Document #2115576

Freedom House (Author)

Nations in Transit 2024 - Tajikistan

Consolidated Authoritarian Regime
1
/ 100
Democracy Percentage 0.60 / 100
Democracy Score 1.04 / 7
Last Year's Democracy Percentage & Status
1 / 100 Consolidated Authoritarian Regime
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0-100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic. See the methodology.
 

Author

  • Ruslan Norov

Score changes in 2024

  • No score changes in 2024.

Executive Summary

In 2023, Tajikistan remained a deeply authoritarian state dominated by the regime of President Emomali Rahmon and his family. Rahmon has ruled the country since 1992, making him the longest-serving ruler in the region covered by Nations in Transit. Since 2015, he has been “Leader of the Nation,” allowing him to rule indefinitely and rendering him immune from prosecution. The concentration of power within the ruling elite limits political dialogue and reinforces systemic problems, especially corruption and cronyism, which are woven into the country's governance framework.

Kleptocracy and nepotism are rife in Tajikistan. The family of the president, who has seven daughters and two sons, dominates politics and the economy. His family members hold key political positions, including speaker of the upper house of the parliament, mayor of Dushanbe, presidential chief of staff, and head of the largest private bank. Members of the presidential family have used their control of the state to amass vast fortunes.

In 2023, the government continued to crack down on potential opposition to its rule, including civil society, the media, and religious groups. This crackdown was particularly intense in the Pamir region, also known as GBAO, which is home to ethnic Pamiri minorities who speak their own languages and practice the Shia Ismaili faith (see Local Democratic Governance). The central government sought full control over the region in 2023, shuttering local NGOs and requisitioning property from the Aga Khan Development Network, which has long provided essential services to the local population.

Throughout 2023, the regime further restricted freedom of the press and civil society. Independent media face constant censorship and pressure, which effectively blocks critical voices from reaching the public. In March, independent journalist Khurshed Fozilov was arrested on charges of “participating in the activities of a banned group” and forced to testify against himself.1 As social media’s popularity has grown, the government has sought to suppress expression online. Article 9, a new bill introduced in the parliament in August, would oblige bloggers to “cleanse” obscene comments from their platforms.2 Article 13 gives the government power to permanently delete blogs if the blogger violates the law.

The government tightly controls publications and censors posts. In June, the Supreme Court declared Pamir Daily News, a website and Telegram channel providing updates on the situation in the Pamir, to be an “extremist organization” and banned it.3 The government has also targeted print media. In September, the government introduced restrictive new book publishing regulations. Deputy Minister of Culture Davlat Safarzoda told publishing houses that “from now on, all publishing houses and printing houses, regardless of their organizational and legal form (private or public), must coordinate the release of books with the Artistic Council of the Ministry of Culture.”4 The move will further tighten censorship.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) crucial to protecting citizens’ rights are systematically restricted, further limiting the scope for public participation and oversight. In the first half of 2023, 239 NGOs stopped operating, following 500 NGOs that ceased operations in 2022.5 In total, one quarter of the country’s NGOs have closed in the past two years under pressure from the government.

Tajikistan’s justice system remains highly politicized. Trials of political opponents or perceived political opponents take place behind closed doors and the proceedings lack transparency. Charges are often fabricated and torture is used to extract confessions. Conviction rates stand at over 99 percent.6 In April, the government amended the Law on Combating Terrorism to prevent relatives from burying those killed in “anti-terror operations.”7 Law enforcement often uses such operations to crack down on the opposition and frequently stages incidents to justify repression. Without access to their relatives’ bodies, family members cannot ascertain how they died.

Tajikistan is one of the most closed countries in the world with one of the worst human rights records. In 2023, no significant events altered the country’s trajectory. Instead, the government strengthened policies to repress potential opposition to Rahmon’s rule, including civil society, the independent media, opposition movements, and religious groups.

At-A-Glance

Tajikistan has been ruled by President Emomali Rahmon for all but one of its 32 years of independence, becoming one of the most authoritarian countries in the world during that period. The parliament has no genuine opposition parties and there has never been a free or fair election. Repression is widespread, with the government implementing systematic formal restrictions and placing informal pressure on civil society, religious communities, and independent media. Freedom of expression does not exist in practice in Tajikistan. The judicial system is deeply politicized. Authorities torture suspects to extract confessions and almost all trials result in conviction. Local minorities remain marginalized, particularly the Pamiri community, which has endured an ongoing attempt by the government to erase its culture in recent years. Corruption and kleptocracy are endemic, with the large presidential family using their links to the state to enrich themselves.

 
National Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. 1.00 / 7.00
  • Emomali Rahmon has ruled the country since 1992. During Rahmon’s reign, Tajikistan has become one of the region's most autocratic states, characterized by extensive repression, rampant corruption, and restrictions on any potential opposition. Since 2015, he has been “Leader of the Nation,” which allows him to rule indefinitely. His eldest son, 36-year-old Rustam Emomali, has been speaker of the upper house of the parliament since 2020. Rustam would become acting president should 71-year-old Rahmon become incapacitated.
  • The parliament is subordinate to the executive. The parliament is dominated by the ruling People's Democratic Party, which controls 50 of the 63 seats in the Majlisi Namoyandagon (the lower house). The rest are deputies from other parties supporting the government. The only genuine opposition party, the Social Democratic Party, holds no seats in the parliament.
  • Power is concentrated in the executive branch, particularly the Office of the President and the powerful State Committee on National Security. The judiciary is also subordinate to the executive. Nepotism and corruption pervade the political system. Members of the president’s extensive family or elites from his home district of Danghara dominate politics.
  • As the government has consolidated its power, the political opposition has been forced to relocate abroad, mainly to Europe. Throughout 2023, the government continued to use transnational repression to target the opposition in exile. In June, Sorbon Abdurakhimzoda, a Tajik citizen wanted for liking opposition social media posts, was deported from Poland to Tajikistan, despite a May European Court of Human Rights ruling that forbade the move.8 In July, Belarusian authorities extradited opposition activist Nizomiddin Nasriddinov to Tajikistan, where he faces charges of extremism.9 Asliddin Sharipov, brother of the director of the opposition Payom TV, was extradited from Russia in October.10
  • The government continues to punish the relatives of opposition members in exile. After protesters in Germany threw eggs at Rahmon during his visit to the country in September, the government retaliated by targeting their family members in Tajikistan. Human Rights Watch reported that at least 47 members of the protesters’ families had been detained by police, with all being subsequently released.11 Some of those detained made videos condemning their family member’s behavior, threatening to cut ties with them, and praising the government.12 Such videos have been made under duress in the past. In October 2023, he stepmother of the chairman of the opposition organization Group 24, Suhrob Zafar, had the electricity cut to her home,13 as did the family of Sharofiddin Gadoev, head of the Movement for Reform and Development of Tajikistan.14
  • The government continues to use brutal methods to meet quotas for its conscript army. Methods reported in 2023 included cutting electricity to homes, closing mosques, and violently kidnapping men from the street.15 Conditions for conscripts remain dire. A report published by the UN in 2023 revealed that 32 soldiers were tortured while on active duty between January 2022 and August 2023.16
Electoral Process 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. 1.00 / 7.00
  • Elections in Tajikistan are neither free nor fair. Instead, they serve to legitimize the authoritarian government and reward elites for their loyalty. In the last presidential election in 2020, President Emomali Rahmon won his fifth straight term with nearly 91 percent of the vote.17 The electoral laws, processes, and election results reflect an autocratic political environment characterized by limited opportunities for opposition parties and individuals to participate in free and fair elections. There were no national elections in Tajikistan in 2023. The next parliamentary election is scheduled for 2025 and the presidential election will take place in 2027.
  • The government’s primary focus is preparing for the transfer of power along dynastic lines. This was made possible thanks to changes to the constitution approved in a 2016 constitutional referendum. According to these changes, Emomali Rahmon can run for an unlimited number of terms and the minimum age of presidential candidates was lowered from 35 to 30, which gave his son Rustam Emomali the right to run for president.18 To prepare his son to assume power, President Rahmon promoted Rustam to various high government positions over the past decade. In 2017, he became mayor of the capital city Dushanbe and in April 2020 he took over as speaker of the Majlisi Milli, which makes him first in line to the presidency.19
  • Rustam Emomali has filled the parliament with deputies who are loyal to him. In July, Rustam ally Mavsuma Muini, the former mayor of Buston in northern Tajikistan, won a by-election to become deputy to the parliamentary committee on law and order of the Majlisi Namoyandagon from district No. 13 of Khujand.20 According to the independent news site Bomdod, no candidates from other parties were allowed to participate in the election in this constituency. She served as one of the deputy chair people of Dushanbe from 2017 to 2022, ascending to the role when Rustam became mayor.21
Civil Society 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. 1.00 / 7.00
  • Civil society continued to face government pressure in 2023. Officially, Tajikistan has approximately 2,000 registered NGOs, although more than half are inactive.22 Civil society has been severely curtailed by the government in recent years through various legal restrictions, complex regulations, and informal pressure that has forced independent NGOs to shut down. Since 2019, 1,103 NGOs ceased their activities, often due to government pressure.23 Human rights organizations have been especially targeted by the government. The Independent Center for Human Rights Protection (ICHRP), which gave citizens free legal advice, was liquidated by court order in January for “violations of its statutes and national law.”24 The organization had long drawn attention to human rights violations.
  • Civil society in the Pamir region, which has its own religion and various ethnic minorities and faced a brutal government crackdown in recent years, experienced particularly harsh repression. In May, civil society representatives reported that the government was pressuring them to “voluntarily” liquidate their organizations.25 A local official claimed that only “NGOs that interacted with criminal groups in the region were liquidated.”26 By August, the Ministry of Justice had terminated the registration of five organizations for their alleged connections to “criminal organizations,” as part of a broader inspection of 140 NGOs in GBAO.27 The Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) faced the most intense government pressure in 2023. Between June and August, the government nationalized a park and lycée controlled by the organization and appropriated a land plot on the campus of the University of Central Asia, which is funded by the AKDN.28 It also launched a legal process to nationalize the Aga Khan Medical Center in Khorog, which was built at a cost of $24 million and started operating in 2018.29
  • While cracking down on independent civil society, the government has created a network of progovernment organizations mainly focused on young people, who make up more than half of the population. Their goal is to mold a docile and loyal generation that does not challenge the regime. In January, the Law on the Patriotic Upbringing of Citizens came into force.30 The law emphasizes the role of civil society and the family in promoting national values, loyalty to the government, and opposition to any forces threatening its power.
  • In October in Khorog, relatives of civic activist Musharafidin Rizvonshoev, including his 80-year-old grandmother, were summoned for questioning by the State Committee for National Security.31 In June, social media activist Junaidullo Khudoyorov was detained by police in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug in Russia at the request of the Tajik police.32
  • The government continues to severely restrict religious freedoms and views religious groups as a potential threat to its authority. Repression in 2023 was concentrated in the Pamir region, which has a large population of Shia Ismailis. In January, officials told elders in Khorog, the administrative center of the region, to tell their communities that praying or displaying images of their prophet the Aga Khan at home were now banned.33 At least two families were fined in January for violating the directive.34 In April, law enforcement raided the Ismaili Tariqah and Religious Education Board (ITREB), a religious education organization, closing its doors and confiscating documents.35
Independent Media 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. 1.00 / 7.00
  • The government continues to heavily restrict independent media through repression, self-censorship, and favoritism towards state media. As a result, many media outlets have closed or relocated and dozens of journalists have left the country in recent years. According to the government, there are 33 TV stations, 15 of which are controlled by the state, and 42 radio stations, three-quarters of which are independent.36 All of these outlets face severe government restrictions.
  • A recent string of criminal cases against independent journalists has dealt a severe blow to media freedom. According to Reporters Without Borders, there were seven journalists in jail as of the end of 2023, five of whom had been arrested in the previous two years.37 In February, prosecutors opened a criminal case against Prague-based independent journalist and blogger Rustami Joni on charges of calling for a “violent change in the constitutional order.” Joni frequently criticizes the government’s crackdown on the Pamiri community in his videos. In May, independent journalist Khurshed Fozilov was sentenced to seven years in prison for “participating in the activities of a banned group” after he was forced to testify against himself.38 In his contributions to various media outlets and websites, Fozilov often spotlighted social grievances and criticized local government policies. In August, police arrested writer Abduhalil Kholikzoda, who had recently published a memoir that criticized the government’s economic policies, the dominance of elites from the south, and rampant corruption, particularly in the Prosecutor General’s Office, which may have been behind the arrests.39 The general director of the Er Graf publishing company, which published the book, was reportedly detained a day after Kholikzoda.40 Weeks later, authorities arrested one of the book’s editors, Abdukodir Rustam. All three were awaiting trial by the end of 2023.
  • As the popularity of social media platforms like Instagram and TikTok grows, the government increasingly pressures influencers. In January, police in Dushanbe arrested 21-year-old blogger Khabibullo Khimmatzoda and detained him for 5 days.41 He was accused of “distributing offensive videos full of obscene language.”42 This came after two other influencers were arrested in December 2022 for “obscene” content over posts that contained swear words.43 Article 9, a new bill on blogging that was introduced to the parliament in August. would oblige bloggers to “cleanse” their platforms of any obscene comments.44 Article 13 gives the government power to permanently delete blogs if the blogger violates the law.
  • The government tightly controls publications and censors posts. It has blocked independent media sites such as Asia-Plus, Radio Ozodi, and Bomdod.45 In June, the Supreme Court banned Pamir Daily News, a website and Telegram channel that provides updates on the situation in the Pamir, declaring it an “extremist organization.”46 The government has also targeted print media. In September, the government introduced restrictive new book publishing regulations. Deputy Minister of Culture Davlat Safarzoda told publishing houses that “from now on, all publishing houses and printing houses, regardless of their organizational and legal form (private or public), must coordinate the release of books with the Artistic Council of the Ministry of Culture.”47 The move will tighten censorship.
Local Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. 1.25 / 7.00
  • Tajikistan has a multilevel local government system, including regional, district, and city administrations, as well as jamoats (village communes). The centralized rule of Emomali Rahmon limits the autonomy and effectiveness of local government structures. Local officials are appointed by the central government, which often prioritizes loyalty over competence. Elites from Danghara, the president’s home region, are favored and often fill local government positions due to their perceived loyalty. Local officials act with relative impunity, impeding the effective delivery of services and the protection of citizens’ rights.
  • The government crackdown in the Pamir region, which intensified in 2022 with the extrajudicial killings of more than 50 people and the arbitrary imprisonment of 205, continued in 2023.48 The region saw mass arrests, the shuttering of NGOs, and systematic attempts to erase the local culture in 2023. According to sources, locals are prohibited from speaking Pamiri languages in public and from praying or displaying the image of the Aga Khan, whom locals revere as a prophet, at home.49 Journalist Anora Sarkorova reported that loudspeakers in Khorog regularly broadcast state radio programs, despite numerous complaints from residents, in an attempt to mold loyal citizens.50 As in other parts of the country, the local government is dominated by officials from the Khatlon region, with staffing changes in the middle of 2023 bringing more non-Pamiris to local government. The government also continued to target informal leaders in the region, who often wield more influence than the central government. In April, authorities detained Rashid Ayombekov, the brother of Tolib Ayombekov, the jailed informal leader.51 Rashid was reportedly sentenced to 10 years in prison in June.52
  • The Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), an organization that has spent millions of dollars providing education, healthcare, investment, and other services to the local population over the past 20 years, faced a sustained onslaught from the government in 2023. In February, the properties of the Medical Center and the First Microfinance Bank, both owned by the AKDN, were confiscated based on the decision of a local court.53 In March, local authorities ordered the leadership of the Mountain Societies Development Support Programme (MSDSP)—the first development project of the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF)—to vacate the building.54 On the same day, the management of the Khorog Serena Inn, another AKDN-owned enterprise, was also ordered to vacate the hotel building.55 These measures constitute an attempt to end the Aga Khan’s activities and assert full control over the local population.
  • Another region that faces government pressure is the Rasht Valley, whose residents largely sided with the opposition during the civil war in the 1990s. Bomdod reported that residents of the Rasht district complained that the head of the local government, Rakhimjon Muqimi, was extorting them and donating their agricultural produce to various festivals.56
Judicial Framework and Independence 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. 1.00 / 7.00
  • The judicial system is deeply politicized and subordinate to the executive. Torture is commonly used by police to extract confessions. Judges, who are appointed by the government, maintain a 99 percent conviction rate.57 The country enforces a rule by law rather than a rule of law system.
  • Torture remains widespread in the judicial and penal systems. The Coalition Against Torture reported 19 cases of torture in 2022, which underestimates the scale of the problem.58 Those who complain about torture and police misconduct rarely receive justice. In February, the Supreme Court reported that it rejected jailed blogger Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda’s claim that he had been mistreated in police custody after his arrest in 2022.59 In January, after three police officers detained Kulob resident Abdukakhkhor Rozikov, relatives were told that he had died of an amphetamine overdose, but his body showed signs of torture.60 Subsequently, dozens of Kulob residents gathered near the police building demanding that the perpetrators be found and punished.61 The implicated police officers were later “punished for negligence” but kept their jobs.62 In November, advocate for Pamiri languages Khushruz Jumaev, who was arrested in 2022, underwent surgery for injuries sustained from torture.63 In November, a Muminobod resident was hospitalized after being detained by police for not sending his son to join the army; police claimed he “fell.”64
  • In April, the government amended the Law on Combating Terrorism to prevent relatives from burying those killed in “anti-terror operations.”65 Law enforcement frequently uses such operations to crack down on the opposition and often stages incidents to justify repression. Without access to the bodies, relatives cannot ascertain how their family members died.
  • Extremism charges have long been used to silence opposition figures. In October, Vahdat resident Shahboz Sharifbek was arrested and accused of extremism after he posted a video criticizing the government for forcing his brother into military service and beating his grandmother.66 In October, police detained a 34-year-old Dushanbe resident for liking various videos produced by the opposition group National Alliance, which was declared an extremist organization by the Supreme Court in 2019.67
  • Lawyers who defend opposition politicians or suspected extremists have been routinely jailed in recent years. In July, human rights lawyer Buzurgmehr Yorov, who was first imprisoned in 2015, was sentenced to an additional 10 years in prison for alleged fraud.68 Yorov was initially arrested after he decided to defend 14 members of the banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT).69 His new sentence could keep him in prison until 2050.
  • Tensions between the police and local populations occasionally triggers violence. In May, nine residents of Lakat in Istaravshan were detained after getting into a fight with three police officers. Protesters and the victim reported that three officers had taken a young girl into a field and started sexually abusing her.70 After she screamed, nearby workers intervened. Five of the local residents were jailed for between 3 and 1.5 years and one was fined $2,600 for attacking the police officers.71
Corruption 1.00-7.00 pts
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. 1.00 / 7.00
  • Tajikistan remains one of the most nepotistic countries in the region. The family of the president, who has seven daughters and two sons, dominates politics and the economy. His son Rustam is mayor of Dushanbe and speaker of the upper house of the parliament. His daughter Ozoda is his chief of staff. His third daughter Rukhshona is ambassador to the United Kingdom.72 A 2023 investigation revealed that the fifth daughter, Parvina, owns Sifat Pharma and has won government contracts worth $5.5 million to supply drugs to the Ministry of Health.73
  • Ambitious elites have arranged marriages for their children to members of the presidential family. Ashraf Gul, the son of former minister of energy Sherali Gulov, is married to Parvina and serves as ambassador to Turkey. Mahmadzoir Sohibov and his nephew Shamsullo are married to Rahmon’s eldest daughter Firuza and fifth daughter Rukhshona, respectively. Based on these connections, the Sohibov family has built a sprawling business empire in pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs, bazaars, energy, logistics, and publishing.74 The son of the head of the State Communications Service is married to Rahmon’s sixth daughter and Prosecutor General Yusuf Rahmon’s son is married to Rahmon’s youngest daughter.75 The president’s brother-in-law, Hassan Asadullozoda, owns the country’s largest private bank and airline. The family has carved the economy up among themselves, using their links to the government to muscle out competitors. In December, Radio Ozodi reported that over 8,000 hectares of land had been transferred to a holding company controlled by another brother-in-law, Rahmatullo Asadullozoda, who dominates agricultural production in the country’s south.76
  • Since independence, a generation has grown up believing that corruption is a normal phenomenon.77 The Agency for State Financial Control and Anti-Corruption has never charged a high-ranking official with corruption in its 17-year history. It has, however, investigated local cases of nepotism. According to statistics from the agency, in the first half of 2023, it identified 44 government appointments on the basis of kinship.78 Officials accused of corruption usually escape with light punishment compared to those convicted of other crimes. For example, in August a school director in Rudaki was fined 3,000 som ($274) despite allegedly receiving almost $6,000 in bribes.79
  • Corruption is rampant in government procurement, with kickbacks and bribery related to government contracts widespread. From August 1, the government started only accepting payments for fines, permits, and services online.80 Traditionally, people paid in cash, which created opportunities for officials to steal their money or accept bribes. The change reduces opportunities for these corrupt practices.
  • While over a million Tajiks live on less than $3.65 per day, elites spend lavishly.81 Many officials and their children have luxury goods, properties, and cars that they cannot likely afford on their official salaries. The government has also squandered public funds on a number of lavish building projects, including the region’s tallest flagpole and largest library and teahouse. In April, the government bought a $92 million Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner from the government of Mexico to serve as the new presidential plane.82 Such spending continues while public funds for schools, healthcare, and social security remain insufficient, indicating the embeddedness of authoritarianism and corruption.

Footnotes

ecoi.net description:
Report on democratisation (electoral process, civil society, independent media, governance) and rule of law (corruption) in 2023
Country:
Tajikistan
Source:
Freedom House (Author)
Published:
2024
Original link:
https://freedomhouse.org/country/tajikistan/nations-transit/2024
Document type:
Periodical Report
Language:
English
Available on ecoi.net since:
24 September 2024
Document ID:
2115576

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