LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The constitution provides for freedom of conscience and religion for all residents, including the right to change, express, or not express religious belief; practice or abstain from practicing religion; and join or refuse to join a religious community. These rights are subject to limitations for reasons of public safety and order or for the protection of the health or rights of others. The constitution provides for the separation of religious communities from public institutions, including the right of religious groups to regulate independently their own organizations, activities, and ceremonies. It provides for equal rights for all religious communities, stipulates the country is secular and neutral regarding religion, declares the state shall ensure the protection and preservation of the country’s religious heritage, and prohibits discrimination based on religion. The constitution states the law may limit freedom of expression to prevent violent and hostile provocations on racial, national, ethnic, or religious grounds. It allows courts to ban organizations or activities that encourage racial, national, ethnic, or religious hatred.

The law on religious freedom stipulates there is no state religion and provides for freedom of nonreligious belief. It states, “All religions and their communes in Kosovo, including the Kosovo Islamic Community, Serbian Orthodox Church, Catholic Church, Hebrew Belief Community, and Evangelical Church, shall be offered any kind of protection and opportunity in order to have rights and freedom foreseen by this law.” The law does not prescribe any additional rights or benefits to these five named communities as compared with other religious groups. Authorities interpret the term “Evangelical Church” as encompassing all Protestant groups, regardless of denomination.

The constitution provides for rights and protection for all citizens, including maintaining, developing, and preserving their religion using their own language. The constitution also states religious communities have the right to establish religious schools and charitable institutions, with the possibility of being funded with government financial assistance “in accordance with the law and international standards.” It guarantees all ethnic communities access to public media. The law on religious freedom provides the right for religious groups to establish and use their own media, maintain unhindered peaceful contacts with persons outside the country with whom they share a religious identity, and have equitable access to public employment.

The constitution provides 20 of the 120 seats in the Assembly to representatives from ethnic minority communities, a majority of whose members are often associated with a single religious group, such as Muslims or Orthodox Christians. It also stipulates that the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any laws pertaining to religious freedom or cultural heritage requires approval by a majority of Assembly deputies representing minority communities as well as by a majority of all deputies.

The constitution provides for an Ombudsperson’s Institution, which is responsible for monitoring religious freedom, among other human rights, and recommending actions to correct violations. It stipulates the state shall take all necessary measures to protect individuals who may be subject to threats, hostility, discrimination, or violence because of their religious identity. The law proscribes hate crime, which includes inciting discord and intolerance between religious groups, and other criminal actions in which religion is a motivating factor or aggravating circumstance.

The law does not require registration of religious groups, but it also does not provide a legal mechanism or specific guidance for religious groups – including the five communities named in the law on religious freedom – to obtain legal status through registration or other means. Without legal status, religious communities may not own property, open bank accounts, employ staff, or access the courts as a collective entity. Individual congregations or individuals, however, may do so and perform other administrative tasks in their own name. Local communities often recognize religious groups’ possession of buildings; however, the law generally does not protect these buildings as property of a religious community, but rather as the private property of citizens or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). SOC property is an exception; the law on special protective zones (SPZs) acknowledges and protects the integrity of SOC property ownership and stewardship over designated areas within the SPZs.

The law provides religious communities exemptions from income tax, value added taxes, immovable property taxes, and customs duties, but these benefits are unevenly enforced.

The law stipulates the rights to establish humanitarian/charity organizations, accept voluntary financial contributions from individuals and institutions, and engage in national and international communication for religious purposes. The law on registering NGOs, however, does not apply to “religious communities, religious centers, or temples,” which prevents religious groups from registering as NGOs and also prohibits NGOs from conducting religious activity in the country.

The law provides safeguards for sites of religious and cultural significance and prohibits or restricts nearby activities that could damage the surrounding historical, cultural, or natural environment. According to the law, the Implementation and Monitoring Council (IMC) is responsible for arbitrating disputes between the government and the SOC concerning SPZs and other matters related to protecting the SOC’s religious and cultural heritage. The IMC is a special body originating from the 2007 Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (also known as the Ahtisaari Plan) and established by law. IMC members include the Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning, and Infrastructure (cochair); Special Representative of the European Union (cochair); Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sport; SOC; and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Municipalities, not the central government, are legally responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of all public cemeteries, including those designated for specific religious communities.

According to the law, “Public educational institutions shall refrain from teaching religion or other activities that propagate a specific religion.” This law is unenforceable in schools operated and funded under Serbian government-run parallel structures, over which the Kosovan government has no control.

A Ministry of Education, Science, Technology, and Information (MESTI) administrative circular on the code of conduct and disciplinary measures for elementary and high school students prohibits students from wearing religious attire on elementary and secondary school premises.

The country is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but the constitution states the human rights and fundamental freedoms enumerated in the covenant and its protocols “are guaranteed by this Constitution, are directly applicable in the Republic of Kosovo, and, in the case of conflict, have priority over provisions of laws and other acts of public institutions.”

GOVERNMENT PRACTICES

Abuses Involving the Ability of Individuals to Engage in Religious Activities Alone or In Community with Others

In March, the government submitted to the Assembly proposed amendments to the law on religious freedom that would permit religious groups to acquire legal status, conduct business and acquire real and personal property in their name, open bank accounts, and gain import tax benefits. As of year’s end, the Assembly had not voted on the amendments. Absent enactment of the legislation, all religious communities said they continued to operate bank accounts registered to individuals instead of communities.

The UKT reported that the government’s Agency of Statistics did not take into account UKT recommendations on the draft census questionnaire, which restricted individuals from self-identifying with a religious community beyond “Islamic, Orthodox, or Catholic” and therefore did not provide an opportunity for some religious groups, such as the Tarikats, to self-identify as distinct communities. The UKT, which also supports the right of all individuals and groups to self-identify as not practicing any religion, said the draft questionnaire did not include an option to select no religion, either.

Because the Tax Administration revoked the UKT’s fiscal number certificate in 2022, the UKT said it remained unable to open bank accounts and benefit from customs exemptions. According to the UKT, the Tax Administration cited as justification the absence of Tarikats as a distinct religious group according to the law on religious freedom.

According to the SOC, on May 24, for the second consecutive year, police prevented SOC clergy from performing a liturgy (service) on the occasion of Orthodox Holy Ascension in the contested Christ the Savior Church in Pristina. The SOC said police warned church officials one day in advance that the service would not be permitted, citing security concerns and stating that religious services in the church were prohibited while the University of Pristina’s 2019 lawsuit against the SOC continued. The university, which claims the church is on university land, filed the suit to contest the 1991 land donation to the SOC by the then Serbian government and to seek demolition of the uncompleted but consecrated church building. In a public statement, the SOC said the lawsuit should not prevent the use of property listed in the cadaster (national real estate registry) as belonging to the SOC, such as the Christ the Savior Church. The SOC said such a prohibition violated the country’s legal protection of the freedom of assembly and worship.

Media outlets reported that some schools, in accordance with the MESTI administrative circular prohibiting religious attire on school property, continued to deny access to Muslim girls who attempted to attend school wearing a hijab. Other school directors, however, allowed students to attend school wearing hijabs. The government took no action to lift the MESTI hijab ban during the year, despite a lawsuit, online signature campaign, and support from the Islamic Community of Kosovo (BIK) – all in 2022 – to do so.

In July, media outlets reported that a trial began against a school director for violating the law on nondiscrimination. The prosecution alleged the school director verbally harassed and illegally dismissed a teacher in the Suhareka/SuvaReka municipality for wearing a hijab to work in August 2022. The municipality reinstated the teacher after media reported the story in September 2022. As of year’s end, the trial continued.

Decan/Decani municipal officials and the central government did not recognize the SOC Visoki Decani Monastery’s ownership of land in the monastery’s vicinity, despite a 2016 Constitutional Court decision, a 2012 Supreme Court ruling, and calls during the year from the SOC and the international community that they do so. The case against the officials who had not complied with the Constitutional Court’s decision remained pending prosecutor action at year’s end, although the court had referred the case to the prosecutor in 2021.

In January, Prime Minister Kurti told media the monastery land issue was “a very sensitive subject and needs thorough consideration and discussion with all involved.” Kurti said he would “like to meet the people in charge at Decani Monastery – but so far they have refused to talk to me.” He also noted “there are many other court decisions that have not been implemented.” In May, President Osmani told the media that enforcing the courts’ earlier decisions regarding the disputed monastery property “could create an extremely dangerous precedent for any decision of (former Serbian leader Slobodan) Milosevic that was made during the 90s” because “under Milosevic, all decisions were arbitrary.” In a response on social media, the monastery said that if the government considered all the Milosevic regime’s decisions illegal, then even decisions that benefitted Kosovan Albanians should be considered illegal. The monastery statement asked why the government’s “discriminatory” decision was only applied to the Visoki Decani Monastery and said that disputing all Milosevic-era decisions related to property, like the one related to the monastery, would lead to “legal chaos.” Throughout the year, the SOC repeatedly criticized remarks by senior government officials, including President Osmani and Prime Minister Kurti, that challenged the merits of the 2016 Constitutional Court decision. The monastery remained a UNESCO World Heritage Site and continued to be guarded by NATO troops.

The SOC limited its engagement with the government during the year. The IMC did not meet, due partly to continued SOC protest over the government’s nonimplementation of both the Visoki Decani Monastery Constitutional Court decision and a 2020 Italian-brokered arrangement between the IMC and Decan/Decani municipal authorities, which would have allowed construction of a road connecting Decan/Decani to Montenegro, and a separate local road within the SPZ.

UKT representatives again reported lack of progress in longstanding disputes regarding property restitution. The UKT said two instances of the seizure of Tarikat property in Prizren by the former Yugoslav government in 1946 and 1996 remained unresolved.

In March, representatives of the Bektashi community reported the government removed a Bektashi tekke in Prizren from the list of the protected sites, which put the building at risk of demolition unless the community paid a land developer €550,000 ($608,000). Following written appeals by the Bektashi, the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports redesignated the tekke a protected cultural and religious site the same month. Representatives of the Bektashi community again reported they were able to utilize only two of their properties, both in Gjakova/Djakovica, as the remainder of their tekkes had been destroyed or occupied following the 1999 war. Bektashi representatives reported longstanding obstacles to property restitution due to the destruction of property documents during the war.

As of December, construction of a Turkish government-funded central mosque in the Pristina city center continued. Construction of the mosque had been delayed for 10 years due to concerns regarding its funding, architectural style, and whether such a large facility was needed in the downtown area, but there was no opposition to its construction during the year.

In October, the Jewish community in Pristina, Bet-Israel Kosova, reported they reached an agreement with the Pristina mayor on a suitable location for a synagogue, for which the Pristina Municipality had issued a construction permit in 2016. Renovation of a building in Prizren, which would become a combined Jewish cultural center and synagogue, continued during the year, partially funded by the government. Media reported that when work began on the site in November 2022, Jewish community leaders and the Israeli ambassador praised the project as “a confirmation of the friendship between the government of Kosovo, Israel and the Jewish people.” The combined Jewish facility would be the first of its type in the country, according to media.

In March, the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sport announced it had completed the restoration of the Sheh Lita Tekke in Gjakova/Djakovica, and it was initiating restoration of “The Guardian Angel” Roman Catholic Church in Ferizaj/Urosevac.

In October, media outlets reported the government halted private construction of a road because it damaged an old SOC cemetery in North Mitrovica/e. The road construction also disturbed human remains. The SOC stated the deliberate desecration of SOC graves in the country “has been ongoing intensively” for more than two decades. The Kosovan Serb political party Srpska List, which is not part of the government, claimed the government ordered the SOC cemetery’s destruction. In a statement, the Ministry of Local Government Administration (MLGA) said, “There is no decision from the government…or from the municipality for any such work” and the MLGA “only finances the construction of houses and not road infrastructure.” The government halted the work pending an investigation.

The OSCE reported improved maintenance of cemeteries by some municipal governments. The OSCE continued to advocate inclusion of representatives of all major religious communities in municipal community safety councils that met to discuss security issues.

The MLGA reported most municipalities adopted regulations regarding funeral expenses for religious groups, which meant those municipalities could cover funeral expenses in some cases. Some municipalities had not adopted such regulations, however, which meant they could not defray any funeral expenses. The municipalities that did not cover funeral expenses included Zubin Potok, Zvecan/e, Mitrovice/a North, Leposavic/q, Mamushe/Mamusa, Gracanica/e, Novo Brdo/Novoberde, Strpce/Shterpce, Junik, Ranilug/Ranillug, and Partes/h. Some religious communities said such regulations (or lack thereof) were discriminatory, as municipalities were not obligated to defray funeral expenses for all religious communities equally. According to the MLGA, most municipalities improved their budget planning and expanded contracts with private companies for the maintenance of cemeteries.

The Kosovo Protestant Evangelical Church (KPEC), Jehovah’s Witnesses, and secularists again said a lack of institutional support for dedicated burial sites prevented their members from conducting burial services in accordance with their religious beliefs or lack thereof. Jehovah’s Witnesses said authorities continued to require a religious leader of another faith to preside over their burial services, while secularists reported most municipal governments did not allow them to conduct a burial without a religious representative presiding. Pristina’s Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and Jewish communities continued to use separate public cemeteries that these groups independently maintained and operated.

The SOC and Kosovan Serb communities continued to state that in many Kosovan Albanian-majority municipalities, local governments did not provide adequate maintenance for their cemeteries and police did not provide sufficient security, allowing for occasional acts of vandalism, such as a reported instance of desecration of an SOC cemetery in Rahovec/Orahovic on December 18.

The Water Services Regulatory Authority stated it once again waived water utility fees during the year for religious buildings owned by religious communities. By law, however, it could not waive water utility fees for buildings rented by religious communities, which disproportionately affected smaller religious communities because most of them rented facilities.

The government continued to provide some funding for Islamic education in the BIK madrassah in Pristina and its branches in Prizren and Gjilan/Gnjilane. Representatives of other religious communities said this funding was discriminatory because the government did not provide funding for religious education to any other religious group.

Most ethnic Serbs and some Bosniaks, Gorani, Croats, and Roma continued to attend Serbian-language public schools operated and funded by Serbian government parallel structures. The schools offered Christian Orthodox classes, and the Serbian government paid for the instructors, who were members of the SOC. Students were allowed to opt out of these classes.

Abuses Involving Discrimination or Unequal Treatment

On October 20, the government deported Father Fotije, the Abbott of the SOC Devine Vode Monastery in Zvecan. Fotije (born as Aleksandar Kostovski in North Macedonia) had resided continuously in the country since 2004. The government revoked his residence permit, citing provisions under the Law on Foreigners referring to “public order, state security, or public health,” but did not provide further details or specify how Fotije broke that law. The government also banned him from entering the country for five years. The SOC filed an appeal and issued a statement calling the deportation a “brutal, arbitrary, and extrajudicial expulsion” and referring to provisions under the Law on Religious Freedom that provided for no arbitrary prohibition of entry or stay for clergy. The SOC also said the government had regularly approved extensions of Fotije’s residency permit, and he had recently passed the Ministry of Internal Affairs test for immigrants. On the day he was deported, Fotije had an appointment with the immigration authorities in Pristina where he expected to receive a Kosovo identity card and a five-year residency permit, according to the SOC.

The SOC again expressed concerns that senior government officials, including Minister of Culture, Youth, and Sports Hajrulla Ceku, referred to the SOC as either “the Orthodox Church” or “the Church” instead of its full name. The SOC said it considered such statements by government officials as denial of the SOC’s identity and an attempt at “Kosovarization” of the SOC.

The KPEC reported the Ministry of Justice did not invite its representatives to participate in a government forum on the integration and deradicalization of foreign fighters, which also dealt with religious extremism, although representatives of other communities, such as the BIK, were invited.

The KPEC again said the government’s official calendar of holidays referred to “Catholic” or “Orthodox” holidays but not “Christian” or “Protestant” holidays. The KPEC stated the government’s lack of advocacy for religious minorities contributed to a perceived climate of discrimination. The KPEC also said the presence of Islamic symbols in some public buildings contributed to a perception of Muslim influence over government institutions.

Bet-Israel Kosova reported central government institutions declined its requests to meet, which the group considered discriminatory. Bet-Israel representatives said the government disproportionately favored larger religious communities by providing greater material support to larger groups and excluding smaller communities from interfaith gatherings.

In July, Prime Minister Kurti posted on social media that Serbia was using ambulances to “smuggle arms into Orthodox churches in Kosovo.” In response, the SOC issued a statement dismissing Kurti’s allegations, adding Kurti “has continued with making inflammatory statements, which openly incite ethnic and religious intolerance against the Serbian people and the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo.”

Other Developments Affecting Religious Freedom

In June, the Assembly unanimously approved a resolution adopting the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance working definition of antisemitism.

FOREIGN FORCES AND NONSTATE ACTORS

On September 24, an organized, armed, and trained group of ethnic Serbs attacked Kosovo Police in the village of Banjska in Zvecan municipality, killing one police sergeant and wounding two other officers. The group then forcibly entered the nearby SOC Banjska Monastery complex and fought with police for several hours, including from the monastery’s property, while the SOC abbot and approximately 40 pilgrims from Serbia sequestered themselves in the monastery until the group fled. Police said three assailants were killed during the skirmish. After the fighting, police and personnel from NATO’s Kosovo Force and the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) entered the monastery and found the SOC personnel and pilgrims there unharmed. According to the SOC, the monastery sustained minor damage to gates and the door of the guest house, which was outside the main monastery building. In a September 29 press conference and speaking on behalf of U.S.-sanctioned Srpska List Vice President Milan Radoicic, Radoicic’s attorney said his client was responsible for organizing, leading, and participating in the Banjska attack. Radoicic’s attorney also announced Radoicic’s resignation as Vice President of Srpska List. Serbian authorities arrested Radoicic on October 3 and released him on October 4, pending further investigation, which continued at year’s end.

The SOC condemned the attack on the police and complained about public statements from government officials, public figures, and media alleging SOC complicity in the attack. For example, Internal Affairs Minister Xhelal Svecla told media in September there were “indications that there was direct involvement” of monastery staff in the action. On September 25, the SOC said that “neither EULEX nor the police found anything that could compromise the monastery,” and stated the “firearms, body armor, and pieces of equipment” discovered after the attack were “discarded by the armed individuals as they retreated from the monastery.” Police separately reported a large cache of weapons and vehicles was found “in and around the monastery,” including rocket launchers, mortar rounds, grenades, explosives, and small arms. In October, despite the SOC denial, Minister Svecla said to media that he would not be surprised if the monastery played a role in the attack, because “the Serbian Orthodox Church has always played a destructive role towards peace in the region and has been part of Serbia’s hegemonic policy.” At year’s end, the government’s investigation into the incident continued.

In October, Minister Ceku wrote the SOC, offering to repair damage to the Banjska Monastery. The letter cited the government’s constitutional obligation to protect and promote religious cultural heritage without discrimination. In response, the SOC said it was “not able to accept the interference of Kosovo institutions in the life of our Church and the assumption of protection of Banjska Monastery.” The SOC said the government’s offer was a “political act,” intended to put the SOC’s “religious and cultural heritage…under the political control of Kosovo institutions” and also to “degrade our basic religious freedoms and rights and the cultural appropriation of our churches and monasteries.” The SOC said it would repair the monastery (which had suffered little damage) with its own resources. In October, in response to media reports that the SOC’s independent repairs to the monastery violated the law (because they were not authorized by the government’s Institute for the Protection of Monuments), the SOC said “the Ahtisaari plan (which provided the basis for Kosovo’s independence and governed the creation of Kosovo’s legal framework) states that the SOC should have ‘full discretion of management, reconstruction, and access to its premises.’”