciting hatred” and “calling for sanctions” against Belarus. Zolatava was editor in chief of TUT.by, Belarus’s largest independent news website, and Chekina was its director general. TUT.by was closed down by the government and declared a “extremist organization” in 2021 and 2022 (see B1). Both Zolatava and Chekina had been detained since 2021, and Zolatava had been previously prosecuted in 2019.298

In February 2023, the government held the trial of Stsiapan Putsila, Jan Rudzik, and Raman Pratasevich, the founders and editors of the Nexta online project, which oversees the country’s most popular Telegram channel and a popular YouTube channel. The defendants were charged under several criminal articles and were accused of committing at least 1,586 crimes. Only Pratasevich was in the country.299 In May 2023, Pratasevich was sentenced to eight years in prison, while Putsila and Rudzik received terms of 20 and 19 years in absentia, respectively.300 Later that month, Pratasevich was pardoned by the government.301

In March 2023, Valeryia Kastsiuhova, founder and editor of the think tank Nashe Mneniye (Our Opinion), editor of the online Belarusian Yearbook, and head of the Belarus in Focus online think tank, was convicted of “conspiring to seize state power, calling for actions aimed at harming national security, and incitement to hatred,” and sentenced to 10 years in prison.302 Human rights defenders suggested that the verdict was designed to intimidate the think tank community.303

Detained in 2021, journalist Andrzej Poczobut was charged with “inciting hatred” and “calling for sanctions” against Belarus. He is a prominent member of the Polish minority in Belarus. In February 2023, Poczobut was sentenced to eight years in prison.304

In February 2023, former security official Alexander Sumar was sentenced to nine years in prison for administering the “Long Live Luninets!” Telegram channel.305

In January 2023, Viktor Savashevich was sentenced to 11 years in prison for creating and overseeing the Telegram channel “23.34”, which posted information about Belarusian judges.306

Thousands of ordinary users also received prison terms for their online activities. The KGB has included many of those convicted on its list of those carrying out “terrorist activities.” During the coverage period, a new trend emerged in which prosecutions for online activities included multiple defendants.

During the coverage period, the government increased its prosecution of Belarusians who had made online donations to independent organizations or for activities that the government has labelled “extremist” or “terrorist.” This included donations to online “solidarity initiatives” such as BYSOL and BY_help, as well as opposition groups operating online, like the media group MotolkoHelp, BYPOL, and the Cyber Partisans (see B8 and C8). In the first quarter of 2024, the Ministry of Internal Affairs targeted 260 people who made such donations.307 By the end of May 2024, 77 individuals had been convicted of donating to extremist organizations or financing allegedly extremist or terrorist activities.308 The previous year, in 2023, more than 80 criminal cases on the financing of “extremist” and “terrorist” activities were opened,309 and 17 on “financing an extremist formation” were initiated. To avoid criminal prosecution, individuals are required to participate in “active repentance” by signing a confession and making a “voluntary donation” (often many times the size of the original donation) to a state organization.310

The Belarusian Helsinki Committee reported that “engaging in systematic charitable activities can now be equated with treason against the state.”311 Mikalai Vasilevich, for example, was sentenced to nine and a half years in prison in September 2023 for making at least 54 donations that “financed” the activities of an “extremist formation” (Article 361-2 of the criminal code) and “terrorist activities” (Article 290-1 of the criminal code).312 Incarcerated for three years in August 2023 for “financing extremist activities,” Vadzim Khrasko died in prison in January 2024.313

The authorities also began prosecuting Belarusians for receiving in-kind support organized online. In January 2024, the government declared INeedHelpBY, a charity that delivered groceries to the families of current and former political prisoners via online shopping (see B8), to be an “extremist” organization. By the end of the following month, at least 287 Belarusians had been prosecuted, including under Article 24.15 of the administrative code, which addresses “the use of foreign gratuitous aid to carry out terrorist and other extremist activities or other actions prohibited by law.” These cases represented the first time this article has been used in Belarus.314

As the Russian government’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has persisted, Belarusians have continued to be prosecuted for different acts of resistance. Since February 2022, at least 1,671 Belarusians have been detained and 91 convicted for their antiwar position.315 Much of the antiwar resistance in Belarus takes place online. As of October 2023, at least 37 individuals had been convicted of sharing photos or videos of Russian military equipment in Belarus with independent media outlets and social media and messaging channels, 38 had been prosecuted for condemning Russian aggression or expressing pro-Ukrainian sentiment online, and 14 were convicted for donating online to Belarusian volunteers in the war. 316 In November 2023, Dzmitryi Mastavy, an IT professional, was sentenced to 10 years in prison for “high treason” and “promoting extremist activities” after livestreaming military activities at a Belarusian airfield.317

During the coverage period, thousands of ordinary Belarusians were persecuted criminally and administratively for their online activities, including doxing, defamation, and “extremism.” In 2023, 691 persons were criminally convicted of defaming Lukashenka.318 That same year, there were 2,791 administrative charges brought against Belarusians for “distributing extremist materials,” including by reposting, forwarding, subscribing to, and liking “extremist materials.”319

During the reporting period, the government continued to launch “special proceedings,” criminal processes carried out in absentia, against critical Belarusian voices living abroad. From 2022 to May 2024, the government launched 40 criminal cases against Belarusians living outside of the country.320 A number of these cases involved online activities. For example, the authorities launched criminal cases against the bloggers Andrei and Olga Pauk, journalist Uladzimir Klimanovich, media manager Pavel Marynich, digital platform creator Pavel Liber, website editor Ihar Kazmerchak, and others. Marynich, the head of the Malanka Media portal, was sentenced in absentia to four years in prison in August 2023.321

Several legal provisions, apparently enacted in part to discourage online criticism of the authorities,322 limit users’ ability to communicate anonymously.

Under 2018 amendments to the Media Law, anyone posting materials and comments online must identify themselves to the owners of the Belarusian websites on which they are posting. Resolution 850,323 issued that year, specifies that commentators should register with the websites using their mobile devices.324 Only one account can be created on a given site for each mobile phone number. Website owners must store the personal data they collect on registered users—including name, gender, date and place of birth, mobile phone number, email address, and IP address—for one year.325 Users of public Wi-Fi hotspots must submit their mobile phone numbers.326

Through a system known as Passport, the Ministry of Internal Affairs links mobile service subscribers to their real-world identities.327

Belarus has legally blocked the use of VPNs and Tor since 2015, though they remained accessible in practice through 2024.328 In 2020, the government blocked additional circumvention tools, including the proxy service Psiphon.329 In 2024 and 2025, the government plans to use traffic filtering to limit the use of circumvention tools, VPNs, and proxy servers that are used "for illegal purposes,” according to a document obtained by the online outlet Flagpole in January 2024.330 Perhaps the first implementation of this strategy was the blocking of VPNs in connection to elections to the Coordination Council, an émigré opposition structure, in late May. Worried about hacking, the Council made access to the voting platform accessible only via VPN. In turn, at least four popular services—Psiphon, Turbo VPN, HUB VPN and TunnelBear—stopped working in Belarus (See B1).331

Under Resolution 218 (1997) of the Council of Ministers, the import and export of encryption technology is prohibited without a license from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Commission on Information Security.332

As the war in Ukraine continued, and with parliamentary elections held in February 2024 and the establishment of a new constitutional body in spring 2024, the Belarusian government increased its surveillance over the online civic space.333

The government has stepped up its transnational surveillance of exile communities.334 For example, the authorities increased their examinations of the mobile phones of people crossing the country’s borders. The Viasna Human Rights Center reported that more than 200 people were detained and prosecuted for political reasons in 2023 following border checks that included examinations of their mobile phones335 for “extremist” materials and electronic tracing of past protest actions336 —a form of digital transnational repression. Experts from Viasna have indicated that Belarus’s security forces “forcibly install spyware on the phones of those detained and their relatives, which allows the KGB to monitor closed chats of activists.”337 A May 2024 Citizen Lab and Access Now joint investigation found that the phones of Belarusian journalists and civil society activists working in exile had been targeted by Pegasus spyware.338

In Belarus, there is no independent judicial or other oversight of the government's electronic surveillance practices. Legislation grants the authorities the “unlimited right” to undertake surveillance of persons suspected of planning to commit a crime or offense (as defined by the state), with no judicial authorization or oversight.339 Legislation also makes it almost impossible for citizens to find out if they are the subject of surveillance, with different units across the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB conducting surveillance.340 Activists and journalists have expressed fears that their offices are bugged, their phone calls are monitored, their locations are tracked, and their online communications are hacked.341 Lukashenka has publicly boasted about the government’s wiretapping practices.342

In May 2024, the Law on the Investigative Committee was amended by the government.343 The new legislation allows investigators unrestricted access to the personal data of Belarusians without their consent, as well as remote access to certain types of live data. In August 2023, Lukashenka signed a decree that allows the security services to track Belarusians’ banking transactions.344 This process is likely linked the government’s crackdown on online donations made to prodemocracy groups (see C3).

Decree 368 (see C6), issued in 2022,345 allows the government to monitor email and internet chat rooms, as well as track opposition activists’ emails and other web-based communications. Authorities conduct raids and confiscate computer equipment and mobile phones to collect personal information on critical voices. State-run television and online media have aired “leaked” telephone conversations, video messages, audio recordings, and personal correspondence that appear to have been obtained via surveillance.346

As Telegram’s popularity surged in 2020, the government ramped up efforts to monitor and infiltrate chats, including closed groups, on such messaging apps. Security forces use Kotatogram, a third-party application that interacts with Telegram, to monitor and export chats, including the comments and IDs of participants.347

The government also maintains and utilizes databases of accounts, names, IDs, usernames, telephone numbers, photos, and avatars to monitor internet users. The authorities employ fake bots, links, sites, and files to identify, collect information about and track users.348

In March 2023, the Ministry of Internal Affairs noted the creation of a new internet intelligence division, ostensibly for combatting economic crimes.349

The government has sought to develop and enhance its video surveillance capabilities. Decree 187, which Lukashenka issued in the wake of mass demonstrations in 2017,350 established a centralized real-time video-monitoring system.351 In early 2023, the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that all shopping centers and public places in Minsk are covered by CCTV cameras.352 The surveillance system appears to be operational; in 2022, the authorities claimed that investigators in Minsk had managed to identify 1,400 individuals who participated in the 2020–2021 protests through this system.353 In 2024, the Center for New Ideas reported that the countrywide video surveillance system includes at least 35,000 CCTV cameras and is being expanded to cover state-run enterprises, educational institutions, and public transport.354

The government has acquired surveillance hardware and software from Chinese, Russian, US, and Israeli companies. The Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei has been supplying video surveillance systems to the government since 2011.355 Beltelecom is working with Huawei on its development of 5G technology, which includes facial recognition for the purpose of creating a “smart mobile checkpoint.”356 Meiya Pico, the Chinese digital forensics and cybersecurity company, has trained Belarusian officials.357

Since 2010, the government has been using the Russian-developed System of Operative Investigative Measures (SORM),358 which provides the authorities with direct, automated access to communications data from landline telephone networks, mobile service providers, and ISPs.359 The Belarusian government also uses Semantic Archive, a software package developed in Russia that monitors open-source data such as blogs, news outlets, and social media.360

Grayshift, a US company, and Cellebrite, an Israel-based digital intelligence company, have supplied the Belarusian authorities with tools for hacking into locked mobile devices.361 Experts believe that Cellebrite’s technology was used by security forces to hack smartphones during the postelection crackdown that started in 2020.362 In response, Cellebrite announced in 2021 that it would no longer sell its products in Belarus.363

Belarus also produces and employs surveillance tools. The Belarusian company Synesis is a leading purveyor of intelligent video-surveillance systems. It oversees a nationwide network of video cameras that was projected to number 13,000 by 2021.364 Following the Belarusian government’s support for the Russian government’s invasion of Ukraine, the US government sanctioned Synesis due to its links with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the use of its technology to suppress protests.365 The EU sanctioned Synesis because “Synesis has provided the Belarusian authorities with a surveillance platform capable of analyzing video using facial-recognition technology.”366

All telecommunications operators in Belarus are required to install surveillance equipment, making it possible for the government to monitor traffic in real time and to obtain related metadata and data—such as users’ browsing history, including domain names and IP addresses visited—without judicial oversight.

Since 2016, all ISPs have been required to retain information about their customers’ browsing histories for one year.367 Companies are also required to preserve identifying data regarding their customers’ devices and internet activities for at least five years and to turn over this information at the government’s request.368 According to Amnesty International, however, identifying data may sometimes be preserved for up to 10 years.369

In 2022, Lukashenka signed Decree 368, which requires all online services to store user data and provide authorities with direct access to it. While the authorities have long had access to telecommunications data, the new decree will now allow them to compare this data with that from online services.370

Pursuant to Resolution 850 (see C4), website owners are required to store the personal data of all registered commenters.

A 2021 personal data protection law,371 on paper, offers many of the same rights accorded to EU citizens by the bloc’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).372 However, independent experts have noted that the legislation, which uses terminology similar to Russian legislation, could be employed by the state to limit the activities of online actors such as bloggers, freelance journalists, and investigative NGOs, as well as opponents of the government.373 The law gives the state-run Operations and Analysis Center (OAC), which oversees and monitors the Belarusian internet space, the power to obtain data on people using online services from telecommunications service providers.374

The National Center for Personal Data Protection, established by decree in 2021, is ostensibly an independent public body,375 but in practice has helped enforce the government’s crackdown on independent media. In 2022, the center asked Twitter to remove or delete information from the accounts of four independent Belarusian media outlets based outside the country.376 The issue of data protection has become more prominent since the events of 2020 because of the repeated doxing of government officials by citizens (see C3) and antigovernment hackers (see C8). Belarus is not a party to the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.

Hotels, restaurants, and other entities are obliged to register guests before providing them with wireless access, whether free or paid.377

Websites on the national .by and .бел domains must be physically hosted in Belarus.378

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 to reflect the violence that Belarusians, including those in custody, face in retaliation for their criticism or organizing online.

Government intimidation of and attacks against online journalists, activists, users, and their families continued during the coverage period. Since the 2020 election and protests, state agents have employed threats, arbitrary detention, torture, ill-treatment, and physical violence in an attempt to suppress critical voices.379 The Justice for Journalists Foundation reported that there were approximately 2,800 attacks against journalists, including legal harassment and other attacks, in Belarus from 2020 to 2022.380 Belarus has led all countries in Europe and is second globally in terms of abuses against journalists since 2020, according to press freedom groups.381 During the coverage period, transnational repression and intimidation of critical voices by the Belarusian government increased.

Arrested and jailed Belarusians continued to experience torture and intimidation. For instance, in December 2023, Ales Sabaleuski, a journalist at 6tv.by, was arrested and reportedly beaten during his interrogation (see C3).382 A March 2024 UN report found that “thousands of Belarusians . . . have been subjected to systematic and discriminatory practices amounting to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in detention facilities across Belarus” since 2020. It also noted significant numbers of cases of physical violence, torture, sexual and gender-based violence, intimidation, and threats made against those arrested from 2020 to 2023.383 At least six political prisoners have died while behind bars—three during this coverage period (see C3)—four of whom had been imprisoned for alleged online crimes.384

In addition, the government harasses family members to intimidate activists and pressure them to cease their activities.385 Human rights experts have documented that the authorities often retaliate against family members through threats, arbitrary searches, detentions, interrogations, and arrests. In August 2023, for example, Artsiom Liabedzka, son of the exiled Belarusian political opposition leader Anatol Liabedzka, was imprisoned for three and a half years for “financing an extremist group.”386

The Belarusian Helsinki Committee noted a 2024 surge in repressive practices targeting the relatives of political prisoners and pressuring the relatives of people who have left the country.387 RFE/RL reported that the government is revoking the parental rights of people who have been imprisoned for political reasons.388 The relatives and lawyers of jailed critics are pressured by the government to sign nondisclosure agreements barring them from talking about the cases or the conditions under which prisoners are being held.389

Since 2020, Lukashenka has both threatened not to readmit Belarusians who have left as well as encouraged them to return. The government’s Road Home program and “return commission” are for “repentant” political emigres who wish to return to Belarus. However, human rights groups say that the program is designed to lure critics back in order to imprison them.390 In July 2023, amendments to the Law on Citizenship came into effect, allowing the government to strip Belarusians of their citizenship for their participation in “extremist” activities or causing “grave harm to the interests of Belarus (see C2).”391

Since 2023, the government has increasingly resorted to the prolonged solitary confinement and complete isolation of high-profile opposition voices in prison.392 In Belarus, “incommunicado” detention—total isolation without any outside communication or information available about their fate, whereabouts, and health condition—is “systematically employed” by the authorities.393

In 2023, the government conducted 34 searches—which are often essentially pretexts to ransack offices or residences—targeting journalists and, at times, their relatives or associates.394 Seven such searches took place in in the first five months of 2024.395 The police often air videos with “before and after” scenes of the trashed apartments—in violation of Belarusian law—to intimidate opponents.396 The government has also seized the property of those who emigrated.397

In 2023, the government initiated a new strategy of follow-up visits, checks, and searches of those who had previously served sentences for committing “offenses of an extremist and protest nature.”398 The strategy is designed to intimidate critical voices out of continuing their actions after their release.

Security forces continued to produce and publicize so-called “repentant” or “confessional” videos that are designed to spotlight and humiliate those arrested, force them to confess to alleged crimes, intimidate other critical voices, and reinforce the coercive power of the state.399 The videos appear not only on government-linked social media and messaging channels and but are also promoted on state media400 and by state bodies. Since 2021, this practice has accelerated and become more inhumane. The subjects of the videos have been “dressed up” with props, accompanied by degrading special effects and music, and had their appearance demeaned. The detainees were forced to disclose personal information—some of it incriminating, such as information about drug use—and sexual practices.401 A new trend during the coverage period was the production and publication of “confessional” videos by state media and other state bodies, in addition to the security forces.402

The Russia government’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has also led to a hardening of the rhetoric and tone of state media.403 The authorities have employed online forms of intimidation against critics and dissidents that are aggressive and demeaning. The state-linked Yellow Plums and other social media channels (see B2) propagate hate speech designed to humiliate and marginalize any perceived opposition.404 The government also maintains online databases and lists, some of them public, that publish information about persons accused of “extremism” in order to stigmatize and intimidate them.405

The ongoing climate of fear, repression, and hopelessness has led to more than 500,000 Belarusians (representing 6 to 7 percent of the population) leaving the country.406 Since the events of 2020, the government has placed travel restrictions on those it considers its opponents.407 It has also encouraged critical voices to leave Belarus, and Lukashenka has openly stated that their departure was good for the country.408 Some dissidents, like the journalist Aleh Hruzdzilovich, were informed that, if they did not leave, they would be imprisoned for a longer period.409

A 2023 survey found that many Belarusian journalists living in exile continue to face transnational intimidation from the Belarusian government, including indirect threats to their life and well-being, legal risks, monitoring, surveillance, and hacking.410 Critical voices who emigrated also have reason to fear that their family members who remain in Belarus will be harassed or intimidated by the authorities.411 In 2024, the government announced raids on and the seizure of property belonging to critical voices that had left the country and continued their dissent from abroad.412

Online hate speech against LGBT+ people remained prevalent. The Belarusian organization Journalists for Tolerance (J4T) monitored websites and Telegram channels from January to October 2023 and found that almost half of publications on LGBT+ issues included hate speech—a rate that was 2 percent higher than the previous year.413 In 2022, the J4T website was blocked by the government.414

Some of the “repentant” videos have targeted sexual orientation to humiliate and marginalize detainees. In May 2023, the Catholic activist Uladzislau Beladzied was detained by police. While in custody, Beladzied was forced to take part in a video that included sexually explicit photos and videos of him and showed him confessing to being gay.415 Other “repentant videos” of supposedly LGBT+ detainees have included intimate photos and disclosures of the names of their romantic partners.416

A decree that came into effect in September 2023 means it is no longer possible for Belarusians outside the country to exchange or extend their passports or process other essential documents at Belarus embassies and consulates; instead, they must return to Belarus to do so. Belarusians living in exile, including online activists and journalists, risk politically motivated prosecution if they return to Belarus.417

Prior to the 2020 election, technical attacks were not pervasive in Belarus. In the wake of the political crisis, however, the number of cyberattacks carried out by the government and independent groups rose. Attacks against government entities by dissident members of the country’s ICT community increased after the Belarusian government helped facilitate Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. There is evidence suggesting that the Belarusian government has been weaponizing organized crime groups specializing in hacking and cybercrime to pursue political and foreign policy objectives.418

Members of Belarus’s ICT community played a prominent role in the 2020–21 protests, and the government has targeted them during the ensuing crackdown. In response, an anonymous group of ICT specialists known as the Cyber Partisans began retaliating in September 2020, mounting hacking attacks against the state.419 This group of self-described “hacktivists” uses website defacement, doxing, leaking, sabotage, and irony to weaken and discredit the Lukashenka government.420

The Cyber Partisans421 group has hacked more than 20 government databases422 and leaked secret police archives, lists of alleged police informants, personal information about top government officials and spies, video footage gathered from police drones and detention centers, and recordings of phone calls from a government wiretapping system.423 In February 2023, the Cyber Partisans was reported to have hacked into a database on all criminal and administrative legal cases in Belarus.424 The group used this information to assist investigative journalists at independent media organizations,425 including those reporting on corruption.426 The Cyber Partisans have claimed credit for over 50 known attacks since 2020; in 2023–2024, the group carried out at least 6 attacks,427 including penetrating the networks of the Belarusian State University, government press agency BelTA, and state-run company Grodno Azot.428 In April 2024, the Cyber Partisans announced they had hacked the website and database of the KGB, leaking approximately 40,000 denunciations submitted by “informers” to the KGB from 2014–2023, and released a bot that identifies photos of more than 8,600 current and past KGB employees.429

The scope of the group’s work increased around the time of the Russian government’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Beginning in January of that year, the Cyber Partisans repeatedly hacked the systems of Belarusian Railways, significantly slowing the movement of Russian troops and military supplies across Belarusian territory ahead of and during the invasion.430 The Cyber Partisans have also targeted the Russian state. In November 2022 and February 2023, the group hacked into parts of Russia's state media watchdog, Roskomnadzor. The group reported that it was able to penetrate a subsidiary's inner network, download more than 2 terabytes of documents and emails, and share data showing how the Russian authorities censor information on the Belarusian and Russian internet about the war in Ukraine.431 During the coverage period, the group penetrated a Russian weapons and military equipment company and turned over the information to the Ukrainian government.432

Ghostwriter, an international hacking and psyops group that is likely linked to the Belarusian and Russian governments, has hacked websites and social media accounts to promote anti-US narratives and opposition to NATO among Belarus’s immediate neighbors since 2016.433 A 2023 report found that Ghostwriter has “impacted thousands of email users, has hacked dozens of social media accounts and media websites, published hundreds of false blog posts and other falsified content, and impersonated multiple government officials, NATO representatives, and journalists in Europe.”434

Other hacking groups likely linked to the Belarusian and Russian governments, such as Moustached Bouncer, Winter Vivern, and Asylum Ambuscade, have stepped up their activities inside and outside of Belarus since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.435

As Belarusian media and civil society groups moved their activities abroad following the post-2020 crackdown, their websites have been subjected to cyberattacks, presumably from Belarusian government-related entities. In May 2024, during the elections to the Coordination Council, an opposition political group in exile, the event’s online voting platform experienced a massive distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, presumably carried out by the government.436 "Palitviazynka," an initiative to support Belarusian female political prisoners; the BYSOL Foundation, which assists repressed Belarusians and their families; and the Youth Bloc initiative all reported cyberattacks in January 2024.437

A 2021 report found that the Belarusian government employed DNS spoofing to censor the internet.438 Civil society researchers documented how the authorities injected “fake entries into DNS servers, causing users to be directed to fake and malicious websites.” When individuals attempted to access prodemocracy websites, the DNS response would be substituted, and the connection interrupted. According to the joint report from the civil society organizations Access Now, Article 19, Human Constanta, and International Media Support (IMS), the state-run NTEC was responsible for the disruptions.439

Belarus is not a party to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. DigitCert, one of the largest website-certification companies;440 Avast,441 a cybersecurity company; and other ICT companies decided to cease working in Belarus after the Russian military’s invasion of Ukraine, and this withdrawal of security products and services may result in more hacking, cybercrime, and government surveillance in the country.442