Argentina’s internet penetration rate is among the highest in Latin America, with 89 percent of the population using the internet according to 2023 data from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the most recent information available.1

There were 8.17 million fixed-line internet subscriptions in the first quarter of 2024, a 2.6 percent year-over-year increase.2 At that time, there were approximately 38 million mobile internet users in the country, a 2.5 percent increase over the previous year.3 According to 2022 data from ENACOM, the number of fiber-optic connections has increased by 229.8 percent since 2019, totaling more than 3 million connections by the end of 2022.4

Measurements of internet speed vary, but a range of sources show that the country lags behind the global median and that speeds are slower than those in several other Latin American countries.5 In the third quarter of 2023, ENACOM reported that the average fixed-line download speed was below 20 megabits per second (Mbps) in 3 provinces; between 20 and 40 Mbps in 2 provinces; and above 40 Mbps, ranging from 41 to 101 Mbps, in 19 provinces and in the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina’s federal capital.6

Projects to expand internet infrastructure continued during the coverage period. In June 2021, Google announced plans to build the Firmina subsea cable to connect Argentina and the United States, with additional landings in Brazil and Uruguay; in August 2022, ENACOM approved the project.7 In April 2024, Google announced that the Firmina cable had successfully reached the Argentine mainland at Las Toninas, in Buenos Aires Province.8 The 2,500-kilometer Malbec subsea cable system, which connects Argentina and Brazil, began operating in June 2021.9

In September 2020, then president Alberto Fernández launched the National Plan of Connectivity (Connect), which sought in part to expand the national satellite system to improve connectivity in rural areas and to continue the expansion of the Federal Fiber Optic Network (REFEFO) by its projected completion in 2024. However, President Milei’s decision during the coverage period to suspend public works projects cast doubt on the future of these government-led initiatives (see A2).10

In the absence of significant public infrastructure investments, the Milei administration has instead encouraged private companies to improve the country’s telecommunications infrastructure as part of a broader push for deregulation (see A4). In February 2024, ENACOM authorized three satellite internet companies—OneWeb, Starlink, and Amazon’s Kuiper—to begin operations in the country.11 Customers were able to start signing up for Starlink service the following month.12

In October 2023, Argentina’s leading mobile providers—Telecom Argentina’s Personal, América Móvil’s Claro, and Telefónica’s Movistar—participated in a spectrum tender for the rollout of the fifth-generation (5G) network in the country.13 In December, it was reported that Telecom Argentina had launched the country’s first 5G standalone (5G SA) infrastructure.14

Some Argentine connectivity costs are low when compared to costs in other parts of South America. However, high inflation makes internet subscriptions relatively expensive for Argentinians, especially for those with lower incomes. A notable geographic divide persists.

Geographic differences in internet access are substantial. According to a 2023 survey by the Argentine Internet Chamber (CABASE), 71 percent of households with fixed-line internet connections are located in only five jurisdictions: Buenos Aires City and the provinces of Mendoza, Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and Santa Fe.15 Though connectivity has improved in recent years, many who lack internet access live in rural areas. Analysis by the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA) found that rural connectivity had expanded by 30 percent between 2020 and 2022. However, there are still notable disadvantages in internet access for residents in rural regions compared to urban areas. For example, household connectivity remains below 60 percent in the more remote northern provinces of Corrientes, Formosa, and Santiago del Estero.16

According to Cable, a UK-based company, the average price for 1 gigabyte (GB) of mobile data in Argentina was $1.11 as of 2023, placing it among the most expensive countries in South America.17 However, Argentina’s average monthly broadband cost of $5.17 was the cheapest in South America in 2024.18

According to data from the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), the monthly inflation rate for communications services was 8.2 percent as of May 2024, which was significantly higher than the country’s overall monthly inflation rate of 4.2 percent.19

Amid severe inflation in recent years, Argentina’s government had sought to curb efforts by internet service providers (ISPs) to raise the cost of telecommunications plans. In August 2020, a presidential decree declared landline and mobile phone, internet, and pay television services essential public services, extended a May decision to temporarily suspend increases in rates to last through the end of 2020, and required government approval for price increases after the suspension ended. However, a series of judicial rulings exempted a number of telecommunications companies from the decree, allowing them to increase prices (see A4).20 In November 2023, a federal judge issued a ruling that nullified the August 2020 presidential decree in the case of Telecom Argentina, arguing that it was up to the National Congress—not the executive branch—to approve such regulations.21 In April 2024, the Milei administration repealed the presidential decree altogether, citing deregulatory free market considerations.22

Various government initiatives have sought to promote digital inclusion in recent years, though such plans face an uncertain future under President Milei. Citing the need to reduce deficit spending, the Milei administration halted virtually all public works projects after taking office,23 saying that it needed to reassess which projects to complete with public funds.24 Milei’s government has indicated that its efforts to close the digital divide would instead focus on boosting private investment and promoting deregulation of the telecommunications sector.25 Critics have raised concerns that Milei’s deregulatory actions risk worsening connectivity in remote regions and could limit consumer choice (see A4).26

Previously, in December 2022, the Fernández government launched the “Mi Pueblo Conectado” (My Connected Town) program under the Secretariat of Public Innovation (now restructured under the Secretariat of Innovation, Science and Technology), with the goal of providing satellite internet access to more than 370 small towns with little to no connectivity and with a total investment of 1.2 billion pesos ($3.3 million).27 As part of the project, the government plans to supply localities with funds to acquire computer equipment.28 As of September 2023, the program had provided satellite connectivity to 88 localities across five provinces.29

In February 2022, ENACOM granted over 1.7 billion pesos ($4.7 million) to a number of projects promoting equitable information and communication technology (ICT) access for less-connected communities, including several focused on expanding broadband infrastructure and promoting the development of ICTs in less profitable, and therefore underserved, parts of the country.30

While Law 27.078 protects net neutrality,31 practices such as zero-rating are commonplace; for example, major mobile providers do not charge users to access WhatsApp.32

The government does not exercise control over telecommunications infrastructure. There have been no reported instances of the government cutting off internet connectivity during protests or social unrest.

Argentina has 28 functioning internet exchange points (IXPs) strategically distributed in major cities across the country,33 which help manage internet traffic efficiently.34

Argentina has hundreds of ISPs, including many small- and medium-sized providers.35 Grupo Clarín is the dominant broadband provider, holding 46 percent of that market as of February 2021, followed by Telefónica with 15 percent, Telecentro with 12 percent, and Supercanal with 7 percent. Small ISPs together hold the remaining 20 percent of the broadband market.36 As of 2023, the mobile sector is concentrated under market leaders Claro (América Móvil, 39.1 percent), Personal (Telecom Argentina, 33.4 percent), and Movistar (Telefónica, 26.3 percent).37 These private estimates are the latest data available; official information is not currently available, as ENACOM does not publicly release market share data.

In December 2023, President Milei announced a series of reforms to deregulate the economy, including measures intended to boost competition and investment from foreign satellite internet providers, such as Starlink (see A1).38 Milei’s 366-article DNU 70/2023, known as the “Mega-Decree,” revokes or amends several laws and regulations in sectors across Argentina’s economy, including the telecommunications industry.39 The decree was rejected by the Senate in March 2024 but had not been rejected by the Chamber of Deputies,40 meaning that it remained in force at the end of the coverage period. Analysts have argued that actions such as DNU 70/2023, which aim to reduce state involvement in the telecommunications market, could ultimately worsen connectivity in regions of the country where private investment is not profitable.41

In recent years, the government and ENACOM have made decisions with the potential to increase competition, though judicial decisions have largely thwarted these efforts. A May 2020 prohibition of price increases for telecommunications services applied only to products offered by select major companies, while cooperatives and small- and medium-sized enterprises were exempt (see A2).42 In April 2021, a federal court suspended the application of an August 2020 presidential decree in the case of Telecom Argentina; under the decree, price increases imposed after a freeze expiring in December 2020 required government approval. In May 2021, ENACOM announced it would appeal that decision at the Supreme Court.43 In November 2022, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds because the federal court’s earlier decision was a preliminary injunction instead of a definitive ruling.44 A series of judicial rulings—most recently in February 2024—have extended the suspension of the presidential decree over time, effectively neutralizing the Fernández government’s attempt to control prices.45 The Milei government repealed the decree in April 2024 (see A2),46 and in June, after the coverage period, ENACOM revoked all resolutions that restricted internet and mobile price increases.47

The state does not impose extensive administrative requirements or financial burdens to become an internet service provider. A 2017 resolution has allowed the government to push for a more “flexible and objective” ICT licensing regime.48 The process to obtain an ISP license can be completed online with a fee equal to 125 times the current value of the Universal and Mandatory Basic Benefit (PBU).49 Providers can access ENACOM’s online platforms to fill out different forms that were simplified in order to make the process easier.50

The main telecommunications regulator, ENACOM, was created by presidential decree in December 201551 and later validated by the National Congress in April 2016.52

The body’s composition has raised some concerns about possible executive influence. ENACOM operates within the innovation, science, and technology secretariat, under the chief of the cabinet of ministers, and typically has a board comprised of four directors chosen by the president and three proposed by the legislature: one by the majority or first minority party, one by the second minority party, and one by the third minority party. ENACOM’s decisions can be approved by a simple majority, and its members, who serve four-year terms, may be removed by the president.53 ICT policy decisions have been shared between the Secretariat of Innovation, Science and Technology and the Secretariat of Connectivity and Communications under the Ministry of Infrastructure since the Milei administration restructured the Secretariat of Public Innovation in December 2023.54

Since taking office, the Milei administration has contemplated major changes to the structure and operations of ENACOM. In January 2024, the government appointed Juan Martin Ozores as the auditor for ENACOM, alongside deputy auditors Patricia Zulema Roldan and Alejandro Pereyra, who was the director of the agency during former president Mauricio Macri’s administration—leaving the body without a board of directors. In response, the opposition accused the government of seeking to eliminate the opposition’s representation in the organization.55 This decision to audit ENACOM—which will include a review of regulations during the previous Fernández administration and its operating structure—is seen by the government as a "transitional but necessary" phase to reorganize the agency.56 The audit was expected to last 180 days, though this period could be extended once.57 The Fernández government’s 2020 decree establishing telecommunications as an essential public service was repealed in April 2024 as part of this review (see A2 and A4). In March 2024, the government announced that it would close all provincial offices of ENACOM, eliminating approximately 500 jobs.58

The executive body, the Network Information Center (NIC) Argentina, regulates and registers all websites with the “.ar” top-level domain name. Registration of any standard domain ending in “.ar” requires an annual fee between 8,500 and 25,500 pesos ($23.60 and $70.79).59

Users in Argentina have access to a wide array of online content. Nevertheless, courts have the power to order website blocks and have done so to protect copyright and limit access to unauthorized gambling sites based on different provincial regulations.60 Law 25.690 also requires ISPs to provide software that can allow users to choose to limit their own access to “specific websites.”61

In late February 2023, during the previous coverage period, a federal judge ordered ISPs to block access to 30 websites that had provided free livestreams of popular sports and TV shows. The injunction was issued at the request of a group of content providers and telecommunications companies that claimed these platforms were violating copyright law. One of the now-blocked sports websites received 3.1 million visits in January 2023. While the blocked websites currently cannot be accessed, other websites have been created that have the same content but different URLs.62 Similarly, after the coverage period in July 2024, a court ordered the blocking of more than 50 illegal sports streaming websites associated with “Fútbol Libre” and “Megadeportes,” two illegal streaming platforms, following a complaint by the Alliance Against Audiovisual Piracy (Alianza).63

Courts have made controversial decisions in recent years to try to block the mobile transportation app Uber, finding it was not in compliance with the legal framework for public transportation services.64 After a provisional order to suspend Uber was issued in Córdoba in 2019,65 Uber stopped operating in the city.66 The company resumed operations there in December 2020,67 after the city failed to comply with an October 2020 court order that required it to enact ridesharing regulations within 30 business days.68 In May 2023, the General Union of the Association of Transport Workers (UGATT) issued a demand for ENACOM to block Uber in Argentina, citing allegations of labor law violations by the company,69 though ENACOM has since given no indication that it intends to block the app.

In September 2023, the Tucumán provincial government repealed the law that allowed Uber to operate in the province and imposed fines on those who use the app. Though the app remains operational in Tucumán, the traffic police is empowered to enforce the ban.70 In March 2024, a member of the San Miguel de Tucumán city council underscored the need to legalize and regulate the use of Uber.71 The app remained illegal in Tucumán as of May 2024.72

Courts continue to consider lawsuits from individuals requesting that search engines and platforms take down certain material. Judges have ordered search engines and social networks to remove content based on the right to honor and privacy, which is guaranteed under Article 52 of the civil code and allows Argentinians to prevent or repair any damage to their reputation. In September 2022, during the previous coverage period, a judge in Formosa Province ordered a digital media outlet to remove content about local public official Paula Cattaneo and prevented it from making any reference to her in the future. The judge ruled that the outlet had made misogynistic comments that constituted psychological, gender-based violence and affected Cattaneo’s moral integrity.73 However, the Argentine Journalism Forum (FOPEA) criticized the ruling for negatively affecting freedom of expression, arguing that public officials have a responsibility to tolerate harsh criticism.74

In July 2023, the Provincial Electoral Court of Santa Fe ordered Google Argentina to remove “insulting” paid advertisements that discredited Carolina Losada, a Juntos por el Cambio (Together for Change) primary candidate for governor of the Santa Fe province. The court accepted the complaint, which was filed by Losada, due to the anonymous nature of the advertiser and its unknown funding source, rather than objections to the content itself.75 One week later, the same court ordered Google Argentina to take down two websites that spread “grievances” about Maximiliano Pullaro, Losada’s rival in the gubernatorial primary. Once again, the court determined that the anonymous authorship and funding of the websites—and not the content itself—raised transparency concerns that justified their removal.76

In October 2023, the party La Libertad Avanza (Freedom Advances), led by then presidential candidate Javier Milei, sent a legal notice to Google demanding the removal of certain electoral ads from the YouTube channels @MileiNo and @ConmisderechosNO for allegedly spreading false information about Milei. Additionally, the party filed a complaint with the National Electoral Court denouncing a particular site that was allegedly used to spread false and misleading information and requested documentation about the source and funding of these ads.77

The “right to be forgotten” remains a subject of debate in Argentina, though several recent court decisions have established a precedent favoring free expression. In June 2022, during the previous coverage period, the Supreme Court ruled against the right to be forgotten when content falls within the public interest in Natalia Denegri v. Google.78 The Supreme Court held a public hearing on the case in March 2022;79 a civil judge had ruled in celebrity Natalia Denegri’s favor in February 2020, ordering Google to delist search results for keywords referring to Denegri’s involvement in a 1990s scandal—a decision that had been reaffirmed by the National Court of Civil Appeals in August 2020.80 During the March 2022 hearing, various civil society organizations recommended that the Supreme Court not enshrine the right to be forgotten.81 The final ruling was well-received by digital rights organizations for setting a strong precedent favoring the public interest over the right to be forgotten.82

The “Denegri precedent” has since been ratified by lower courts. In September 2023, a federal court rejected an appeal that sought to deindex certain content on Google related to a homicide case in which the defendant was ultimately acquitted. The court argued that, despite the acquittal, the content in question, while outdated, was not inaccurate at the time it was reported and that freedom of expression should enjoy precedence over the right to honor when such debate is in the public interest.83

A number of courts have recently overturned prior rulings requiring search engines to deindex information, with particular emphasis on information related to cases of sexual harassment. In July 2021, the Federal Chamber of Bahía Blanca reversed a decision requiring Google and Facebook to remove present and future content about an actor who had been accused of sexually harassing a teenager in a 2018 Facebook post. The court stressed that free expression takes precedence over potential reputational damage, especially when the content in question involves specially protected speech from vulnerable populations—in this case, the rights of women, adolescents, and children.84

ENACOM publishes an online repository of websites that have been blocked, reinstated, or both after court orders.85 The webpage allows users to access a copy of the court orders and the arguments. The vast majority of website blocks concern online gambling, which is regulated differently in each province. In February 2023, during the previous coverage period, service providers were ordered to block a list of 30 websites providing free access to sports events and TV shows. The block was ordered by a judge who based his decision on the sites’ alleged violation of copyright and intellectual property rights. A similar block was ordered in July 2024, after the coverage period (see B1).

In October 2023, the National Congress enacted the Olimpia Law, which legally recognized digital or telematic violence as a form of gender-based violence86 and raised the possibility of criminal penalties for these activities (see C2). The law defines such violence as “any conduct, action or omission against women based on their gender that is committed, instigated or aggravated, in part or in whole, with the assistance, use and/or appropriation of information and communication technologies, with the aim of causing physical, psychological, economic, sexual or moral harm, both in the private and public sphere, to them or their family group.”87 As part of the law, judges are empowered, as an urgent preventive measure, to order digital platforms to remove online content that meets this definition. In their orders, judges must specify a specific URL to be removed.88

Recent court decisions have established takedown criteria to avoid potential abuse of generic injunctions that restrict freedom of expression (see B2).89 Though the country lacks a law on intermediary liability, a landmark 2014 Supreme Court ruling confirmed that intermediaries should not be liable for third-party content if they did not have knowledge of alleged third-party violations.90 It also established that intermediaries must remove unlawful content only if they are notified by a judicial order, thus favoring a judicial takedown regime over a “notice-and-takedown” system. However, the court stated that if the content involves “manifest illegality,” a private notification to the intermediary is sufficient. A 2017 Supreme Court ruling reaffirmed these standards in Gimbutas v. Google.91 In June 2022, the Supreme Court ruled that the “right to be forgotten” cannot be applied when the content in question is newsworthy or of public interest (see B2).

Self-censorship among bloggers and internet users is not widespread in Argentina, although some isolated events have elicited self-censorship in particular cases.

Following the attempted assassination of then vice president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in September 2022,92 the anonymous Argentine online forum Rouzed, which was known to host right-wing extremist content, was voluntarily shut down by its administrators. The decision was taken after several anonymous users alleged that the attacker was an active member of the forum and accused other members of participating in the planning of the attack. However, just days after Rouzed was closed down, administrators created a new anonymous forum called Boxed.93

A number of developments in recent years have sparked concern over their potential to increase self-censorship among journalists and ordinary users. In March 2022, for instance, the government announced its work on a project to promote the “proper” use of social networks. The initiative was interpreted by the opposition and journalism organizations as a plan to regulate social networks,94 which they said would encourage self-censorship.95 In response, the government stressed that it had no intention of proposing regulation on the matter.96

Soon after the attempted assassination of Fernández de Kirchner, then president Alberto Fernández (no relation) again raised the possibility of regulating social networks to prevent the spread of violence and hate speech online. Members of the opposition again criticized the government for allegedly promoting censorship. Despite Fernández’s statements, no regulation proposal was passed before the end of his presidential term in December 2023.97

Women journalists in Argentina, especially those covering gender issues, have reported a surge of threats and online attacks from the far right amid the political rise of President Milei (see C7). Luciana Peker, a journalist and activist, said that she left Argentina as a result of the threats against her.98 This hostile environment could force women journalists to self-censor their reporting or other critical comments online.

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because the 2023 presidential election featured a significant degree of online content manipulation, including false claims of electoral fraud.

There have been episodes in recent years of seemingly organized digital behavior through bots, trolls, and personal accounts connected to political campaigning.99 During the 2023 presidential election, both candidates widely shared AI-generated content.

Seemingly coordinated online trolls were reportedly deployed in advance of the 2023 presidential election. According to media reports, a network of troll accounts was used to influence online conversations about the election100 and inauthentically boost the social media posts of then candidate Milei, who campaigned on a right-wing platform outside the political mainstream.101 The network reportedly working on behalf of Milei, controlled by the political marketing firm Numen Group, allegedly included up to 50,000 inauthentic accounts and has reportedly been hired by other Argentine candidates in the past.102 Fernando Cerimedo, Numen Group’s founder and head of Milei’s campaign communications team, has claimed that he doesn't use trolls to attack political opponents online but rather to “deceive” the algorithms and boost his clients’ messaging.103

During the 2023 electoral period, both presidential candidates, Massa and Milei, and their supporters used AI to generate campaign content. Massa’s campaign leveraged AI to craft images and videos portraying him as a decisive and charismatic leader, contrasting with the campaign’s depictions of Milei as unstable. Conversely, Milei’s campaign responded with AI-generated imagery that presented Massa as a Chinese communist leader and himself as a nurturing cartoon lion.104

Some campaign content generated by AI was intentionally created to spread misleading information, raising concerns about the impact of the content on voter perceptions. For example, Massa’s campaign created a deepfake video that depicted Milei discussing a hypothetical market for human organs.105 Meanwhile, a manipulated video that received more than 190,000 likes on TikTok in September showed Massa intercepting a clear bag that contained something white, falsely implying that it was cocaine.106 The following month, in November, Milei posted an image on his official Instagram account that claimed to show “Fake News about Milei” that was supposedly published by Argentina’s executive branch. However, the list was not published by the presidency and included certain statements that were in fact made by Milei at various points in the past. The post received more than 275,000 likes on Instagram.107

Shortly after the first round of the presidential election in October 2023, during which Milei came in second place and advanced to a runoff with Massa, supporters of La Libertad Avanza, Milei’s political party, used social media to spread seemingly coordinated allegations of electoral fraud. Despite the absence of evidence to substantiate these claims, these narratives gained traction on platforms like TikTok and X, casting doubt on the integrity of the vote count and official results. Several political figures from La Libertad Avanza, including then candidate Milei, endorsed these allegations by reposting content on X.108 Electoral authorities dismissed these accusations since they were not supported by real evidence. In another case from that month, supporters of Milei shared a photo on X and Facebook that allegedly showed protesters denouncing electoral fraud; however, the photo was taken during an unrelated February 2021 demonstration.109

Though some disinformation regarding politicians also appeared online in the lead-up to the November 2021 legislative election, the content did not have a significant impact on public debate. One false claim that circulated, for instance, was that former president Mauricio Macri misspelled “November” in his personal notes.110

Since President Milei took office, reports have documented the existence of social media accounts that fiercely support his government and La Libertad Avanza, potentially constituting “a deliberately planned hierarchical action.”111 This network has reportedly been deployed to amplify support for Milei and harass critics of the president online (see C7), particularly on X. In one incident from March 2024, pro-Milei accounts sharply criticized then bioeconomy secretary Fernando Vilella after he liked a post on X that was critical of the government’s health policy, prompting Vilella to distance himself from the liked post.112 While some sources have speculated that these trolls are coordinated directly within the executive branch,113 others have noted that there is no definitive proof that this network is financed by public funds.114 The precise operations and financing of these trolls remained unclear during the coverage period.

In September 2022, following the attempted assassination of then vice president Fernández de Kirchner, misinformation about the attack proliferated online (see B7). Several of the false claims were intentionally manipulated. For example, photoshopped images circulated on social media showing the alleged attacker standing next to former president Macri and former Buenos Aires province governor María Eugenia Vidal, both from the center-right opposition.115 These efforts were part of broader attempts across the political spectrum in Argentina to discredit political opponents through manipulated online content.

State advertising is typically allocated to traditional media outlets, placing some economic constraints on digital outlets, though the share of funds allocated to digital outlets has increased in recent years. Political allocation of official advertising plays a major role in shaping media content at both the federal and local levels.116 In March 2023, the national government issued updated regulations for allocating state advertising funds.117 The new rules, which remove some conditions to receive official advertising and eliminate the government’s obligation to produce an annual plan for advertising, were criticized for granting more discretionary power to the government to allocate funding.118

The Fernández administration, which left office in December 2023, continued a long-standing trend of allocating funds based on positive news coverage,119 though outlets editorially critical of the Fernández government nevertheless received significant shares of funding.120 Alberto Fernández's government spent a total of 40.2 billion pesos ($111.7 million) on official advertising between January and October 2023, which represented a decrease from the 63.6 billion pesos ($176.7 million) spent, in constant terms, in 2022. Digital outlets and social networks accounted for 30 percent of all official advertising spending in 2023, up from just 16 percent in 2020. Grupo Clarín, the media group that received the most funds, received 10.2 percent of all official advertising funds in 2023, far outpacing the second- and third-ranked recipients, Indalo (5.8 percent) and Octubre (5.4 percent).121

Furthermore, there was a notable concentration of advertising expenditures in media outlets based in Buenos Aires City, which generally possess a “national” reach. These outlets received a substantial 67.4 percent of the total funds, while media in Buenos Aires Province received 9.3 percent of the allocation. Media in other provinces received more marginal shares of funds.122

In December 2023, the Milei government officially announced the halt of national advertising expenditures, citing austerity measures. The measure will be effective for one year, though it can be extended, and allows exceptions for certain circumstances. The regulation excludes “official advertising activities mandated by existing regulations, as well as campaigns arising from force majeure situations or duly justified specific communication needs.”123

Analysts have expressed different views on the potential consequences of the government’s decision. Some experts have said that small and medium organizations will be disproportionately affected, while others have speculated that the suspension could lead to the substantial “reconfiguration” of the media sector, considering that many outlets depend on public funds to operate.124 However, the full effects of the advertising suspension remain to be seen as of the end of the current coverage period.

In April 2019, the Senate approved reforms regulating the financing of political campaigns.125 It notably mandates that 60 percent of public resources for political-party digital advertising be allocated to digital news sites that generate content, 35 percent to outlets providing national coverage, and 25 percent to provincial outlets focusing on local content. This responds to media associations’ demands to compensate for losses due to the migration of advertising to search engines and social networks.126 After obtaining approval in the Chamber of Deputies,127 the law was published in the Official Gazette the following month, in May.128

Argentina has an open and diverse online media environment, though new pressures have emerged under President Milei. The digital ecosystem is populated with initiatives and content that reflect the interests of different groups, including Indigenous groups,129 LGBT+ people,130 feminists,131 migrants,132 and various religious congregations.133 However, media ownership is highly concentrated, which may in turn affect the diversity of news in the market.134

In March 2024, President Milei announced his intention to close the Argentine public news agency Télam,135 accusing it of being “a Kirchnerist propaganda agency” for the country’s leftist Peronist movement.136 Télam’s website was shut down just days later, displaying an error message with the national emblem and the phrase “Page under reconstruction.” Simultaneously, workers reported on social media that Télam’s headquarters had been fenced off, preventing journalists from accessing the newsroom. Télam was one of the most important news agencies in Latin America and provided coverage across all regions of the country.137 In May, the government announced that it would close all the state news agency’s correspondent offices across the country, affecting branches in 13 provinces.138 In July, after the coverage period, the government published a decree that officially closed Télam as a journalistic entity.139

The government’s decision to close Télam negatively impacted daily operations for media outlets across the country, particularly for smaller, more remote outlets. Many journalists have noted that the news agency was a critical source of reliable and comprehensive information at the federal level, making it more difficult for them to accurately report on national issues.140 Because Télam provided more than 12,000 cables, 6,000 photographs, 400 videos, and 100 audio recordings per month to a network of over 800 clients,141 its closure has the potential to severely degrade the quality of online news for Argentinians across the country.

During the 2023 elections, false and misleading content was widely shared online (see B5), including content generated by AI. However, some analysts have noted that the use of generative AI during Argentina’s 2023 elections had a relatively minor impact on the online information space. Because much of the AI-generated content lacked sophistication, it often contained noticeable flaws and was relatively easy to identify as false information.142

Additionally, several civil society initiatives have sought to counter online misinformation and disinformation and render the online media ecosystem more reliable in recent years. Reverso, a collaborative project coordinated by fact-checking organization Chequeado and AFP Factual, and consisting of more than 100 media organizations, returned in June 2023 in the run-up to the October general election.143 The project, which aims to combat misleading or false electoral information, was previously active in both 2019 and 2021, ahead of national elections during those years.144

In the aftermath of the attempted assassination of then vice president Fernández de Kirchner in September 2022, misinformation about the attack spread widely on social media. For instance, some social media users falsely claimed that the Canal 5 Noticias television channel had reported the attack several hours before it occurred, implying that it had been staged. Others falsely claimed that the attacker was an employee of then Buenos Aires City Mayor Horacio Rodríguez Larreta, an opposition leader. Many of the false claims that circulated online about the attack were intentionally manipulated to target or discredit political opponents (see B5). According to one analysis, immediately after the attempted assassination, almost a third of all social media posts mentioning the attack “concentrated on disbelief” that it had even occurred.145

Argentinians continue to use social media as a tool for political and social mobilization. Digital activism has played a crucial role in rallying protests and ushering in legislative change in recent years, especially for women’s rights.

After various announcements by President Milei regarding substantial cuts in public spending and the privatization of the economy, different social sectors took to the streets to protest. Social media played a significant role in organizing and amplifying the impact of these protests as well as enabling Milei’s supporters to show support for his policies. In January 2024, the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), the country’s largest labor union, called for a general strike. Social media analysis conducted amid the CGT’s strike identified more than 580,000 mentions about it, reportedly reaching nearly all users in the country. The Milei government and its supporters amplified the hashtag #YoNoParo (#IDoNotStrike), garnering 100,000 mentions. Conversely, 4,000 posts mentioned #YoParo (#IStrike), a hashtag in support of the strike. Other hashtags used during the social media campaign included #CGT, #ParoGeneral (#GeneralStrike), #24E, #Milei, #DNU, and #LeyOmnibus (#OmnibusLaw).146

Nationwide demonstrations against gender-based violence took place in June 2022, during the previous coverage period, as part of a movement that began seven years prior following protests that began with the X hashtag campaign #NiUnaMenos (#NotOneLess).147 The hashtag initially went viral on social media in June 2015148 and remained one of the most posted hashtags in subsequent years.149 Activists continued to use digital channels to spread the movement’s message in June 2022, including through an initiative that involved family members of femicide victims sharing their stories on social media.150 Another online campaign addressing gender issues, #PeriodismoConDiversidad (#JournalismWithDiversity), was launched in April 2022. Women journalists and dedicated gender editors shared videos accompanied with the hashtag in which they called for improved coverage of gender issues and the greater inclusion of women and other marginalized groups in media.151

The legalization of abortion in December 2020 was widely seen as the result of the #NiUnaMenos movement.152 Social media played a key role in facilitating discussion during the legislative debate held in the month before the decision. Hashtags both supporting and opposing the right to abortion trended during the legislative session, which was livestreamed and watched by a record audience of more than 48,000 people.153

As in previous national elections, Argentinian political candidates used online platforms to campaign for the country’s October 2023 general election. Social media has continued to serve as an important part of political campaigning in Argentina, with several candidates using TikTok154 and other platforms to communicate with voters during the coverage period.

Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the constitution155 and through the ratification of regional and international human rights treaties that share constitutional status.156 Argentina also explicitly established online freedom of expression protections through a presidential decree issued in 1997.157 These were expanded by the National Congress in 2005 to include “the search, reception, and dissemination of ideas and information of all kinds via internet services.”158 A national freedom of information law came into force in 2016.159

This legal framework has been supported by various Supreme Court decisions that have favored freedom of expression in cases related to intermediary liability and the right to be forgotten (see B2 and B3).

While the Supreme Court is relatively independent, Argentina’s judicial system has faced criticism in the past for its inefficiencies as well as accusations of politicization in lower and province-level courts. In October 2022, the media reported on an apparent secret meeting—among judges, prosecutors, media businesspeople, and at least one member of the Buenos Aires city government from the opposition Republican Proposal (PRO) party—that occurred that month at a private estate in Lago Escondido.160 Following the meeting, Telegram chats that appeared to show attempts by the participants to cover up details of the meeting were allegedly leaked from the mobile phone of Marcelo D'Alessandro, the justice minister of the city of Buenos Aires, igniting accusations of judicial collusion from then president Fernández and other members of the governing party.161 After additional messages were leaked in December, with some appearing to show private messages between D'Alessandro and a spokesman for the Supreme Court, D'Alessandro accused individuals linked with the national government of illegally hacking his cell phone in order to obtain the messages (see C5).162 Following the controversy, D’Alessandro resigned as the Buenos Aires security and justice minister in March 2023.163

Some laws impose criminal and civil liability for online activities, though defamatory statements regarding matters of public interest were decriminalized in 2009.164 Law 11.723 holds liable those who reproduce content that violates intellectual property by any means and establishes sanctions ranging from fines to imprisonment of up to six years. In November 2013, the National Congress approved a law amending the penal code and establishing penalties of up to four years’ imprisonment for online contact with a minor carried out “with the purpose of committing a crime against [the minor’s] sexual integrity.”165 The proposal had sparked criticism among academics and legislators due to vague wording that would have criminalized any online interaction with minors, issuing the same sentence that is mandated for cases of abuse.166

A 2008 cybercrime law amended the criminal code to prohibit distribution and possession of child sexual abuse images, interception of communications and informatics systems, hacking, and electronic fraud. Some of the terms used in the legislation have been criticized as ambiguous, which could lead to overly broad interpretations.167

During the coverage period, the government enacted legislation meant to address digital violence against women, a serious issue in Argentina (see C7). In October 2023, the National Congress passed Law 27.736, known as the Olimpia Law.168 The law amends the 2009 Act on the Comprehensive Protection of Women to classify digital or telematic violence as a recognized form of gender-based violence and allows for a judge to order the removal of online content that meets this definition (see B3).169 An accompanying proposal, known as the Belén Law, would update the penal code to criminalize certain forms of digital gender-based violence, including the nonconsensual sharing of intimate images and pornographic deepfakes, to be punished with fines or imprisonment. However, the Belén Law had not been passed by the end of the coverage period.170

Other bills that could be used to punish certain forms of online speech due to broad wording have been proposed in recent years, though none had been passed by the end of the coverage period. In July 2023, concerns were expressed over a bill passed by the Chamber of Deputies of the province of Salta. The bill aims to establish penalties, in the form of arrest and/or fines, for individuals who disseminate false news in digital publications. The most concerning aspect of the proposed law is the provision that imposes penalties of up to 25 days of arrest or fines on individuals who knowingly create or spread false news digitally with the intent to cause panic, discredit individuals or officials, or incite disorder or riots. After being approved in the lower house, the proposal was sent to the Salta Senate, but so far, it has not been approved.171 In August 2023, the chairman of the commission overseeing the bill in the provincial senate stated that it would not be a priority agenda item, making its passage unlikely.172

In July 2023, the governor of the La Rioja province, Ricardo Quintela, used a constitutional convention in the province to raise the possibility of regulating alleged hate speech and disinformation in the media. The governor’s statement raised concerns among journalists and press freedom organizations due to the potential for media censorship. However, no specific proposals had advanced by the end of the coverage period.173

Score Change: The score declined from 5 to 4 because two individuals from the Jujuy province were held in pretrial detention for almost two months—a disproportionate measure in connection with their online activities.

Internet users do not generally face politically motivated arrests or prosecutions for online speech, though two individuals were detained in connection with their online activities during the coverage period. In recent years, journalists have also been charged for their digital activities; users have been fined or investigated for social media comments; and social media monitoring has led to investigations being launched against online users.

In January 2024, Nahuel Morandini and Humberto Roque Villegas from the Jujuy province were detained for almost two months after Morandini made an ironic post on X suggesting that Tulia Snopek, the wife of former Jujuy governor Gerardo Morales, had an extramarital affair, and after Villegas circulated photos on Facebook of the couple’s daughter implying that Morales is not her father. Prosecutors claimed that these posts amounted to psychological gender-based violence against Snopek and to “rendering uncertain” their daughter’s identity.174 After the case received national attention and condemnation, Morandi and Villegas were released from pretrial detention in late February. However, the judicial process against them continued, and the two individuals face up to eight years in prison if convicted.175 Prosecutors in Jujuy issued an arrest warrant for another individual, Lucía González, after González allegedly discussed the allegations involving Snopek in a private WhatsApp group with Morandini. Prosecutors reportedly discovered the private conversations after searching Morandini’s phone following his arrest in January.176 Though the arrest warrant against González was later revoked, the criminal investigation against her continues and she faces up to six years in prison.177

Journalists and online personalities have faced charges and proceedings in relation to their digital activities, though charges have tended to ultimately be dropped. Daniel Santoro, an investigative journalist for the national newspaper Clarín, was charged with attempted extortion in April 2021 based on a judge’s claims that Santoro, who had requested comment on an article via a WhatsApp message, was a “necessary participant” in a broader extortion scheme. If found guilty, he would have faced up to five years in prison.178 A federal court revoked the decision in June 2021, citing a lack of evidence.179 The last charge against Santoro was ultimately dropped in November 2021, in another federal court decision that stressed Santoro’s behavior as a neutral and noncriminal outcome of his journalistic profession.180

Santoro, along with journalist Joaquín Morales Solá from La Nación, faced an additional criminal lawsuit during the previous coverage period. In January 2023, Argentina’s Federal Intelligence Agency (AFI) filed criminal charges against the two journalists and their newspapers, claiming they had revealed political and military secrets by publishing the names of supposed military personnel who were alleged to have illegally worked as intelligence agents for the AFI.181 The articles in question were published online between December 31, 2022 and January 3, 2023.182 Ultimately, in April 2023, the charges were dropped by a federal judge since the disclosures by Morales Solá and Santoro were part of their journalistic work and therefore protected by freedom of expression.183

In 2020, a court ruled that Diego Masci, a journalist and director of the zbol.com.ar outlet, engaged in criminal violation of privacy, issuing a 90,000 peso ($250) fine. In November 2021, a San Luis court upheld the ruling. The initial decision stemmed from a video that Masci had published online showing government minister Natalia Spinuzza under the influence of marijuana—a video that the court also ordered Google to remove from YouTube. Press freedom groups voiced concern over the ruling, which cited the lack of a public interest component, arguing that the video ceased being private when Spinuzza recorded and distributed it to third parties.184 In August 2022, the Supreme Court overturned the San Luis court ruling, finding that it lacked appropriate consideration of Spinuzza’s status as a public figure and, consequently, of the right to freedom of expression more broadly.185 In November 2023, during the coverage period, the San Luis court followed up on the Supreme Court’s decision by issuing a new ruling, this time rejecting the claim against Masci and citing a public interest component.186

That same month, in November, Malena Galmarini, the wife of former economy minister and presidential candidate Sergio Massa, filed a criminal complaint against the director of the digital outlet Diario Mendoza Today, Christian Sanz, and other individuals for their posts on X. Galmarini claimed that the group formed an alleged conspiracy on social media to damage Massa’s public image.187 Galmarini’s complaint was condemned by the Fundación LED, a free expression organization.188

Libertarian journalist and YouTuber Eduardo Prestofelippo (also known as El Presto) has faced several legal actions in recent years. In March 2024, union leader Pablo Moyano filed a complaint against Prestofelippo for alleged harassment and slander, after Prestofelippo reportedly made online statements that referred to Moyano as a “sewer rat,” among other insults, and insinuated that Moyano could have been involved in his wife's death.189 Previously, in February 2022, Prestofelippo was sentenced to 30 days’ house arrest for discrimination and harassment against the former first lady, Fabiola Yáñez. The charges stem from two YouTube videos and a Facebook post made by Prestofelippo in 2020, in which he made insulting remarks about Yáñez’s private life. Prestofelippo was also ordered to take a course on gender violence and respect for women at the National Institute Against Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Racism, a state agency.190 This sentence was upheld by a Buenos Aires city court in September 2022.191 However, an April 2024 ruling by the city of Buenos Aires’s superior court overturned Prestofelippo’s conviction for harassment and the unauthorized dissemination of intimate images, while upholding his conviction for discrimination, appearing to prolong the case.192

In September 2020, Prestofelippo was also arrested during a police raid on his home after he allegedly posted death threats to then vice president Fernández de Kirchner on X (then known as Twitter); the charges were dismissed that December when a judge ruled that the post was protected under freedom of expression standards.193 However, the dismissal was revoked by the Federal Chamber of Córdoba in October 2021 following a successful appeal by the prosecutors. The Federal Chamber of Cassation upheld the 2021 ruling, which ordered the prosecution of Prestofelippo for “threats,” in October 2022.194 The case appeared to remain ongoing at the end of the coverage period.

The Argentine government does not impose restrictions on anonymity or encryption for internet users, but registration requirements are in place for obtaining a mobile phone or a domain name (see A5). Bloggers and internet users are not required to register with the government and can post anonymous comments freely in online forums.

Telecommunications operators must register users’ identification information before selling them mobile phones or prepaid SIM cards.195 A resolution signed in October 2016 established a database of personal information, requiring ENACOM to adopt measures to identify all mobile users in a national registry.196 Mobile service providers must store the information in a safe and auditable manner and supply information on request to the judiciary or public prosecutors. The resolution does not state how long the information must be stored. Civil society groups criticized the policy for undermining anonymity and the freedom of expression.197

In March 2023, ENACOM introduced an updated identity validation system requiring biometric data. These new rules establish stricter requirements for identity verification during both initial user registration and when making changes to SIM registration, such as transferring ownership. The regulations require users to “revalidate” their identity using biometric data or multi-step/factor authentication when making such changes.198

In July 2016, the National Directorate for the Registry of Internet Domain Names launched a new regulation for the administration of domain names.199 In order to register, transfer, or cancel a domain, individuals must apply for a “tax password” (Clave Fiscal) by providing the Federal Administration of Public Revenues with fingerprints, a facial photo, and their signature.200

In general, Argentina has strong, constitutionally rooted privacy standards. Though covert or unlawful surveillance against ordinary internet users does not seem to be widespread, some sectors have attempted to spy on individuals. Security services engage in monitoring of journalists’ online activities.

Government agencies do not systematically collect or access internet users’ metadata directly, but they may request it from service providers with a warrant,201 which has been upheld by the judiciary regarding information such as geolocation data.202 The interception of private communications requires judicial authorization.203

The Ministry of Security has consistently recommended that federal police engage in “cyberpatrolling” since 2017, when the email and X (then Twitter) account of the security minister at the time were hacked.204 Cyberpatrolling involves a proactive approach to identifying illicit activities online, mainly by searching social media platforms and monitoring results, without appropriate transparency measures or safeguards.205 In October 2022, the Ministry of Security repealed a 2020 resolution206 that had laid out the general principles and guidelines for cyberpatrolling207 after Argentina’s data protection authority recommended that the protocol be suspended or changed to comply with the national data protection legislation.208

In May 2024, the Ministry of Security published Resolution 428/2024,209 formally authorizing federal forces to conduct cyberpatrolling on open-source online information and allowing them to deploy AI tools as part of this work. Under the regulations, law enforcement is only allowed to conduct cyberpatrolling in relation to specified crimes, such as drug dealing and terrorism, and must comply with data protection legislation and respect the right to freedom of expression.210 However, digital rights groups have raised concerns about the vagueness of the principles and the lack of oversight authority and other mechanisms for accountability.211

In March 2022, the Federal Chamber excluded from evidence a report stemming from an investigation into whether former president Macri and other officials pressured members of the judiciary; the defendants alleged the report relied on cyberpatrolling. In November 2021, a federal prosecutor had ordered an agency under the Supreme Court’s authority to report all critical public statements, including those shared on social media, made by Macri and officials close to him between 2015 and 2019. That month, the Bar Association of the City of Buenos Aires criticized the order as a violation of free-expression rights; in its rejection of the report as evidence, the Federal Chamber said it invasively and excessively infringed upon people’s democratic rights.212

In late 2022, an apparent leak of private messages revealed the details of a secret meeting between judges, businesspeople, and then city of Buenos Aires minister of justice and security Marcelo D’Alessandro. The leaked messages appeared to show an attempt to cover up the meeting, sparking allegations of collusion between the judiciary and members of the opposition (see C1). The messages, which allegedly originated from D’Alessandro’s mobile device, were reportedly obtained by a hacker at the request of an anonymous Telegram user.213 The reported hacker, Ezequiel Núñes Pinheiro, was released from prison in April 2024 after spending nine months in detention, although he remained under investigation.214 The identity of the Telegram user who supposedly requested and paid for the hacking operation remained unclear during the coverage period.215

These allegations have emerged as part of a larger investigation into illegal surveillance of high-profile figures, though few conclusions were reached during the coverage period. In November 2023, federal investigators claimed to have uncovered a massive illegal surveillance operation. Prosecutors alleged that former federal police officer Ariel Pedro Zanchetta monitored and collected the personal data of more than 1,000 public figures, including then president Alberto Fernández and current president Javier Milei, along with judges, journalists, and union leaders. The investigation also alleged that Zanchetta had ties with two people close to Cristina Fernández de Kirchner: a national legislator and a tax official.216 After spending 10 months in prison, Zanchetta was released in April 2024, but he remained under investigation.217 At that time, investigators had found no evidence linking Zanchetta to the D’Alessandro incident, casting doubt on their claims that he was part of a larger surveillance operation.218

The AFI was found to have carried out illegal surveillance during the presidency of Mauricio Macri, from 2015 to 2019. Targets included journalists, politicians, and political and social organizations.219 In December 2021, Macri was charged with ordering the illegal surveillance of the relatives of 44 sailors who died when their submarine sank in 2017. Family members reported having their email addresses, social media, and other accounts hacked in 2018. Macri denied the charges, calling them politically motivated.220 A federal court dismissed the charges in July 2022, during the previous coverage period, labeling the operation justified based on its “sole objective” of preserving “presidential and/or internal security.”221

Cellebrite, an Israel-based digital intelligence company, has supplied federal security forces with tools for hacking into locked mobile devices since the early 2010s.222

Citizens’ personal information contained in the databases of the National Administration of Social Security (ANSES) can be transferred to the Public Communication Secretariat (SCP).223 A court ruled in 2018, however, that ANSES could not share a woman’s phone number and email address with the SCP without the woman’s consent.224 The national government appealed the ruling before the Supreme Court, but there appeared to be no final resolution of the case by the end of the current coverage period.225

A number of measures to protect Argentinian users’ data and communications are in place, and the courts have upheld rulings that protect privacy.226 However, there are some mechanisms by which service providers and companies can be compelled to provide user information under certain circumstances.

In 2009, the Supreme Court upheld a ruling that 2003 data retention legislation represented a violation of privacy rights.227

A 2013 resolution by the Communications Secretariat of the Ministry of Federal Planning introduced data retention requirements for the purpose of assessing the quality of services, requiring providers to store data related to quality indicators for three years. It states that providers should guarantee the telecommunications regulator “free access” to installations and should provide “all the information that is required in the set manner and timeframe.”228

The Criminal Procedure Code states that, if a judge orders them to do so, communication service providers must be able to immediately intercept data for a period of up to 30 days, with the possibility of an extension. Providers are held criminally liable in cases of noncompliance.229 Companies can be sanctioned for not complying with a provision under the Argentina Digital Act (Law 27.078), which mandates that ICT providers share information with competent authorities when requested.230 The Olimpia Law, passed in October 2023 (see B3 and C2), requires authorities to request that platforms retain certain data related to content removed under the law—including traffic and subscriber information—for a period of 90 days, which can be extended once. Investigating authorities may request that digital platforms turn over this information “by means of a reasoned order.”231

In March 2022, after the position had been vacant for more than a year, political scientist Beatriz de Anchorena was appointed the director of the Agency for Access to Public Information (AAIP). The appointment was criticized both by civil society organizations and the opposition for de Anchorena’s lack of expertise, as well as doubts about her impartiality due to her past membership in the Patria Institute, a think tank founded and overseen by Fernández de Kirchner.232 The National Auditor General’s Office released an audit report on the AAIP that same month concluding that the agency had not developed or implemented tools that effectively protected personal data, highlighting shortcomings in the operation of various national registries.233

However, the AAIP has made progress on improving Argentina’s data protection framework during recent years. In mid-2022, the AAIP kicked off a process to update existing legislation through a new data protection law. The initiative started with a series of meetings between the data protection authority and various stakeholders, including civil society organizations and private sector representatives, that led to the publication of a first version of the new draft law on August 30. Members of the public were able to submit comments and opinions on the preliminary version of the draft law during a public consultation period that was launched in September. The final draft version of the data protection bill was ultimately unveiled in November 2022.234 In June 2023, the Data Protection Bill was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies for consideration.235 The bill contains several provisions influenced by the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and civil society organizations have praised the inclusion of due diligence requirements to mitigate potential harms and the preeminence principle of favoring the data subject when uncertainties arise about how to interpret the law.236 The bill remained pending in the National Congress at the end of the current coverage period.

In April 2023, Argentina completed its ratification of Convention 108+, a binding multilateral instrument on data protection issued by the Council of Europe. Argentina is the second Latin American country to ratify the convention.237 In January 2024, the European Commission reaffirmed that Argentina provides suitable protections for the cross-border transfer of personal data, with the EU favorably assessing the independence of the AAIP, the recent ratification of Convention 108+, and the ongoing process to update personal data protection legislation.238

In March 2022, the Internal Trade Secretariat issued a resolution extending a prohibition against Meta’s implementation of WhatsApp’s updated terms of service and privacy policy for Argentinian users. The resolution, originally issued in May 2021, will be in force until the conclusion of an ongoing investigation into the company’s potential abuse of a dominant market position and possible excessive, unjustified, and exploitative data processing and sharing by WhatsApp.239 In August 2023, the Federal Civil and Commercial Court of Appeals dismissed a legal challenge filed by Meta and affirmed the Internal Trade Secretariat’s precautionary measure until the conclusion of the investigation.240 The government also fined Facebook 5 million pesos ($13,881) in January 2022 for including “abusive clauses” in WhatsApp’s privacy policy conditions, which the company used to limit its liability for damages and restrict user rights.241

Physical violence in reprisal for digital activities is rare, though journalists and activists, including those who work online, are subject to intimidation, harassment, and smear campaigns on social media; there is evidence that these threats have worsened under President Milei.

The Argentina Forum of Journalism (FOPEA) reported 117 cases of harassment against journalists in 2023, compared to 88 in 2022; journalists working for digital outlets were targeted in 22 cases.242 According to FOPEA, 45.3 percent of the episodes were caused by state actors, including public officials across the political spectrum. Attacks on physical integrity, including physical assaults and threats of violence, were the most common type of aggression, comprising 36.7 percent of cases. Stigmatizing discourse from political officials accounted for nearly 20 percent of cases, while restrictions on access to public information encompassed nearly 12 percent of cases.243 In March 2024, FOPEA reported that, during Milei’s first 100 days in office, 40 percent of all recorded attacks against journalists involved either the president himself or a government minister.244

Online gender-based violence poses a prominent threat to women, particularly journalists and public officials. Women journalists in Argentina, especially those covering gender issues, have reported worsening harassment from the far right, at times emboldened by President Milei. In June 2024, Fundación COLSECOR, an organization dedicated to social cooperation, reported that the recent trend of worsening digital gender-based violence was “exacerbated by the current social context, marked by the emergence of policies that hinder coexistence between citizens and the circulation of hate speech on social networks and other digital media.”245

Milei has often used social media to discredit journalists and their reporting. In January 2024, press organizations, including FOPEA, condemned Milei for his derogatory remarks on X toward journalists Luisa Corradini, María O'Donnell, and Silvia Mercado, whom he accused in separate incidents of being liars and spreading false information. Press freedom organizations stressed that while public officials have the right to disagree with reporting, insulting journalists is unacceptable and could lead to self-censorship (see B4).246

At times, President Milei’s followers on social media—who are suspected to constitute a coordinated online network in support of the president (see B5)—have amplified his harassment of critics and political opponents. In one incident from February 2024, Milei’s supporters used social media to boost the president’s derogatory nickname for Argentinian singer Mariana Lali Espósito, whom he referred to as “Lali Depósito” in reference to Espósito receiving state funds for performing public concerts. Espósito, who is politically opposed to Milei, drew similar ire for an August 2023 social media post that referred to Milei’s primary victory as “dangerous” and “sad.”247

In January 2023, during the previous coverage period, Marina Abiuso, a journalist and gender editor for the TV channel Todo Noticias (TN), closed her X account after being subjected to online harassment, including insults, threats, and the spreading of false information about her. The harassment directed at Abiuso occurred during a controversy over claims of gender-related bias in TN’s journalistic coverage: Critics alleged that TN’s reporting on the trial of a mother and her partner who were accused of murdering their son was less comprehensive compared to the outlet’s reporting on a trial of male rugby players accused of murder.248

A study published in April 2023 indicated that more than 40 percent of all people surveyed had been victims of hate speech or discrimination online, noting that women in particular were more likely to be targeted by online harassment or violence. Female political candidates are especially targeted, including with online smear campaigns.249

After the attempted assassination of then vice president Fernández de Kirchner in September 2022, a mission from the Organization of American States (OAS) visited Argentina to investigate gender-based political violence in the country. Members of the mission stated that hate speech spread via social media could have created the conditions that led to the attack against Fernández de Kirchner or could increase the potential for political violence against other women who hold public office. Therefore, they recommended that social media and other media actors create self-regulatory codes of conduct to prevent political violence against women.250

In December 2023, journalist Eduardo Feinmann received a death threat via direct message on his X social media account, in which a user wrote: “I inform you that if you continue speaking in favor of Javier Milei, I will kill you and your family, and the same will happen to Javier Milei.” Feinmann received support from politicians and colleagues on social media, including a statement from the Association of Argentine Journalistic Entities (ADEP) condemning the threats.251

In May 2023, digital and radio journalist Griselda Blanco, who regularly reported local news through Facebook Live broadcasts, was found murdered in her home in Corrientes Province. According to prosecutors, no evidence has been found that Blanco was killed because of her work as a journalist.252 The Argentine Federation of Press Workers (FATPREN) called for a full and transparent investigation into the case, noting that Blanco had received threats for her reporting in the past.253 While one person had been arrested in connection with the case as of May 2024, the exact circumstances and motive behind Blanco’s murder remained unclear at the end of the coverage period.254

In December 2022, journalist Uki Goñi restricted access to his social media accounts after being subjected to online harassment, including insults and death threats on X and Instagram. Goñi was harassed in response to his article in the Guardian that reported on structural racism facing Argentinians of African descent.255

Government entities and commercial enterprises are particularly vulnerable to ransomware attacks, and digital media outlets have suffered technical attacks in recent years.

Two days before the presidential runoff in November 2023, the website of the Unión por la Patria (UP) party was hacked by anonymous attackers, who changed the name of the site to “United for Drugs” and posted content targeting UP’s presidential candidate and then economy minister Sergio Massa. The content was largely removed within an hour and the website returned to its normal functioning, though Google search results continued to display the altered content for some additional time. Massa’s personal website was previously hacked in October.256

In June 2021, a website hosting the results of journalistic investigation La Reacción Conservadora was taken offline shortly after it launched. The journalists behind the investigation reported that the site failure was caused by a technical attack,257 though others argued that the site crashed due to a large amount of visitor traffic.258 The website was supposed to display an investigation conducted by feminist journalists on the relationships between conservative political, religious, and social groups and individuals. The investigation sparked controversy due to its inclusion of personal information on the people investigated. The website never went online again, but part of the investigation was accessible via other newspapers’ websites.259

Government entities are also sometimes targeted with cyberattacks. In August 2022, during the previous coverage period, the province of Córdoba’s judiciary was the victim of a ransomware attack, forcing an outage of its IT systems and website. According to reports, the attack, reportedly by an operation called “PLAY,” attempted to erase all the information contained in the judiciary’s IT system instead of demanding money.260 The attack caused the judiciary to temporarily cease all electronic processing of court documents.261 A few months later, in October 2022, the Ministry of Health’s IT systems were hacked by attackers who reportedly leaked individuals’ sensitive health information and caused official email accounts to send malicious emails. Despite launching an internal investigation, the government has not provided updates on the actors behind these attacks.262

In August 2023, the Comprehensive Medical Care Program (PAMI), Argentina’s public health insurance provider for senior citizens, was the victim of a ransomware attack by the group Rhysida. After PAMI declined to pay a reported ransom of 25 Bitcoin ($944,095), Rhysida posted 1.6 million files (equivalent to 831 GB of data) on the dark web, including medical records, treatment plans, and other personal data. The cyberattack also disrupted PAMI’s internal service delivery, resulting in appointment delays and issues with medication distribution and making it impossible for PAMI’s 14,000 employees to log into their workstations as usual.263