Access to the internet in Angola remains very poor but has been steadily improving. The National Institute of Telecommunications (INACOM), the country’s telecommunications regulator, counted 11.09 million mobile internet subscribers and 137,705 fixed-line internet subscribers in September 2023.1 DataReportal’s Digital 2024 report indicated an internet penetration rate of 39.3 percent.2

The total number of mobile phone subscribers reached 25.9 million in the third quarter of 2023, representing an increase of more than 17 percent compared to the same period in 2022, according to INACOM data.3 According to the 2022 edition of the GSM Association’s Mobile Connectivity Index, 92 percent of the Angolan population was covered by third-generation (3G) wireless network access, while only 44 percent were covered by fourth-generation (4G) networks.4

Unitel expanded its 4G services in 2021.5 The Unitel North Submarine Cable opened in February 2023 and connects the provinces of Cabinda and Zaire through two routes, allowing the provision of high-speed mobile or fixed telecommunications services, improving access to the internet.6

Unitel launched the first commercial network using fifth-generation (5G) technology in Angola in December 2022, with speeds ranging from 10 to 200 megabits per second (Mbps) and prices ranging from 15,000 to 125,000 Angolan kwanzas (approximately $30 to $245) per month. During its launch phase, the service was only available in the center of the country's capital, although it expanded to two additional provinces in 2023.7

Still, poor infrastructure significantly hinders information and communications technology (ICT) access in the country. The country’s fractured electricity system served 75 percent of the urban population as of 2021,8 but only 7.3 percent of the rural population as of 2018, the most recent year for which data is available,9 according to the World Bank. Power outages remain frequent. The leading causes of complaints from internet users are lack of internet signal, network instability, and high prices, according to providers.10

According to internet speeds aggregator Ookla, as of February 2024, Angola had a median download speed of 12.7 Mbps and an upload speed of 8.55 Mbps on mobile connections, and a median estimated download speed of 19.96 Mbps and an upload speed of 6.67 Mbps for fixed-line connections.11 These estimated download speeds are less than half the global median for mobile and less than a tenth the global median for fixed-line connections.

In August 2023, a rupture in the three main submarine cables that serve Angola— the West Africa Cable System (WACS), the South Atlantic 3/West Africa Submarine Cable (SAT-3/WASC), and Africa Coast to Europe (ACE)—due to strong currents along the Congo River resulted in a deterioration in the quality of the internet and communications services within Angola.12 All three cables were repaired in September 2023.13

Users reported disruptions in service from Unitel, the largest provider in the country, in the first quarter of 2024. The company attributed the service problems to equipment failures, and claimed that they were unable to purchase new equipment to improve network quality due to a shortage of foreign currency reserves.14

In January 2023, the Angolan government signed an agreement with Sinohydro, with financing from China’s Exim Bank, to implement a National Broadband Network.15 The government signed another $248 million loan agreement to purchase equipment and services for the project in November 2023.16 The network is expected to improve speeds and lower the costs of connectivity in Angola’s remote areas.17

Internet access remains prohibitively expensive for many people, especially in rural areas. The government and some private companies have made efforts to establish free wireless hotspots.

ICT access remains prohibitively expensive for the majority of Angolans, partially due to a lack of competition in the ICT industry (see A4).18

According to Cable, a UK–based telecommunications company, the average monthly cost of broadband internet service was $47.52 in 2024.19 The average cost of 1 gigabyte (GB) of mobile data was $1.01 as of August 2023.20

Prices for broadband internet access in Angola are high compared to neighboring countries. According to a 2021 joint study by the African Union (AU) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), only 4 percent of the population can afford 1 GB per month of data, well below the regional average of 23 percent.21 Lower-cost packages, such as those offered by Movicel and NetOne, are associated with inferior speeds and overall lower service quality.22

Poor infrastructure particularly affects rural residents, for whom voice and data services are of much lower quality and are subject to frequent cuts and extremely slow connection speeds. Due to the country’s fractured electricity system, urban areas are more likely to have connectivity (see A1).

Angola Online, a government-promoted project, has established a number of hotspots in an effort to expand internet availability and accessibility.23 In Luanda and other cities, free hotspots sponsored by private companies24 have increasingly become available in public spaces.25 As of December 2023, 135 free hotspots have been installed throughout the country, with plans to further expand the program through partnerships with service providers.26 Angola Online hotspots have been overwhelmed by demand and have suffered from power outages, vandalism, and budget cuts, according to the National Institute for the Promotion of the Information Society.27

AngoSat-2, a telecommunications satellite developed as a joint project between Russia and Angola, was launched in October 2022.28 In February 2023, the Angolan government began the commercialization of AngoSat-2—which will enable national and international operators to provide telecommunications services in the country—with the goal of offering more competitive prices for service and expanding access in offline areas.29 As of October 2023, more than 150 remote locations in 16 of the country’s 18 provinces have installed very small aperture terminals (VSATs), used to transmit and receive data over satellite networks, connected to telecommunications services via the Angosat-2 satellite.30 Commercial operation of the satellite had not yet begun as of March 2024.31

No restrictions on connectivity to fixed-line or mobile networks were reported during the coverage period. The Angolan government’s indirect control of telecommunications infrastructure via state-owned Angola Telecom and Unitel, which was nationalized in 2022 (see A4), may enable the government to partially control internet connectivity, if desired.32

A proposed national security law, which passed its first reading in January 2024, would create a new national security system, which would be headed by the president and granted powers to disrupt telecommunications services under “exceptional circumstances.” Critics said that the proposed law would allow the government to restrict connectivity for any reason.33

Angola is connected to the international internet through the West Africa Cable System (WACS), which is owned by Angola Cables; the South Atlantic 3/West Africa Submarine Cable (SAT-3/WASC), which is operated by Angola Telecom; the South Atlantic Cable System (SACS), which is operated by Angola Cables; and 2Africa, which is owned by a consortium of international telecom providers.34 Angola Cables is a consortium of Angolan service providers; Angola Telecom and Unitel hold the largest stakes, respectively owning 51 percent and 31 percent.35 Angola Cables also manages ANGONIX, the country’s internet exchange point (IXP).36

According to a 2019 World Bank report, Angola Telecom also controls 12,000 kilometers (7,450 miles) of the 22,000 kilometers (13,670 miles) of fiber-optic cables in the country.37

The state is still the main shareholder in some of Angola’s main service providers, despite government plans to reduce the state’s presence in the sector. Politicians, government allies, and state-owned oil company Sonangol can exert some control on the ICT sector through direct and indirect ownership of shares in internet service providers (ISPs) and mobile service providers.

Unitel and Africell are the biggest providers of mobile internet service, holding 65.7 and 27.8 percent of the mobile broadband subscriptions market, respectively.38 Sonangol owns 3 of the country’s 18 ISPs (MSTelcom, Nexus, and ACS); is a major shareholder in Angola Cables; and controls 50 percent of Unitel, the country’s largest ISP.39 Angola Telecom owns 51 percent of Angola Cables and provides their own internet services.40 Two of the four undersea cables that connect Angola to the internet are managed by Angola Cables, and one is owned by Angola Telecom (see A3). With the launch of the 2Africa cable in July 2023, Angola Telecom no longer holds a de facto monopoly on internet provision to telecommunications companies.41

In August 2019, the government introduced a plan to sell numerous state holdings, including service providers. MSTelcom, NetOne, Unitel, TV Cabo Angola, and Multitel were set to be privatized. As of April 2023, Multitel was marked for initial public offering (IPO) in 2023.42 In late 2020, the president authorized an IPO of 49 percent of its stake in TV Cabo, the main fixed-line broadband provider in the country.43 The government was set to start the privatization process of TV Cabo in 2023, and the process for MS Telecom in 2024.44 In August 2023, the government laid out a timeline for the sale of companies in the ICT sector, including Multitel, Angola Telecom, and TV Cabo, which placed the estimated date of privatization around the end of 2023.45

In January 2022, a 25 percent stake of Unitel owned by a loyalist of former president José Eduardo dos Santos was reportedly seized by authorities.46 Another 25 percent stake in Unitel controlled by Isabel dos Santos, the former president’s daughter, was also transferred to the Angolan state following a legal battle in 2022.47 Subsequently, the Institute for the Management of State Assets and Participations (IGAPE) launched the reprivatization process of UNITEL in a competitive market, led by a joint working group.48 In May 2023, officials announced that Unitel’s privatization process would begin that year.49 In February 2024, Angola’s secretary of state for finance and treasury announced plans for an IPO of Unitel in 2024.50

In December 2021, Angola Telecom announced that it would transfer its mobile telecommunications networks to private companies by November 2022.51 In December 2022, the government handed over the entire transmission network infrastructure of Angola Telecom as part of a 15-year contract with a consortium led by London-based investment company Gemcorp.52 53 Prior to the deal, Angola Telecom was under the threat of financial collapse.54 In June 2023, the government announced that it had abandoned its plans to privatize Angola Telecom, and would instead restructure the company.55 In February 2024, Angolan president João Lourenço terminated the company’s board of directors, with the aim of making the company more attractive for subsequent privatization.56

The National Social Security Institute (INPS), a state agency, controls 51 percent of Movicel, with Angola Telecom retaining a 24 percent stake.57 Under a 2019 agreement, Vodafone took charge of Movicel’s operational management.58 The INPS was reportedly in negotiations to sell its majority stake in the company to a South African company during the coverage period. Meanwhile, the company has continued to face financial challenges: in May 2024, 400 Movicel employees reported that they had not received their salaries since January.59

Africell Holding SAL was licensed as Angola’s fourth telecommunications operator in March 2020,60 and successfully tested its network in December 2021.61 According to INACOM, Africell reached a 27.8 percent market share for mobile internet in September 2023, ahead of Movicel (6.5 percent) and behind Unitel (65.7 percent).62 Africell introduced eSIM (embedded Subscriber Identity Module) in Angola in 2022,63 which is expected to increase competition among service providers.64

The 2017 Law on Electronic Communications further enhances the government’s ability to control the country’s ICT sector.65 On paper, the law aims to ensure that ICTs in Angola are developed to play a fundamental role in ensuring citizens’ universal access to information, transparency in the public sector, and participatory democracy. It also sets broader goals of poverty alleviation, competitiveness, productivity, employment, and consumer rights.66 However, the law also contains a broadly worded clause allowing the head of government to “intervene” if ISPs jeopardize “social functions” or “gravely compromise the rights of subscribers or users.”67

Angola’s powerful ruling party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), maintains effective control of regulatory bodies.

The Ministry of Telecommunications, Information Technologies, and Social Communication (MTTICS) is responsible for oversight of the ICT sector. INACOM, established in 1999, serves as the sector’s regulatory body. In this capacity, it determines industry policies, sets prices for telecommunications services, and issues licenses. INACOM is, on paper, an independent public institution with both financial and administrative autonomy from the ministry. In practice, its autonomy is fairly limited.68 Its director general is appointed by the government and can be dismissed for any reason.69 In addition, the MTTICS can influence staff appointments.

Under the Lourenço administration, INACOM has exercised its regulatory powers more assertively, primarily in containing consumer price increases by telecommunications operators.70

Despite a history of censorship in print and broadcast media, there have been no known incidents of the government blocking or filtering online content in Angola, and there are no restrictions on the types of information that can be exchanged through digital media technologies. A set of media laws that took effect in 2017 has been criticized as restrictive, but no websites have been censored under their provisions to date (see C1). Social media and communications apps, such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and international blog-hosting services, are freely available.

There were no public reports of forced content removal during the coverage period, though informal government demands on users to remove content from the internet have been documented periodically, and levers of informal economic coercion such as gifts and bribes influence what content is published online.

Reports have indicated that individuals at some smaller, underfunded newspapers have accepted bribes to remove reporting or to write poorly substantiated stories about government personalities, including the president.71 In 2023, authorities regularly harassed the employees of an independent online news website (see C7), leading the site to suspend its broadcasting.

In August 2021, an article by the anticorruption website Maka Angola covering corruption in the dos Santos family was targeted by a fraudulent content removal request. The digital media foundation Qurium, which provides web-hosting services to Maka Angola, reported receiving a notice under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) that purported to be from the Portuguese news portal Esquerda.net, which had reposted the Maka Angola article; the impersonator claimed that Maka Angola had copied the article from its site and was thus committing a copyright violation. Qurium did not comply with the notice.72

While some Angolan laws applicable to the digital sphere contain harsh restrictions, in practice these have not been enforced on websites or users.

In January 2017, the government implemented new media laws known as the Social Communication Legislative Package. The package included the new Press Law and created a regulatory body with the power to ban websites (see C1). Article 10 of the Press Law states that “all social communication media” have the responsibility to inform citizens “in accordance with the public interest.” Article 7 sets limits to the exercise of freedom of the press, including on the internet, with several broad provisions.73 Critics say these effectively enable the government to control and censor critical information posted on social media or elsewhere online.

Self-censorship has been pervasive and commonly practiced by journalists at both state-run and private print outlets, though bloggers and social media users were less reluctant to express criticism of the president and ruling party.

Recent crackdowns on the media have sharpened self-censorship, including for online journalists. During the previous coverage period, the owner of TV Camunda, an online news channel, announced that the outlet would stop broadcasting due to pressure from the Criminal Investigation Service (SIC) and feelings of insecurity faced by the entire staff (See C7).74

Friends of Angola, a US–based advocacy organization, has warned that the Angolan government and intelligence services’ monitoring of activists and independent media is contributing to increased self-censorship.75

Responding to comments from the president that journalism in Angola was growing, several Angolan journalists noted that they consider there to be a “stagnation and regression” of press freedom in the country, driven by state ownership of news outlets (see B5) and closure of independent outlets like TV Camunda. Some outlets have shifted their journalistic coverage from politics to entertainment, which the secretary-general of the Angolan Journalists’ Union (SJA) said in January 2024 limited the space for debate.76

Government efforts to manipulate online content are still sporadically reported. During the election period in 2022, some independent online news outlets reported receiving regular calls from government officials directing them to tone down criticism or refrain from reporting on certain issues.77

Political parties spread disinformation online ahead of the August 2022 elections, attributing false statements to or manipulating quotes from presidential and vice presidential candidates from the MPLA and the opposition National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).78

Inauthentic social media accounts were used to increase interactions with MPLA accounts during the electoral period, at a time when the ruling party was trailing the opposition in online activity.79 Research from the Stanford Internet Observatory in August 2022 found that a network of inauthentic Facebook and Instagram accounts that posted pro-MPLA content and criticized UNITA were linked to MindForce, an Israeli public relations firm. An employee of the company publicly disclosed that the Angolan government was a MindForce client.80

Members of the ruling MPLA own and tightly control a majority of the country’s media outlets, including those that are the most widely disseminated and accessed. State-controlled media largely relay progovernment content. In September 2021, the main state-owned television channels announced they would no longer cover the leading opposition party, UNITA, after UNITA allegedly threatened their journalists during an antigovernment march.81 Members of opposition parties and youth activists in the province of Cabinda, where several independence and autonomy movements are active, remain excluded from state media programs, including online.82

Most privately owned newspapers are also held by individuals connected to the government.

In 2021, UNITA accused the government of spreading false information about the party and party’s president on social media.83 Another opposition party, the Broad Convergence for the Salvation of Angola–Electoral Coalition (CASA–CE), made similar claims in March 2021.84 Analysts suggest that such campaigns may be coordinated by the Angolan intelligence services and presidential advisors.85

Russian disinformation and misinformation campaigns on social media have been identified in Angola.86 After Russian forces launched their full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, pro-Russian disinformation relating to the conflict and statements denigrating the leadership of Ukraine and of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states—which emanated from the Portuguese-language service of Russian state outlet Sputnik—spread on major messaging services.87

Both state agencies and private sector actors often deny advertising revenue to media outfits that criticize the political-military elite. In December 2021, Radio Despertar, a Luanda-based radio station that also streams its programs online,88 accused Movicel of pulling its advertisements from the station because of its critical coverage of the government, which had allegedly caused discontent among MPLA–affiliated shareholders in the company.89

Separately, a severe economic crisis has led to financial constraints at numerous outlets, and reports of wage arrears and layoffs are frequent.90

As a result of low rates of ICT access, radio, television, and print outlets remain the primary sources of information for the majority of Angolans. Both online and traditional media suffer from some degree of government interference, especially those with ties to the MPLA, which limits the diversity of accessible viewpoints (see B5). False information, often unsourced or wrongfully credited to reliable media, is increasingly common, especially on messaging platforms.

The main sources of alternative and independent online news in Angola include Club-K and Maka Angola. Outlets funded by foreign governments, including Portuguese news agency Lusa, Voice of America (VOA), French broadcaster Radio France Internationale (RFI), and Germany’s Deutsche Welle (DW) Africa, are also widely read.

Many independent newspapers are at risk of closure, especially those that have lacked the resources to shift online during the economic crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic crisis exacerbated the closure of independent print media, prompting some journalists to turn to online publishing.91

While the online information landscape represents an increasing variety of groups and viewpoints across the country, the lack of connectivity in rural areas hampers regional and ethnic representation. The effective decriminalization of same-sex relations in January 2019 has enabled freer online discussion of issues affecting LGBT+ people.

While arrests of protesters and online activists have muted digital activism and mobilization in the past, the use of social media to mobilize support for various causes has become more common in recent years. Mobilization platforms are freely available to users, and citizens criticize the government and react to alleged wrongdoings within Angola’s lively social media environment. Youth groups in particular have increasingly flocked to Facebook to call out government corruption, reflecting a slight weakening of the environment of fear within civil society.92

Social media and messaging apps, like Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp, are frequently used to mobilize protests or launch campaigns. With access to social networks growing, these platforms became a center of political dispute between political parties and their supporters during the 2022 electoral period, with various reports of disinformation circulating (See B5).93

Activists consider livestreaming and messaging as effective tools to record evidence of police brutality, as security forces often repress demonstrations with disproportionate force. For instance, videos shared through WhatsApp during protests in late 2020 and January 2021 showed police using live ammunition against protesters.

The Angolan constitution provides for freedom of expression and the press, and the 2011 Law on Electronic Communications and Information Company Services provides for citizens’ rights to privacy and security online, among other provisions regulating internet use and services.

Nevertheless, Angolan laws also include problematic language that may infringe on internet freedom (see C2).94 In January 2017, former president dos Santos enacted a set of media laws known as the Social Communication Legislative Package, which included a Press Law, Television Law, Broadcast Law, Journalists’ Code of Conduct, and statutes to establish the Angolan Regulatory Body for Social Communication (ERCA). The latter body was created to regulate journalists’ conduct and investigate producers of online content without judicial oversight; it has the power to suspend or ban websites that fail to abide by its standards of “good journalism.”95

Meanwhile, the judiciary is subject to considerable influence from the ruling political-military elite, with Supreme Court justices appointed to life terms by the president and without legislative input. President Lourenço’s 2021 revisions to the constitution, which changed the hierarchy of the country’s top courts, was sharply criticized by members of the judiciary as a breach of judicial independence, including by the presiding judge of the Constitutional Court, Manuel Aragão.96 Aragão was replaced shortly after by a new presiding judge, Laurinda Cardoso, the former secretary of state for territorial administration and an MPLA party member.97

Stringent laws regarding state security and defamation run counter to constitutional guarantees. Article 26 of the 2010 State Security Law penalizes individuals who insult the country or president in “public meetings or by disseminating words, images, writings, or sound” with prison sentences of up to three years.98

The penal code that took effect in February 2021 criminalizes “insults” against the president and contains articles specifically pertaining to media activity.99 These include fines and up to six months’ imprisonment for “abuse of press freedom,” which can encompass incitement, the dissemination of hate speech, and the defense of fascist or racist ideologies. The measure also covers those who disseminate texts, images, or sounds obtained by fraudulent means, as well as those who intentionally publish false information. Under the 2021 code, individuals who insult someone through the media can be fined and sentenced to up to six months in prison; people charged with defamation can draw fines and a prison sentence as long as one year.

Computer crimes are also included in the 2021 code, which punishes illegitimate access of information systems. Article 444 stipulates that “if access is achieved by breach of security rules or if it has been carried out to a protected service, the penalty is two to eight years’ imprisonment.”100

In January 2024, the Ministry of Telecommunications, Information Technologies, and Social Communication (MTTICS) stated that it was drafting regulations for online and electronic media, citing a need to fight disinformation and the dissemination of false information on website and news portals.101

Journalists, activists, and ordinary internet users are subject to prosecution for their online activity in Angola, and cases were lodged against members of the press and civil society during the coverage period.

In October 2023, an Angolan influencer, Ana da Silva Miguel, known online as Neth Nahara, was sentenced to two years in prison and a fine of one million kwanzas ($1,200) for insulting and accusing President João Lourenço of “anarchy and disorganization” in a TikTok video.102 She had initially been sentenced for the crime of outrage in August 2023 and was given six months in prison and a fine of one hundred thousand kwanzas ($120) before an appeals court increased her sentence.

In February 2023, Gelson Quintas, known as "Man Gena," used social media to denounce the alleged involvement of senior figures from the national police and the Criminal Investigation Service (SIC) in drug trafficking networks. He took refuge in Mozambique with his family due to alleged pressure from the authorities and fear for his life, but was expelled and returned to Angola in February 2024. He was in detention as of the end of the coverage period and set to be tried for the crimes of slander and outrage against the state and its symbols and organs under Article 333 of the penal code (see C2).103

Another activist, Gilson Moreira da Silva ("Ta Naice Neutro"), faced prolonged detention after being arrested in January 2022 while livestreaming a visit to a Luanda prison hospital to show the situation of another activist, Luther “King” Campos, during his lengthy pretrial detention.104 Ta Naice Neutro was put on trial for rebellion and resisting the security forces in October 2022 and found guilty; he was issued a 15-month suspended sentence.105 Although a judge called for his immediate release due to health concerns, he remained in prison without adequate medical care until his release in June 2023.106

Journalists are also investigated and sometimes charged with criminal defamation based on complaints regarding their online reporting. William Tonet, editor of privately owned newspaper Folha 8, which also publishes an online edition, faces criminal defamation charges based on a complaint brought by a former Constitutional Court judge after Folha 8 published an article in 2020 that cited a book implicating the judge in a 1977 massacre.107 The case was ongoing at the end of the coverage period.

In September 2021, Carlos Alberto, editor of the news website A Denúncia, was charged with “criminal defamation, injurious denunciation, and violating press freedom”; Luis Liz, a deputy attorney general, filed a complaint after A Denúncia covered an allegedly illegal land transaction on Liz’s part. Alberto received a two-year prison term and a fine of 110 million kwanzas ($172,000), a sentence that would be rescinded if Alberto apologized via Facebook and A Denúncia every 5 days within a 45-day period. Alberto appealed and lost; the length of the suspended prison sentence was increased from two to three years, but the fine was decreased to 1.5 million ($3,451) kwanzas, and he was required to apologize every ten days for sixty days.108 In October 2023, Alberto was arrested for failing to comply with a court ruling regarding his 2021 sentence after he inquired about paying the fine in installments.109 Alberto remained in prison as of late 2023.

In October 2023, Daniel Frederico, editor of the news portal Reporter Angola, was charged with criminal defamation and insult in connection with an article published in 2022 by another news site, Angola Online. Frederico denies writing the article and believes that authorities are pursuing the defamation case against him in retaliation for radio interviews he gave discussing alleged human rights abuses he witnessed while he was detained after being arrested in September 2023 while covering protests in Luanda.110

Three social media users were arrested in September 2022 for their online activities. Two were arrested for posting a video on TikTok criticizing purported embezzlement in the construction of the new international airport and alleging that the president was profiting personally;111 the third person was arrested for posting a false announcement of the president’s death.112

There are no reports of substantial restrictions on encryption. SIM card registration is mandatory, however, and hampers the ability of mobile phone users to communicate anonymously. SIM cards must be registered directly with INACOM, the ICT regulator that operates under government oversight. The process requires an identity card or driver’s license and tax card for national citizens, or a passport with a valid visa for visitors.113

Africell introduced eSIM in Angola in 2022,114 which is expected to increase competition among service providers (see A4).115 However, the adoption of eSIM could also enable carriers to trace location data more easily, as an embedded SIM cannot be removed from mobile phones or other devices the way physical SIM cards can.116

The government’s ability to monitor and intercept the data and communications of Angolan citizens without adequate oversight is a major concern, particularly among human rights activists and journalists. The full extent of the government’s surveillance capabilities and practices is unknown, though recent developments suggest that the government plans to expand its surveillance capacity.

Between March and August 2023, 50 URLs that mimicked popular Angolan news sites but actually led to pages infected with Predator spyware were created; there were no known cases of Angolan victims.117 Analysis from Recorded Future’s Insikt Group found evidence of customer infrastructure for Predator in Angola in March 2024.118 The Angolan government did not respond when asked if they had acquired Predator or used it to monitor activists and political opponents.119

In January 2021, UNITA claimed that its communications were being monitored by state intelligence. As evidence, they cited content of WhatsApp messages sent between UNITA president Adalberto Costa Júnior and the president of Guinea-Bissau about an upcoming meeting, which surfaced in state-aligned online media.120

In June 2020, reports emerged that Angolan intelligence services had purchased Pegasus spyware, which allows clients to compromise devices and monitor communications, from the Israeli technology company NSO Group.121 Pegasus was known to have abused vulnerabilities in WhatsApp, the dominant messaging app in Angola, which is widely used by journalists, activists, and opposition politicians.

A law that permits law enforcement to conduct electronic surveillance and location tracking with minimal oversight came into force in May 2020. The law authorizes the public prosecutor’s office, the National Police, and judges to order and deploy surveillance technology, including spyware and telecommunications interception, in a broad range of circumstances. It prohibits surveillance on political grounds or on the basis of discriminatory motivation.122 Though it is not yet clear how the law has been applied, Angolans worry it provides legal coverage for existing surveillance practices, with little or no competent oversight of security forces’ use of invasive technology.123

The proposed national security law introduced in January 2024 (see A3) would grant police the autonomy to surveil people whose activities are deemed “likely to disturb public order” without judicial oversight or requirements to obtain a warrant for surveillance. The content of the bill has drawn grave concerns from journalists and freedom of expression advocates.124 The bill remained under consideration as of April 2024.

In December 2019, the government opened the Integrated Center for Public Security (CISP), a surveillance data integration center operated by state security forces, in Luanda. The government has since opened centers in four major provinces and was preparing to open another center in 2023.125

Investigations have revealed increased engagement with the Chinese government on surveillance methods.126 According to 2017 research by the Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law, there is strong suspicion that Chinese companies were providing support to the government’s signals intelligence program on mobile phones and the internet, which aimed to target human rights organizations and defenders as well as grassroots social movements.127

Strong state influence in the ownership structure of Angola’s telecommunications companies, particularly mobile service providers, suggests that the authorities are likely able to require service providers to assist in the monitoring of communications.128 Such interweaving of political and business interests through family connections is compounded by the lack of rule of law in the country.

The 2017 Law on Protection of Information Networks and Systems mandates that telecommunications operators store traffic and location data for the “investigation, detection, and repression of crimes.” Article 37 requires the approval of a magistrate for the interception of communications by the security services.129 Article 22 mandates that service providers allow the prosecutor general or a magistrate access to data, including location data, or systems storing information considered “evidence.”130 Article 23 requires telecommunications operators to store all data for at least one year.

Law 22/11 on Personal Data Protection has been in place since 2011 and requires data controllers, with few exceptions, to obtain consent from data subjects before processing personal data. The law also provides the right for data subjects to access, object to, rectify, update, and delete their personal data. Furthermore, data subjects have the right to be informed about the processing of their data, the purposes of such processing, the categories of data, and the recipients to whom the data is communicated.131 Failure to comply with the law by data controllers based or operating in Angola can draw a fine of up to $150,000.

In March 2023, Angola’s national Data Protection Agency (APD) fined Africell $150,000 for violating the Law on Protection of Personal Data by failing to notify and request authorization from the APD before processing customers’ personal data.132

Online activists and journalists are sporadically targeted with threats, though they face less violence and harassment than journalists who operate mainly in the traditional media sphere. No incidents of severe violence for online activities were noted during the coverage period.

In April 2024, an armed intruder broke into the home of William Tonet, the editor of Folha 8, a privately owned newspaper that also publishes online, but fled after Tonet shouted when the gunman entered his bedroom. Folha 8’s Luanda offices burned down in June 2023, destroying thousands of dollars of equipment; police investigations into the fire never identified the cause of the blaze.133

In July 2022, an MPLA supporter attempted to physically attack Isabel Makitoko, a reporter for TV Maiombe, an online news platform, while she was covering an event organized by the opposition National Patriotic Alliance (APN).134

Camunda News, a popular independent video news streaming website, stopped broadcasting in March 2023 due to frequent harassment by the authorities. The outlet’s owner, David Boio, said that feelings of insecurity had affected the entire organization following visits from the SIC. Boio and Camunda News employees were brought in for police questioning multiple times following the appearance of an outspoken government critic on a program broadcast on the Camunda News YouTube channel. Boio described pressures from the SIC as an attempt to shut down Camunda News by creating fear among its employees, because there was not enough of a case for the authorities to formally close the outlet.135

Women and LGBT+ people face online harassment in Angola. Since the February 2019 decriminalization of same-sex conduct, fewer incidents of harassment against LGBT+ people have been reported.

Angola is frequently targeted with cyberattacks, with the estimated total attacks between 200 and 5,000 per day in 2024.136 Mobile phones and banking apps are often targeted.137

In January 2024, Angola’s National Bank (BNA) suffered a cyberattack, though the bank stated that the attack had no significant impact on the institution’s infrastructure or user data.138 The BNA reported receiving an average of 250 attempted cyberattacks per day in 2024, 100 fewer than the 2023 average.139

In September 2020, the website of the online news outlet Correio Angolense crashed in response to an apparent distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack after publishing a report alleging that President Lourenço’s chief of staff had embezzled millions of dollars in public funds. Simon Casimiro, a journalist who worked on the story, also experienced a cyberattack.140