Proactively investigate and prosecute officials allegedly complicit in facilitating trafficking, and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, which should involve significant prison terms. * Increase efforts to identify and protect trafficking victims exploited in neighboring countries in forced labor in online scam operations arriving in or transiting Thailand; cease placing victims in immigration detention centers and ensure victims are not inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. * Fully implement the NRM and the reflection period for victims in all provinces and open remaining victim identification centers. * Use victim-centered and trauma-informed approaches, including during multidisciplinary team (MDT) interviews and labor inspections; include NGO representation in MDTs as a standard practice to support these efforts. * Enforce worker protections in the fishing industry and other commercial sectors, including electronic pay options and bans on transfers-at-sea. * Deconflict Ministry of Labor (MOL) and Ministry of Social Development and Human Security (MSDHS) forced labor and trafficking screening forms into one comprehensive set of guidance and train all front-line officials. * Increase the use and availability of interpreters to assist victims, including in shelters and court proceedings. * Train officials on and ensure effective implementation of Section 6/1 of the anti-trafficking law and identification of labor trafficking victims. * Increase the ability of victims, especially adults, to move freely in and out of shelters and access communication devices regularly. * Ensure government- and NGO-operated shelters provide victims with adequate trauma-informed and individualized care, such as legal assistance and psychological care, and implement consistent policies on victim services across all shelters. * Ensure labor violations and migrant workers’ complaints that include indicators of forced labor are investigated for trafficking crimes, including by enforcing procedures for labor officials to refer potential cases of labor trafficking to MDTs and law enforcement. * Increase awareness among relevant officials of trafficking indicators such as debt-based coercion, excessive overtime, confiscation of documents, and non-payment of wages. * Review and reduce unnecessary barriers for NGOs to establish shelters for trafficking victims, especially in regions along border towns and outside of Bangkok.

The government increased law enforcement efforts. Section 6 of the 2008 anti-trafficking law, as amended, criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of four to 12 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 400,000 baht to 1.2 million baht ($11,650 to $34,950) for offenses involving an adult victim and six to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 600,000 baht to 2 million baht ($17,480 to $58,260) for those involving a child victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. An amendment to the 2008 anti-trafficking law in 2019 included a separate provision under section 6/1, specifically addressing “forced labor or services,” which prescribed penalties of six months’ to four years’ imprisonment, a fine of 50,000 baht to 400,000 baht ($1,460 to $11,650) per victim, or both. This provision prescribed significantly lower penalties for labor trafficking crimes than those already available under the existing human trafficking provision of the law.

In 2023, the government reported investigating 312 trafficking cases (253 cases in 2022), prosecuting 542 suspected traffickers (308 in 2022), and convicting 211 traffickers (249 in 2022). Courts sentenced 293 convicted traffickers in 2023, with approximately 95 percent sentenced to two or more years’ imprisonment and 37 percent sentenced to 10 or more years’ imprisonment. In 2023, courts issued forfeiture orders for assets valued at approximately 31.84 million baht ($927,470) in trafficking cases litigated by the Anti-Money Laundering Office. The Thai Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force investigated 99 cases of Internet-facilitated child trafficking in 2023 (41 in 2022). Officials initiated investigations of 15 cases of suspected labor trafficking, compared with 47 labor trafficking investigations in 2022.

The government operated specialized anti-trafficking divisions in the Bangkok Criminal Court, the Office of the Attorney General (OAG), the Department of Special Investigation (DSI), and the Royal Thai Police (RTP). Thai authorities continued to share information and evidence with foreign governments, including in four investigations that remained ongoing at the end of the reporting period. The RTP met with law enforcement officials from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Burma in Tak Province to improve cooperation on efforts to combat trafficking, including forced labor and forced criminality in online scam operations. The government collaborated with Malaysian authorities to extradite four Thai nationals charged with trafficking crimes in Malaysia. The government also initiated development of a Transnational Referral Mechanism in collaboration with regional foreign governments to improve coordination and victim assistance across country borders; the mechanism remained in progress at the end of the reporting period.

NGOs assessed officials did not effectively identify labor trafficking cases; this likely stemmed in large part from a lack of understanding of forced labor among officials, corruption, and officials being deterred by lengthy court processes for these cases. Some observers reported officials often did not identify debt-based coercion, excessive overtime, or withholding of wages as indicators of labor trafficking. In some cases, officials encouraged potential victims to accept mediation with their employer or pursue their cases as labor law violations, rather than recognizing them as trafficking victims and recommending criminal prosecutions against the traffickers. Law enforcement often used the results of victim identification interviews as the final determination of whether a trafficking case existed; observers reported these interviews were sometimes ineffective. In some provinces local officials lacked the capacity to effectively investigate trafficking, and some officials were reluctant to identify cases out of fear it would negatively impact perceptions of Thailand; in addition, some provincial governments continued to set “zero tolerance” polices for trafficking, which contributed to a reluctance to investigate cases and identify victims.

Prosecutors worked with NGOs to prepare victims to testify, courts allowed NGO lawyers to serve as co-plaintiffs in some cases to legally support victims, and government shelters enabled victims to participate in mock courts to prepare them for participation in proceedings against traffickers. The OAG established a Witness Assistance Service in 2023 to provide increased support to victims and witnesses before and during criminal proceedings; it reported providing services to 33 trafficking victims and witnesses and prepared an additional 26 victims and witnesses for court proceedings. Nonetheless, some NGOs reported little support from the government when navigating a difficult legal process to assist victims. MSDHS also aided victims who were unable to participate in proceedings in person to prepare impact statements in lieu of testimony and reported two victims utilized this option. Fear of detention and extended shelter stays, a lack of adequate services, and retaliation from traffickers made some victims reluctant to participate in prosecutions. In some cases, courts did not provide adequate accommodations for victims to participate in trials. Some migrant victims could not fully participate in legal proceedings because of a lack of interpreters. Observers reported some judges showed improved efforts during the reporting period to deploy trauma-informed and victim-centered engagement in courtrooms, while other judges and court officials lacked sufficient understanding of trauma-informed care, potentially leading to victim retraumatization. The trafficking division of the criminal court did not require trafficking trainings for judges newly assigned to the division, which may have contributed to the use of practices that were not trauma informed.

The government frequently rotated police officers with experience working trafficking cases out of their positions and replaced them with inexperienced officers. The government, often in collaboration with NGOs and international organizations, trained police, immigration officials, and labor officials on victim identification, labor trafficking, online investigative techniques, and conducting forensic interviews. In December 2023, the government co-chaired its first meeting with a foreign government donor to coordinate oversight of a new facility to provide capacity building training for law enforcement officials and to improve regional cooperation in trafficking investigations. The government solicited feedback from anti-trafficking stakeholders to develop curriculum; the trainings were not implemented during the reporting period. In collaboration with NGOs, the OAG provided anti-trafficking trainings for prosecutors on the use of trauma-informed approaches. The government also held workshops with various agencies to increase interagency collaboration. The Courts of Justice (COJ) collaborated with an international organization and a foreign government to train judges overseeing trafficking cases. The COJ also collaborated with an NGO to train interpreters working trafficking cases. The OAG’s trafficking litigation unit continued to use teams of prosecutors with experience working trafficking cases in each region to advise less experienced prosecutors and law enforcement; the government reported these teams deployed within 24 hours after an arrest to advise local officials.

Corruption and official complicity in trafficking and related crimes perpetuated human trafficking and allowed traffickers to operate with impunity. This included corrupt immigration and local law enforcement officials facilitating trafficking by accepting bribes from brokers and smugglers along Thai borders, transporting individuals across borders for illicit jobs, and bypassing visa and other immigration documentation protocols, which observers reported contributed to traffickers increasingly utilizing Thailand as a transit country to exploit victims in special economic zones (SEZs) and online scam operations in neighboring countries. An NGO reported local law enforcement officers who accepted bribes from business owners were in some cases reluctant to identify labor trafficking victims or documented labor trafficking cases as labor violations, incurring lesser charges for the alleged perpetrators.

The deputy prime minister chaired the National Committee on Prevention of Official Complicity in Human Trafficking. DSI continued to operate the Complicit Officials in Human Trafficking Monitoring and Investigation Center, which monitored and investigated suspected complicit officials. Initially implemented in the previous reporting period, DSI utilized a database of public officials who worked on trafficking cases, allowing it to monitor the progress of cases. The government reported initiating investigations of 20 officials accused of complicity in trafficking crimes in 2023 and continuing investigations into two officials from previous reporting periods; this compared with new investigations of 35 officials in 2022. The courts did not report criminal convictions or sentencing any complicit officials in 2023. The government did not report the status of prosecutions initiated in February 2023 of 107 immigration officials charged with issuance of illegal visas to PRC nationals potentially associated with online scam operations involved in forced criminality in neighboring countries.

The government increased efforts to identify and protect victims. The government identified 640 victims compared with approximately 444 victims identified in 2022. Authorities identified 105 migrant labor trafficking victims exploited in Thailand in 2023, including at least one exploited in the fishing industry, compared with 92 migrant labor trafficking victims identified in 2022. The government reported providing services to all 640 victims (compared with 444 victims in 2022) including through the provision of shelter, reintegration support, legal assistance, financial assistance, and other support; 270 victims received assistance in government shelters, 22 victims resided in NGO-run government-registered shelters, and 348 received services outside shelters, the vast majority of whom were Thai. The 640 trafficking victims provided services included 248 men and boy victims and 392 women and girl victims; 489 Thai nationals, seven Laotian nationals, 39 Burma nationals, four Indian nationals, 33 Indonesian victims, 25 victims from other countries (Burundi, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, PRC, Rwanda, South Africa, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Uzbekistan), and 43 victims from unspecified countries; and 314 victims of sex trafficking, 309 victims of labor trafficking, and 17 victims of unspecified forms of exploitation.

The government continued to implement the NRM, finalized in 2022, which guided officials to place potential victims in a temporary shelter where they could access basic services for up to 15 days before undergoing identification interviews by MDTs. The government facilitated a subcommittee of its NRM Committee that supported oversight of victim services assistance and access to compensation, and established a task force during the reporting period to review trafficking victim cases for committee members to assess areas of improvement; survivors of trafficking participated as subcommittee members. MDTs, which included representatives from government agencies and NGOs, interviewed potential victims to formally identify trafficking victims and refer them to services. Formal identification by MDTs was necessary for victims to obtain a legal right to the full range of services available to trafficking victims, including access to the government’s trafficking shelters. After formal identification by MDTs, the government provided victims who consented to participate in legal proceedings against traffickers with services or allowed victims an additional 30 days to decide if they wished to participate in legal proceedings. Under the previously existing framework, which was still used by some officials, the anti-trafficking law permitted officials to take potential trafficking victims into the government’s custody for no more than 24 hours, or up to eight days with the permission of a court, during which MDTs conducted victim identification interviews. This process was a significant barrier for some victims who were not physically or psychologically prepared to undergo the MDT identification process to obtain services. Some front-line and provincial officials reported concerns that higher victim identification numbers would reflect poorly on them likely hindering effective victim identification efforts, especially in labor sectors.

The government reported establishing 13 victim identification centers where potential victims could receive services during their reflection periods; the centers assisted 759 potential victims (132 children and 633 adults; 354 Thai nationals and 411 foreign nationals, including 309 Burmese nationals). The government, in collaboration with civil society organizations, trained officials from relevant agencies on the NRM. Despite these trainings, civil society reported implementation of the NRM was inconsistently applied, especially in provincial areas along the northern border; some officials remained unsure how to implement it and the government did not allocate sufficient resources to ensure its effective implementation throughout the country or provide sufficient training to labor inspectors on it. The government implemented SOPs for the identification of labor trafficking victims according to the 2019 forced labor amendment of the trafficking law (section 6/1). The government reported conducting more than 2,130 initial screenings utilizing these SOPs and identified 112 potential victims in 2023, all of whom entered the NRM process; officials referred potential victims to MDTs for formal identification interviews, in accordance with the SOPs. The MOL finalized efforts to assess and revise the SOPs, with an NGO; however, many local officials did not receive sufficient training on their use.

Some officials lacked an understanding of trafficking and did not effectively implement identification procedures consistently throughout the country. Some officials concluded if individuals originally consented to come to Thailand to work, including outside regular migration channels or to take illicit jobs knowingly or unknowingly, they could not be trafficking victims. The government required immigration officials be present for MDT interviews involving migrants, which likely deterred some from recounting their experiences, fearing deportation or detention. There were reports that authorities discouraged MDTs from changing their assessments after a second victim interview. While MDTs confirmed trafficking victims, MDT personnel, which sometimes included local police officers, provincial MSDHS staff, and local labor officials, at times lacked sufficient experience with trafficking victims. To address gaps in victim identification among provincial level officials, the government continued to send teams to support less experienced MDTs in the identification process.

DSI, with financial support from an international organization, trained officials from various agencies on screening for indicators and victim identification in labor trafficking in the fishing sector. Labor inspectors and members of the Royal Thai Navy screened migrant workers for trafficking during inspections, including during inspections of fishing vessels. However, due to inconsistent and ineffective interviewing practices during inspections, many labor trafficking victims remained unidentified. Observers also reported labor inspectors did not understand their role included identifying trafficking victims. NGOs reported assisting trafficking victims on fishing vessels that underwent inspections, but whom authorities did not identify as victims.

The law only protected victims from prosecution for unlawful immigration acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked; due to incomplete implementation of victim identification procedures, authorities likely penalized trafficking victims for immigration violations and other criminal acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Officials did not consistently screen undocumented migrants for trafficking, particularly those fleeing political instability in Burma, those in immigration detention centers, or those fleeing online scam operations in neighboring countries, which left many unidentified victims detained and without services. Some undocumented foreign victims likely did not report their exploitation to authorities because of fears of arrest and deportation; other undocumented foreign victims preferred to go through the deportation process instead of entering the NRM due to the long wait times in the latter to repatriate to their home country.

Some officials also reportedly lacked understanding of forced labor in online scam operations and stated those exploited could not be trafficking victims, despite widespread reports indicating most individuals recruited for these operations faced conditions indicative of forced labor. Although the RTP and Thai embassies in Burma, Cambodia, and the Philippines, worked to facilitate the repatriation of Thai victims of forced labor in online scam operations, the government charged victims with criminal violations related to the scamming activities traffickers forced them to commit.

The government continued to refer victims formally identified by MDTs to government-operated shelters where they had access to counseling, legal assistance, medical care, civil compensation, financial aid, witness protection, education or vocational trainings, and employment opportunities. While the MSDHS reported providing some services to victims who did not agree to participate in the prosecution process, authorities often made the provision of many services contingent upon victims’ willingness to participate in law enforcement investigations. The MSDHS operated 77 short-stay shelters and nine long-term regional trafficking shelters for victims, including four dedicated to men and families, four for women and girls, and one for boys. The government typically only permitted foreign victims who held a valid visa or work permit at the time of their formal identification to stay outside government shelters during legal proceedings against traffickers. Shelters continued to partner with companies to provide victims opportunities to work outside shelters; MSDHS signed MOUs with 13 companies in 2023 to employ adult survivors of trafficking looking for employment; the government did not report how many adult survivors received outside employment. Authorities sometimes required undocumented foreign victims to remain in government shelters while the government processed applications for permits to temporarily stay and work in Thailand.

MSDHS trafficking shelters did not allow some victims, including adults and those with temporary stay permits, to leave without permission, which authorities determined on a case-by-case basis; only victims who received permission to work outside shelters could leave the shelter on a regular basis for work. Authorities often required victims to stay in shelters until the completion of proceedings or until an advanced stage of providing testimony against traffickers, even in cases in which they were physically and psychologically ready to exit the shelter system. In addition, shelter staff sometimes restricted victims’ access to personal cell phones, particularly at the beginning of shelter stays, sometimes required victims obtain permission to make personal phone calls, and often monitored their calls. MSDHS held workshops to train shelter officials on how to develop guidelines appropriate for each shelter on victims’ freedom of movement and access to communication devices and finalized the guidelines. MSDHS developed new SOPs for service providers delivering services to victims who did not wish to reside in shelter and new Standards of Care for TIP Shelters, which incorporated input from survivors of trafficking. In practice, MSDHS implemented different policies for different shelters and among different populations regarding victims’ communication and freedom of movement. Officials said these measures were taken to ensure victims’ safety and to prevent re-victimization; however, requiring victims to remain in shelters longer than necessary, combined with restrictions on movement and communication during shelter stays, may have contributed to some victims’ re-traumatization and inhibited their ability to earn an income. An open-concept shelter developed with an NGO in 2021 opened and registered with the Thai government.

For some foreign victims the government did not identify suitable employment opportunities, and some shelter officials cited fear victims would “flee” shelters as a rationale for restricting their freedom of movement. The required shelter stays continued to deter foreign victims from cooperating with law enforcement, with some preferring to be deported to their home countries instead. The government reported permitting victims to choose whether to stay at a government-run or one of the three government-registered NGO shelters; victims often preferred to stay at the NGO shelters over government-operated shelters in part because of more freedom of movement. Victims using the NGO shelters could still obtain compensation from the government’s anti-trafficking fund; however, the government did not provide additional funding to support the operation of these shelters. Strict government requirements for NGO-operated shelters to assist formally identified victims made it challenging for additional NGOs to operate shelters. Although the government reportedly improved its engagement with NGOs, in practice, government officials did not take meaningful steps to work with these organizations to protect victims or otherwise support the government’s anti-trafficking efforts.

MSDHS shelters employed inconsistent policies and provision of care to victims. Government shelters often lacked adequate numbers of psychologists and staff trained on trauma-informed care, inhibiting victims from obtaining psycho-social care. The MSDHS reported all shelters had the capacity to provide temporary accommodations to LGBTQI+ victims, and one shelter could provide long-term accommodations; however, the long-term shelter did not provide separate bedrooms and restroom facilities for LGBTQI+ victims. In addition, aspects of the identification process made it difficult for LGBTQI+ victims to express their gender preferences, and authorities often did not ask victims their shelter preferences. MSDHS did not equip its shelters to provide adequate accommodations for victims with disabilities. Although MSDHS reported it worked with the National Interpreter Association to increase the number of interpreters available to assist shelters, an ongoing lack of interpreters weakened shelter capacity to provide services to victims. NGOs reported interpreters who participated in victim identification interviews and in court proceedings lacked training in trafficking cases. MSDHS collaborated with an NGO to develop a training course for MSDHS officials on trauma-informed care and trained social workers, psychologists, and attorneys on trauma-informed care. The law permitted foreign trafficking victims and witnesses to stay and work in Thailand for up to two years upon the completion of legal proceedings against traffickers; the government did not report extending this benefit to any victims. NGOs reported the inability to stay in Thailand beyond the two years meant many trafficking victims did not want to be identified by authorities because it would result in their repatriation after participating in legal proceedings against traffickers.

In 2023, the government provided 2.67 million baht ($77,780) to trafficking victims from its anti-trafficking fund (compared with 4.96 million baht, or $144,480, in 2022), including 1.49 million baht ($43,400) that went to victims residing outside government- or NGO-operated shelters, for living expenses, payments for work inside shelters, education, medical care, repatriation, and other expenses. NGOs reported the process for victims to access this fund was complex, which likely prevented some victims from obtaining necessary monetary support. The government operated an online platform for victims to submit requests for compensation from the trafficking fund. The government’s requirement that victims stay in shelters during the legal process resulted in some victims, especially sex trafficking victims who were women and girls, choosing to forgo their rights to compensation to minimize time in shelters. The law obligated prosecutors to file restitution claims when a victim expressed intention to make a claim. The Human Trafficking Criminal Procedures Act allowed judges to award compensation or restitution to victims, including in the absence of a victim request for these funds. The law allowed the government to use assets seized from traffickers to compensate victims. The government reported courts ordered 76.68 million baht ($2.23 million) in restitution for victims across 100 cases, an increase compared with 66.6 million baht ($1.94 million) in 2022. MSDHS provided legal assistance to victims to file compensation claims and ensure enforcement of orders; however, only two cases resulted in the successful execution of restitution orders.

Criminal defamation laws continued to allow companies to pursue criminal charges against potential victims, advocates, and government officials investigating cases, sometimes through strategic lawsuits against public participation, which resulted in advocates facing years of legal harassment. Observers reported criminal charges for defamation could be brought even if the trafficking case led to a guilty verdict; these types of cases deterred advocates and victims from reporting exploitation.

The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The Deputy Prime Minister, who also served as the Minister of Natural Resources and Environment, directed the National Anti-Trafficking in Persons Committee and the Coordinating and Monitoring of Anti-Trafficking in Persons Performance Committee, which met three times. The government continued to monitor progress to combat trafficking through data collection and annual reports to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet; the government finalized the 2024 report in Thai and English but did not make it publicly available by the end of the reporting period. In 2023, the government allocated approximately 110.1 million baht ($3.2 million) toward its prevention and suppression of trafficking budget, compared with approximately 441.7 million baht ($12.9 million) in 2022. Government agencies conducted numerous anti-trafficking awareness and prevention campaigns, including through awareness trainings aimed to prevent child sex trafficking and online child sexual exploitation. The government sought input from survivors. The Ministry of Tourism (MOT) took some steps to reduce demand for extraterritorial child commercial sexual exploitation and abuse. In 2023, the MOT signed MOUs with other government agencies, the private sector, and civil society organizations to implement a project in hotels to identify and prevent domestic and extraterritorial child commercial sexual exploitation and abuse in the tourism sector. The government did not report any updates to a draft law reported in the previous period seeking to increase regulations on NGOs in Thailand that would, if enacted, negatively impact NGOs’ ability to conduct anti-trafficking work in Thailand.

MSDHS operated a mobile application for trafficking victims and witnesses to report exploitation and request protective services, including interpretation, and it provided information on the rights of trafficking victims in seven languages; the government did not report the number of potential trafficking cases reported through this application in 2023, compared with 19 in 2022. MSDHS and MOL operated hotlines with operators fluent in 19 foreign languages. In 2023, the MSDHS trafficking hotline received calls related to 71 possible trafficking cases, which were referred to relevant agencies for investigation and identification (compared with 331 cases in 2022); the government did not report whether these calls resulted in any victim identifications. The law permitted recruitment agencies to charge recruitment fees to Thais seeking overseas employment. Fees charged by unscrupulous recruitment agencies made workers vulnerable to debt-based coercion. In fiscal year 2023, the Department of Employment (DOE) conducted 181 inspections of employment agencies that recruited Thai workers for overseas employment but did not find any unlawful practices. The DOE charged 301 individuals in 341 cases of recruiting workers without a license and labor fraud. The MOL and the RTP collaborated to investigate unauthorized online advertisements for jobs for Thai workers overseas that involved trafficking, fraudulent employment, migrant smuggling, and commercial sex.

The government maintained bilateral MOUs with neighboring countries to recruit migrant workers to Thailand. Authorities continued to implement revised migrant worker recruitment measures developed by a working group in the previous reporting period. The complicated nature of the government’s migrant worker registration programs, including the MOU process, often resulted in workers’ and employers’ reliance on brokers who charged fees to workers, in addition to fees charged by the government, or used informal channels to bring workers to Thailand, thereby increasing their vulnerability to debt-based coercion. The government implemented programs to enable workers to stay in the country after their initial registration expired and to provide work permits to unregistered workers already in the country. The 2018 Royal Ordinance on Management of Migrant Workers required employers to provide workers a copy of their employment contracts; to cover some costs, such as recruitment fees and transportation costs; and prohibited employers from deducting more than 10 percent of workers’ monthly salaries for personal expenses and retaining travel or other personal documents. The law prescribed penalties of fines ranging from 10,000 baht to 100,000 baht ($291 to $2,910) and up to six months’ imprisonment for employers. Despite inspecting 288 migrant recruitment agencies, the government did not find any in violation of laws or regulations. MOL reported fining 360 employers a total of 2.59 million baht ($75,440), with no terms of imprisonment, for employment violations under the law in the previous reporting period. The MOL reported conduction inspections at 1,101 business establishments categorized as at-risk of child labor and forced labor and prosecuted three cases of Labor Protection Act violations. The MOL also reported conducting inspections of seasonal workers, including agricultural workers and domestic workers; no victims were identified during these inspections. The law did not prohibit employers and recruiters from charging migrant workers with some costs related to their recruitment, such as expenses for passports, medical checks, and work permits; NGOs reported authorities did not adequately define and enforce the regulations on recruitment fees, and recruitment agencies and brokers still required workers to pay recruitment fees and transportation costs. The ordinance enabled employers to retain workers’ documents if they obtained their consent and if the employer provided access to the documents; however, observers reported because enforcement was lacking, in some cases, unscrupulous employers retained workers’ documents, especially in cases in which workers were not familiar with their rights under Thai law. According to NGOs, inadequate regulation of brokers and recruitment agencies contributed to practices that facilitated trafficking. Although government regulations permitted exploited migrant workers to change employers, some policies restricted their ability to do so in practice and sometimes resulted in workers incurring additional fees when they did change employers. A lack of available interpreters also made it difficult for exploited migrant workers to report exploitation to government agencies. The Labor Protection Act excluded agricultural and domestic workers from benefits and protections, which heightened their risks to trafficking. Labor laws prevented migrant workers from forming labor unions, which, according to civil society organizations, further contributed to the vulnerability of migrant workers. Draft legislation to legalize collective bargaining remained pending during the reporting period.

A lack of clear guidance from authorities to measure work and rest hours for workers aboard fishing vessels heightened their risk of trafficking. The Ministerial Regulations on the Protection of Labor in the Marine Fisheries required employers to provide a contract in a language migrant fishermen could understand, maintain a record of payments to workers, and provide sufficient meals and drinking water to fishermen on vessels. Regulations also required employers to pay workers’ salaries at least once per month through electronic deposits and to share catch profits. However, concerns remained that some workers were still paid in cash, were unable to access their funds because of a lack of cash machines near some ports, or were not sufficiently trained on how to use the system, and vessel owners, captains, or brokers withheld workers’ bank cards and security codes. During the reporting period, civil society raised serious concerns over draft legislation that would decrease worker protections in the fishing industry, including by permitting transfers at sea and reinstating cash-based wage payments, therefore increasing labor trafficking risks; the draft legislation remained pending at the end of the reporting period.

MOL worked with NGOs to provide services, including receiving complaints of labor violations, assisting workers in changing employers, and updating workers’ registration documents, at 10 migrant worker assistance centers. The government reported continued efforts from MOL’s Anti-Labor Trafficking Ad Hoc Working Group, which inspected employers and workplaces with high risks of trafficking; however, investigations did not lead to any trafficking prosecutions during the reporting period. MOL conducted inspections at high-risk workplaces, seafood processing facilities, and fishing vessels and found 6,795 violations of labor laws. The MOL inspected 55,028 workplaces for unregistered migrant workers and identified 1,093 employers in violation of labor laws; the MOL referred 733 of these cases for further investigation. Observers reported labor inspectors were sometimes deterred from completing inspections when companies had influential owners and inspectors minimally interacted with workers, often because of language barriers, which prevented them from identifying indicators of trafficking. While government officials reported screening 33,563 registered fisheries for indicators of forced labor, no victims were identified. The government operated inspection centers at ports to verify whether fishing vessels were operating legally and reported identifying 30 vessels in violation of the law and regulations. Some officials reportedly did not follow existing procedures, and at-port labor inspections continued to be inconsistent and ineffective at identifying potential cases of forced labor on fishing vessels, often because of a lack of victim-centered interview practices. Observers indicated some vessel owners and other workplaces received advance warning of labor inspections; observers also noted an absence of interpreters available to assist workers during inspections, and employers, including vessel captains, were present during inspections, which likely deterred workers from reporting their exploitation to authorities. Observers reported some labor inspectors instructed interpreters not to translate reports from workers that included indicators of forced labor, such as excessive working hours or wage violations. Interpreters working on cases reported they did not always have awareness of labor trafficking indicators during initial engagement with potential victims and were prohibited from supporting a second interview, leaving some trafficking victims unidentified. Several NGOs reported some victims did not have access to interpreters who spoke their language or dialect, leaving them unidentified. The government finalized amendments to the Port-In Port-Out Control Center Manual, which included guidance on how to handle reports of missing fishermen and updated worker inspection details. In practice, at-port inspection centers did not universally apply a standardized procedure for referring cases of fishermen who went missing at sea, including identifying indicators of trafficking on the vessels in which they went missing. The government conducted at-sea inspections of 258 vessels but did not identify any violations. At-sea inspections did not include sufficient checks for labor violations or consistently have interpreters available for interviewing foreign crewmembers. The government has never reported identifying trafficking victims as a result of labor inspections of fishing vessels. The government made efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts, including coordinating with foreign governments to deny entry to known sex offenders and increasing arrests of individuals involved in child commercial sexual exploitation and trafficking (197 individuals arrested in 2023 compared with 67 individuals arrested in 2022).

As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Thailand, and traffickers exploit Thai victims abroad. Labor and sex traffickers exploit women, men, LGBTQI+ individuals, and children from Thailand, other Southeast Asian countries, Sri Lanka, Russia, Uzbekistan, and increasingly some Northern African and Sub-Saharan African countries, including Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, in Thailand. Members of ethnic minorities, highland persons, and stateless persons in Thailand experience instances of abuse indicative of trafficking. Children from Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, and Laos are increasingly victims of sex trafficking in brothels, massage parlors, bars, karaoke lounges, hotels, and private residences. Traffickers induce Thai children to perform sex acts through videos and photos on the Internet, sometimes by blackmailing victims with explicit images. Children are lured by traffickers into commercial sex through the Internet, chat and dating applications, as well as other social networking platforms. Children in orphanages are at risk of trafficking. Children of families that lost employment because of the impacts of the pandemic, including among migrant families, were increasingly at risk of trafficking. Children increasingly fleeing political instability and violence in neighboring countries are at increased risk of being exploited in dangerous and illegal labor situations, particularly in border provinces and areas where seasonal and informal work is common. Approximately 158,000 Thai children of legal working age – 15 to 18 years old – are involved in child labor, including in agriculture, auto repair and other service trades, construction, manufacturing, and in the hospitality industry, and were at risk of forced labor. More than half of these children are not in school, many work in hazardous conditions with long and irregular working hours, and most are at risk of trafficking. Some brokers or parents force children from Thailand, Cambodia, and Burma to sell flowers or other items on the streets, to beg, or to work in domestic service in urban areas. Elderly persons and persons with disabilities from Cambodia are forced to beg in Thailand. There are reports separatist groups in Southern Thailand recruit and use children for insurgent activities.

Traffickers subject Thai nationals to forced labor and sex trafficking in countries in North America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Thai women and LGBTQI+ individuals are exploited in Switzerland in sex trafficking. Thai citizens who travel to Norway for family reunification are at risk of sex and labor trafficking. Traffickers subject some Thai men and women to forced labor in Israel’s agricultural sector, imposing conditions of long working hours, no breaks or rest days, withheld passports, and difficulty changing employers because of limitations on work permits. More than 100,000 Thais work in the Republic of Korea, where traffickers subject Thai men and women to forced labor and sex trafficking, including forcing victims who owe debts to entertainment establishment owners or loan sharks into commercial sex. Traffickers in Sweden and Finland exploit Thais in forced labor for berry picking.

Criminal syndicates and traffickers run and facilitate online scam operations primarily in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, and the Philippines, often in SEZs, where they exploit victims in forced labor, forced criminality, and sex trafficking. Traffickers often use Thailand as a transit country by recruiting workers from numerous countries with false promises of high paying jobs in Thailand, then transport them to neighboring countries where these operations are located and force them to conduct illicit online scams, often through physical violence. Thai victims are also exploited in these operations in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Thai children are at risk of forced labor in SEZs where criminal activity is widespread.

Smugglers, brokers, employers, and others exploit Thai and migrant workers in labor trafficking in commercial fishing and related industries, the poultry industry, manufacturing, construction, garment, agriculture, domestic work, and street begging. NGOs reported a significant prevalence of forced labor in the production of ethanol, sugar cane, palm oil, and rubber. Burmese nationals are increasingly vulnerable to human trafficking crimes in Thailand. Ongoing civil unrest, conflict, economic hardship, and the anticipated enforcement of Burma’s conscription law increased the number of civilians migrating to Thailand. These migrants, as well as migrant workers from other countries seeking employment in Thailand, are at risk for trafficking in Thailand. This increased migration coincides with an increase of informal broker networks operating between Thailand and Burma, which recruit migrants for work in various sectors, including in garment factories and on fishing vessels.

Many workers pay fees to brokers, recruitment agencies, and others before and after they arrive in Thailand. Traffickers often use debt-based coercion, deceptive recruitment practices, retention of identity documents and bank cards, illegal wage deductions, physical violence, and other means to subject victims to forced labor. Employers confiscate workers’ identity documents to compel workers to remain in their jobs, often in addition to paying less than the minimum wage and failing to provide workers a day off. Workers in the seafood processing and fishing sectors increasingly faced forced overtime because of an increasing demand for shelf-stable seafood during the COVID-19 pandemic as well as unsafe working conditions.

Vessel owners, brokers, and senior vessel crew subject Thai, Burmese, Cambodian, Vietnamese, and Indonesian men and boys to forced labor on Thai and foreign-owned fishing boats. Some are paid little or irregularly, sometimes as infrequently as once a year, incur debts from brokers and employers, work as much as 18 to 20 hours per day for seven days a week, and are without adequate food, water, or medical supplies. Some boat captains threaten, beat, and drug fishermen to work longer and sell fishermen drugs as a means to generate additional debt. Vessel owners confiscate the identity documents of fishermen without their consent. Some trafficking victims in the fishing sector had difficulty returning home because of isolated workplaces, unpaid wages, and a lack of legitimate identity documents or safe means to travel. Employers in fishing and seafood processing often made confusing wage deductions for documentation fees, advances, and other charges, making it difficult for workers to account for their wages accurately. Research published in 2019 and 2020 found between 14 and 18 percent of migrant fishermen were exploited in forced labor in the Thai fishing industry, indicating traffickers exploited thousands of workers on fishing vessels.

Corruption continues to undermine anti-trafficking efforts. Some government officials are directly complicit in trafficking crimes, including through accepting bribes or loans from business owners and brothels that exploit victims. Corrupt immigration officials facilitate trafficking by accepting bribes from brokers and smugglers along Thai borders. Observers reported this contributed to the increasing trend of traffickers utilizing Thailand as a transit country to exploit victims in SEZs and online scam operations in neighboring countries. Credible reports indicate some corrupt officials protect brothels, other commercial sex venues, factory owners, agriculture business owners, and fishing vessel owners from law enforcement actions, inspections, and prosecutions and collude with traffickers. Some local police reportedly withhold information from prosecutors to protect traffickers. Some government officials profit from bribes and direct involvement in extortion from and exploitation of migrants.