The president is elected for up to two consecutive five-year terms. Incumbent Vadim Krasnoselsky, who was backed by the Renewal (Obnovleniye) Party, was reelected with 79 percent of the vote in the December 2021 presidential election. Krasnoselsky’s only competitor was a local clerk, Sergey Pînzar, who won 11.8 percent of the vote. Another 8.8 percent of ballots were ruled invalid. Turnout stood at 35.2 percent, a record low for a presidential contest. The Renewal Party was established and is funded by Sheriff Enterprises, the powerful business conglomerate that dominates the Transnistrian economy.

The 2021 elections were considered especially uncompetitive. Notable opposition figures Anatoly Dirun and Nikolai Malyshev were not allowed to register as candidates by the Central Election Commission due to alleged irregularities in the signatures collected for their nominations. Another candidate, Sergei Dechev, withdrew his candidacy without explanation. An electoral-code amendment instituted in June 2021 removed the option to vote “against all” option from the presidential ballot.

The unicameral Supreme Council has 33 members, all serving five-year terms. Elections for the Supreme Council were last held in November 2020. Candidates ran unopposed in 23 of the 33 electoral districts; by comparison, only two candidates had run unopposed in each of the previous two legislative elections. Voter turnout was just 28 percent of the eligible electorate. Renewal won 29 seats, and the remainder went to candidates who had other links to Sheriff Enterprises.

The Central Election Commission of Transnistria was legislated in 2000 as the body in charge of organizing elections and referendums. The commission is made up of 21 members appointed to five-year terms, of which 7 members are appointed by the president of Transnistria, 7 by the Supreme Council of Transnistria, and the remaining 7 members by Transnistria’s city and district authorities.

The Central Election Commission has long been criticized by various political figures for lack of impartiality and independence. In 2021, it refused to hear challenges to the election results and dismissed voter objections to its earlier decision to eliminate the possibility for voters to vote “against all.”

In light of its unrecognized status, established international election monitors do not monitor elections in Transnistria or formally assess the competency of its electoral bodies. The Russian Federation sent an election monitoring mission for polls in 2021.

Transnistrian legislation formally allows for functioning of multiple parties. However, the entire political establishment supports the separatist agenda and Russia’s role as the territory’s foreign patron. Figures who oppose the local elites linked with Sheriff Enterprises are subject to intimidation and have been mostly silenced in recent years.

The opposition Communist Party is repressed. In 2018, its party leader, Oleg Horjan, was arrested, stripped of parliamentary immunity, and jailed for organizing illegal demonstrations, criticizing officials, and interfering with law enforcement agents. He was released from prison in December 2022 after completing his sentence. On the night of July 16, 2023, Horjan was murdered at his home near Tiraspol. A party member told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) that he was discovered with multiple stab wounds, and a US government representative also expressed alarm about his death by stabbing. Local police reported that he had been shot and that the killing may have been related to a robbery attempt, but local activists, lawyers, and opposition figures told international journalists that they were skeptical of that claim.

Formally, opposition parties are allowed to operate. However, owing to government repression, opposition candidates and parties have few realistic opportunities to gain power through elections.

The Renewal Party has long controlled the legislature, and the 2016 victory of Vadim Krasnoselsky cemented its control over the executive branch. The territory’s persecuted opposition parties did not play a significant role in the 2020 legislative elections, which left the Supreme Council with no genuine opposition. Opposition candidates were prevented from contesting the December 2021 presidential election, which Krasnoselsky won by a wide margin amid low turnout.

The ruling Renewal Party and the political establishment more broadly are dominated by Sheriff Enterprises. In addition, the political influence of the Russian government is undergirded by the presence of Russian troops, who are ostensibly stationed in Transnistria to guard a Soviet-era ammunition depot and, as peacekeepers, to uphold a 1992 cease-fire between Transnistrian and Moldovan forces. Moscow has also financially supported the territory’s pension system and provided subsidized energy.

The July 2023 murder of Communist Party leader Oleg Horjan, who was reportedly stabbed multiple times about six months after his release from prison on politically motivated charges, effectively signaled that expressions of dissent may be life-threatening.

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because the murder of an opposition leader after his release from prison signaled that expressions of dissent may be life-threatening.

Residents have the legal right to vote, participate in campaigns, and run for office. However, the system in practice allows little opportunity for independent political activity by any segment of the population. Few women are included in the political leadership; only two women hold seats in the Supreme Council.

While Transnistria has three official languages—Russian, Ukrainian, and Moldovan—Russian dominates in governmental affairs and public communications.

Transnistria’s flawed elections undercut the democratic legitimacy of both executive leaders and legislative representatives. The 2020 legislative and 2021 presidential elections were both marred by low rates of participation and a lack of competition. Sheriff Enterprises exerts a strong influence on elected officials’ policy decisions, which are also closely monitored by Moscow.

Transnistrian politics have long been built on personal business interests, nepotism, and favoritism. There are few visible safeguards against official corruption.

Although officials publish some government information on websites and are occasionally interviewed by media outlets about their policies, the public is generally excluded from decision-making processes, and governmental openness and transparency are extremely limited in practice.

Authorities closely monitor and control the public media, and Sheriff Enterprises dominates private broadcasting, leading to widespread self-censorship. The territory’s few independent print outlets have limited circulation. Critical reporting can result in reprisals including criminal charges. The government also uses bureaucratic obstruction and withholding of information to inhibit independent journalism.

Legislation adopted in 2016 gave authorities even greater control over state media outlets, including the power to appoint editorial staff, and enabled officials to limit media access to their activities and bar the use of recording devices.

Most of the population is Orthodox Christian, and authorities have denied registration to several smaller religious groups, which at times face harassment by police and Orthodox opponents. The law imposes restrictions and penalties related to unauthorized distribution of religious literature, preaching in public spaces, and organized religious activities in residential buildings. Foreign religious groups are not permitted to register, and foreign individuals may not found or join registered groups.

Adherents of minority religions face constraint from authorities. Members of the Muslim community reported a reluctance to openly express their faith due to past intimidation by authorities, and they have struggled to advance plans to establish a mosque in Tiraspol. Jehovah’s Witnesses have been unable to obtain registration in Transnistria.

Academics and students may take part in international forums, but potential reprisals by Transnistrian authorities are a deterrent to participation in programs sponsored by Moldova. Academic analysis of topics such as the 1992 conflict, the role of the Russian Federation and peacekeeping forces, and Transnistrian statehood are subject to censorship.

The few Latin-script schools in Transnistria that are overseen by the Moldovan state face pressure from Transnistrian authorities.

Legal restrictions on certain kinds of speech discourage free discussion. Among other provisions related to defamation or insult of the authorities, the criminal code penalizes public expression of disrespect for the Russian peacekeeping mission in the region.

In September 2022, a Tiraspol court sentenced a civilian, Victor Pleșcanov, to three years and two months in prison for “inciting extremism” in connection with his critical remarks about the Russian army and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. On November 23, 2023, Pleșcanov’s wife reported on social networks that he had been diagnosed with a serious medical condition. In December, a public appeal for his release was launched.

Freedom of assembly is tightly restricted. Authorities consistently reject applications for permits to hold meetings and protests, and participants in unauthorized actions face administrative penalties or criminal prosecution.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civic activists operate in a repressive environment. Groups that work on human rights issues or other topics deemed politically sensitive are subject to surveillance and harassment.

A 2018 law requires burdensome reporting by NGOs, including on foreign funding, and prohibits foreign-backed NGOs from engaging in broadly defined “political activities.”

The trade union system in Transnistria has not been reformed since the Soviet era, and unions are manipulated by the political leadership in practice. Independent labor activism is not tolerated.

The judiciary serves the interests of the political authorities and Sheriff Enterprises. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has asserted that Moscow is responsible for the decisions of Transnistrian courts, which do not meet minimum standards of fairness.

In May 2022, the Transnistrian legislature approved amendments criminalizing the act of filing complaints to international or Moldovan bodies about violations committed by regional authorities. Individuals appealing to such prohibited institutions can be punished by up to 10 years in prison.

Security and law enforcement agencies in Transnistria regularly engage in arbitrary arrests and detentions and deny detainees access to attorneys. Trials and other criminal proceedings lack safeguards for due process and are frequently held without public scrutiny, with the outcomes announced after the fact.

Moldovan citizen Adrian Glijin was abducted by territorial security forces in 2020 and accused of treason, in what Moldovan authorities and NGOs characterized as a politically motivated, retaliatory action by Transnistrian authorities. Glijin was held incommunicado for more than a year, and in 2022, was sentenced in a closed-door process to 13.5 years in prison. Glijin was released in April 2023, after spending two and a half years in detention.

In January 2023, authorities in Bender handcuffed and detained a 15-year-old resident of Hagimus, a nearby village under control of Moldovan authorities. Transnistrian authorities kept him in custody for two hours without explanation before releasing him.

In a March 2023 closed-door trial, a Transnistrian court convicted and sentenced Alexander Dimov, a Moldovan citizen, to 20 years in prison for terrorism and sabotage. Dimov was convicted of carrying out a May 2022 attack in which two fire bombs were thrown at the military enlistment office of Tiraspol. Media reported that the attack had caused minimal damage and no injuries.

Police mistreatment of suspects is common, and physical abuse is employed to obtain confessions. Prison conditions remain poor and denial of proper medical care has been reported.

While the Transnistrian constitution guarantees people’s rights and freedoms “without distinction as to sex, race, nationality, language, religion,” and other such categories, these protections are frequently violated. Members of certain minority groups including Moldovan speakers and most notably Roma, face discrimination and harassment. Women are also subject to discrimination in practice; among other problems, they are formally excluded from numerous occupations that are considered hazardous or physically difficult. Same-sex sexual activity is illegal in Transnistria, and members of the LGBT+ community generally do not identify themselves publicly due to widespread government and societal discrimination.

Approximately 300,000 people in Transnistria hold Moldovan citizenship and can travel freely to European Union (EU) countries. Since 2018, Transnistria residents have been able to obtain neutral license plates for use on international roads. Moldovan authorities began recognizing Transnistrian educational documents that year.

Citizens of Moldova cannot move freely across Transnistria because of entry requirements and checkpoints established by the Transnistrian authorities along the border of the region. Some citizens of Moldova have been refused access to Transnistria on arbitrary grounds.

Full private property rights are only recognized for housing; other property rights, including land ownership, remain restricted. Procedures for establishing a private business are hampered by bureaucratic impediments.

Sheriff Enterprises, which controls the region, interferes with independent business activity. In July 2023, local authorities raided and closed down the popular new local retailer Five Pockets, with management and a number of the retailer’s employees (mostly women) placed under arbitrary arrest on corruption allegations. A civic activist, Ghenadii Ciorba, claimed in a social media post that the store sold household products at lower prices than what was charged at stores owned by Sheriff, and that management had refused directives to procure items from Sheriff.

Same-sex marriage is not permitted. Domestic violence is a persistent concern, and it is not considered a criminal offense in the absence of serious physical injury. However, the problem has become more public in recent years, including through television reports. Dedicated services, including psychological aid, a hotline for victims, and shelters, are operated by NGOs supported by international donors.

Economic opportunity remains very limited. Sheriff Enterprises dominates the economy. Despite increased international aid meant to ensure better opportunities for women, many still fall victim to traffickers who subject them to forced labor or sex work.