LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Transition Charter, established by the military government of Transition President Traore as its guiding legal text, supersedes the constitution but states that all legal matters are determined by the 1991 constitution unless the ALT, a 71-member body established in November 2022, decides otherwise. The constitution states the country is secular, and both the constitution and other laws provide for the right of individuals to choose and change their religion and to practice the religion of their choice. The constitution states that freedom of belief, nonbelief, conscience, and religious opinion is guaranteed but subject to respect for law, public order, good morals, and “the human person.” Political parties based on religion, ethnicity, or regional affiliation are forbidden.

The law provides that all organizations, religious or otherwise, may register with the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS). Registration confers legal status; the process usually takes three to four weeks and costs less than 50,000 CFA francs ($85). Religious organizations are not required to register unless they seek legal recognition by the government, but after registration they must comply with applicable regulations imposed on all registered organizations or be subject to a fine of 50,000 to 150,000 CFA francs ($85 to $255). The government taxes religious groups if they engage in commercial activities, such as farming or dairy production, but not all mosques, churches that engage in these activities are taxed, despite a 2022 decision by the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, to which the country belongs, that member governments do so.

The DGARCT, established by MATDS in May, coordinates the ministry’s activities related to religion. The new directorate has the stated aim to promote and foster interreligious dialogue and peace; eliminate radicalization and religious extremism; develop and implement measures for the construction of places of worship and the registration of religious organizations and religious congregations; and monitor the implementation of standards for burial, exhumation, and transfer of remains (which may include religious elements).

Religious groups operate under the same regulatory framework for publishing and broadcasting as other entities. MATDS may request copies of proposed publications and broadcasts to verify they are in accordance with the nature of the religious group as stated in its registration. MATDS also reviews permit applications by religious groups.

The state generally does not fund religious schools or require them to pay taxes unless they conduct for-profit activities. The state, however, provides subsidies to a number of Catholic schools as part of an agreement allowing students from public schools to enroll in Catholic schools when public schools are at full capacity. The government also provides subsidies to registered Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim (commonly referred to as “Franco-Arabic”) schools for teacher salaries, which are typically less than those of public-school teachers.

Religious education is not allowed in public schools. Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant groups operate private primary and secondary schools and some institutions of higher education. These schools are permitted to provide religious instruction to their students. Private schools, including religious schools, must submit the names of their directors to the government and register with the Ministry of National Education and Literacy. The government does not appoint or approve these officials, however. The government periodically reviews the curricula of new religious schools as they open, as well as others, to ensure they offer the standard academic curriculum. A majority of Quranic schools are not registered, and thus their curricula are not reviewed.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

GOVERNMENT PRACTICES

Abuses Involving Violence, Detention, or Mass Resettlement

NGO sources said government security forces illegally arrested religious leaders during the year and held them incommunicado because they were from the mostly Muslim Fulani ethnic group, which the NGOs said was often suspected by the government of supporting terrorists because armed groups recruited within the mostly Muslim Fulani community. The NGO sources said arrests were often based on ethnic and religious profiling of subjects. Because religion and ethnicity are closely linked, it was difficult to categorize most arrests as being solely based on religious identity, however.

In March, for example, NGO sources said TA security forces kidnapped Mahamoudou Diallo, an ethnic Fulani and retired teacher and imam, from his home in Bobo-Dioulasso. Before his disappearance, Diallo had warned publicly against the stigmatization, arrest, and disappearance of ethnic Fulani leaders based on allegations that some of them used religion to recruit militants for terrorist groups. As of year’s end, all attempts to find him were unsuccessful. NGO sources also said that another imam in Bobo-Dioulasso, Adama Sangare, allegedly kidnapped by TA security forces in November 2022, remained missing at year’s end.

On May 19, Aujourd’hui, a daily newspaper, reported that the TA’s Central Brigade for the Fight against Cybercrime arrested a Muslim man who administered the Facebook page “Islamic Poem and Dou’a” (an Islamic act of worship in which Muslims ask God for forgiveness and mercy). The newspaper said the individual was charged with glorification of terrorist acts, incitement to radicalization, violent extremism, and threats by means of information and communication technologies (social media).

On May 31, daily newspaper L’Express du Faso reported that an imam was jailed in Bobo-Dioulasso for a video in which he threatened to attack and destroy all Catholic churches in the Belle Ville district. The imam said he was angered by the judiciary’s resolution of a land dispute in the Catholic Church’s favor.

The TA continued to condemn the stigmatization of vulnerable communities and the use of violent rhetoric. TA representatives said they were aware that action, including interfaith dialogue, was needed to control hate speech and other activities that could affect social cohesion. On June 13, the TA’s Superior Council of Communication (CSC) signed a charter of good conduct with faith-based media, including Muslim and Christian outlets, to combat radicalization and violent extremism. According to CSC president Abdoulazize Bamogo, the charter, if followed, would contribute to “strengthening the faith of believers and cultivating love of neighbor, tolerance and forgiveness, which are essential values that underpin community life.” The media entities that signed the charter committed to not broadcast live programs with religious content, but only programs with prerecorded religious content that would be reviewed by an internal committee before broadcast. Written material with religious content for publication would also be reviewed in advance by the committee. The charter also required the signatories to refuse to broadcast or publish content contrary to the law or likely to compromise social cohesion.

On October 10, ALT Speaker Ousmane Bougouma announced that the ALT would adopt a religious freedom law that he said was designed to “avoid abuses that could undermine efforts for peace and social cohesion, to fight effectively against religious fanaticism, and to promote interreligious dialogue.” The bill, originally proposed in 2022, would establish guidelines for the content of sermons and religious broadcasts by secular or religious media, define the roles of foreign imams and Quranic teachers, and establish rules by which the government could better monitor the exercise of religious freedom in the country. The bill remained pending in the ALT at the end of the year.

The TA continued to state that terrorists attacked religious institutions with the aim of dividing the population. To counter these terrorist attempts at division, TA representatives took actions they said were intended to foster peaceful relations between communities and followers of different religions. For example, members of the DGARCT and the National Observatory of Religious Facts (ONAFAR), an entity set up under MATDS at the request of religious organizations to monitor religious activity nationwide, met in December with religious and traditional leaders around the country to promote peaceful coexistence and religious tolerance.

Abuses Involving the Ability of Individuals to Engage in Religious Activities

According to religious leaders, the TA continued to routinely approve applications from religious groups for registration, although some applications were rejected on “moral” grounds, such as a “negative character assessment” of the person or group seeking registration, unlawful conduct of the group’s activities, or lack of transparency in disclosing the group’s sources of income.

On October 26, the National Identification Office (ONI) announced it would allow women to wear head coverings in their national ID card photos. To be accepted, the applicant’s full face and ears must be completely clear in the photograph, and in compliance with the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization. According to the ONI, the decision was directed at face coverings in general, not religious face coverings in particular.

In September, FAIB leaders expressed concern that the government had failed to integrate students who graduated from domestic and international Arabic higher education institutions into the civil service, despite recruiting them for that purpose. As of 2023, there were approximately 2,000 such students who lacked the government positions promised them. FAIB leaders said they saw this as increasing the risk of frustration and radicalization of these students.

Abuses Involving Discrimination or Unequal Treatment

According to civil society sources and traditional and religious leaders, the continued security crisis in the country exacerbated intercommunal tensions. Some observers said that, unlike his predecessors, Transition President Traore spoke more about improving the security situation than reducing social or interreligious tension. According to some civil society leaders and Christian groups, because the TA did not do more to encourage social cohesion, increased tension among some religious and ethnic groups led to greater “politicization of religion.” For example, some Muslim clerics questioned the calls by certain Muslim groups to pray for the Transition President during Friday services; the clerics said prayers should be for peace in the country in general and not for any individual in particular. In October, the Muslim chaplain for the main military barracks in Ouagadougou said during a Friday prayer session that Traore was a “gift from God.” According to Muslim leader Mahmoud Ouedraogo, this statement caused unease among Muslims who said Islam should not be politicized, and among Christians.

Some religious and traditional leaders advocated for the restoration of the Ministry of Religious and Customary Affairs, which was created during the first transition government in early 2022 but replaced with the DGARCT within MATDS by the current TA after it took power in September 2022. These leaders said that MATDS had too many responsibilities to focus adequately on religious issues, as the previous ministry did. Transition President Traore did not respond to that request by the end of the year.

In February, the Help and Not Help Yourself Movement, a national NGO, stated, “We must all publicly and openly condemn [the country’s] drift in identity [towards more Muslim influence] which is at odds with our collective identity as a [multifaith] nation and as a People.” The NGO’s leader also “firmly and unreservedly” condemned the interference of religion in politics, and “any distrust towards customary and religious authorities, who historically have played a key role in maintaining social cohesion.” In June, l’Express du Faso also said the country should try to prevent a “religious drift,” which observers stated meant a drift towards more Muslim influence in politics.

The l’Express du Faso also reported the concerns of a group of Christians, who published an open letter in June calling on their leaders – the Burkina-Niger Episcopal Conference, representing Catholic bishops, the Federation of Evangelical Churches and Missions, and the Confederation of Charismatic Churches of New Generation and lay Christians – to publicly raise their concerns about threats to social cohesion and division between Christians and Muslims. The letter stated that some Muslims were concerned with what they said was disproportionately higher representation of Christians in the TA and claimed unfair treatment of Muslims by the previous government. The letter said that these Muslims viewed Transition President Traore as a “messenger from God” and his government (which included more Muslim officials than its predecessor) as remedying the “injustices” of the previous governments. The Christian authors of the letter stated the claims of injustice against Muslims were unfounded, unfair, and fostered further interreligious division.

Representatives of another Christian group said they believed some Muslim leaders preferred supporting the TA over returning to democracy. These individuals said Muslim leaders organized a “general mobilization” to rally Muslims nationwide on May 5-7 in support of the TA and to denounce “interference” by the international community such as the calls by other West African nations for a clear transition timeline and greater human rights protections in the country. The representatives of the Christian organization said many senior Muslim leaders spoke at public rallies that weekend, and many Muslims were “forced to close their shops and go to the sites of the demonstrations” to show support.

In September, representatives of civil society organizations and journalists said they were worried about growing religious influence from Muslims within the government, which they said they believed was slowing down the return to a democratic government. On September 15, they said the members of the TA had “tasted power” and did not want to give it up.

Some individuals and religious and civil liberties groups continued to note the use of religious rhetoric in political speech, in particular by Muslim supporters of Transition President Traore. They said that these supporters prayed and displayed religious signs with Arabic text and references to the Quran during demonstrations and also publicly insulted and threatened religious and traditional leaders whom they viewed as not supporting the transition government sufficiently. Some Traore supporters also called for jail, exile, or death for those whom they characterized as “enemies” of the Transition President and “nonpatriots.” The Traore supporters also called for a new constitution that better reflected the traditional values of the country by prohibiting homosexuality, for example, and that outlined a form of government based more on local values and traditions. Civil society organizations said that the greatest danger from terrorism was the threat it posed to previous traditions of peaceful coexistence in the country.

On November 5, the FAIB and the Federation of Evangelical Churches (FEME) issued statements denying they had sent representatives to a political rally held by supporters of the Transition President that day calling for him to “reign for life.” The FEME condemned the remarks of one of the speakers, falsely claiming to be speaking on behalf of FEME, who presented himself as a “pan-African evangelist Christian” who supported Traore.

The TA allocated 75 million CFA francs ($127,000) each to the Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, and animist communities, the same level as in previous years, but these communities did not receive their allocation by year’s end. TA sources continued to state that the funding was meant to demonstrate equitable support to all religious groups in the country.

Other Developments Affecting Religious Freedom

On January 20, Transition President Traore met with leaders of the FAIB and invited them to help promote peace and social cohesion in the country. FAIB president El Hadj Oumarou Zoungrana said to the media that the meeting was a reminder “of the values that are close to our hearts” which “we already advocate in mosques.” Zoungrana said imams had been asked to share the message of peace and social cohesion during their weekly sermons. “We are also going to hold meetings in the coming days to spread the message so that it reaches all Burkinabe people,” Zoungrana said. “We will do everything we can with prayer so that peace returns to Burkina Faso,” he concluded.

On May 16, TA spokesperson Jean Emmanuel Ouedraogo met with Archbishop of Ougadougou Philippe Ouedraogo and commended him for his support for interfaith dialogue during his tenure. Ouedraogo also solicited the Archbishop’s participation in a national communication campaign to promote peace and social cohesion.

In July, Bonaventure Ouedraogo, president of the government’s Economic and Social Council (CES), stated during a forum on secularism that the country was a good example of, “the population demonstrating a firm desire to live together in their plurality.” He said, “Our objective [in the CES] is to see together what we must do so that in Burkina Faso, each citizen freely lives their faith in respect of our freedoms, [with] the fair understanding of this guarantee offered to us by the State.”

In May, FAIB leaders said the TA did not provide subsidies for the 2023 Hajj pilgrimage because of domestic security concerns. FAIB leaders said they understood that the government needed more resources for weapons and to pay those mobilized to fight terrorism. In 2022, the Ministry for Religious and Customary Affairs granted 800 million CFA francs ($1.3 million) for Islamic pilgrimages.

ACTIONS BY FOREIGN FORCES AND NONSTATE ACTORS

Domestic and transnational terrorist groups continued to operate in the country, according to media and NGO reports, conducting increased attacks against civilians, including numerous targeted killings based on religious identity. According to the ACSS, during the year, 8,800 persons were killed in the country in violence linked to militant Islamist groups, more than double the 3,800 deaths recorded by ACSS in 2022. ACSS stated that 67 percent of deaths attributable to militant Islamists in the Sahel region during the year took place in Burkina Faso. In June, the deputy Africa director for the NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) said, “Islamist armed groups are wreaking havoc in Burkina Faso by attacking villages and towns and committing atrocities against civilians.” Sources stated that the attacks by terrorist groups, militants, and jihadists forced residents to flee their villages, brought more communes under the groups’ control, and prevented villagers from farming. They said the attacks spread to the Cascades, Boucle du Mouhoun, Center-South, Center-West, Hauts Bassins, and Center-East Regions. The active organizations included the U.S.-designated terrorist groups Ansaroul Islam, ISIS-GS, JNIM, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine, and al-Mourabitoun. Militant Islamist groups, primarily Ansaroul Islam and other groups associated with JNIM, laid siege to at least 36 towns and took control of more than half the country’s territory.

Media outlets and religious leaders reported that terrorist groups, militants, and jihadists regularly targeted Muslim and Christian clergy, religious congregations and houses of worship of both faiths, teachers, local government employees, schools, and Muslims they criticized for not practicing a sufficiently conservative form of Islam. Media reports and church leaders said terrorists singled out and killed individuals wearing Christian symbols such as crucifixes and urged Muslims and non-Muslims to adapt their mode of living. According to residents, these groups were also responsible for killing imams whom the groups accused of collaborating with TA security forces or not practicing the groups’ preferred form of Islam.

Although the perpetrators of many attacks in the country were not identified, observers continued to attribute most attacks to three terrorist groups: Ansaroul Islam, JNIM, and ISIS-GS. HRW said in June that eyewitnesses believed assailants were members of Islamist armed groups because of their methods of attack, choice of targets, and their garb. Those interviewed by HRW also cited statements by the attackers, including demands for residents to leave the areas under attack. HRW said militant groups used displacement as a strategy to assert their power and authority and collectively punish villagers and townspeople for collaborating with government authorities and security forces.

In its World Watch List report covering 2023, Christian NGO Open Doors reported that political instability in the country strengthened the influence of militant groups, and that “Islamic militant influence has managed to erode much of the peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Christians.” Open Doors also reported that between October 2022 and September 2023, 31 Christians were killed for their faith and thousands were displaced due to the insecurity in the country.

In January, members of an armed group killed a Catholic priest in Soroni in Sourou Province. On January 11, media reported that an armed group attacked the mosque in Mehdi Abad near Dori in Seno Province, killing nine, including the local imam, who were all from the Ahmadi Muslim community. The attackers arrived near nightfall on motorcycles, separated the women and children, and preached to the congregation to change their way of worshipping, according to media and civil society sources. The militants reportedly demanded the nine male elders of the community renounce their faith or be killed, and then killed them all when they refused. According to the Ahmadiyya representatives, the militants also warned the community not to return to the mosque, causing hundreds of villagers to flee to a nearby town for safety.

On February 26, during an attack by terrorists in the Partiaga commune in the eastern part of the country, at least 60 persons were killed, including some participating in the Sunday Mass. “Even Christians who were at their places of worship in church were not spared,” residents told media during a press conference on March 1.

On May 15, terrorists attacked the village of Silmiougou in Bam Province, killing three, including the pastor of an Assembly of God church, and wounding a civilian. The attackers also burned shops, a pharmaceutical depot, and houses.

Terrorists attacked the village of Molokadou in the northern part of the country on May 25. Seven villagers were killed. The pastor of the local Apostolic church was among the victims, shot and killed in front of his wife.

In August, with organizers reportedly concerned about a possible terrorist attack, the annual Catholic commemoration of the Feast of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary again took place on the grounds of the Cathedral Church of Christ the King of the Universe of Ouahigouya and not at its usual location on the Marian hill of Saye in the suburbs of Naaba Kango. Security guards were deployed at the cathedral during the commemoration.

Following an attack, the Christian population of Debe village in Di Province on the border with Mali was forced by armed groups to leave that area in October. Most fled south toward the city of Dedougou. The attackers accused Catholic villagers of defiance when they refused to pray in their church in which militants had just killed two young men, one in front of the altar and the other in front of the statue of the Virgin Mary. The two were reportedly killed for attempting to reach Tougan, Sourou Province, in violation of the militants’ ban on travel in the area. In solidarity, Muslim residents of Debe left the village as well.

In December, suspected JNIM militants killed approximately 100 persons, including Christians, at Basse in the commune of Bekuy. The Christians were gathered in a church and shot. The same day, suspected JNIM militants killed eight others, including an imam, at Keedsom, near Boulsa in the Namentenga Province.

Anais Lankoande, the head of the Department of Spiritual Works of the Federation of Churches and Evangelical Missions, reported that between 2018 and May 2023, 1,339 churches were closed, 89 others destroyed, and approximately 10 pastors killed in terrorist attacks. Figures were not available for the number of churches closed or destroyed nor for pastors killed in 2023 alone. Two other pastors remained missing at year’s end. Lankoande said scores of pastors had been displaced by terrorists. He also said that worshippers found ways to practice their faith at home or, in some cases, had been forced to adapt to the militants’ demands.

Militant groups opposed the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), the civilian force established by the government to fight militants. The militants said they were fighting for God in a religious war and the VDPs were rejecting God’s appeal. According to the Violent Incident Database of the International Institute for Religious Freedom, on July 23, terrorists killed 16 members of the VDP in Namemtenga Province and also set fire to homes, a local market, and a motorcycle. On November 10, a terrorist group shared a video in Arabic and local languages threatening to kill civilians who joined the VDP force.

Representatives of the Catholic Church said 24 of its 224 parishes in the country had been closed since the beginning of the terrorists’ attacks in 2015. The most affected region was the Center North where eight of the 14 parishes had closed. The church did not provide figures for the number of parishes closed in 2023 alone.

According to the Ministry of Education, 6,149 schools were closed as of May due to militant attacks, depriving more than one million students of access to education. The ministry did not provide a breakdown of how many of those schools were Muslim or Christian, or how many schools were closed during the entire year. The Boucle du Mouhoun, Sahel, and East Regions, where more than 1,000 schools were closed, were most affected. In response, the ministry reopened more than 500 schools during the year and relocated approximately 400 schools as of May.