Ensure police, immigration, labor, and other relevant officials use the victim identification index and proactively identify trafficking victims by screening for trafficking indicators among vulnerable populations, including individuals involved in commercial sex, individuals with disabilities, fishermen, unhoused individuals, and foreign migrant workers, and refer them to care. * Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, particularly of labor trafficking, including of forced labor on ROK-flagged fishing vessels, and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, which should involve significant prison terms. * Increase the availability and improve the quality of specialized protection services – including short-term shelter, long-term housing, counseling, and medical care – for all trafficking victims, particularly male, child, foreign, and disabled victims, by partnering with and allocating sufficient funding to civil society service providers. * Amend the definition of trafficking under the Criminal Act to be consistent with the definition of trafficking under the 2000 UN TIP Protocol and the newly enacted Prevention of Trafficking in Persons, Etc. and Victim Protection Act. * Increase and enforce protections for migrant fishermen, including by enforcing prohibitions against document confiscation through a more consistent system for inspecting the labor conditions of distant water fishing vessels. * Ensure victims are not inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked and improve coordination between police and immigration authorities in cases involving foreign victims. * Institutionalize and expand anti-trafficking training for front-line officials on the indicators of trafficking, victim-centered and trauma-informed trafficking investigations, and the victim identification index. * Amend the victim identification index to include measures to screen for trafficking indicators, including debt bondage, among labor trafficking victims. * Expand efforts to raise awareness on all forms of human trafficking, particularly among employers and labor recruiters and vulnerable populations, including individuals in commercial sex and foreign migrant workers. * Train law enforcement officials, prosecutors, judicial officials, and social service providers to better understand trafficking as defined by international law. * Increase cooperation with civil society organizations on anti-trafficking efforts, including on efforts to identify and protect trafficking victims. * Take steps to eliminate recruitment and/or placement fees charged to workers by labor recruiters in the ROK and workers’ home countries and ensure any recruitment fees are paid by employers.

The government increased its law enforcement efforts. Various articles under Chapter 31 of the Criminal Act, when read together, criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to 15 years’ imprisonment for trafficking crimes, which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with the definition of trafficking under international law, Article 289 (“trafficking in persons”) limited the definition of trafficking to require the buying or selling of another for exploitation and did not include a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion as an essential element of the crime. However, Articles 288 (“kidnapping, abduction, etc. for the purpose of indecent acts, etc.”) and 292 (“receiving, harboring, etc. of person kidnapped, abducted, trafficked or transported”) could apply to trafficking crimes not covered under Article 289. Similarly, Article 12 of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles Against Sexual Abuse incorrectly defined child sex trafficking to require transnational movement of the victim. However, various other articles under the law could be applied to child sex trafficking crimes that did not involve such movement. The government prosecuted some trafficking crimes under other laws, including Article 7 of the Labor Standards Act, which criminalized forced labor crimes and prescribed penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine; Article 19 of the Employment Security Act, which criminalized the use of exploitative recruitment fees and prescribed penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine; and Article 17 of the Child Welfare Act, which criminalized certain forms of child sexual exploitation and prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment or a fine. The absence of a criminal offense that defined trafficking in a manner fully consistent with international law resulted in varying understanding of the crime among law enforcement and prosecutors and may have led officials to conflate trafficking with related crimes such as commercial sex, kidnapping, domestic violence, and other forms of sexual abuse. The Prevention of Trafficking in Persons, etc. and Victim Protection Act (Prevention and Protection Act) which came into effect in 2023, included a definition of trafficking in persons that aligned more closely with the international definition of trafficking in relation to the government’s protection and prevention efforts; however, the law did not amend the definition of trafficking within Chapter 31 of the Crimes Act or change the existing criminal provisions predominantly used to prosecute trafficking crimes.

While the government maintained general statistics on victims and offenders across all subsections of the criminal code, it did not adequately distinguish trafficking cases from related crimes such as sexual assault, statutory rape, and commercial sex. This made it difficult to determine which law enforcement actions reported by the government involved human trafficking as defined by international law. The government reported investigating 680 cases – including 593 cases investigated by the Korean National Police Agency (KNPA), 87 forced labor cases investigated by the Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL), one forced labor case investigated by the Korea Coast Guard (KCG), one forced labor case investigated by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF), and one unspecified exploitation case investigated by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) – compared with investigating 509 cases in the previous reporting period, including 429 cases investigated by the KNPA and 80 forced labor cases investigated by the MOEL. The government initiated prosecutions of 593 suspects (402 in 2022), including 391 prosecutions of traffickers who purchased commercial sex acts from children (274 in 2022). Courts convicted 485 offenders (425 in 2022) for crimes related to trafficking, including 320 convictions of traffickers who purchased commercial sex acts from children (267 in 2022) and 33 labor trafficking convictions under Article 7 of the Labor Standards Act (two in 2022). Some of the investigations, prosecutions, and convictions may not have been trafficking crimes according to the definition under international law. Courts reported sentencing 126 traffickers to at least one year imprisonment, compared with 170 in 2022. Courts sentenced a majority of those convicted for trafficking crimes to less than one years’ imprisonment, suspended terms of imprisonment, or fines. Courts sentenced 35 percent of those convicted of trafficking crimes to at least one years’ imprisonment. In comparison with other grave crimes, 41.2 percent and 27.5 percent of individuals convicted of rape and kidnapping, respectively, were sentenced to one year or longer in prison. This practice weakened deterrence, potentially undercut efforts of police and prosecutors, and may have created security and safety concerns, particularly for victims who cooperated with investigations and prosecutions. Reports in recent years indicated officials treated some potential labor trafficking cases as administrative labor violations. Officials sometimes did not prosecute cases involving debt-based coercion of foreign victims due to a perceived lack of jurisdiction over recruitment that generally originated in a victim’s home country. The government has never prosecuted a case of human trafficking in the distant water fishing sector; one NGO attributed this to a lack of inspection capacity. In January 2024, the government initiated prosecution of a local council government official for alleged complicity in sex trafficking; the Democratic Party expelled the council member and the prosecution remained ongoing at the end of the reporting period. The government did not report updates to an investigation of a local police officer or a prosecution of another local police officer, initiated in 2022, for alleged complicity in separate trafficking-related crimes.

In May 2023, the Ministry of Justice established the Drug and Organized Crime Division (the Division) in the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office; the Division coordinated trafficking investigations and prosecutions, among other crimes. MOEL was the lead investigative agency for labor trafficking crimes. The government trained law enforcement officials, prosecutors, labor inspectors, and government social workers on various anti-trafficking topics, including the victim identification index and victim support. In addition, the government trained immigration officers on victim-centered approaches for working with trafficking victims. The government collaborated with foreign counterparts on extraditions and joined a judicial cooperation network of Southeast Asian countries, which aimed to strengthen international cooperation on transnational crimes, including human trafficking.

The government increased efforts to identify and protect trafficking victims. The government reported screening 1,432 individuals – 59 Koreans and 1,373 foreign nationals – using its victim identification index, which included victim identification and referral SOPs, developed in the previous reporting period. Out of these screenings, the government identified 55 potential trafficking victims – 35 for sex trafficking and 20 for labor trafficking – compared with identifying 12 trafficking victims from January to March 2023. For the second consecutive year, MOEL did not identify any labor trafficking victims. This was the first reporting period the government provided full-year victim identification data; in January 2023, the government, as a result of the Prevention and Protection Act, began collecting statistics on trafficking victims identified at 61 crime support centers. The KNPA, Korea Immigration Service, MOGEF, and MOJ all distributed guidelines for using the victim identification index to their respective agencies; the government sought input on the guidelines from a sexual exploitation focused NGO coalition, which may have included sex trafficking victims. The government required all government officials who used the victim identification index to receive education on it. An NGO asserted the victim identification index did not contain adequate measures to screen for trafficking indicators among labor trafficking victims. In November and December 2023, MOJ, MOEL, and MOGEF officials screened entertainment visa holders for sex trafficking using the victim identification index; however, authorities did not identify any trafficking victims through these efforts. Despite reports of forced labor and multiple trafficking indicators among foreign workers in South Korea under the auspices of the SWP and EPS, authorities did not report proactively screening such workers for trafficking indicators. In June 2023, the KNPA published a guidebook, available in seven languages, on trafficking victims’ rights and support services available; authorities reportedly provided the guidebook to all potential trafficking victims. Despite NGO concerns that traffickers exploited migrant workers in the fishing sector, the government did not identify any migrant fishermen exploited in labor trafficking. NGOs reported law enforcement often did not take steps to proactively identify victims and failed to identify many victims.

The KNPA was responsible for guiding all victims of crime, including trafficking victims, from the initial point of contact with law enforcement to protection and support systems. Some authorities reportedly only referred victims to services in extreme cases, and some victims did not receive timely support. Although the government took steps to seek input from civil society organizations on anti-trafficking policies, it did not adequately collaborate with these organizations to identify and protect victims. The government referred 38 potential victims to protection services, compared with providing financial support and counseling services to 12 trafficking victims and referring eight individuals identified during law enforcement actions on commercial sex establishments to support services operated or funded by MOGEF in the previous reporting period. The government reported providing accommodation, financial support, legal assistance, and/or employment training to the 38 potential victims through the various government-run facilities. In addition, MOGEF reported providing work permits to two labor trafficking victims.

The government did not allocate funding specifically for trafficking protection services. However, the national government reported allocating 64.405 billion KRW ($49.572 million) to MOGEF, 82.672 billion KRW ($63.632 million) to MOJ, and 995 million KRW ($766,844) to MOF for protection and assistance funding for victims of crime, including trafficking victims; the government did not report how much it allocated for protection and assistance in the previous reporting period. In January 2024, the KCG established a victim protection fund to provide temporary accommodation for victims of crime, including trafficking victims. MOGEF operated multiple types of support centers nationwide, including more than 100 facilities that provided protection services, including counseling services, psycho-social support, shelter, education, and recovery support, to victims of crime, including trafficking victims. MOGEF also operated 33 support facilities and nine counseling centers specifically for migrant women and children who were victims of domestic violence, sexual violence, and commercial sex. In these centers, MOGEF could provide health care, legal assistance, accommodation, job training, and other services. In addition, MOGEF provided services to 5,404 individuals across its 96 support facilities for individuals in commercial sex, compared with 5,277 individuals in 2022; the government did not report identifying any as sex trafficking victims. In the 96 support facilities, MOGEF could provide counseling, health care, legal assistance, job training, and other assistance. In addition, MOGEF provided services to 1,441 victims at 17 support centers for child sex trafficking victims, compared with 862 victims in 2022. MOGEF could provide counseling, health care, legal assistance, academic support, employment assistance, and continuing care at the 17 support centers. While the MOGEF facilities primarily served female victims of crime, the government made some services, such as counseling, medical, and legal assistance, available to male victims. The government reported seeking input from civil society, including service providers and legal experts, on operational guidelines for support programs for trafficking victims. MOJ also operated 16 facilities for victims of crime, including trafficking victims. MOJ could provide financial support, medical assistance, protective services, and legal assistance.

MOF could provide foreign seafarers with temporary accommodation during investigations and allowed victims to work on a different vessel, if requested. Trafficking victims who were foreign seafarers could receive legal assistance from the Korea Seafarer’s Welfare and Employment Center, funded by MOF. MOEL also operated 44 counseling centers for foreign workers who were victims of sexual and labor exploitation, which could include trafficking victims. In these centers, MOEL could provide interpretation, medical treatment, and counseling services to migrant workers. KNPA established its own corps of 3,375 civilian investigation interpreters for use in suspected trafficking cases; however, the KNPA did not report using the interpreters in trafficking investigations during the reporting period. NGOs reported the quality of victim care was insufficient, particularly for male, disabled, foreign, and child victims. The National Human Rights Commission of Korea reported an instance of a foreign child sex trafficking victim who was refused protection services because of her nationality; the commission recommended the government establish a plan to provide equal support to trafficking victims regardless of victims’ nationality.

The government did not require trafficking victims to participate in investigations or prosecutions in order to receive protection services; authorities reported three victims participated voluntarily. The government could provide protective measures, including protective shelter, when victims of a serious crime, including human trafficking, faced potential retaliation by the perpetrator. The government could also provide legal assistance, psychological treatment, and financial support to participating victims. The government allowed victims to provide testimony via video relay or after the alleged trafficker left the courtroom. The government provided an alternative option for trafficking victims to draft victim statements under an alias rather than speak with law enforcement officials during the investigation process. The government allowed victims with disabilities to receive assistance by a trusted individual during trial proceedings. Prosecutors could designate court-appointed lawyers to assist trafficking victims during criminal proceedings against traffickers.

The government did not provide undocumented foreign victims some services unless they cooperated with law enforcement in the investigation of traffickers. The government issued G-1 visas to foreign victims of crimes, which allowed victims to stay and work in the ROK for up to one year as long as they were cooperating in investigations and prosecutions. The Immigration Act, as amended in 2022, allowed foreign trafficking victims to extend their stay permits for the duration of criminal or civil proceedings. The government reported 65 potential foreign trafficking victims remained in the ROK on a G-1 visa at the end of the reporting period. The government only permitted foreign victims to stay in shelters for three months; however, authorities could extend this period of stay if victims participated as witnesses in ongoing trials. The lack of an option to provide foreign trafficking victims with long-term or permanent residency reportedly discouraged victims from reporting trafficking situations and participating as witnesses in investigations of traffickers. MOJ reported foreign victims of sexual violence and trafficking were exempt from immigration penalties for remaining in the country beyond the permitted period of stay; it reported nine victims benefited from this provision, compared with 13 victims in the previous reporting period.

Government officials reported courts sentenced convicted traffickers to shorter prison sentences due to a judicial culture focused on ordering restitution instead of issuing lengthy prison sentences; courts did not report ordering any traffickers to pay restitution. The government operated a victim compensation fund for victims of crime, including trafficking victims. Victims could file civil suits to receive compensation; courts granted compensation to multiple victims in a labor trafficking case initiated in a prior reporting period.

Although the law prohibited punishment for illegal acts that individuals were coerced to commit, in recent years, government officials sometimes arrested and temporarily detained victims for commercial sex crimes committed as a direct result of being trafficked. While the government required law enforcement authorities to use a victim identification index to screen individuals when arresting them for commercial sex acts, authorities did not consistently conduct screenings for indicators of trafficking when arresting individuals. In the previous reporting period, NGOs reported some instances in which authorities sought deportation of potential foreign trafficking victims without screening them for trafficking or providing services. In addition, NGOs previously reported authorities deported some foreign sex trafficking victim-witnesses who participated in prosecutions against traffickers. KNPA reportedly had a policy not to inform immigration officials of the irregular migration status of foreign victims who self-reported their exploitation to authorities; however, KNPA did not extend this policy to victims who did not self-identify or were not accompanied by legal counsel or other service providers.

The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The Policy Coordination Council on Human Trafficking (the Council) coordinated national efforts to combat human trafficking, including facilitating cooperation among 11 relevant government agencies and implementing the Comprehensive Plan for Prevention of Human Trafficking 2023-2027 (NAP); however, the Council did not meet during the reporting period. MOGEF established an internal working-level task force to coordinate anti-trafficking efforts among the 11 government agencies, including monitoring the implementation of the NAP, use of the victim identification index, planning anti-trafficking programming, and sharing information. The government allocated approximately 23.231 billion KRW ($17.88 million) towards the implementation of the NAP, including prevention efforts, victim identification and protection, and law enforcement efforts; this was the first reporting period the government provided overall dedicated funding information. The government conducted online public awareness campaigns and distributed printed awareness raising materials, developed by MOGEF, to foreign embassies, immigration offices, counseling centers for migrant women, and foreign worker support centers. The government translated the awareness raising materials in 11 languages. In addition, MOGEF provided awareness materials to marriage immigrant program participants headed to Vietnam, the Philippines, and Thailand. MOF provided online educational materials, available in Indonesian and English, for seafarers, masters, and ship owners. In recent years, anti-trafficking NGOs reported a low level of public awareness of human trafficking, as defined by international law. In January 2024, the government provided anti-trafficking training to employers of foreign seafarers, including deep-sea fishing companies and recruitment agencies. MOGEF conducted research on foreign governments’ anti-trafficking systems and cases to inform the government’s anti-trafficking efforts.

MOEL inspected workplaces, including those that employed groups at risk of trafficking, including migrants and individuals with disabilities, and prohibited the operation of unlicensed and unregistered employment agencies. In August 2023, MOEL issued guidelines for labor inspectors on victim-centered approaches when conducting investigations and included information on trafficking in training for new labor inspectors. The government had agreements with 16 countries to recruit migrant workers through its EPS, implemented by the MOEL. The government stipulated in these agreements that only public sector entities could be involved in the recruitment of workers and banned third party brokers. However, the use of third-party brokers remained a common practice in sending countries. In 2023, MOEL conducted inspections of approximately 6,397 workplaces under the EPS and identified 1,466 violations, compared with inspecting 3,221 workplaces and identifying 1,406 violations in 2022. However, MOEL did not report identifying any cases of labor trafficking. MOEL did not report conducting investigations into salt farms in 2023, compared with investigating 10 salt farms and identifying 48 cases of delayed payment of wages and non-disclosure of labor conditions in 2022. MOEL reported that it investigated 168 recruitment agencies, after which it suspended 24 businesses, issued 108 warnings, levied four administrative fines, and cancelled 32 agreements with businesses, compared with investigating 191 recruitment agencies, suspending 29 businesses, issuing 132 warnings, and cancelling 24 agreements in the previous reporting period. MOEL conducted surveys on housing conditions of foreign workers in the agriculture; the government did not report the surveys’ findings. The government asserted it permitted workers who reported exploitation or labor violations to MOEL to change their employers while MOEL investigated their claims; the government reported MOEL was required by law to move an employee within three days if a laborer alleged unsafe working conditions or abuse. However, according to NGOs, MOEL reportedly did not adequately investigate workers’ claims and some workers spent months attempting to prove their exploitation to MOEL before receiving permission to change their place of employment. In prior years, employers found guilty of exploiting their workers often only received fines or suspended sentences. NGOs reported some migrant workers experienced passport confiscation, wage withholding, and discrepancies between contracts offered by labor agents overseas and the actual job in Korea. MOJ provided training on human rights violations, including human trafficking, to some seasonal workers and local government officials. In addition, the government met with civil society and local governments on human rights violations and recruitment of seasonal workers in South Korea.

MOF labor inspectors investigated labor violations involving seafarers, including cases of human trafficking. In the previous reporting period, MOF trained 22 labor inspectors to identify trafficking; an NGO reported concern about the labor inspectors’ workload to adequately conduct field inspections of approximately 60,000 crewmembers and about the level of training the labor inspectors received to look for forced labor indicators. The MOF conducted regular labor inspections, with four inspections per year for distant water seafarers and two inspections for coastal seafarers. The government reported conducting inspections of 732 coastal fishing vessel worksites and 39 distant water fishing vessel worksites in 2023, compared with conducting on-board inspections of 139 fishing vessels in 2022. An NGO reported the government only conducted one labor inspection of a Korean distant water vessel in 2023. The government did not mandate distant water fishing vessels return to ports for routine labor inspections. NGOs reported that, unless they required maintenance, distant water vessels could avoid returning to port and many vessels remained at sea for more than a year at a time, increasing risks for forced labor. In January 2024, MOF and deep-sea fishing companies agreed that distant water fishing vessels must enter the port of call within one year of departure, beginning in 2024. In recent years, observers reported fishing vessels flagged for forced labor by foreign governments were able to enter Korean territorial waters without inspection. Civil society reported an inadequate legal framework and insufficient human and technical resources hindered authorities’ ability to monitor forced labor in their ports. MOF distributed surveys to migrant seafarers working on fishing vessels to enable workers to report abuse and disseminated information posters on reporting human rights abuses in loungers on distant water vessels; however, NGOs noted concern workers on distant water vessels often completed the surveys under the supervision of captains or other senior crewmembers, who could coerce or manipulate workers to not report exploitation on these surveys. NGOs reported the surveys did not adequately measure forced labor indicators as they did not include questions on wages being deducted or withheld, or about the worker’s recruitment process. MOF conducted outreach to foreign seafarers on social media; the government reported investigations were initiated based on reports obtained through this outreach.

MOF increased engagement with civil society on protections for foreign seafarers. In March 2024, in partnership with civil society, MOF developed an updated plan to increase protections for foreign seafarers on distant water vessels; the plan was not implemented by the end of the reporting period. However, civil society reported concern that the updated plan was not legally binding, hindering authorities’ ability to adequately enforce the policies. The government amended existing policies to protect foreign fishermen, but traffickers continued to capitalize on gaps in ROK labor laws to exploit foreign fishermen in forced labor. The Seafarers Act exempted migrant workers from the legal working and rest hours and paid holidays prescribed for ROK fishermen. In addition, while MOF agreed in 2022 to increase the minimum wage of foreign seafarers to the same minimum wage as ROK seafarers over the course of three years; the lack of a minimum wage set for foreign seafarers increased their vulnerability to trafficking. In October 2023, the government amended the Seafarers Act to prohibit physical and mental harassment of seafarers, mandate the investigation of cases of harassment, and impose penalties on violators; the government did not report investigating any cases or imposing penalties. In November 2023, MOF amended existing regulations to strengthen enforcement of local recruitment agencies imposing illegal recruitment fees or committing human rights violations. The government reported ship owners established passport management plans in November 2023 for deep-sea fishing vessels; the Korea Seafarer’s Welfare and Employment Center, funded by MOF, conducted checks of the passport management plans and implementation remained ongoing as most deep-sea fishing vessels were operating overseas. In March 2024, MOF imposed a fine on a captain or other fisher for passport retention. The government maintained an MOU with the government of Indonesia on protections for migrant seafarers.

While MOF issued rules in January 2021 to better regulate the recruitment system, prevent excessive working hours, set a minimum salary, prohibit passport confiscation, and ensure the provision of clean drinking water for migrant seafarers, NGOs reported authorities did not adequately implement these rules and called for stricter punishment of violators. NGOs reported some migrant fishermen continued to work long hours, sometimes more than 18 hours per day. The Seafarers Act required all migrant fishermen receive 280 hours of rest a month; a seafarer and vessel captain could reach an oral agreement on how to allocate those hours over the course of a month. While regulations prohibited ship owners from retaining identification documents, including passports, these regulations did not apply to ship masters and other seafarers. NGOs continued to report many migrant fishermen still did not maintain control of their identity documents and that fines for violating this measure were inadequate to deter confiscation of seafarer documents.

The government did not adequately regulate the recruitment process for migrant fishermen, and instead a cooperative of private agencies regulated the process and charged a standard recruitment fee of approximately $5,500 to workers, and many paid more than that. The government also did not prohibit exploitative wage deductions or prohibit worker-charged recruitment fees, which enabled traffickers to use debt-based coercion to exploit migrant fishermen, as well as workers in other industries. In March 2024, MOF required distant water fishing companies and Korean recruitment agencies to terminate business with an uncertified Indonesian recruitment agency. The government engaged foreign counterparts on recruitment fees charged by recruitment agents to foreign nationals in South Korea. MOEL reported it required recruiting agencies to publicly list the costs they charged to foreign workers on their webpages. The government funded an NGO-operated dedicated trafficking hotline; the government reported 37 calls resulted in seven referrals to protection services and 30 instances of providing information. The hotline operated for seven hours each weekday, provided counseling and relevant information to potential victims of human trafficking, and referred victims to law enforcement authorities. MOF operated two call centers to provide counseling for migrant seafarers, with interpretation services in Indonesian, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Burmese languages. The government operated a dedicated reporting email for self-reporting abuse, established in the previous reporting period. The government reported distant water fishing vessels were equipped with wireless internet access, which could enable workers to report exploitation while at sea; nonetheless, NGOs reported many fishermen were unable to access their phones while on vessels. In February 2024, MOF established an online platform to provide anonymous reporting for seafarers. The government made efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts, including through public broadcasting programs, advertisement campaigns on social media, and the use of an automated calling system to disrupt communication of buyers of commercial sex acts. In addition, the government mandated one hour of education per year on sex trafficking prevention for all public sector workers.

As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in South Korea, and traffickers exploit victims from South Korea abroad. Traffickers exploit South Korean women and children – including children who run away from home and victims of domestic violence – in commercial sex, including in bars, nightclubs, and other entertainment establishments, or through internet-advertised escort services. Traffickers increasingly utilize online platforms to recruit and coerce victims to engage in commercial sex acts and to facilitate trafficking by communicating with purchasers of commercial sex. Chat room operators recruit South Korean women and children, including child sex trafficking victims, and threaten them with the release of compromising photographs to coerce them to participate in the production of pornographic materials. Travel restrictions and quarantine requirements related to the COVID-19 pandemic prevented traffickers from recruiting some foreign trafficking victims, leaving women in the ROK more at risk of exploitation in prior reporting periods. Some brokers force South Korean women who worked in clubs prior to the pandemic into commercial sex. Individuals with disabilities, unhoused individuals, undocumented migrants, and individuals arrested for involvement in commercial sex have an increased vulnerability to trafficking. Traffickers have forced some physically or intellectually disabled South Korean men to work on fishing vessels and fish, salt, and cattle farms.

Traffickers exploit men and women, primarily from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Thailand, Russia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Morocco, and other countries in Asia, the Middle East, and South America, in forced labor and sex trafficking in South Korea. Traffickers force victims who owe debts to entertainment establishment owners or loan sharks into commercial sex. Sex traffickers exploit some foreign women on E6-2 entertainment visas – many from the Philippines and Thailand – in bars and clubs, including “foreigners only” bars near ports and U.S. military bases. Job brokers, unscrupulous recruitment agencies, and managers or owners of bars and clubs recruit foreign women under false promises of jobs as singers or performers but instead coerce victims to engage in commercial sex acts. Recruiters and owners of massage parlors fraudulently recruit women for work as professional masseuses in the ROK but force them to engage in commercial sex acts, sometimes through passport confiscation, physical violence, and threats of deportation or violence. Some victims are not provided an adequate number of days off, face harassment, verbal and physical abuse, and are paid less than the minimum wage or have their wages withheld to discourage them from leaving the ROK or seeking new employment. Some bar managers reportedly confiscate victims’ passports or alien registration cards and restrict their ability to go outside their workplace. Women from the Philippines and other countries in Asia enter Korea on tourist visas after receiving false promises of short-term work in factories or other industries but then have their passports confiscated by traffickers who force them to work in clubs and engage in commercial sex acts. Local governments provide financial assistance to South Korean men living in rural areas to pursue marriages to foreign women; some women from the PRC, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and Cambodia, who are recruited for marriages to South Korean men through international marriage brokers, are vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor after their arrival. North Korean escapees living in the ROK often face economic hardship that increases their risks to trafficking and traffickers exploit North Korean women in sex trafficking. The KNPA, MOJ, and MOF previously acknowledged instances of deportation of foreign trafficking victims, including some who self-reported, and attributed it to a breakdown in communication between investigators and immigration authorities.

Unscrupulous labor recruiters contribute to the forced labor of migrant workers, especially those from Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Mongolia through debt-based coercion by charging workers excessive fees, sometimes leading to thousands of dollars in debt. In February 2024, the Government of the Philippines temporarily issued a ban on sending Filipino workers to South Korea due to reports of unsafe working conditions and complaints of abuse among Filipino seasonal workers. Traffickers exploit temporary migrants, including individuals in the SWP, in conditions indicative of forced labor in the agriculture, manufacturing, and fishing sectors. Approximately 200,000 migrant workers employed under the EPS work in fishing, agriculture, livestock, restaurants, and manufacturing. Undocumented workers are also employed in these sectors, although there are no official statistics on their numbers. Migrant workers in the agriculture sector are sometimes forced to live in inadequate housing, sometimes in greenhouses, shipping containers, or dormitories.

The ROK is a transit point for Southeast Asian fishermen exploited in forced labor on fishing ships bound for Fiji and other ports in the Pacific. There are ongoing reports of abuse, including forced labor, of migrant workers in the South Korean fishing fleet, one of the world’s largest distant water fishing fleets. Recruiters, boat owners, captains, and job brokers often use debt-based coercion to exploit migrant fisherman in forced labor on South Korean-flagged or owned vessels. Reports estimate nearly 4,000 migrant workers, mainly from Indonesia, are employed on these vessels. South Korean distant water fishing vessels frequently use at-sea trans-shipment of catches and can often stay at sea for a year or longer without visiting a port, limiting the ability of workers to report exploitation to authorities or to safely leave their exploitation. Recruitment agencies and job brokers often charge fishermen excessive recruitment fees, sometimes as much as $15,000, increasing their vulnerability to debt-based coercion. Employers often hold the first three months of wages of migrant fishermen on distant water vessels to serve as a “deposit” that they are unable to receive back until the completion of their contract. Such workers can be forced to work excessive hours, up to 18 hours per day, with limited rest hours or days off, abused physically and verbally by boat captains, subjected to salary deductions, provided inadequate food and water, or forced to live and work in unsanitary conditions. NGOs reported recruitment agencies, captains, and skippers retain coastal and distant water fishermen’s passports to prevent them from leaving their employment. The use of oral agreements to determine rest days, instead of formal labor contracts, increases fishermen’s vulnerability to trafficking. Anecdotal reports indicated local police were occasionally complicit in trafficking and related crimes. Local police sometimes accepted bribes from establishments facilitating commercial sex acts, which may have facilitated sex trafficking. Traffickers reportedly utilize partnerships with some law enforcement authorities to threaten victims with penalization and deportation. In prior reporting periods, NGOs reported some local police sexually exploited children and solicited individuals in commercial sex, some of whom may have been sex trafficking victims. A small number of Korean national men may facilitate and engage in commercial sex and extraterritorial commercial child sexual exploitation and abuse abroad, including in the Philippines. Traffickers exploit South Korean women overseas, including in the United States and Australia, in sex trafficking in massage parlors, salons, bars, and restaurants, or through internet-advertised escort services, often through debt-based coercion. Reports indicate more than a dozen Australian education providers knowingly help South Korean women enter Australia on false student visas to work in the commercial sex industry, increasing their vulnerability to sex trafficking.